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THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY
IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
PART I. CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF PERSONALITY.
A. INTRO-
DUCTION:
1 . Some rea-
sons for classi-
fication.
2. Some poa -
ble principles
of classifica-
tion ;
a. Metaphys-
ical systems.
b. Method of
approach.
A logical classification of typical views is an appropriate
and valuable introduction to a metaphysical study of personality
because it brings to light questions of principle, and saves one,
by its comprehensiveness, from the prevalent fault of settling in
a too limited or abstract theory. The process also reveals funda-
mental problems, and, by suggesting valid elements in many concep-
tions, prepares the way for as complete an exhibition of the nature
of personality as present insight permits. Further, a classifica-
tion of personality-theories tends to disclose their important
dependence upon certain methodological principles and assumptions
which are in great need of explication.
Numerous principles for such a logical division may be and
have been proposed. The most common method of ordering theories of
personality is to do so according to the general character of the
metaphysical systems of which they are components. J. H. Witte
carries out this procedure in a thorough-goii% manner by putting
all types of historical views of the soul under the following
headings: materialism, skepticism, positivism, Kantian criticism,
idealism, and realism. (1) J. Royce suggests the use of such a
principle, (2) and H. Lotze thinks that there are three possible
views of the soul: the spiritualistic, the materialistic, and a
kind of Spinozistic union of the two. (5) G. Kafka uses, very im-
perfectly, a somewhat similar scheme in studying current conceptions
of the self, (4) and also,C. Jeanmaire. (5) The chief objection to
this principle of division is that it is too broad, and leads one
too far away from the main question.
The same objection holds against attempts to classify views
of personality according to the methods of approach adopted; for
example, according to scientific observation, mystical intuition,
rational inference, practical living, etc. An additional defect in
the latter procedure is the obvious overlapping which v/ould result
so far as the nature of personality itself is concerned. Let us
search for a principle that ia more immediate in its application.
(1) Das Wesen der Seele.
(2) The World and the Individual, vol. II, page 282.
(5) Medicinische Psychologic, section Aj. Compare also,
B. P. Bo .me, Metaphysics, pages ^00, and 53 1
(4) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschau-
ungen Uber das Ichproblem, Archiv ftlr die gesamte Psychologie,
bd. XIX, 1910.
(5) L'idee de la peraonnalite dans la psychologie moderne.

2c. Conscious-
ness and exper-
ience.
5. Inherent
limitations of
a detailed
classification.
A very suggestive principle, that of the relation of the self
to consciousness, is used quite successfully by A. Drews in his
criticism of about a dozen typical theories. (1) According to him
the ego may in general be regarded as either a form of consciousness
the content of consciousness, or something conscious. In considera
tion of the widespread presumption that consciousness is ambiguous,
and in view of Drews' doubtful hypothesis of an unconscious ego, we
may improve perhaps upon this valuable classification by making
human experience the center of reference, and by determining the
main subdivisions according to the Kantian distinction between the
immanent and the transcendent. Then the most important groups of
immanent theories may be subdivided by reference to the distinction
in experience between subject and object. The justification of this
scheme will appear in the fruitfulness of its development, and if
it should be successful, there would be an appropriate place for
any well-defined theory.
Several qualifications of this plan of classification need
to be noted. It is concerned with general principles, and involves
a minimum of assumptions; and its usefulness is widened because it
lacks detailed definitions. The following brief elaboration of it
in topical form is not intended to indicate any order or judgment
of worth among the theories included, nor to exhibit all of their
possible or historical permutations and combinations. Great Ameri-
can thinkers certainly cannot be found to represent all of the
types recognized. The idea of experience will be considered only
from the human or finite point of view.
A special limitation of a detailed classification is that
historical justice can be done to few theories, for it happens as
a rule that only certain restricted aspects or selected expositions
of actual complex theories may be considered if they are to be
fitted into the pigeonholes of a logical scheme which rests upon
distinctions of which the thinkers concerned were not perhaps
themselves cognizant. In proportion as one takes account of the
concrete and historical details in comparing theories of the self,
one must simplify his plan of classification, until in the end
the point of making the classification has largely disappeared.
Another kind of difficulty is met in attempting to classify views
of the self which have not been systematically or critically
worked out, such as that found in new realism. If, however, one
subordinates his interest in historical completeness and recognizes
clearly the historically inadequate representation of many of the
theories included in a specific classification, he is justified in
undertaking the latter for the sake of the logical values mentioned
in the first paragraph above.
( 1 ) Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik.

5B. THE PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION.
1 . Transcendent theories—personality regarded as something tran-
scending experience :
a. Materialistic theories—the soul a physical thing or function
(materialism, naturalism, impersonal monism).
1
1
.
Corporeal theories—the soul regarded as a kind of body:
a 1
.
Somatic theories ("lower" materialism), where the soul
is considered to be purely material or corporeal.
It was L. Feuerbach, for example, who said that,
"man is what he eats"; (1) and who taught that the
spirit or ego is as much an object of the senses as
the flesh is. (2) While T. Hobbes asserts in some
of his writings, that the spirit is so refined that
it escapes observation of the senses, yet it is
physical body; an incorporeal spirit does not
exist. (5)
The contemporary thinker, R. Willy, a friend and
disciple of R. Avenarius, affirms, "This is what we
understand by a human individual: a composition out
of components of our own body and those dependent
things which belong with it, a composition which con-
stitutes itself a whole and a relative unity, just as
any body in the environment composed of many parts*"
(4) H. Krflll similarly asserts that, "Everything
which we call soul is traced back to reflex processes
in the nerve paths j" (5)
b'. "Psychoplasmic" theories ("higher" materialism), where
the material substratum is regarded as intrinsically
sensitive, or where one of its attributes is "psychic",
E. Haeckel is a well-known representative of this
theory; he maintains that, 'We have given to that
part of the protoplasm which seems to be the indis-
pensable substratum of psychic life the name of
psychoplasm (the 'soul-substance,' in the monistic
sense); in other words, we do not attribute any
peculiar 'essence' to it, but we consider the psyche
to be merely a collective idea of all the psychic
functions of protoplasm . In this sense the 'soul'
is merely a physiological abstraction like 'assimila-
tion' or 'generation'." (6)
(1) W. Windelbsnd, A History of Philosophy, page 641.
(2) Grundsfeftze der Philosophic der Zukunft, page 1849, sections
40, 42; summarized by F. A. Lange, History of Materialism, vol. II,
pages 246-^6.
(5) F. Thilly, History of Philosophy, pages 267-8.
(4) Das erkenntnisstheoretische Ich und der riatUrliche Weltbe-
griff, Viertel jahrschrift fur wisaenschaftliche Philosophic, 1894,
page 9.
(5) Der Aufbau der menschlichen Ceele, page }40; see also,
pages 286, J89.
(6) The Riddle of the Universe, page 109.

42'. Energetic theories—the soul a form of energy: W. Ostwald,
for example, maintains that mental or spiritual energy
is born of, or is a transformation of, chemical energy
in the brain under determinate conditions, and that the
energy of consciousness is the loftiest and rarest form
of energy known to us. (1) This conception has striking
similarities to numerous pre-critical views in ancient
philosophy. D. von Holbach, too, believed that the
activities of the soul are brain movements, and as such
are only a special case of bodily motions. (2)
5'. Coordinatory theories
—
personality a physical coordination:
For example, H. S. Jennings says, "When the set of phe-
nomena we call matter reaches a certain complexity, it
gives rise to this particular manifestation that we
call personality." (?)
4'. Functional theories—where the soul is regarded as a
function, product, accident, or result of living matter
or bodily changes. F. J. V. Broussais held this view.
(4) Some of the most radical of the older materialists
viewed the soul as a secretion of the brain, just as
gall is a secretion of the liver. Thinkers of this
type usually consider that the brain is the particular
part of the body which produces the soul.
b. Vitalistic, animistic, mystical theories—the soul regarded
as an organizing principle of life. According to this
group of theories, the soul is distinct from the body,
perhaps even separable from it, but in any case it inter-
acts with the body. Among the modern biological vitalists
belong especially H Driesch; also, H. Bergson, J. A.
Thomson, and J. S. Haldane. (5) Wm. McDougall is a noted
representative of animism from the psychological side. (6)
K. DuPrel is an excellentejLmple of one who holds a mystical
view of the soul, where the latter is primarily a principle
of life beyond consciousness. (7)
Since, in views of this type, the soul regularly has
a conscious aspect in addition to its organic agency which
works beyond the limits of the individual's consciousness,
they belong strictly in the third class of theories, in
which the soul is regarded as being at once immanent and
(1) Vorlesungen ttber Naturphilosophie, pages 594 and 598.
See also, Individuality and Immortality, page 7; and articles in
Annalen der Naturphilosophie.
(2) F. A. Lange, History of Materialism, vol. II, pages
99-100. See the whole of chapter III, section 4, of this work,
where the author summarizes the work of Holbach entitled,
Systeme de la Nature, etc., 1770.
(5) Life and Matter, page 18.
(4) W. Windeluand, A History of Philosophy, page 6^4.
(5) See these names in bibliography at end.
(6) Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism.
(7) Die Philosophie der Mystik.

5transcendent. (1) But 30 far as exponents of these vi tal-
is tic conceptions consider consciousness to be a narrow or
superficial reflection of a much vaster and richer life be-
yond consciousness, this point of emphasis warrants us in
placing their theories, with the qualifications noted, in
the transcendent class. DuPrel, for example, speaks of
"the objective mode—the organic personality," and finds
the ultimate reality or being of the soul in an inscrutable,
trans-conscious, organic subject, termed sometimes "the
Unconscious," which is "simultaneous" rather than "con-
tinuous" with the conscious subject. (2)
c. Realistic theories:
I
1
. Older realistic theories, in which the soul is regarded
as a substantial substratum, supers ensuous^or uncon-
scious real, a thing-in-itself , the unknowable, etc.
The theory of A. Drews, an admirer of Schopenhauer and
an enthusiastic disciple of E. von Hartmann, is a strik-
ing recent example of an attempt to explain personality
in terms of an unconscious, real being. He asserts
that, "the predicate of reality belongs to the latter
because it alone is a genuinely independent and original
being with reference to which conscious being is depend-
ent and conditioned, both in its content and in its
form." (5) He summarizes his view as follows: "The
soul is the living system of unconscious will-acts of
the absolute substance whose external appearance fashions
our body and whose inner appearance fashions the totality
of our conscious psychic functions." (4)
2'. Neo-realistic theories, where the mind or the self is
regarded as a certain grouping of neutral elements,
i.e., elements which are neither physical nor mental.
The view of R. B. Perry (5) may be treated as an example
of this type if one considers that the emphatic feature
of his theory is that the entities which compose the
relational complex called consciousness exist ir.aeper.a-
ently of consciousness. (6) Since, however, mind or
consciousness, when they are actual, lie in the "open
field of experience," the view in question belongs with
greater appropriateness among the immanent theories of
the objective type. (7)
(1) See below, pages 8-11.
(2) The Philosophy of Mysticism, translated by C. C. Maasey;
see prefaces by DuPrel and by Maasey, especially pages ix-xi
.
and
xxiv-xxvi
.
(5) Zur Prage nach dem Wesen des Ich, Archiv fUr systematiache
Philosophic, vol. VIII, pag^ 199
.
(4) Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik, page }01
.
(5) This view is described fully below, pages 67-122.
(6) See below, page 102.
(7) See below, pages 97-8.

62. Immanent theories—personality regarded aa immanent in experience ;
d. Object! vistic or phenomenalistic theories, where the self is
viewed as an object of experience, i.. e. , an empirical ego,
in the usual sense. Here belong all theories in which the
attempt is made to explain the self in terms of psychic
phenomena alone, (empirical psychology become philosophic,
empiricism, positivism, and some forms of new realism).
These .objecti viatic endeavors lead to exceedingly unstable
results, and it is very difficult to find pure examples
of these theories; the subject of experience ia always
lurking in the background. The subdivisions of this class
correspond, respectively, to the traditional tripartite
divisions of the mind.
1
' .
Facultative theories—attempts to reduce personality to
a single group of mental processes, or to ground the
self in some "primary" faculty of the mind:
a'. Intel lectualis tic or rationalistic theories, where the
self is regarded as a mere idea, concept, or memory.
Richet'a view is essentially intellectualistic, for
he maintains that, "the consciousness of personality
is a phenomenon of memory. It is the conscious
memory of ourselves, of that which we are, of our
age, our nationality, of the place where we live,
the feelings which we are accustomed to have, our
social, physical, and psychic situation. It is a
memory phenomenon." (1) He says further, "If the
memory with reference to our personality ceases,
the consciousness of our person vanishes.
. .
There
are ideas in us which play an overruling part. They
are the ideas with reference to our ego." (2) Any
strictly nominalistic theory of the self which might
be found would belong in this class. P. Lapie
asserts that the will is a mode of the understanding.
(5)
b 1
.
Emotional is tic or hedonistic theories
—
personality
regarded as essentially emotion or feelings. E. M.
Weyer, for example, emphasizes the doctrine that
"the feelings constitute the warp and woof of per-
sonality,
. . .
and are alone qualified to span the
chasm to another sphere, to maintain the thread of
peraonaJ^-dentity
. . . Our personality can thus per-
sist without the artificial aid of memory, which is
the frailest of our faculties.
. . In the realm of
(1) Revue Philosophique, vol. XV, pages 227, 2^2.
(2) L'homme et 1 'intelligence, page 2^7, quoted by K. Oester-
reich, Die Phffnomenologie dea Ich in ihren Grundproblemen, pages
(5) Logique de la volonto.

7feeling each personality is a law to himself." (1)
c
1
. Voluntaristic theories
—
personality as primarily will.
d'. Various combinations of the last three subdivisions.
2'. Collectional theories
—
personality as the totality of
the mental processes of an individual, that is, a
collection or succession of conscious states. David
Hume is the father of this large family of theories.
On the whole, the view of Wm. James belongs in this
class. Some of the new realists may be included here.
Thi3 is the most appropriate place, on tiie whole, to
put the view of R. B. Perry. (2) When B. Russell
speaks of the self as "the whole assemblage of things
that would necessarily cease to exist if our lives
came to an end," (5) he is describing a view which
stands close to this type of conception.
A striking example of this kind of theory is to be
found in the thought of A. Spir, who asserts that,
"To our ego, to our own being, therefore, we can reckon
only those contents of perception which we can and must
know a6 our own. If we investigate this content, it
will be found that it consists of feelings (pain and
pleasure), thoughts, wishes, memories, hopes, and
similar mental phenomena. Our ego or self, is, there-
fore, in truth, a complex of these phenomena." Again,
he says, "The unity of our ego is much more inner and
real than the unity of an organic body, but neverthe-
less we are composite." (4)
e. Subjecti vistic theories
—
personality considered as subject of
experience
;
1*. Transcendental theories—self as logical or pure ego or
mere knowerj for example, the mere subject of the "I
think" which Kant develops in his Critique of Pure
Reason
. (5) In general the theories of the self pre-
sented in neo-kantian and neo-hegelian philosophies
illustrate this type of theory. An example of this
primarily epistemological conception of the self is
found in G. Kafka's "attempt to present a critical
representation of the more recent views of the problem
of the ego." He describes the latter as the subject <fff
(1) International Journal of Ethics, vol. XVII, page 2^9, etc.
(2) See below, pages 100-101.
(5) Our Kno. /ledge of the External World as a Field for
Scientific Method in Philosophy.
(4) Gesam. Werke, Band I, Buch II, 1. Kap., pages 4^2, 450.
(5) See W. Schmidt, Der Begriff der Persffnlichkeit bei Kant,
chapter III, pages 25-48, for an excellent summary of Kant's
conception of personality as set forth in the Critique of Pure
Reason.

8consciousness and in no sense an object of conscious-
ness. It is not "found" or "experienced," but must be
assumed to exist; it is perfectly empty, and has no
predicates, (l)
2'. Activistic theories
—
personality as active subject,
moral agent, subject of rights and duties, etc. Here
belongs Kant's view of moral personality which may be
defined as the autonomous moral being or the subject
of the moral law. §) Berkeley
1 8 view of the spirit as
unitary and active being which cannot be perceived
probably is properly included in this class.
f
.
Subjectivistic-objectivistic theories—personality regarded
as subject of experience, but as something which may, in
certain ways, make ite experiences objects of knowledge:
in general, the theories of the self found in personalis tic
philosophies illustrate this class:
1', Personality viewed as a mental complex or whole organized
around the immediate experience of the self as subject.
Miss M. 1. Calkins' conception of the self represents
this type, for while she stoutly maintains that the
self is a unique subject of consciousness, it is also a
"relatively persistent, yet changing, complex, related
being." (2)
2*. Personality regarded as developing, active agent which
knows itself through its activities. B. P. Bowne (5)
and James Ward (4), for example, hold that, the self is
a feeling and acting being or Bubject which can know
itself indirectly through the results of its activities.
g. Absolutistic theories: for example, that of J. G. Fichte;
these are omitted from consideration for the reason that
this classification is concerned only with types of human
personality.
J. Lamanent- transcendent theories—personality regarded as something
both immanent in and transcending human experience
.
The subdivision and delimitation of the theories of this
third main group are most difficult to carry out because of
the variety of the factors and points of view involved. It is
probable that most conceptions of personality belong in this
third class, 3ince nearly all of them are both immanent and
transcendent in some sense, except, notably, those found in
the "immanent philosophy" of W. Schuppe and J. Rehmke and others.
( 1 ) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschau-
ungen Uber das Ichproblem, Archiv fttr die gesamte Psychologic,
vol. XIX (1910), pages 1-241; see especially pages, 192-6, 225, 2}}
.
2) The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4th ed., pages 407-8.
5) See the whole account of Bov/ne below, pages 122-152.
(4) Psychological Principles.
(5) See W. Schmidt, Der Begriff der PeraMnlichkeit bei Kant,
chapters 4 and 5» Pag©s 49-G2, where this view is well summarized.

9Two qualificat.ons need to be attached to this assertion.
First, it does not require necessarily that the immanent and
transcendent factors be made equally important in the conception
of personality. It seems to be true, on the whole, that the
immanent factor is predominant in the most adequate theories,
and that the transcendent views tend, under criticism, to fall
primarily within the circle of the immanent ones.
Secondly, the affirmation in question depends upon reading
a broad meaning into transcendent . The theories of those who
recognize the efficacy in personal experience of influences
which are not consciously present at the time of their opera-
tion, (1) or who do not find the meaning of personality ex-
hausted in any actual, momentary experiences, (2) or who seek
to discover the significance of personality in the structures
of knowledge and institution which are the products of its
activities,—all these theories involve transcendent factors,
if this term is not restricted to what is supposed to lie
beyond all possible experience or knowledge.
Hence, the main problem in fixing the limits of this class
is to determine whether or not particular thinkers have recog-
nized a transcendent aspect of personality with some degree of
clearness. It is beyond the purpose of this classification to
elaborate the possible meanings of transcendent so as to include
surely all historical types of theory which might be placed in
the third main class, for this would, really involve writing a
history of the concept of personality. (2)
Wherever, therefore, an empirical factor is assumed or
recognized in a theory of personality which is primarily tran-
scendent, or wherever some kind of transcendent factor is as"
sumed or recognized in a theory that is primarily immanent, -
one will find a view of ti;e third, comprehensive type, namely,
the immanent- transcendent class. It is evident that many such
combinations are possible. Only some of the more striking ex-
amples will be noted.
h. Neo-realistic theories of the self. These are especially dif-
ficult to classify because they have not been definitely and
thoroughly elaborated. It has been noted that they belong
primarily in the second general group of theories. But,
since, in the case of R. B. Perry at least, consciousness,
and therefore the self, is composed of elements which in
themselves are n other-than-mind, " we have found reason for
putting the neo-realistic view in the first division too.
Logically, therefore, it must be included also in the third
combined class. In this connection the self means a cer-
tain grouping of neutral elements; these elements exist
independently of mind, for the most part; their grouping is
due^o the selective behavior of an interested organism.
( 1 ) See , e.g., the view of P. W. H. Myers, Human Personality,
and its Survival after bodily Death; also, S. Freud, The Interpre-
tation of Dreams; and, E. B. Holt, The Freudian Wish.
(2) See, e.g., A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 3d
edition, page
.
(5) See, at the end below, the special bibliography concerning
the history of the concept of personality. No adequate history of
this idea has been written. G. H. Schubert wrote two volumes on
Die Geschichte der Seele, but this work lacks Metaphysics! defini teness
.
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i. The Kantian view. According to Kant, personality has both an
immanent (transcendental and practical) and a transcendent
(noumenal) aspect. The soul for him is in part an idea or
postulate of reason, and is transcendent in the sense that
we cannot have a theoretical knowledge of its noumenal being.
However, we can know the self as phenomenal, that is, as
manifested in its synthesizing activities in the construc-
tion of the experienced object and as performing acts of
volition. Personality is immanent in experience, then, in
the sense, first, that the transcendental subject is the
condition of all experience and knowledge, and, secondly,
that it performs acts of volition or realizes ends.
j. In the mystical conception of DuPrel (1) one finds a striking
dualistic theory of the self which intimately combines im-
manent and transcendent factors. In each human individual
there is, he says, a "simultaneity of two persons in one
subject." (2) The movable "threshold of sensibility" is the
dividing line between the two phases or halves of personality.
Above this threshold is the conscious life of thought and
sensation, and below it is the "inner working of our mystical,
intelligible subject," which is a kind of organizing, vital
principle. (2) The conscious self is only an imperfect re-
flection of a more real life behind or beyond conscious phe-
nomena, which are coexistent with it. In other words, the
total life of the self at any moment has a much larger cir-
cumference than the field of consciousness.
k. The monadic theory of the self, in either of two forms, be-
longs in this third type. The dualistic monadism described
by F. H. Bradley (5) illustrates well how immanent and
transcendent theories of the self may be combined. Accord-
ing to this unusual type of monadic explanation, the self is
a kind of simple being which stands in intimate relation
with the successive changes of the conscious life without
itself undergoing change, or suffering internal variations.
The conception of the soul-monad set forth by Leibniz
belongs here, namely, the view that the activity of the
soul continues even in states of unconsciousness; in other
words, not all of the activities of the soul are sufficiently
distinct to appear in consciousness. (4)
1. In absolutistic theories it is common to explain personality
as a meaning which, though present in human experience,
finds its whole significance only in the experience of an
Absolute which transcends present human experience.
( 1 ) See above , pages k and 5-
(2) The Philosophy of Mysticism, tranblated by C. C. Massey,
s xxiv-xxv.
(5) Appearance and Reality, 2d edition, pages 66-87.
(k) See his Nouveaux Essais, preface.
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J. Royce, for example speaks of the self as "a Meaning
embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole
within the unity of the Absolute life." (1) According to
F. H. Bradley, the experience of the self, whatever finite
individuals may consider it to be, must somehow be trans-
muted before it becomes real in the experience of the
Absolute.
C. CONCLUSION.
1
.
Types of It is beyond the scope of the following inquiry to discuss
theory to be dis-representatives of all types of view listed above. It is probable
cussed in the that there are only three or four basic ones, so far as fundamental
following in- differences of principle are concerned. J. Royce thinks there are
vestigation
.
"three different kinds of conception," the empirical, the realistic,
and the idealistic. (2) This division is objectionable because cer-
tainly the meanings of the empirical and the idealistic views
overlap to a considerable extent.
The second part of this investigation will be confined to a
criticism of leading representatives of three important movements
in contemporary American philosophy: pragmatism, new realism, and
personal idealism. The study of these will disclose no doubt the
issues which are of fundamental importance in solving the problem
of personality, and will prepare for and contribute to the con-
structive goal of this investigation. The conception? of the self
found in all three belong primarily in the second or immanent class
of theories. Lack of time and space forbid the introduction, save
incidentally, of a study of representatives of naturalism and ab-
solute idealism. A type of naturalistic conception, namely the
energetic view, included above among the transcendent theories,
will be examined in connection with the introduction to the study
of mental activity. The absolutist view of F. H. Bradley will
be treated very briefly in connection with the definition of the
reality of personality. (5)
In connection with these two discussions, as well as with the
criticism of new realism, the relation of the immanent to the alleged
transcendent phases of personality will be considered. The adverse
criticism of many of the transcendent theories has been in general
so abundant and effective that one seems warranted in expecting
that they must somehow be transformed or expanded into immanent
theories if th.y are to be regarded as valid. A metaphysical system
which fails to offer an adequate treatment of the all-important pro-
blem of personality is, therefore, condemned, so that this problem
constitutes one valuable touchstone of the worth of philosophical
systems.
(1) The World and the Individual, volume II, page 268;
see also pages 269-277.
(2) Ibid., pages 2^6-7, 266-9.
(5) See below, pages
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2. This claaa - Reflection on the above classification of personality-theories
ification of gives rise to important questions not only concerning what is the
personality
- reality of personality, but also concerning what are the best
theories sug- methods of gaining knowledge of it. Indeed, corresponding to each
Rests numerous of the main types of view listed above, one or more questions of
questions as to method may be propounded. Some of these follow:
method of ap-
proach , a. Can one adequately explain or describe personality from the
physical or mechanical point of view, and if this is attempted,
what untried assumptions concerning personality are made?
b. How shall we grasp or interpret the meaning of life or soul when
they are regarded as existing apart from our human conscious-
ness?
c. Is personality merely a postulate of reason, and how do some
reach the conclusion that its reality lies in some kind of
substratum beyond our immediate experience?
d. Can personality beadequately or scientifically described as an
object of experience? Is the attempt to find personality
primarily in one type of mental process a correct approach
to the problem?
e. If personality is only the subject of experience, how can it
possess any concrete meaning, content, or individuality, and
how is it known? What is the function or significance of
intuition and self-consciousness in the search for real
personality?
f
. If personality is at once subject and object, what is the rela-
tion of the categories to personality? and how is the objective
phase of personality related to its subjective one?
g. By what method of testing or comparison is it inferred that
finite personality is a mere appearance or phenomenon? By
what method of reasoning do some reach the conclusion that
the Absolute alone possesses a true self, and others that
the Absolute is not a self at all?
h-1. How conceive the relation of that aspect of personality which
is regarded as being within experience to those aspects or
conditions which are regarded as transcending it, if they
exist?
Thes:. questions of method 3eem to be of such prime impor-
tance in a metaphysical study of personality that they should be
kept in the foreground in the critical examination of the views
of certain American thinkers which is now to follow.
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PART II.
CRITICISM OF CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONALITY
SELECTED FROM AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY.
Introduction:
purpose and
method of in-
vestigating
current
theories
.
Three theories of personality selected from current American
philosophy will now be reviewed and criticized. We shall inquire
how far each view clarifies the problems at issue and to what extent
it is one-sided or incomplete. A question of special interest will
be to ascertain whether any inadequacy present is due to the exi-
gencies of the method of procedure or metaphysical system involved.
In the third part of the thesis an attempt will be made to
further clarify the concept of personality ,and to reach, if pos-
sible, a more satisfactory idea of it. In this endeavor any posi-
tive contributions discovered in the course of the critical survey
of the second part will be appropriated. The latter will be con-
cluded with a summary of the leading movements in the theory of
personality.
The three representative thinkers to be considered are William
James, Ralph Barton Perry, and 3orden Parker Bowne. The first two
are treated in the order named because it is the order of their
historical connections. It would be reversed, however, if all
three views were presented in the order of their estimated worth
or success in dealing with the problem that is before us. In the
study of each representative, the following order of topics will
be observed: (1) statement of the theory with some reference to
it3 historical connections; (2) method used and metaphysical system
involved; (5) criticism; and (4) positive contributions.
A. THE SELF IN THE PRAGMATISM OF WILLIAM JAMES. (1)
Introduction;
The pragma-
tism of Wm.
James concerns
personality.
The first philosophical movement to be examined in its bear-
ing upon the theory of personality ia pragmatism. This includes a
characteristic doctrine of the self, although it is neither logically
necessary nor fully developed as yet. As the representative of this
movement for the purposes of this investigation, I have selected
the illustrious William James, because of the actual fruitfulness
and influence of his thought, and especially for the reason that
the nature of the human mind waa his most fundamental interest.
In the teaching of James, pragmatism has an important bearing
upon£he problem of personality. In the autobiographical confessions
of his book, A Pluralistic Universe , especially in chapter five,
his philosophy may be seen reshaping itself amid painful struggles
with absolutism and its intellectualistic logic. The firm founda-
tion upon which he persistently rests his case are the facts of
psychology and practical life. In the effort to escape the contra-
dictions and dissatisfactions resulting from the conflict between
(1) For the chief sources concerning James' view of the self,
see the general bibliography below.
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1 . The essen-
tial doctrines
of pragmatism
.
a. General
characteristics
of pragmatism.
b. The prag-
matic method
and its appli-
cation.
1
1
. General
statement of
the "pragmatic
rule."
these facts and the absolutistic dialectic, he finds himself in an
intolerable " trilemma. " One horn of this, he thinks, requires the
reinstatement of the traditional doctrine of the soul in the sense
of a spiritual substance distinct from mental processes. He re-
fuses, however, to "forswear that 'psychology without a soul' to
which my whole psychological and kantian education had committed me."
(1) His grounds for this decision are pragu-tic, but he confesses
at the same time that some future metaphysical champion may succeed
sometime, in virtue of having discovered some hitherto unrevealed
pragmatic insight, in giving the soul its "innings again in philoso-
phy." (2) James himself, however, experienced for tliirty years a
pragmatic repugnance against admitting the common-sense and scholas-
tic soul into hi3 system of thought, and yet he has a very interest-
ing pragmatic substitute for it. Let us, then, try to understand
his pragmatism in its relation to the theory of personality. The
first task is to set forth in a summary way the relevant principles
of pragmatism as expounded by James. This exposition will be fol-
lowed by a statement of his views of the self, and a criticism of
them.
Beginning with the general characteristics of the pragmatism
of James, we notice that it is primarily a doctrine of method,
which, developed in opposition to intellectualism, seeks truth in
the practical value or consequences of ideas rather than in their
logical interrelations. (5) James want3 logic "to take its right-
ful and respectable place in the world of simple human practice."
(4) The methodology of pragmatism involves a psychological doctrine
which strongly emphasizes the non-intellectual features of person-
ality, or, in other words, gives a central place to the conative
phases of consciousness. In metaphysics pragmatism tend3 to plur-
alism by reason of its insistent recognition of the independent
worth of human centers of experience. These are the outstanding
features of the pragmatic attitude. The more detailed description
of it which follows is a free and incomplete rendering.
James' last statement of his main doctrine is found in "the
pragmatic rule" of his book, Some Problems of Philosophy . The
principle of this rule 11 is that the meaning of a concept may always
be found, if not in some, sensible particular which it directly
designates, then in some particular difference in the course of
human experience which its being true will make. . . If, question-
ing whether a certain concept be true or false, you can Lhink of
absolutely nothing that would practically differ in the two cases,
you may assume that the alternative is meaningless and that your
concept is no distinct idea. . . Thia rule applies to concepts of
every order of complexity." In other words, "If you claim that
( 1 ) A Pluralistic Universe, page 208.
(2) Ibid., page 210.
(5) For summary accounts of pragmatism, see R. B. Perry,
Present Philosophical Tendencies, Part IV and Appendix; and,
E. G. Spaulding, The New Rationalism, chapter XjCX.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, page 214.
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any idea is true, assign at the same time some difference that its
being true will make in some possible person's history, and we shall
know not only just what you are really claiming, but also how
important an issue it is. and how to go to work to verify the claim.'
This ''pragmatic test" tries to reduce the meaning of a concept
"to its positive experienceable operation." (2) Ideas that are
called true must work in the sense of making factual differences
in some one's particular or concrete experience. (5) Concepts which
make no such differences are indistinct, meaningless, unimportant,
or redundant. The pragmatic method, therefore, is useful in separat'
ing what is essential from what is superficial, especially among
long-standing metaphysical disputes. (4) It is a very literal and
persistent application of the law of parsimony in thinking. "All
that the pragmatic method implies then is that truths should have
practical consequences," (5) whether in the way of thinking or of
acting. (6) In short, in the practical functioning of ideas the
pragmatist tries to find the criterion and the nature of truth. (7)
2'. The nature But in what way, according to James, can the differences which
and importance concepts make be determined? The positive answer to this question
of experiential is much more difficult than a negative one, for it takes no extra-
verification ordinary insight to assert that ideas that make no differences are
(mediate knowl- not distinct or important. The reply of James is: by constant and
edge). direct appeal to experiential verification, to experience in the
old sense of trial and testing. If one wishes to be convinced of
the truth or falsity of a conception, one should believe in it as
an hypothesis and follow the plan of action or reflection which it
indicates. In the active or sensory process of verification, sig-
nificant or insignificant differences will be found, and truth or
falsity will happen to the idea, for truth is a process of growth
rather than a product.
Verification will consist in the satisfying progress and ter-
mination of the leading suggested by the idea. The latter is veri-
fied in its successful and concrete working, in bringing us into
satisfying relations with the objects or goals to which the idea
point8.(8) If an object comes to enjoy perceptual immediacy by
reason of an idea pointing to it, we attain that satisfying harmony
(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 61 ff . Further refer-
ences concerning this rule, in chronological order^ are: Reflex Ac-
tion and Theism, in The './ill to Believe, etc., page 124; Varieties
of Religious Experience, pages 444-5; Pragmatism, chapters II and
VII j Meaning of Truth, Preface; the latter contains an excellent
summary.
(2) Meaning of Truth, page x. (J) Ibid., page xiv.
(4) Pragmatism, page 4^; Varieties of Religious Experience,
pages 44J-4.
(5) Meaning of Truth, page 52.
(6) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 60. (7) Ibid., page 62.
(6) "On a very Prevalent Abuse of Abstraction, Popular Science
Monthly, vol. UCXIV (1909), pages 490-5; other references in this
connection are» Pragmatism, pages 5&, 66, 76, 200 ffj Cleaning of
Truth, pages 10jff
.,
4}ff.
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between thought and things in which one chief kind of pragmatic
truth consists. Further, ideas arise beca.se of our practical
needs, and they are true when they regulate our conduct so as to
remove or to satisfy those needs. "I define the true as that which
gives the maximal combination of satisfactions, and say that satis-
faction ia a many-oimerxsior.al term that can be realized in various
ways ,* ( 1
)
Several important facts about this doctrine of verification
are noticeable. One is that James emphasizes the prospective or
purposive function of ideas, and finds their meaning in a concrete
course of action which terminates in the object meant. James denies
that there is an absolute standard of truth, but thinks that the
ideal of truth is gradually reached in the course of a dynamic devel-
opment of human experience. This first fact exhibits the character-
istic pragmatic subordination of intellect to action. It is notice-
able also that in this exaltation of verification James elevates to
the position of a general philosophic method one aspect of tradition-
al inductive logic. (2) This is probably the source of the affinities
of pragmatism with naturalism and positivism; another reason for its
kinship with the latter is the aversion of the pragmatist to sub-
stances as principles of explanation. James thinks that philosophy
has no method peculiar to itself, but is "characterized by conserva-
tive assertions and careful verification. 11 (5)
The point of emphasis which gives any novelty and peculiarity
to the pragmatic method that it possesses is to be found in the prac-
tical and vital character of the experiences which mark the comple-
tion of the verifying process. These experiences are primarily
volitional and emotional satisfactions connected with consistent
reasoning, the discovery of percepts, deliverance from obstacles,
achievement of ambitions, and in general with successful attempts
to fulfil our human interests. The kind of satisfaction present is
determined by the character of the interest or the purpose of the
idea concerned, for every idea is satisfactory for a certain purpose
and under specific circumstances. The difference, then, which true
ideas make should be expressed as soon as possible in particular or
concrete experience. In the thought of James the more usual meaning
of practical is particular or factual
. (4) in contrast to abstract
and universal . The significant differences among ideas are those
which are realizable in the immediacy of experience, for here we
meet reality in its most genuine form.
In view of these facts we can hardly expect to separate the
logical from the psychological factors in tne pragmatic theory of
knowing. The psychology of wiil and purpose, of interest and deeire,
of belief and activity, becomes a significant chapter in pragmatic
epistemology because the latter is primarily a study of the values
of ideas in practical life. When it is maintained tnat the true
is the satisfying, and when it is assumed that what is valuable is
(1) Essays in Radical E:npiri cisa, page 260.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 16.
(?) Ibid., page 15.
(4) The Meaning of Truth, page 40.
I
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conceptual
knowl edge
.
real, the nature of value becomes an important problem. This em-
phasis upon value is at once a contribution of pragmatism and a
peril, for it involves a subjective or individualistic tendency
which the movement has not succeeded, on the whole, in overcoming,
and which in fact has stimulated the neo-realistic reaction.
If James had been asked in his later years for a justification
of the pragmatic method and its application as these have been
described freely in the preceding paragraphs, he might have replied
that hie sufficient reason for adopting it was its success in mak-
ing ub acquainted with the essential nature of reality, for evident-
ly he regards such success as the basic criterion of a philosophic
method. (l ) His view of this problem of direct acquaintance with
reality, or "knowledge of acquaintance" as he calls it, needs to be
examined now so that we may understand his conception of our appre-
hension of personality. This immediate, perceptual, or intuitive
knowledge is very different from the mediate or conceptual kind,
where ideas of things are entertained and verified, which occupied
our attention in the previous section. (2) In that account, how-
ever, the importance of particular experiences in the process of
validation was also evident. The same fact may be expressed by
saying that any significance which mediate knowledge, or "knowledge
about," may possess is derived from or rooted in the more compre-
hensive immediate knowledge, in which we become conscious of the
"face value" of things. Theoretical knowledge "touches only the
outer surface of reality." (3)
James regarded conceptual knowledge as a borrowed function
which offers a very inadequate transcription of reality. This low
estimate follows from the merely instrumental function of ideas in
leading to valuable particular experiences. (4) He tries to prove
"the insuperability of sensation" by showing: "1. that concepts are
secondary formations, inadequate, a:.d only ministerial; and 2. that
they falsify as well as omit, and make the flux impossible to under-
stand." (5) Since concepts are static, fixed, partial, and retro-
spective, they cannot, he thinks, give us genuine knowledge of the
flowing, growing whole of present experiences from which they ab-
stract.
The details of his estimate of conceptual knowledge cannot be
set forth here. (6) A few leading passages which summarize his
view of it may be noted without the introduction of particular evi-
dence. "The sole thing that is certain in the midst of it all is
that Bergson is absolutely right in contending that the whole life
of activity and change is inwardly impenetrable to conceptual treat-
ment, and that it opens itBelf only to sympathetic apprehension at
(1) Compare, A Pluralistic Universe, page 212.
(2) On this distinction between two kinds of knowledge, see
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 221-2; The Meaning of
Truth, page 4^
.
(5) A Pluralistic Uidverse, page 249.
(4) For the present purposes, we assume that James ubos con-
cepts and ideas synonomously ; compare page 00 with page 6l in 3ome
Problems of Philosophy.
(5) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 79.
(6) For important discussions, see, A Pluralistic Uidveroe,
Lecture VI; Some Problems of Philosophy, IV-VI.
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The activity
of the real
world escapes
conceptual
formulation.
a' The re-
stricted value
of conception.
the hands of immediate feeling." (1) "Reality, life, experience,
concreteness
,
immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic,
overflows and surrounds it." (2) Conception may tell much " about . .
such realities as the ether, God, souls, or what not," but "it sheds
no ray of light into their interior." Indeed, the more complete
our definitions of them, "the less
. . .
intelligible do they appear
to us." (1)
It is the temporal or durational character of reality, its
fascinating mutations and its incessant transitions, which especially
resist interpretation in terms of "timeless" concepts. "The real
world is the world of causal and dynamic relations, of activity and
history." (5) "Y/hat really exists is not things made but things in
the making." (4) "Experience and reality come to the same thing."
(5) "By reality here I mean where things happen , all temporal real-
ity without exception." (6) But "intellectualism draws the dynamic
continuity out of nature as you draw the thread out of a string of
beads." (7)
A warped view of reality results, then, from a dogged con-
ceptualism. "Our whole intuition of activity gets branded as il-
lusory because you cannot possibly reproduce its flowing substance
by juxtaposing the discrete." (7) He gives a list of "examples of
puzzles introduced by conceptual translation: . . . activity and
causation are incomprehensible; personal identity is conceptually
impossible," etc. (8) "That inner dimension of reality is occupied
by the activities that keep it going, but the intellect, speaking
through Hume, ivant & Co., finds itself obliged to deny, and persists
in denying, that activities have any intelligible existence." (9)
Concepts possess, however, a restricted value in the economy
of human life. (10) They are useful in "orienting ourselves"; they
enable us in various ways to make more successful adaptations to the
world, (a) Their service of guidance in empirical verification and
in facilitating acquaintance with the particular bits of the percep-
tual world has been noted already, (b) In plans of action they
perform an indispensable service by enabling us to predict, to a con-
siderable extent, the course of future experience, (c) Further, a
conceptual map of experience makes it more articulate and brings its
general features into perspective or relief; conception makes possi-
ble a "synoptic treatment" (11) of phenomena, occupying time and
apace which immensely surpasses immediate experience, (d) By func-
tioning as substitutes for percepts, concepts help us to act with
reference to a very much greater environment than would be possible
(1
(2
(4
(5
7
(8
(9
(10
(11
A Pluralistic Universe, page 542.
Ibid., page 212. (5) Ibid., page 540,
Ibid.
,
page 265
•
Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 59.
A Pluralistic Universe, page 215.
Some Problems of Philosophy page 86.
Ibid., pages 85 and 87.
A Pluralistic Universe, page 2^0.
Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 75-4.
A Pluralis ic Universe, page 2^1
.
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5*. The fund-
amental import-
ance of percep-
tual or intui-
tive knowledge.
a 1
.
Superior-
ity of percepts
over concepts
in apprehending
reality.
if we had percepts alone. And finally (e) we can often greatly
economize our efforts in knowing and dominating reality by relying
upon second-hand verifications, the immediacies of others, for con-
cepts serve as mediums of exchange in commerce with reality. (1)
In view of these facta James' condemnation of conception is far
from being so absolute as it at first appears to be. They warrent
him in regarding concepts as belonging to a realm possessing
peculiar reality of its own. Concepts give us real knowledge of
its kind, however inadequate it is to the fulness of reality. James,
therefore, is not an absolute perceptualist (2), although he shows
great sympathy with a limited form of the intuitive method of Berg-
son. (5) In his last book he acknowledges his acceptance of a log-
ical realism. (4)
But since, for James, all value is determined by its relation
to the will (5), theoretical reason does not lose its subordination
to practical reason. After all "concepts signify consequences." (6)
Their worth is borrowed from and ultimately is guaranteed by the
perceptual world from which they arise and to which they lead back.
"Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are thus complementary
of each other; each remedies the other's defects." (7) "Perception
gives 'intension', conception gives 'extension' to our knowledge." (6)
The real ground for James' relative anti-intellectualism lies
in his conviction that there is a non-intellectual form of knowledge
which is^eeper and wider than intellection, and which, in pragmatic
phraseology, makes the greater difference to life as a whole. This
fundamental and royal road to reality in its native fulness ie per-
ceptual or intuitive (9) acquaintance. Tais is the more reliable
means of knowing because "percepts are primordial and concepts are
of secondary origin." (10) "if, as metaphysicians, we are more
curious about the inner nature of reality or about what really .nakes
it go, we must turn our backs upon our winged concepts altogether,
and bury ourselves in the thickness of those passing moments over
the surface of which they fly, and on particular points of which
they occasionally resVand perch." (11) "All the whats as well as
the that
8
of reality, relational as well as terminal, are in the end
contents of immediate concrete preception." (12) What is real is
determined by the pragmatic rule: "Anything is real of which we
find ourselves obliged to take account in any way." (1^) "in the
relative sense
. .
,
reality means simply relation to our emotional
and active life. In this sense whatever excites and stimulates
our interest is real." (14)
( 1 ) See The cleaning of Truth, pages 110 IT.; 1^6.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 78-9* 100;
(3; See below, pages 19-20.
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 96, 74.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page >41
.
1 6) The leaning of Truth, page 275.
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page 2^1
(8) Some Problems of Philosophy, page b2j see further, Prin-
ciples of Psychology, vol. I, pages 221-2.
(9) The Meaning of Truth, page 4}
.
(10) Some Problems of Philosopiiy, page 9o.
(11) A Pluralistic Univcrje, pages 2^1-2.
(12) Ibid., page ^42
.
(I}) Some Problems of Philosophy, pago 1u1
.
(14) Compare further, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 295,

20
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knowledge of
acquaintance
.
4'
.
Knowledge
of human per-
sonality
.
James gives us only scattered and general suggestions as to
the exact nature of this immediate perception or knowledge of ac-
quaintance" which he believes is so fundamental in the apprehension
of reality. (1) It must be fitted of course to grasp the dynamic
character of reality. (2) It must help us to put ourselves at the
point of view of the thing's interior doing . " (5) What we need is
" insight " which will "connect us with the inner life of the flux"
of things. (4) He struggles to find phrases and metaphors to de-
that sense of our own life whi ch we at every
He asserts that (6) "in its inner nature
scribe this insight,
moment posses
a
." (5)
.khe sense of reality is a sort of feeling more allied to the emo -
tions than to anything else . " It is essentially a "living or sym-
pathetic acquaintance" with things as distinguished from "knowledge
about " them. (7) "The only way in which to apprehend reality's
thickness is either to experience it directly by being a part of
reality one's self or to evoke it in imagination by sympathetically
divining some one else's inner life." (8)
The difference between those states of mind "that are mere
'acquaintance' and those that are 'knowledges-about ' is reducible
almost entirely to the absence or presence or psychic fringes or
overtones" which make us "aware of relations and objects but dimly
perceived." "Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations;
acquaintance with it is limited to the bare impression which it
makes." (9) Sometimes he speaks of this immediacy as sensation or
perception, sometimes as a feeling of life or activity, sometimes
as a concrete divination. i.10) "The concept, 'reality , which we
restore to immediate perception, is no new conceptual creation, but
only a kind of practical relation to our Will, perceptively exper-
ienced
.
" (11) The percepts, theBe termini , these sensible things,
these mere matters-of-acquaintance are the only realities we ever
directly know." (12) "Knowledge of acquaintance" does not mean
intuition, says H. M. Kallen (15), in the sense of the identification
of the self or mind with the object, but means an immediate appre-
hension of the individual object in its uniqueness, its wholeness,
its flux.
All that has been said about the method of knowing applies to
our grasping of human personality. The difficulty of conceiving
the dynamic character of reality (14) holds good of that personal
( 1 ) The most important passages are to be found in A Plural-
istic Universe, especially pages 246-64 and 558-45-
(2) On the nature of reality, see above, pages 18-19.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 262. (4) Ibid., page 246.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 297.
(6) Ibid., page 285.
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page 249
(9) Principles of Psychology, vol. I,
(10) A Pluralistic Universe, page 2^1.
Ml) Some Problems of Philosophy, page
(12) The Meaning of Truth, page 59.
(15) William James and Henri Bergcon, page 82.
( 14) See above, pages 17-18.
(8) Ibid.,
pages 258-9.
111
.
pages 250- 1
.
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d. "Radical
empiricism" and
Pluralism.
"Radical
empiricism"
flux of experience in which reality appears in its most solid form.
According to James, ( 1 ) no conceptual construction can furnish an
adequate knowledge of such an active and unique entity as human
personality is. Concepts cannot "reveal" personality to any one
who has not felt it, but having experienced it, he may be led by
them to where it is operative. (2) Any conception of personality,
therefore, which the intellect formulates will not reproduce its
reality, but will serve only the practical purposes of action and
thought.
To really grasp personality requires a supreme act of what
James calls "intuitive sympathy 1 (2) with life as it is being lived
out by us human beings in its fulness and concreteness; it calls for
acquaintance with "the active sense of living which we all enjoy."
(4) "Get at the expanding centre of a human character, the elan
vital of a man, as Bergson calls it, by living sympathy, and at a
stroke you see how it makes those who see it from without interpret
it in such diverse ways." (5)
In his psychological study of mind, as distinguished from his
metaphysical, James uses the method of 'introspective observation,"
which means "looking into our minds and reporting what we there dis-
cover." (6) We meet great difficulties, however, when we try to
introspect the "transitive" or rapidly moving portions of the stream
of consciousness. (7) "The attempt at introspective analysis in
these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its mo-
tion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the
darkness looks." (6) In his Phe Principles of Psychology James
endeavors, nevertheless, to carry the analysis of "personal self-
hood" as far as he can, as well as to state its general character-
istics. (9)
These various references exhaust, so far as I know, what James
says about the particular problem of the method of knowing human
personality.
In concluding the exposition of the pragmatic method, we
ought to notice briefly the bearing of "radical empiricism" upon
the problem of personality. Although James declares "that there
is no logical connexion between pragmatism . . and 'radical empir-
icism'" (10), there is actually in his thought a very intimate one,
and he speaks definitely in at least one place as if the pragmatic
method v/ero one of the principles included in radical empiricism.
(11)
Radical empiricism in general means, says J:mes, the method of
building wholes out of perceptual parts. (12) It takes account of
everything that is directly experienced and nothing else. (1})
1)
(2)
5)
(A)
(5
(6
(7)
(8)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(15)
See above, pages 17-18.
Compare Some Problems of Philosophy, page 62.
A Pluralistic Universe, page 26J.
Ibid., page 547; Essays in Radical Empiricism, page p0.
A Pluralistic Universe, page 262.
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 1o>.
Compare Ibid., page* 24J-4
.
Ibid., page 244. (9) Ibid., page 227
Essays in Radical Empiricism, Preface, page iv.
A Pluralistic Universe page .
Some Problems of Philosophy, page *o
.
Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 42.
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It is characterized by verifying ideas in the immediate experience
of some "experient" and by limiting genuine knowledge to what is
presented. "Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, " in
some one's particular experience. (1) "The deeper features of
reality are found only in perceptual experience." (2) He maintains
that reality is an "experience-continuum." (5) Hence, Perry affirms
that
,
"Empiricism in this sense is the characteristic of James'
philosophy as a whole." (4)
One of the oomponent doctrines of radical empiricism that is
important for our eposes is that all relations, "conjunctive as well
as disjunctive," are matters of experienced contents. (5) By this
tenet James thinks he overcomes the atomistic sensationalism of
Hume without admitting any "higher unifying agency" or lower solidi-
fying substance. This is an explicit and intentional exclusion of
the idealistic doctrine of a unifying subject of consciousness or
experience, ror James, experience itself "is self- containing and
leans on nothing." (6) In the end, consciousness itself comes, in
the philosophy of James, to lose its existence and become merely
a relation among experienced entities. "In other words: Everything
real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing ex-
perienced must somewhere be real." (7) We shall indicate below (9)
how James 1 progressive championship of "radical empiricism" carries
with it a progressive degeneration in the conception of personality.
Pluralism and Another phase of the thought of James which bears upon the
personality. question of personality i3 his pluralism. This is a logical con-
sequence of his "radical empiricism" just so far as he emphasizes
in it the particular experiences of "the individual," (6) but how
it can be reconciled with his doctrine of "pure experience" (10)
is difficult to make out. Pluralism is a logical implication of
the pragmatic theory of knowledge according to which we find the
way to reality in the particular experiences of finite individuals.
From this it follows that these individuals and their experiences
do not depend for their reality upon belonging to any larger whole,
such as that of tbe Absolute. Within certain limits they can live
out their lives in separateness; this is a relative pluralism.
Now it is clear that a systematic development of pluralism
requireo a thorough-going exposition of the nature of those individ-
uals or persons who constitute the pluralistic democracy. James
has not worked out this system in his essays dealing with pluralism.
Whether he intended that his psychological doctrine of the self
(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 160. Compare page vii
of R. B. Perry's introduction to these Essays
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, pages 100 and 97.
(5) The Meaning of Truth, page 152; A Pluralistic Universe,
Lectures V-VI
.
(4) Editor's Preface to Essays in Radical Empiricis.n, page viii
(5) The Meaning of Truth, pages xli-xiii; Easayo in Radical Em-
piricism, pages 42-52, 185, etc.; The Will to Believe, page 273;
A Pluralistic Universe, page 280.
(6) The Meaning of Truth, page 124j for a supplementary ac-
count of experience, see below, page
(7) A Pluralistic Universe, page J72.
Ct) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 41.
(9) See below, pages 50-J1 , (10) See below, pages 28- 52.
66-75.
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2. James 1 con-
ception of the
self in relation
to hie pragma-
tism.
a. The bear-
ing of pragma-
tism upon the
self.
1'. The self
of James' psy-
chology fills a
gap in his
pragmatism.
2 1
. The prag-
matic demand
with reference
to the self.
might serve as a substitute to fill in his pluralistic meta-
physics we can only surmise. We guess that he so purposed because
of his confident belief in the pragmatic sufficiency of his psycholog-
ical description of the self. (1) Now that the essential principles
of pragmatism are before us, we may turn next to James' application
of those principles to the problem of the self.
.
No single theory of personality is, on the wuole, required
apparently by the logic of pragmatism, although a certain view is
somewhat characteristic of it James uses the pragmatic rule, so
far as the self comes in question, chiefly in a negative way, namely,
to prune out of philosophy and cast aside unfruitful metaphysical
notions of it. In place of thes = he offers in his Principles of
Psychology a positive conception which, he thinks, satisfies the
tests of the pragmatic method. If his psychological self can do
all the work required of a self, he will be troubled so much the less
by metaphysical problems. His unsystematic habits make it difficult
to determine how much of his psychological doctrine should be regard-
ed as essential to supplement the meager treatment of the self in
his strictly pragmatic writings. This supplementation may be quite
consistently carried out because of the primarily empirical char-
acter of both his view of the self and his pragmatic method.
The psychological doctrine of the self well fills the gap in
his pragmatism also because there is in pragmatism a strongly poai-
tivistic trend, and a tendency to avoid metaphysical complications
whenever phenomenal explanations will pass pragmatic muster. James,
however, does not maintain that psychology necessarily furnishes a
complete solution of the problem of the self; rather he recognizes
that psychology properly leaves untouched the metaphysical question
concerning the ontological status and nature of the self. (2) He is
not averse to any search for the rational ground of mental and
physical correlations which we experience (5), provided the intel-
lectual result of the inquiry makes some important difference in life,
Hoy/, then, does the pragmatist state the problem of the self
or personality? He demands, of course, a view that will make sig-
nificant differences in practical life. (4) A satisfactory theory
must explain all relevant facts of personal experience and do so
without smuggling in any superfluous or useless postulations . The
search should always be for what is important and what is essential,
and for what can be empirically verified. "What practical difference
ought it to make if , instead of saying nai'vely that 1 1 am active
now in delivering thiu address, I say that a wider thinker is active .
or that certaizi ideas are active , or that certain nerve- cells are
active , in producing the result? This would be the pragmatic mean-
ing of the three hypotheses." (5) The fundamental question, then, is
not so much what personality is, but how it works; how does it act
or operate?
ffl See below, pages kk-6.
(2) Compare rrinciples of Psychology, vol. I, pages 182, 401
.
(5) Ibid., page 550.
(4) Compare, Some Problemsof Philosophy, page 59.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 564; see also pages 566,
566, 590.
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1
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of conscious-
ness .
a 1
. It is
changing,
b 1
.
and
sensibly
continuous
.
is
In setting forth the view of the self held by James, we shall
follow in general his own order of exposition, namely: first, sum-
marize his psychological doctrine of the self; secondly, give his
reasons for rejecting certain metaphysical theories of it; and,
thirdly, notice the place of the psychological doctrine in his
pragmatism.
James' conception of the self may well be approached by way
of its foundation in his theory of consciousness, which fits the
flowing character of reality. He describes consciousness as a
"stream of thought," where thought means "every form of conscious-
ness indiscriminately." (1) He thinks that "the only true manner
of regarding the mind's changes" is a "concrete and total manner."
(2) The outstanding characters of consciousness are as follows: (5)
In the first place, consciousness is not static, but is "always
changing." (4) He emphasizes in most varied ways that it is in con-
stant flux. This is "the fundamental fact about our experience."
(5) "No state once gone can recur and be identical with what it
was before," (6) although its object may do so. (7) Our mental
states never recur because the passing of every one leaves us more
or less different. "Experience is remoulding us every moment, and
our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of
our experience of the whole world up to that date." (8) "Personal
histories are processes of change in time, and the c hange itself
is one of the things immediately experienced . 'Change 1 in this
case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition." (9)
Felt continuity is the second mark of consciousness. (10) It
is "sensibly continuous" in spite of the variety and complexity of
its contents. One's experiences pass into others that are oncoming
in a way which he describes as a " co -conscious transition" within
each of our personal histories; and the objects, interests, and
purposes " are continuous or may be continuous . " (11) "Continuity
here is a definite sort of experience." It stands in strong con-
trast to the discontinuity felt in passing from my experience to
my conception of another's experience (12), "whereas in passing
from one of my own moments to another the semeness of object and
interest is unoroken, and both the earlier and the later exper-
ience are of things directly lived." (1J) "Life is in the
transitions as much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it
seems to be there more emphatically, as if our spurts and sallies
forward were the real firing-line of the battle. . . In this line
we live prospectively as well as retrospectively." (14)
(1
(2
(5
(4
(5
(6
(9
10
(11
(12
(14
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pa^ee 224, 259.
Ibid., page 2}? (of Philosophy , p. 49-5^
.
See ibid., page 225, f° r summary; also, Gome Problems
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 229-57.
The Meaning of Truth, page 89.
Princ. of Psych., I, 2J0, 255. (7) Ibid., 2;1. (8) Ibid., 2^4.
Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 48.
Princ. of Psych. I, 257-71; A Plur. Universe, Lecture VII.
Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 47-8.
Ibid., page 49. (15) Ibid., page 49.
Ibid., page 87.
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c' Conscious-
ness is also
cogni tive,
d'. And
selective or
interested.
e'. Conscious-
ness is person-
al.
These two characteristics of consciousness disprove two chief
aspects of traditional associationalisui, namely , that (a) conscious-
ness is a sucession of atomistic units (b) which retain a permanent
or self-identical nature. (1)
Next, consciousness "always appears to deal with objects in-
dependent of itself." (2) The sense of self, however, is something
in addition to the awareness of objects, altho the former may be
lost in objective contemplation. James thinks it is "a perfectly
wanton assumption" that "the reflective consciousness of the self
is essential to the cognitive function of thought. . . I may have
either acquaintance-with, or knowl edge-about, an object without
thinking about myself at all.
. If, in addition to thinking 0, I
also think that I exist and tnat I know 0, well and good; I then
know one more thing, a fact about 0, of which I previously was
unmindful." (5;
In the fourth place, consciousness "is interested in some parts
of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects"
chooses from among them, in a word—all the while." (4) This" choosing"
is present in all of our mental operations, notably in "selective
attention and deliberation" and conduct, but also in sensation, per-
ception, and reasoning, x.ot only do we emphasize things, and unite
some, and keep others apart," but "we actually ignore moat of the
things before us." (5) Things themselves are only "special groups
of qualities, which haopen practically or aesthetically to interest
us.
n (6)
"Looking back, then, over thi3 review, we see that the mind is
at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Conscious-
ness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the
selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the rein-
forcing and inhibiting agency of attention." (7) "It is by the
interest and importance that experiences have for us, by the emo-
tions they excite, and the purposes they subserve, by their affective
values, in short, that their consecution in our several conscious
streams, as 1 thoughts 1 of ours , is mainly ruled." (5)
The most important characteristic of consciousness for our
purposes, and the first one discussed by Jamee (9), is that all of
"the thoughts which psychology studies do continually tend to appear
as part3 of personal selves," (10) or "of a peraonal consciousness
.
"
(11) "The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with
are found in personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete
particular I's and you's. . . It seems as ii t.ie elementary
psychic fact were not thought or this thought or thai thought . but
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 2J0 . 236-7; jee
further below, pages 43-4.
(2) Ibid., pages 271-63. (5) Ibid., page 274.
(4) Ibid., page 225; 264-91 . (5) Ibid., page 264.
(6) Ibid., page 285. (7) IMA., page 266.
(8) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 151
.
(9) Princioles of Psychology, vol. I, 225-9.
(10) Ibid., page 227.
(11) Ibid., page 225.
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1". Conscious-
neas is personal
even after time-
gaps and divid-
ed conscious-
ness
.
2". The per-
sonal bond has
"warmth and
intimacy;
"
5" And gives
unity to con-
sciousness
.
my thought
,
every thought being owned
. ... On these terms the
personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the im-
mediate datum in psychology," (that is, if these terms are not
taken to imply any particular theory regarding the nature of the
self). "The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thougirts
exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel.' No psychology, at any rate,
can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a psy-
chology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to
rob them of their worth." (1) This is a very striking and important
passage
.
Human consciousness preserves a personal character even amid
very radical disruptions and transformations. "Even where there
is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as if it belonged
together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the
same self." (2) "This community of self is what the time-gap
cannot break in twain." (5) Even when a group of thoughts "split
off from the main consciousness, the form of it tends to personality,
(4) and these thoughts "are still organized selves with a memory,
habits, and sense of their own identity." (5) "After sleeping, my
retrospection is as perfect as it is between two successive waking
moments of my time." (6) Thus, the presence of split and alternat-
ing personalities does not destroy the personal character of the
consciousness that i3 present.
Now the various portions or consciousness are "inwardly con-
nected," and belong together as "parts of a common whole," which is
naturally named, " myself
.
I, or me." (7) The general character-
istics of this bond which unifies the personal community or individ-
uality are "warmth and intimacy and immediacy." (?) These quali-
ties "suffuse" my present states of consciousness arid my remembrance
of my past states as they do not suffuse the mere conception of
objects or of others' states of mind. In thisrespect the knowledge
which I have by "direct feeling" of my mental processes is entirely
different from the indirect knowledge which I have of my neighbor's
mental life, "if the thinking be pur thinking, it must be suffused
through all its parts with that peculiar warmth and intimacy that
make it come as ours." (8) It will be noted below (9) how this
"warmth and intimacy" is nothing "more than the feeling of the same
old body always there." (S) By warmth he says he means a certain
"group of feelings ('interest* aroused, 'attention* turned, 'eyes'
employed, etc.)" that are closely connected with some object. (10)
Now the various phases of the stream of thought "form conscious
unities" and "cohere mutually" (11) because of this common bond of
"warmth and intimacy." James accepts the account of this unity
(1
(2
(4
(6
(7
(6
(9
(10
(11
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 226.
Ibid., page 2J7. (5) Ibid., page 2^9
Ibid., page 227. (5) Ibid., page 229
Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 1J5.
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 2}8.
Ibid., page 242.
See below, page 55-
Esdays in Radical Empiricism, page 129.
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, 22^.
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Religious
Experience
.
which is given by the Reverend James Wills when the latter says,
"Our mental states have always an essential unity such that each
state of apprehension, however variously compounded, is a single
whole, of which every component is, therefore, strictly apprehended
(so far as it is apprehended) as a part. Such is the elementary
basis from which all our intellectual operations commence." (1)
James is opposed only to the "non-sensical
. . .
and unneces-
sary" notion that consciousness is a compound of distinct psychic
units. However complex the stream of consciousness may be, "our
higher fields of consciousness" are always felt as novel wholes. (2)
He affirms that, "Whatever things are thought in relation are
thought from the outset in a unity , in a single pulse of subjec-
tivity
,
a single psychosis
,
feeling , or state of mind " (3) "The ego
. . . mo so form a liai son between all the things of which we become
successively aware." (4)
In these facts is seen the justification for Miss M. W.
Calkins' classification of James as a "pluralistic personalistic .
"
(5) He clearly asserts that this unsharable personal feeling is
the most solid and the fullest measure of reality which is accessi*
ble to us. His very important statement in The Varieties of Re-
ligious Experience deserves to be quoted at length. (6) It will
summarize well his general description of consciousness:
"The inner state is our very experience itself; its reality
and that of our experience are one. A conscious field plus its
object as felt or thought of plus an attitude towards the object
plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs—such a
concrete bit of personal experience may be a small bit, but it is
a solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a mere abstract
element of experience, such as the 'object' is when taken all
alone. It is a full fact, even though it be an insignificant
fact; it is of the kind to which all realities whatsoever must
belong; the motor currents of the world run through the like of
it; it is on the line connecting real events with real events.
That unsharable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of
his individual destiny as he privately feela it rolling out on
fortune's wheel may be disparaged for its egotism, may be sneered
at as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the
measure of our concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that
should lack such a feeling, or its analogue, would be a piece of
reality only half made up.
"If this be true, it is absurd for science to say that the
egotistic ele.aents of experience should be suppressed. The axis
of reality rune solely through the egotistic places. . . Individ-
uality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the
darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the
world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly per-
ceive how events happen, and how work is actually done. . . The
'original' of the notion of causation is in our inner personal
experience, and only there can causes in the old-fashioned sense
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 241, note.
(2) See A Pluralistic Uni/erse, lecture V, especially pp. 194-5;
205-6. Note partial withdrawal of this view on page }}6.
(5) Principles of Psych, vol. o, p. 27<i. (4) Ibid., page 242.
(5) Persistent Problems of Philosophy }d edition, page 556.
(6) Pages 499-5U2 including note 1 on page 502.
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be directly observed and described."
The self is .In The Principles of Psychology (1) James also refers to the
the type of all self as the type of the real. " The fons et origo of all reality ,
reality accord- whether from the absolute or the practical point of view , is thus
ing to one pas- subjective . is ourselves . . . As_ thinkers with emotional reaction ,
sage in the we gi ve what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to what-
Principles of ever things we select and emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL. These
Psychology . are our living realities.
. .
Reality, starting from our Ego, thus
sheds itself from point to point- -first
,
upon all objects which
have an immediate sting of interest for our Ego in them, and next,
upon the objects most continuously related with these. . . We reach
thus trie important conclusion that our own reality , that sense of
our own life whi ch we at every moment possess . is the ultimate of
ultimates for our belief . 'As sure as I exist
!
1
--this is our utter-
most warrant for the being of all other things.
"As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the cogito go bail
for the reality of all that the cogito involved, so we all of us,
feeling our own present reality with absolutely coercive force,
ascribe an all but equal degree of reality, first to whatever things
we lay hold on with a sense of personal need, and second, to what-
ever farther things continuously belong with these.
"The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities
is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional
term. That is the hook from which the rest dangles, the absolute
support. . . . Whatever things have intimate and continuous connec -
tion wi th my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt. "
2' The place James does not consistently maintain the personalistic position
of conscious- implied in these striking passages quoted in the preceding para-
nesa in his graphs. In his Principles of Psychology he holds, for the most
philosophy of Part, to the idea of a duplicity between mentul content and mental
pure experience, activity as a fundamental fact. (2) According to this doctrine,
we feel our life flowing within us in distinct contrast to the
objects in which we are interested. He asserts, for example, (})
"All people unhesitatingly believe that tney feel themselves think-
ing, and that they distinguish the mental state as an inward activ-
ity or passion, from all the objects with which it may cognitively
deal . I regard this belief aa the most fundamental oi' till the pos -
tulates of Psychology
T
" Again he says, We can feel, alongside of
the thing known, the thought of it going on as a: : altogether sepa-
rate act and operation in the mind. Tuia aubjecLive life of ours"
ia ndi8tinguished as such . . clearly from the objects known by
ita meana. (4)
a'. Conacious- Only two years, however, after writing the above paragraph,
neas regarded quoted from The Varieties of Religious Expe rience . Jamua published
aa a nonentity, for the first time (5) his famous eaaay called "Doea Coneciouanoea
Exist?" in which conaciouanesa losea ita peraonal and dual charac-
ter. It "doea not denote a apecial atuff or mode of being". (6)
It become8 a nonentity, and he champions inatead a relational or
(1) Vol. II, pages 296-6.
(2) See above, page 2fi #
O) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pa^e
(4) Ibid., page 297J see aleo The Varieties of Religious
Experience, pagea 496-9.
(5) Journal of Philoeophy, etc., vol. I, 1?04, reprinted aa
the firat chapter in Essays in Radical Empiricism.
(6) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 25.
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functional theory of consciousness, and emphasizes the "neutral
and non-committal" character of what he cells "pure experience."
(1) Later, James 3ays, "The total proces.. of experience, another
name for all that is in fact . " stands in distinct contrast"with the
personal and individualized self." (2)
b 1 . The nature What James means by "pure experience" is most fully set forth
of "pure ex- in his Essays in Radical Empiricism . "'Pure experience' is the name
perience." which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the
material of our later reflection with its conceptual categories." (5)
"Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or
sensation." (4) "The instant field of the present is at all times
what I call the 'pure 1 experience. It is only virtually or potenti-
ally either object or subject as yet. For the time being it is
plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that. In this
naYf immediacy it is of course valid ; it is there . we act upon it;
and the doubling of it in retrospection into a state of mind and
a reality intended thereby, is just one of the acts. . . The im-
mediate experience in its passing is always 'truth', practical truth,
something to act on
.
at its own movement." (5) "Experience as a
whole is a process in time." (6) The totality of experience "is
a that
,
an Absolute, a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale,
undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing." (7)
1". How the If, then, experience is pure in its primordial state, how does
distinction of the distinction between subject and object arise within it? That
subject and ob- pure experience itself has any "inner duplicity" James firmly
ject arises with-denies. " Experience . I believe . has no such inner duplicity ." (8)
in pure exper- "Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely,
ience. realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i.e. talked-of, twice,
considered along with its two differing contexts respectively, by
a new retrospective experience," etc. (9) It is "the self-same
piece of pure experience taken twice over, that serves now as thought
and now as thing." (10) " Thoughts in the concrete are mude of the
same stuff as things are ." (11)
c
1
. An hypoth- " Let us try to understand the prob. ble development of James'
eeis as to the philosophy of pure experience. He confesses that for twenty years
probable devel- he has "mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity." (12) From a hint
opnent of James' in his Principles of Psychology (15) we may surmise that his thought
philosophy of developed in some such manner as follows. It is suggested in the
pure experience, pages referred to that both the self and the not-self arc objects;
that, therefore, all that one ever experiences is"objective; " and
that the subjective condition need not be consciously present at
all, and cculd be regarded as a "logical postulate" rather than
as an inner perception. If, now, he should noglect this postulate,
as he does, and direct his attention to the experienced contents,
( 1 ) See R. B. Perry's somewhat biased interpretation of
"James 1
Philosophy of KIM,* Appendix of the former's Present Philos. Tendenci
(2) A Pluralistic Universe, page 580.
(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 95-
f4). Ibid., page 9A. (5) Ibid., pages M-4.
(6) Ibid., page 62. (7) Ibid., page
(£) Ibid., page 9. (9) Ibid., page 2}
.
(10) Ibid., page 27. (H) Ibid., page 57.
(12) Ibid., page 5-
(15) Pages 504-5, volume I.
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we have reached that world of pure experience in which the duality
of subject and object supposedly has disappeared as an essential
structure or condition of experience itself. In consequence, con-
sciousness ceases to be an active entity, and comes to be merely
one kind of relation among the various neutral things, the stuff
of "pure experience," of which everything is composed. (1) This is
his position in the Essays in Radical Empiricism
, notably in the
first one, "Does 1 Consciousness 1 Exist?" Of course the relation
itself which constitutes consciousness is a part of pure exper-
ience; one of the "terms" of the latter becomes the subject or
bearer of the knowledge, the knower; the other becomes the object
known
. ( 1
)
The dialectic of the thought of James may be stated in another
way. In his Principles of Psychology he maintains that relations
are given as facts of sensibility. (2) This is the central doc-
trine of "radical empiricism." (4) In his book, A Pluralistic Uni -
verse
,
he asserts that "relations of every sort are just as integral
members of the sensational flux as terms are." ) Hence, the rela-
tion between the subject and object must become an experienced
content and take its place in "the stream of pure experience, the
stream of concretes or the sensational stream." (5) He plainly says
in the Essays in Radical Empiricism (6) and in The meaning of Truth
(7) that the ''conscious" quality is best explained by relations
which themselves are part of the experienced content. This devel-
opment of hi 6 thought is very interesting indeed.
In the later metaphysical writings of James, therefore, per-
sonal, active consciousness, as something distinct from the concrete
flux of the stream of experience, has vanished. If one adopts his
point of view and looks consciousness squarely in the face, he
finds nothing but identifiable, observable contents. When a per-
ception appears in experience, feelings and conation may appear
also, but they are not essentially different from perceived content.
Only imperfect analysis leads one to suppose that they are differ-
ent. If one should search for the thinking subject, one could only
find the sense data which come from contact with tne^ir and from
muscular movements.
"The 'I think 1 which Kant said must be able to accompany all
my objects, is the 'I breathe' .hich actually does accompany them.
There are other internal facts besides breathing (.intracephalic
muscular adjustments, etc., of which I have said a word in my
larger Psychology), and these increase the assets of 'conscious-
ness, 1 so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception;
but breath, which was ever the original of 'spirit,' breath mov-
ing outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am per-
suaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the
entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious .
while thoughts in the concrete arc fully real . But thour.hto in
(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 4 and 26.
(2) Pages 244-8, 269-71 of vol. I; A Pluralistic Univerae.p. ;>49
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 279. (4) See above, pages i.1-2
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page }49
.
(6) Page 25; compare the whole essay, pages l-JC.
(7; Page 126.
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the concrete are made of the seme stuff as things are
.
1
( 1
)
e' Positive James 1 more constructive or positive description of conscious-
description of ness may be noted now. Its meaning is to be found in a certain
consciousness relationship or grouping of the elements of pure exerience, of
as a functional which the mental world is one and the physical world is another
relation. arrangement, the relations " themselves being experiences." (2)
"One undivided portion of experience" plays the p^rt of a knower
in one context of associations, and of a thing or object in another.
(5) The same original terms, the same bit of experience, may occupy
different groups at the same or successive times, or may be at once
subjective and objective. (4)
In other words, consciousness is a complex of pure experiences
which are susceptible of various arrangements. It is a "kind of
external relation" between experiential terms. (5) The subject
and object do not represent ontological distinctions, but are merely
different functional contexts of the sameiiltimate stuff of pure ex-
perience. "'Consciousness 1 has evaporated to this estate of pure
diaphaneity." (6) "The acquisition of conscious quality on the
part of an experience depends upon a context coming to it." (7)
In another place James asserts that, "I tried to show that thoughts
and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material, and
that their opposition is only one of relation and of function. • .
The same identical piece of 'pure experience' (which was the name
I gave to the materia prima of everything) can stand alternately
for a 'fact of consciousness' or for a physical reality, according
as it is taken in one context or in another." (8) "'Outer' and
'inner' are names for two g roups into which we sort experiences
according to the way in which they act upon their neighbors. Any
one 'content' . . . can be assigned to either group. . The basis
of the two groups respectively is the different type of interrela-
tion, the mutual impenetrability, on the one hand, and the lack of
physical interference and interaction on the other." (9)
In this argument it is interesting to notice that n we sort
experiences," and that it is we who classify things in different
ways according --o "our temporary purposes," (10), or according
to our "practical or intellectual ends." (11) In another book
consciousness appears to possess a dynamic character for which the
relational theory does not provide, namely, when James puts forward
the "notion of a permanent obstruction to the transmission of
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consciousness, which obstacle may in our brains grow alternately
greater or less." (1)
In concluding this description of consciousness, we may fairly
say that James believes that he has robbed consciousness of its
power. "'Consciousness 1
.
. . has evaporated to thi3 estate of pure
diaphaneity." (2) "It is the name of a nonentity ana has no right
to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are
clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disap-
pearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy." (2) "The personal form
and activity," which in classical philosophy attached to the spirit-
ual principle of consciousness, "pass over to the content." (5) He
tries to find, "in the realities of experience," a "pragmatic
equivalent" for this principle, or some kind of substitute for it.
(A)
Where, then, is the self in this philosophy of pure experience?
The doctrine "solves the problem of tne self by saying it consists
of certain transitional experiences." (5) These flowing or transi-
tional experiences do not depend upon the ego, but are a part of the
world of pure experience; it alone i3 real. No self or personality
is required to sustain it, for "experience leans on nothing." Per-
sonality has lost it9 autonomy, and has been deprived of that unique
possession of reality which James represented it as having in
religious experience. (6)
The bearing of pragmatism upon the problem of the self and
James' theory of consciousness have now been set forth. Let us
return to his classical exposition of the nature of the self in The
Principles of Psychology . He here emphasizes the existence of the
personal element in the stream of consciousness, but many disputes
are waged, he says, with reference to its exact definition. "To
give an accurate account of it is the most difficult of philosophic
tasks." (7) Is personality or the self the whole or a part of the
stream of thought? and what i3 its fundamental nature? He points
out that, of course, we may say that "our full self is the whole
field" of present consciousness, "the concrete stream of my thought
in its entirety," (8) "with all its indefinitely radiating possi-
bilities of increase," but "what we conceptually identify ourselves
with, and say we are thinking of at any time, is the center." (9)
We are here primarily interested in the essential character of this
innermost or central self.
(1) Human Immortality, pa^e 24.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 2.
(5) Ibid., pages 2 and 6.
(4) Ibid., page J.
(5) J. A. Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, second edition,
page 456.
( 6) See above, pages 27-28.
(7) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 225.
(6) Ibid., page 519.
(9) A Pluralistic Universe, page 269.
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of possible experience,
A general preliminary survey of Janes' plan of describing the
self will furnish good guidance in the exposition that is to follow.
Every one, he says, divides the world into two parts. In one part
he takes an "altogether unique kind of interest," and calls it "me"
;
it is the empirical self. (1) All else is "not-me"—the world of
experienceable objects, in which may be included those in which I
am actually interested but which I do not call mine. The empirical
self has three constituents, the material, the social, and the spirit-
ual selves, and corresponding to each of thes^ there are many emotions
and special forms of activity. The fundamental question for us is
whether there is some empirical or trans empirical principle, such as
the "pure ego" or soul, which unifies this whole process in time, and
which has permanence amid change? James 1 ov/n view is that the prin-
ciple is an empirical fact, and he calls it "the passing thought."
All phases of the empirical self get value and unity because this
thought "cares" for them.
The several selves of James"
____
_
abstract analysis and their re-
lations may be symbolized, I
trunk, by the accompanying dia-
gram, composed of a series of
concentric circles. This series
is intended to represent a cross-
section of an individual' 8 pre-
sent 3tream of consciousness.
The circle with the solid line
represents the distinction be-
tween the "me" and the "not-me."
The inner circle with the radius,
x, marks the field of the empiri-
cal self with its several over-
lapping constituents. The size
of the spaces symbolizing these
constituents should be imagined
as varying from moment to moment
according to the character of the
7 interest and attention which are
/ present. Because of the intimate
connection between the material
and spiritual selves, (2) they
are very appropriately represented
in the diagram as adjacent. The
outer circles, with the indefin-
ite radius, y., are meant to in-
clude the indefinite number of
experienced and experienceable objects which the individual con-
cerned does not regard aa a part of himself. All part- of the dia-
gram must be thought of not only as elongated in thu third dimension,
to illustrate the temporal flow of consciousness, but alao as chain-
ing their relative positions and importance with kaleidoscopic swiftne
Objects xn which I am
N
^ interested '
itandin^ outside of my pre-
. sent consciousness
.
Diagram to illustrate
James' abstract view of
the empirical self.
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 289, 291.
(2) See below, page 55*
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The situation may be outlined as follows:
Universe of ( \. Not-me.
2*. The con-
stituents of
the empirical
self.
a
1
.
The ma-
terial self.
b 1 . The so-
cial self.
c'. The spir-
itual self;
1". The com-
mon description
of it.
2". James 1
account of it
in the ab-
stract,
experienced or
experienceable
objects
.
2. Me, or the
empirical
self.
The passing
The material self. +hr,i,rrh+ v^-ino- +hp
The social self. I thought, be g t e
c. The spiritual [principle of unity
3e^ i J and continuity.
Since our primary concern is with matters of principle, our
interest in this scheme centers in the nature of the "spiritual self"
and of the "passing thought." Besides the spiritual self, the total
empirical self includes the material self, of which the "body is the
innermost part" (1), and a"man's social self," which "is the recog-
nition which he gets from his mates." (2) The latter, especially
in the form of the ideal social self, is a very dynamic and effective
factor in determining what one shall seek as his 'true . .
,
ultimate,
and permanent Me," and also in realizing that which at first is only
potential or possible. These important facts lead James in one
place to speak of the social self as "the innermost of the empirical
selves of a man." (2)
But in addition to these two aspects of the stream of conscious-
ness, we may abstract from it another, a central or innermost portion,
with which we ordinarily identify ourselves in "an altogether pecu-
liar degree." (4) Compared with this spiritual self, other elements
of the conscious flux are transient and even may be disowned by it.
"What is this self of all the other selves?" (5) Up to a certain
point, everyone describee it in very much the same way, namely, as
"the active element in all consciousness," or as "a spiritual some-
thing" which welcomes and rejects objects, which is the "source of
effort and attention," and "the home of interest." (6) The effort,
however, to reach a more accurate definition of this element leads
to a great diversity of opinions. Theee may be lined up between
the two extremes of a simple, active substance or soul and a fic-
tion, the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun, I." (7)
James presents both an abstract and a concrete account of what
he thinks the spiritual self is. He points out that in every self
we may distinguish" between the immediate and actual, and the remote
and potential, between the narrower and the wider view. (6) Accord-
ing to the latter standpoint or the abstract method, James describes
it in terms of dispositions, which are conceptually distinguished
from other elements in the stream of consciousness, and waich are
regarded as having a longer temporal r~ach than^ the concrete feel-
ings of the present moment. He affirms that, By the Spiritual
Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's ii
or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken
concretely: not the bare principle of personal Unity, or 'pure'
Ego, whica remains still to be discussed. Theso psychic disposi-
tions are the most enduring ana intimnto prt of tho eolf , that
which .ve moat verily aeem to be." C9)
(1) The Principles of Psychology, pages 292-J; 319-2}. vol. I
2 Ibid., pages 29^-6; 506-24. (}) Ibid., pages 515-16.
(4) Ibid., page 297. (5) Ibid., page 297.
. m ic r
(6) Ibid. , page 296.
(8) Ibid., page 515-
(7) Ibid., page 296.
(9) Ibid., page 296.
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Since the spiritual self belongs to the "empirical me", it
may be concretely felt a3 a section of the stream of consciousness.
"It is something with which we also have direct sensible acquaint-
ance, and which is as fully present at any moment of consciousness
in which it is, present, as in a whole life time of such moments."
(1) The concrete question, then, is "how this central nucleus of
the self may feel?" (2) "Can we tell more precisely in what the
feel in;; of this central active self consists , -- not necessarily
as yet what the acti/s self ia, as a being or principle, but what
we feel when we become aware of its existence?" (5)
James 1 general answer to this question is that the central self
is an interplay of furtherances and hindrances in my desiring and
thinking to which I react in a spontaneous way by welcoming or oppos-
ing, appropriating or disowning. "But when I forsake such general
descriptions and grapple with particulars, coming to the closest
possible quarters with the facts, it_ is difficult for me to detect
in the activity any purely s pi fcj tual element at all . Whenever my
introspective glance succeeds in turning around quickly enough to
catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it
can evsr feel distinctly is some bodily procesa . for the moat part
taking place wi thin the head . " (41 Then he proceeds to describe
the different bodily feelings that appear in various mental pro-
cesses, such as attention, effort, memory, and reflection. (5)
His conclusion, therefore, is that "the sanctuary within the
citadel of our personal life" which is most vividly felt is con-
stituted of feelings of bodily processes or activities. (6) "The
nuclear part of the self" turns out to be a "cohered" group of phy-
siological acts of the class called "adjustments", which follow the
reflex type of action, and are distinguished from "the rest of the
mind's contents" by being constantly and incessantly repeated. (7)
"The inner nucleus of my spiritual self" is a "collection of ob-
scurely felt 'adjustments', plus perhaps that still more obscurely
perceived subjectivity as such." (6) What thia "feeling of some-
thing more" may be is left here as an open question. In a later
place (9) James says, in speaking of his work in The Principles of
Psychology , that " I sought to show that there is no direct evidence
that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual agent ae such (I
should now say the activity of 'consciousness' aa such)."
James has, ho// ever, a principle which takes the place of thia
agent. Before considering what that is, we should ..ote what are
the fundamental emotions and instincts of the eevcral empirical
selves. Each of the three arouses various feelings of self-esti-
mation which iiay be claaaed under the two general emotions of self-
complacency and aelf-satiafaction. (10) James emphatically denies
that any one is "animated by a direct fe eling of regard for his.
own pure principle of individual existence. (11) Jhe words ME
S
1)
(2)
The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 299.
Ibid., page 298. (5) Ibid., page 299.
(4) Ibid., pages 299-290. (5) Ibid., pages }00-1.
(6) Compare Esuays in Radical Empiricism, page 129.
(7) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 502.
(8) Ibid., page }19.
(9) A Pluralistic Universe, page 579, note.
(10) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 50>7.
(11) Ibid., pages 516, 52}.
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e
1
.
Rivalry
and order of
worth among
the empirical
selves.
y . "The pure
ego" and "the
passing
thought."
a' Empirical
description of
personal
identity.
then and SELF, s_o far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional
worth
,
are OBJECTIVE designations
.
meaning ALL THE THINGS which have
the power to produce in a stream of consciousness an excitement of a
certain peculiar sortT^ ( 1
)
Further, each of the three empirical selves includes a group
of fundamental instinctive impulses which have the general charac-
ter of self-3eeking, and which fulfil the function of the self-
preservation and promotion of the several selves. (2) One may find
a complete tabular summary of both emotions and impulsive tendencies
of the self on page 529 of the first volume of the Bsychology .
These desires and impulsive tendencies are not only often in-
consistent among themselves, but their realization is often greatly
restricted by physical nature. In consequence, "rivalry and con-
flict among the different selves" arises, {$) and our thougut must
choose which of many possible or ideal selves shall become reality.
(4) The question then appears as to which is the most real self,
and what is the proper order of worthful subordination of the rest?
One can attain his life's purposes either by reducing them, as
some of the Stoics proposed, or by realizing them. James gives an
indirect hint that the most real self would be the one that most
completely and actively identified itself with the meaning of the
universe and with the highest wishes of mankind. (5) Various
forces which determine the hierarchy of worth among our selves are:
moral pressure, direct ethical judgments, and the acts and opinions
of others. (6) The customary order of increasing worth is: material
social, and spiritual. James reverses this order of estimation be-
cause of the importance of the body for tne earthly existence of
the mind, and says, " Its own body then, first of all . its friends
next , and finally its spiritual dispositions . MUST be the supremely
interesting OBJECTS for each human mind . " (7)
Now does this empirical description exhaust the spiritu 1 self,
or is there something, for instance, a pure ego, different from any-
thing in these empirical selves, which is the "medium" of their
unification and which carries them through time? James believes
that each passing thought, and not a pure ego, performs these func-
tions. This concept i3 a very important one in James
1 psychology
and in hi3 doctrine of the self. It is essential to understand its
significance. The nature of this Thought, written with a capital J,
may be approached by considering one of its moat important offices,
namely, the preservation of one's personal identity.
We shall examine, therefore, hia account of personal identity.
It was noted above (5) that the unity and the "owned" character of
one's thoughts is due to their having certain marks of intimacy
and warmth" which do not characterize tne thoughts or mental pro-
cesses of others. (9) Now it is distinctly noticeable that these
1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }19.
2) Ibid., pages 507-9. (5) I***-. P
a6ee V9*
Zi *m (5) Ibid., page 515.
(7) Ibid., page 52}.
4) Ibid., page J10.
16} Ibid., page
(8) See above, pages 26-7.
If) Compare, Principles of Paycnology,
vol. I, page
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1
" The nature
of the judgment
of personal
identity.
2" Some im-
portant fea-
tures of this
account of
personal
identity.
a". It is
empirical;
marks belong to certain " things thought about " (1); they are objec-
tive qualities because the present "self comes to its acquaintance
or is actually felt with warmth and intimacy," (2) and "the char-
acter of 'warmth' ... in the present self, reduces itself to
either of two things,—something in the feeling which we have of
the thought itself, as thinking, or else the feeling of the body's
actual existence at the moment,, --or finally to both. We cannot
realize our present self without simultaneously feeling one or
other of these two things." (2)
But curiously "our remoter spiritual, material, and social
selves, so far as they are realized, come also with a glow and a
warmth." (2) Any "distant self which fulfils the conditions just
mentioned "will be thought with such warmth and intimacy. It can
do so, however
>
only because it possessed for us" these qualities
when it was alive. In consequence, we become conscious of a re-
semblance or sameness, in respect to these qualities, between our
past and present selves. And this sameness or identity can be
felt (2) or perceived just as easily as thexesemolance between
other things which I successively observe and identify. "The in-
tellectual operations seem essentially alike, whether I say 'I am
i itthe same' or whether I say 'the pen is the same, as yesterday.
(5)
It is notable that the resemblance is perceived by thought
and predicated of things thought about. The certainty of our
judgment of sameness is greatly enhanced by the felt continuity
between our present self and the less remote selves, "especi:J.ly
the felt continuity of our bodily feelings. (4) "The sense of our
own personal identity
,
then , ia exactly like any one of our other
perceptions of sameness among phenomena . It is a conclusion
grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect . or
on the continuity before the mind , of the phenomena compared. (5)
When these two forms of connection, resemblance with respect to
warmth and that continuity of bodily feelings, are no longer felt,
the sense of personal identity goes too. (6)
In this description of personal identity, two important facts
stand out. In the first place, thi3 account is a purely empirical
one. The "core of sameness running through the ingredients of the
self exists even as a phenomenal thing" (2), and ie "perfectly
verifiable" (4) and real. "There is no other identity than this in
the 'stream' of subjective consciousness . " (4) "Experientially our
personal identity consists ... in nothing more than the functional
and perceptible fact that our later states of mind continue and
remember our earlier ones." (7) "There is no other no£u£e, no other
whatness than thi3 absence of break and this sense of continuity in
that most intimate of all conjunctive relatione, the paaeing of one
experience into another when tney belong to the tame eelf . And
this whatneea is real empirical 'content.' . . . Practically to
experience one's personal continuum in thie living way ie to knoi
the originals of the ideas of continuity and of eameneoo,
own all°that they can ever mean." (6)
11 But union, by continuoue
to
"fj Princ. of Psych., I, p. 522.
5) Ibid. , page Ml
.
5) Ibid., page 5?4.
Ibid., page m.
Ibid., page }J6.
Ibid.
,
pages }}}-6.
7) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 122.
See above, page 24
8) Essays in Radical Empiricism,
page
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b". And the
judging of the
passing thought
is important.
b 1 . The pass-
ing thought.
1" General
description.
2". Its
capacities
.
transition are the only ones we know of,
. . .
whether in personal
identity, ... or elsewhere." (1)
In the second place, this capacity of the present thought to
know and to assimilate to itself a past thought is a very remarkable
function. "My present Thought stands thus in the plenitude of owner-
ship of the train of my past selves, is owner not only de facto but
de Jure, the most real owner there can be, and all without the sup-
position of any 'inexplicable tie,' but in a perfectly verifiable
and phenomenal way." (2) No other unity is implied than that which
is actually felt in this unbroken stream of personal consciousness.
Let U3 examine in a more specific way the nature of this all-
important present or passing thought. The "vehicle of the judgment
of identity" is a "pulse of thought." (5) It is "the real, present
onlooking, remembering, 'judging thought' or identifying 'section'
of the stream. This is what collects ,--' owns ' some of the past facts
which it surveys, and disowns the rest,—and so makes a unity that
is actualized and anchored and does not merely float in the blue air
of possibility. And the reality of such pulses of thought, with
their function of knowing, it will be remembered that we did not
seek to deduce or explain, but simply assumed them as the ultimate
kind of fact that the psychologist must admit to exist." (4) It is
this passing thought which in the last analysis is for James the
essential and central self.
This passing thought possesses numerous and interesting capaci-
ties, (a) One is knowing. Not only does it know present objects,
but (b) it knows much about the contents of the past stream of con-
sciousness of which it is the present section. The capacity of
these "perishing pulses of thought" to "regret and know" what went
before is their most striking power. Every new thought stands "as
the representative of the entire past stream" of consciousness. (5)
Every "nascent thought" thus performs the "trick" of "immediately
taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it together with all
of the remoter selves possessed by this expiring thought." (6) "Each
later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts *hich went
before, is the final receptacle—and appropriating them is the final
owner—of all that they contain and own." (7) Again, James says,
this "actual focus of accretion" is "tae hook from which the chain
of past selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present, which alone
passes for real, and thus keeping the chain from being a purely
ideal thing." (8) In this way "thought La perennially renewed in
time, but always cognitive thereof." (9) It follows that the full-
est self would be "the last and most complicated fruit" (10) of the
stream of consciousness, the one, namely, which inherits the rich-
est legacy of historic content.
1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 59.
2) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }60.
5) Ibid., page 557-
v.5) Ibid., page 5^0.
(7) Ibid., page 559.
(9) Ibid., page %1.
(4) Ibid., page ^8.
(6) Ibid., pages ?59<40.
(8) Ibid., pages 540-1.
(10) Ibid., page 2.
I
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5" The pres-
ent thought
as knowing
subject.
.
4"
.
Knowledge
of the passing
thought
.
5". Bodily
feeling is the
center of refer-
ence in the ap-
propriations of
the passing
thought
.
(c) In these appropriations and repudiations thought acts as
an agent, so "that thought is a vehicle of choice as well as of
cognition." (1) For James, the genuine self is identical with this
judging thought. All that is assumed in this scheme is a stream
of perishing thoughts, endowed with the above functions, among
others. (2)
According to the doctrine of James, the present but fleeting
thought fulfils all the functions of the pure ego. The latter, con-
sequently, must be regarded as a superfluous conception, as tested
by the parsimonious rule of pragmatism. The present thought acts
as the knowing subject Taking the place of the pure ego, it is
"merely the vehicle in which the estimation" and knowledge of em-
pirical objects "is carried on." (5) "But all these things are
objects, properly so called, to the subject which does the think-
ing." (4) Over and above the purely objective self and not-self
"there is_ nothing save the fact that they are known, the fact of
the stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective
condition of their being experienced at all. But this condition
of the experience is not one of the things experienced at the moment
this knowing is not immediately known . It is only known in sub-
sequent reflection." (5) The passing, judging thought, therefore,
is "only aware of its 'pure' Self
. . .
in an abstract, hypothetic
or conceptual way." (6) "The Thought never is an object in its
own hands, it never appropriates or disowns itself." (1) It is al-
ways the subject with reference to the objects expropriated. (7)
How, then, can one know anything about this knowing subject at
all? (a) Indeed, "nothing can be known about it till it be dead
and gone." (8) In this sense the present thought "is the darkest
in the whole series." (8) But when it has passed, then its suc-
cessor can know about it, and appropriate what is interesting about
it. We do possess the "mysterious" capacity "to think ourselves as
thinkers" (9) in this retrospective way.
(b) But while the judging thought does not know about itself
as an object, yet, in the present, as it lives, "it may feel its
own immediate existence," (8) and this "knowledge of acquaintance"
is of greater worth than any "knowledge-about . " "The passing Thought
then seems to be the Thinker; and though there may be another non-
phenomenal Thinker behind that, so far we do not seem to need him
to express the facts." (2)
Since, therefore, the present but fleeting thought is not an
object with reference to which it can appropriate its past 6elve8,
what is the center for its appropriations? "its appropriations
are
. . .
less to Itself than to the most intimately felt part of
its present OBJECT, the body , and the central adjustments . which
('[) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 540.
(2) Ibid., page 542; for a fuller account of the capacities
of the passing thought, ate below, pages 44-6.
(5) Ibid., page 528. (4) Ibid., page 525.
(5) Ibid., page 504.
(6) Ibid., page 504; this is a provisional formulation of
James; see pages 5°4, bottom, and 5O5 of the Psycho lo/.y .
(7) Compare with his idea of pure experience, above pp. 28-9.
(8) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. J41.
(9) Ibid. , page 296.
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A transi-
tional note.
d. Criticise
of three ob-
jectionable
theories of the
self; there are
three histori-
cal types of
self-theory
.
1
1
. The spir-
itualistic
theory: the
substantial
soul
.
a. Usual
statement of
this view.
b 1
.
Objec-
tions to the
soul -theory:
accompany the act of thinking, in the head. These are the real
nucleus of our personal identity . . . They are the kernel to which
the represented parts of the Self are assimilated, accreted, and
knit on; . . . even were Thought entirely unconscious of itself in
the act of thinking." (1) Thus, in our search for the pure ego,
we are brought bacic to the normal bodily feelings as trie important
center of the self. (2)
The exposition of James' doctrine of the self, with the excep-
tion of hi3 theory of mental activity, has now been completed. Be-
fore presenting that theory and summarizing the fundamental charac-
ters of personality as set forth by James, we shall review briefly
three historic conceptions of the self, which, if the hypothesis of
the passing thought be accepted, may be cast aside as pragmatically
superfluous. We shall supplement this review by noting how the
passing thought is a pragmatic substitute for the self or soul.
These are the topics for exposition before the criticism of James
theory will be presented.
James believes that all authors, except himself, who deal
with the self may be classified under three schools: substantial ism
transcendentalism, and associationism. Only the last is an empiri-
cal theory; representatives of the other two hold to a trans-
empirical or non-phenomenal principle which stands outside of the
stream of consciousness. (James indeed recognizes that there are
two other theories, but they are negligible: (a) the improbable
material -monad theory, (2) and (b) the unintelligible mind- atuff
theory. (4) These, however, are very similar in principle to the
first one mentioned above, and have similar faults.)
The most important of these traditional theories of the self
is that of the substantial soul, which is held by commonsense,
scholasticism, and spiritualistic philosophy. (5) According to
this doctrine, there exists somehow, behind the phenomena present
in an individual's consciousness, a simple, changeless, and immater
ial substance or soul. This is required to be: the center of in-
herence for psychic faculties, the unifier of the discrete elements
of consciousness, the abiding ground of personal identity, and the
principle of individuality. (6) James, however, on his part, has
"fought shy of admitting a self or soul or other agency of combina-
tion," (7) and rejects the hypothesis for the following reasons:
The first general objection to the soul-theory is^hat it is a
pragmatic superfluity. It is "a complete superfluity so far aa
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }41
.
(2) See above, page 55*
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 179-30.
(4) Ibid., chapter VI.
(5) Ibid., pages 342-250; 160-182.
(6) Ibid., compare pages, 1-}, }19, 5^5- Jejaea gives
an excellent summary of the usual arguments for the existence of
Buch a aoul in hi8 Principles of Paychologyvol . I, page ^4j.
(7) A Plurali8tic Univerae, page 188.
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1". It is a
pragmatic
superfluity.
2"
. It cannot
be verified in
experience
.
5"
. The soul-
theory io baaed
upon a false
assumption.
accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience
goes." (1) James admits that this and other reasonings do not, of
course, prove the non-existence of the soul. (2) But "it is at all
events needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of
consciousness as they appear." (5) If we should ask, with James,
"What difference in practical experience is it supposed to make
that we have each a personal substantial principle"? (4) we could
reply with him that, "few things would seem to have fewer pragmatic
consequences for us than substances, cut off as we are from every
contact with them." (5) He praises Locke and Hume for pragmatically
getting rid of soul -substance
. (6)
To admit into our philosophy the soul principle which does no
real work, or at least which does no work which the passing thought
does not do, would be to violate the law of parsimony which the
advocate of pragmatism must recognize as authoritative for him.
"You see no deeper into the fact that a hundred sensations get com-
pounded or known together by thinking that a 'soul' does the com-
pounding than you see into a man's living eighty years by thinking
of him as an octogenarian, or into our having five fingers by
calling us pentadactyls . Souls have worn out both themselves and
their welcome, that is the plain truth. Philosophy ought to get
the manifolds of experience unified on principles less empty. Like
the word 'cause,' the word 'soul' is but a theoretic stop-gap
—
it marks a place and claims it for a future explanation to occupy."
(7)
The second serious objection to the soul, which also has a
prugmatic tone, is that the soul cannot be empirically verified.
"One can give no positive account" of what it is. (8) It is "in-
accessible to direct knowledge." (9) Introspection is incompetent
to lay hold of it, and can reach only the soul's phenomena. (9)
The only way to get at it would be "by stepping outside of exper-
ience altogether," (10) but that would violate that part of the
pragmatic method which requires empirical verification. It can
neither be presented nor represented. (11) "The passing thought
is the only verifiable thinker."
The final objection to the soul-theory is that it is based
upon a false assumption, due to an abstract psychology and an in-
tellectualistic logic, the assumption, namely, that mental life
is originally a succession of separate states or ideas. Having
made this erroneous assumption, one seems compelled to invoke the
soul to get thi3 atomistic plurality together again into tne unity
which is an evident fact of consciousness. Shocked at the discon-
IS
(4)
ll]
(7)
6)
(9)
(10)
(11)
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 548.
Ibid.,' page 550. (5) Ibid., page }44,
Some Problems of Philosophy, page 125
.
Pragmatism, page 88.
Ibid.
,
pages 90-92.
A Pluralistic Universe, pages 209-210.
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 550.
Ibid., page 167
.
A Pluralistic Universe, page 267.
Ibid., page 209.
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c' . The posi-
tive values of
the soul -theory,
2'. The tran-
acendentalist
theory;
a Its
essential
character
.
tinuous character of their scheme, the spiritualists assume a
'soul' or 'ego' to melt the separate ideas into collective con-
sciousness." (1)
The original supposition, hov/ever, is mistaken. Conscious-
ness is not a collection but a continuity, and contains in itself
manyness-in-onene3 3 as a fact of immediate perception. (1) Besides,
the soul itself is a "discrete concept, and therefore, as a matter
of fact, lacks the unifying power it is supposed to possess." (1)
"My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul i3 that
it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts
are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it." (2) "The
notion of the substantial soul has fallen upon such evil days, and
ha3 no prestige in the eyes of critical thinkers. It only 3hares
the fate of other unrepresentable substances and principles." (3)
It has no "advantage as a theory over the simple phenomenal notion
of a stream of thought accompanying a stream of cerebral activity."
(4)
Jame3 gives his reader permission, if he desires, to supplement
the theory of the passing thought by the soul-hypothesis, provided
he can offer metaphysical or pragmatic reasons for doing so. Until
he explains his theory of the passing thought, he points out "the
logical respectability of the spiritualistic position," and it seems
to him "the line of least logical resistance." (5) He points out
two of its advantages over the mind-stuff theory. The positive sig-
nificance, in the first place, of the soul-hypothesis, is that it
might iaean that there is some ground in the nature of things for
the possibility of thought, and for one's mental processes as they
come into existence; it might represent a protest against supposing
"that the bare existence of the phenomena i6 the total truth." (6)
Secondly, the idea of "substance" may be regarded as "descriptive
of the fact that certain specific and verifiable connections are
found among the parts of the experimental flux." (7) If any soul-
hypothesis is to be defended, however, James thinks that the con-
ception of a world-soul is more promising than that of a lot of in-
dividual ones. (6)
Space forbids an extended account of the trans cendentalist
theory originated by Kant. (8) The essential point in the complicated
argument seems to be that all consciousness implies the awareness
that I think. This "original transcendental synthetic unity of
apperception" is the condition of all connectedness which is essen-
tial to knowledge, and of the unification of the manifold. It is
the bare and empty consciousness that accompanies all knowledge.
Kant did not give it any positive attributes. It only tells us
that we are, but gives us no positive theoretical knowledge of the
soul, ffe can have knowledge only of the empirical ego. (9)
Ml Some Problems of Philosophy, page 67.
(2) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }50.
'3) A Pluralistic Universe, page 209.
4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }45.
5) Ibid., pages 181-2. (6) Ibid., pages 245-6.
(7) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 124.
(8) Compare, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 56O-75.
(9) Compare above, page 10.
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b'. Ite
defects
.
y. The
a830ciational
theory.
a'. Ite
basic
elements.
The chief objections to this theory are as follows: (a) The
fundamental objection, according to James, to the trans cendental
theory is that it is based upon an erroneous assumption. The
chaotic manifold which the "I think" is supposed to synthesize is
mythological. The relations among objects known, which the "i
think" is assumed to condition, are themselves given in what is
known and need not, therefore, be sought in any knower. E. N. Mer-
rington reminds us (l) that relations, according to James, belong
in the world of objects rather than on the subjective side. (2)
(b) A second objection to the transcendental ego is its ab-
stract character, especially as it is developed in the thought of
Kant's idealistic successors. In them it takes on an absolute and
conceptual form which is foreign to human experience. This abstract
av/areness, in Kant's thought, does not explain, as well as does the
passing thought, (J) how synthesis in the concrete actually comes
to pass. To give it a cumbersome name does not fit it better to be
a vehicle of knowing than the judging thought.
(c) Finally, the whole doctrine is ambiguous in Kent's thought.
In the opinion of James, the transcendental ego is insignificant in
Kant's thought, unless it be interpreted to mean the soul, and if
this is done, it falls into all of the errors of the soul-doctrine.
(4)
The associationists represent a third class of philosophers
who have struggled to explain the facts of selfhood. (5) The basic
tenets of their doctrine with respect to the self seem to be the
following: There are given certain fixed and simple psychic units
called sensations and ideas. They exist discretely and independ-
ently of each other. These units are compounded into consciousness
according to the laws of association, and, when collected, retain
their individual distinctness and numerical totality. The following
errors in this doctrine are noted by James:
(a) Here, as in the case of the other two theories, the funda-b'. Errors
in the associa- mental assumption is wrong. The "manifold of co-existing ideas
tional doc-
trine.
—
-
— — o
is itself a "chimera." "A permanently existing ' idea ' or ' Vorstel -
lung ' which makes its appearance beiore the footlights of conscious -
ness at periodical intervale, la as mythological an enti ty as the
Jack of Spades . " (6) Ideas do not, as a matter of fact, exist in
this discrete way. To suppose that they do is to fall into the
psychologist's fallacy, namely, of supposing that the ideas of
objects exist separately just because their objects bo exist. (7)
In fact, thoughts appear as phases of a sensibly continuous stream
which contains within itself at once diversity and unity.
(b) A second error lies in supposing that a bundle of ideas of
itself could ever form a unity or a single pulse of thought. (8)
(1) The Problem of Personality, page 15.
(2) See above, page 22; Princ. of Psychology, vol. I, p.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page .
(4) Bea above, pages 40- ;*2
.
(5) See Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages IA5-I62.
(61 Ibid., page 256.
(7) See Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 2^1, 278.
(8) Ibid.
,
page 277.
16}.
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The passing
thought doe
8
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of the self.
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explained
in detail
.
The associational party mistakenly confuse the idea of unity with
the unity of ideas; here is another case of the psychologist's
fallacy. The original assumption of diversity cannot be overcome
by that diversity from within itself. (1) It is logically unintel-
ligible to suppose that any number of entities, call them what
one will, "can sua themselves together." (2) "Atoms of feeling
cannot compose higher feelings any more than the atoms of matter
can compose physical things." (5) In A Pluralistic Universe (4)
he presents elaborate arguments to disprove the supposition that
consciousness can become a whole as a result of self-compounding
on the part of the associationist' s units or of the intellectual-
ist's concepts. As a matter of fact, the stream of thought carries
its own unity with itself. Every pulse of thought is an indecom-
posable unity. (5) "The sum itself exists only for a bystander
who happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such."
(6)
(c) Finally, therefore, it is to be noted that the associa-
tionistB smuggle in the "bystander, "^or "judging thought." They
continually talk about what the mind^ana what "we" do. Hume, for
instance, uses the pronoun, I., even when he affirms that he cannot
find any real "I .
"
James recognizes that the associational view has great sim-
plicity, but he himself prefers the "vaguer conception of the
stream of thought." (7) He has done a real service in demon-
strating the inadequacy of the doctrine in question.
This review of the three typical historical theories does not,
James thinks, require a revision of his theoretical formulation of
the stream of thought, nor does it reveal a more workable hypothesis
than that of the passing thought. His general criticism of the his-
torical views mentioned is that they fail in helping one to explain
or understand the actual facts of consciousness. He thinks rather
that "our 'Thought 1 — a cognitive phenomenal event in time—is, if it
exist at all, itself the only Thinker which the facts require." (8)
The judging thought fulfils all the functions—and that in a veri-.
fiable way—which are supposed to be performed by the substantial
soul and the transcendental ego, and is certainly a great improve-
ment upon the doctrine of associationism.
James explains in great detail how the passing thought does
all the work of the self which he believes i3 required of the latter,
in the other theories referred to. The passing thought knows,
conceives, distinguishes, identifies. (9) "in my Psychology! have
tried to show that we need no knower other than the 'passing
thought." 1 (10)
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page
(2) Ibid., page 158. ~ (?) Ibid., page 161 .
(4) See especially pages 201-8.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. 57 1 . (<3) Ibid., p. 156.
v7) Talks to Teachers, page 21.
(8) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }69.
(9) Ibid., pages 351-2.
(10) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 4, note; James here
refers the reader to Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages ff.
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The passing
thought is
pragmatically
sufficient.
All kinds of relations are found by it in the stream of conscious-
ness of which it is a part. (1) "Both connection and separation are
ways in which the past thoughts appear to the present Thought." (2)
Thus, in its immediate experience is solved the baffling problem of
diversity in unity. (5) "immediate feeling possesses a native
wholeness" (4) in which distinctions and contrasts are nevertheless
present.
Further, the passing thought is an agent of choice which ap-
propriates and rejects objects in its own past and in the world that
is presented to it. The thoughts that compose "mental-activity
trains" do work on each other; "they check, sustain, and introduce.
They do so when the activity is merely associational as well as when
effort is there." (5)
Again, "it is impossible to discover any verifiable features
in personal identity" which are not contained in the sketch of the
passing thought. (6) These successive thoughts, too, are centers
of feelings and desires as well as volitional agents. "Spontaneity
is just as possible, to say the least, in a temporary spiritual
agent like our 'Thought' as in a permanent one like the supposed
Soul." (7) "The present Thought also has being, . . . and if there
be no otlaer Being in which it 'inheres,' it ought itself to be a
'substance.'" (8)
In short, "the unity, the identity, the individuality, and
the immateriality that appear in the psychic life are thus account-
ed for as phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and witti no
need of reference to any more simple or substantial agent than the
present Thought or 'section' of the stream." (9) "All the exper-
iential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered
with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts
or states of mind." (10)
It is the passing thought, then, which, in the opinion of
James, makes the most difference to us of any of the hypotheses
concerning the nature of the mind. "Wiich of my spiritual selves
do I really care for? My Soul-substance? my 'transcendental Ego'
or Thinker? my pronoun I? my subjectivity as such? my nucleus of
cephalic adjustments? or my more phenomenal and perishable powers,
my loves and hates, willingnesses and sensibilities, and the like?
Surely the latter." (11) And because the passing thought, with the
capacities that have been enumeratedJ meets practical requirements,
James concludes to its pragmatic sufficiency.
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 56O.
(2) Ibid., page 555.
(5) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 260; 49-5*1; Principles
of Psychology, vol. I, page 5^5-
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 92.
(5) A Pluralistic Universe, page 590, note.
(6) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 540; compare also,
pages ?58-9, etc.
(7) Ibid., 546. (8) Ibid., page 5^5.
(9) Ibid., page 544.
(10) Ibid. , page 401
.
(11) Ibid., page 525.
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E. N. Merrington quotes ( 1 ) an interesting note written by
James himself which confirms this conclusion. The latter asserts
that, "I have worked for so many years with the 'passing thot 1
formula which pragmatically does all the work of a Self, that the
inability to define the Self except by its work makes me perhaps
unduly hostile, not to the word, of course, but to the use of it as
a fundamental term in philosophy. The 'train of experience' kind
of self gets its unity after the facts only; but the 'unanalyzable
principle' kind is anterior to the facts and seems to warrant their
having unity. But if one makes for each stage of unity already
achieved in fact, an active worker for more unity, with efficacy
toe, doesn't the warrant also seem to exist?"
The conclusion, then, to which the thought of James leads, is
that, since the passing thought does all the work which is histori-
cally and actually required of the self, the two are identical,
except in words, and one may be substituted for the other. This
substitution is only a particular application of the general prag-
matic rule of identifying concepts which have the same practical
consequences. (2) James himself, however, prefers the term, the
passing thought. His pragmatic attitude to the traditional views
of the self may be summed up by saying that the only use to which a
transcendental ego, or any transempirical principle, could be put
would be either to identify the empirical self, which already has
been identified in our stream of consciousness, or to guide us in
our future activities, for which purposes our knowledge of the
empirical and passing thought is already sufficient. (3) Since
the passing thought performs all the functions of the soul, James 1
psychology is without a soul in name only, and not in fact, so far
as his own intentions are concerned.
James' account of "the experience of activity" (4) is so im-
portant in his theory of the self and also so illuminating in
general that it calls for special consideration. He says that,
in studying this experience, several points of view may be
adopted, namely, that of metaphysics, logic (or epistemology)
,
and psychology. This order of review will be followed.
The metaphysical standpoint of James in his discussion of
activity is that of "radical empiricism
. . . with its pragmatic
method ana its principle of pure experience." (5) The pragmatic
rule appears in the demand that an acceptable theory of activity
must exhibit "pragmatic consequences," and make "assignable par-
ticular differences." (6) It must help us to control more intel-
ligently and effectively our future operations. (7) Accordingly,
he asks the metaphysical question about activity in regular prag-
matic fashion: "Is there a fact of activity? and if so, what, idea
must we frame of it? What is it like, and what does it do, if it
does anything?" (6) "The question Whose is_ the real activity , is
thus tantamount to the question tfJiat will be tne actual results?" (8)
(1) The Problem of Personality, page vii
.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 103-4; fill to Believe, 124.
(3) Compare, A Pluralistic Universe, page 392.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, Appendix B.
Ibid., page 372. (6) Ibid., page 571 .
(I
'
5
(7) Ibid., page 392. ,8) Ibid., page 3G6.
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The theory of activity not only must meet the practical testa
of pragmatism, but it must conform to the principles of radical
empiricism: "Nothing shall be admitted as a fact, it says, except
what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient."
(1) Hence, "if there be real creative activities in being, radical
empiricism must say, somewhere they must be immediately lived.
Somewhere the that of efficacious causing and the what of it must
be experienced in one." (2) These are the main points in his ap-
proach to the problem. "It provides an empirical and relational
version of 'activity,' and so distinguishes the author'3 voluntar-
ism from a view with which it is easily confused--the view which
upholds a pure or transcendental activity." (5)
One more preliminary point should be noted. James himself
does not accept any trans-phenomenal form of activity, or any
activity-in-itself , which he regards as fictitious. He denies that
he ever held to a metaphysical principle or transcendental agent
behind our experienced activity which makes the latter go, (4) al-
though he leaves open the possibility of there being such a princi-
ple. He retains the word, activity, however, and finds its posi-
tive significance in a certain experience-complex. Let us examine
the nature of this
.
James finds "the original type" of real activity in the con-
crete, identifiable experience of the individual , with his strivings
and struggles. It is to this primary model that all ulterior judg-
ments about activity must refer. (1) "The gercipi in these origin-
als of experience is the esse ." (5) "i conclude, then, tha real
effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a category,' if
you like, of reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that
kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal. We have
the whole butt and being of it in our hands." (,6) "Relations of
activity"tie "terms into series involving change, tendency, re-
sistance, and the causal order generally." (7)
James is unable to discover any pragmatic worth in the past
attempts of three types of philosophers to find the "real facts"
of our activities beyond the passing concrete experience, whether
in their "ultimate outcome" in the life of some "wider mind," such
as the "Absolute thinker;" or in the narrow span of "the most pre-
vious agent ascertainable," such as brain cells; or in a struggle
of"idea8." (8) These various conceptions "de-realize my activi-
ties," except that the wider consciousness, if I take it religiously
and regard it as good, may corroborate their reality. (8) Espe-
cially, it has not been shown how nerve-cells or idea-entities
guarantee in the future the fulfilment of ray wishes and will. (9)
Here "is the old dispute come back! Materialism and teleolo-
gy; elementary short-span actions summing themselves 'blindly,' or
far foreseen ideals coming with effort into act." ( 10) But even
( 1 ) A Pluralistic Universe, p. 572. (2) Ibid., page 589.
(5) So R. B. Perry, Editor's preface, page xi, of Essays in
Radical Empiricism.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, p. 591. (5) Ibid., page 576.
(6) . Ibid., page 592.
(7) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pages 44-5.
(8) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 584-5.
(9) Ibid., page 586. ( 10} lb( ) I id., page 587.
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if we could picture how these ulterior agents regulate our activi-
ties, we should nevertheless test the meaning and succession of
their exertions practically and empirically, (l) In the details of
actual fact we find the activities which make the real differences
in human life. (1) The attempts, up to date, to explain how our
activities might be linked with agents beyond the passing thought
have not been successful. James, however, encourages the endeavor
to connect up our activities with some larger historic or universal
mind; this problem opens, he thinks, a promising field for meta-
physical investigation. (2)
James' concluding description of activity follows: "Sustain-
ing, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on,
and. finally achieving our intention—this ijj. action, this is effectu-
ation in the only shape in which, by a pure experience-philosophy,
the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed. Here is creation
in its first intention, here is causality at work. To treat this
offhand as the bare illusory surface of a world whose real causality
is an unimaginable ontological principle hidden in the cubic deeps,
i3, for the more empirical way of thinking, only animism in another
shape. You explain your given fact by your 'principle,' but the
principle itself, when you look clearly at it, turns out to be no-
thing but a previous little spiritual copy of the fact." (5) James
avoids this latter circle of reasoning and considers real what are
sometimes called appearances.
This account of activity fits well in a pluralistic philosophy
and is consistent 7/1 th personalism. He regards .the activities of
individual experiences as real in themselves as they appear without
appealing to something beyond them as the source of their reality.
"Each partial process, to him who lives through it, defines itself
by ita origin and its goal." (4) "The real activity ... is the
doing of the fact." (5)
The epistemological question, "'Whence do we know activity?" has
been answered already. The reply is: we know our activities by
"living through" them. (6) They are "thus simply given." 1,7) James
defines his position when he affirms that, "I try to defend" the
recognition of th . notion of activity "as a definite form of im-
mediate experience against its rat_onalistic critics." (8)
From the standpoint of radical empiricism, psychology has a
very intimate relation to metaphysics; indeed, it differs from the
latter chiefly in that it provides more detailed descriptions of
qualities and conditions of experience. The step from radical
empiricism to psychologism seems very short indeed. Now it is
the different forms of activity, and tne relations of will, emotion,
and interest to it, that especially concern psychology. The psy-
chological question is: "Tfhere in the stream of experience do we
( 1 ) A Pluralistic Universe, page 5S7.
(2) Ibid., page 594. (5) Ibid,
(4) Ibid., page 582. (5) Ibid,
(6) Ibid., page 577- (7) Ibid,
(6) Ibid., page 558.
pages 590- 1 .
page 58 1
.
page 574.
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seem to find what we speak of as activity?" And if we have percep-
tions of activity, what are their attributes, and their conditions
of occurrence? (1)
First of all, the psychological field must be located by dis-
tinguishing three kinds of activity. "We are tempted to affirm ac-
tivity wherever we flind anything going on
.
Taken in the broadest
sense, any apprehension of something doing, is an experience of ac-
tivity.
. The sense of activity is thus in the broadest and vaguest
sense synonomoue with the sense of 'life'." (2) "The basis of our
personality, as M. Ribot says, is that feeling of our vitality
which, because it is so perpetually present, remains in the back-
ground of our consciousness." (2) "The fact that something is going
on, the bare fact of event or change," is, then, the most "elementary
and general kind of activity. (4) This variety of activity, however,
may lack direction, agency and aim. (5)
In our actual experience, however, activity comes usually with
more specific characteristics, "with definite direction, with desire
and sense of goal and resistance," etc., and as such has the form of
a "conjunctive-series" or "experience train." (6) It is "a kind of
synthetic object, or conjunctive relation experienced between bits
of experience already made." (7) "The experiencer of such a situa-
tion possesses all that the idea contains. He feel3 the tendency,
the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive
giving up.
.
.He goes through all that ever can be imagined where
activity is supposed.
.
The word 'activity' has no imaginable content
whatever save these experiences of proces.
,
obstruction, striving,
strain or relea.ie, ultimate qualia as they are of the life given us
to be known." (6) This description "is clear to any one wiio has
lived through the experience, but to no one else."
James', however, does not identify the activities which are pe-
culiarly ours with the "total eKperience-process, " but only with one
phase of it. The general activity described above may be divided
into two kinds, the activity of the not-self and of the self. What,
then, is the nature of the activity which is "felt as ours?" (10)
"My" activity is marked by the presence of certain affectional states
connected with certain bodily movements.
Jamea offers the following striking description of personal
activity: "So far as we are 'persons', and contrasted and opposed
to an 'environment 1
,
movements in our body figure as our activities;
and I am unable to fidd any other activities that are ours in this
strictly personal 3ense. . . The individualized aelf, fchich I believe
to be the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content
of the world experienced. The world experienced (otherwise called
the 'field of consciousness') comes at all times with our body as
its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. .
(1) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 373» 37"1 .
(2) Ibid., pa-e 373-
(5) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 375.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 379; 373-
(5) Ibid., page 374. (6) Ibid., page 361.
(7) Ibid., page 361. . (6) Ibid., pages 376-7-
(9) Ibid., page 576. (10) Ibid., page 379.
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We return here to that corporeal theory of the spiritual self
which was noticed above (2), and according to which "the central
part of the me is^he feeling of the body and cf the adjustments in
the head; and in the feeling of the body should be included that of
the general emotional tones and tendencies, for at bottom these are
but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities run."
(5) "The conscious self of the moment, the central self, is probably
determined to this privileged position by its functional connexion
with the body's imminent or present acts." (4)
2'. Causation Now "real activities" are always "efficacious;" they "make
and free will. things be" which otherwise would not be. (5) Nov. thi6 efficacy of
our activities seems to include both causation and free will, as
they are commonly called, which differ from activity by having the
specific marks, respectively, of intended result or purpose and of
novelty. Let us consider these briefly. (6)
a'. Nature of Causation "evidently
. .
is got in our own personal activity-
causation, situations." (7) "Real effectual causation . . is just that kind
of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal. (3) "Percep-
tually or concretely causation names the manner in which some fields
of consciousness introduce other fields. It is but one of the forms
in which experience appears as a continuous flow." (9) This peculiar
conjunction of experience is present when "a previous field of 'con-
sciousness,' containing
. .
the idea of a result, develops gradually
into another field in which that result . . appears as accomplished,
or else is prevented by obstacles against which we still feel our-
selves to press," and the perceived result is called an effect be-
cause, In the new section of consciousness, it stands as the fulfil-
ment of the purpose that was intended in the previous one, which,
therefore, is called the cause. (10) James says that the cause
contains the effect "by proposing it as the end pursued. Since the
desire of that end is the efficient cause, we see that in the total
fact of personal activity final and efficient causes coalesce. Yet
the effect is oftenest contained aliquo modo only, and seldom ex-
plicitly foreseen. The activity sets up more effects than it pro-
poses literally. The end is defined beforehand in most cases only
as a general direction, along which all 3orts of novelties and sur-
prises lie in wait." (11) In The Principle s of Psycho logy (12),
Ml A Pluralistic Universe, pages 379-00, note.
(2) See above, pages 35, 39-40.
O) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 571.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, page 344.
(5) Ibid., pages 339; 393.
(6) See especially Some Problems of Philosopuy, chaps. XII-XIII.
(7) Ibid., page 120.
(8) A Pluralistic Universe, pftgf 392.
(9) Some Problems of Phil., pacei 196-9 J OOapftr aleo the
excellent description, page 211. flO) Ibid., pages 210-13.
(It) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 136-44.
( 111) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 213.
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he presents some facte to Bhow "that consciousness has causal ef-
ficacy." If this is the type of actual causation, James sees him-
self led in the direction of a panpsychic philosophy. (1)
The presence of free will in the stream of consciousness is
marked by the "novelties" ju3t referred to. "'Free will 1 means
nothing but real novelty." (2) "The perceptual . . flux yields a
perfect effervescence of novelty all the time." (3) James says,
"As a matter of plain history, the only 'free will' I have ever
thought of defending is the character of novelty in fresh activi-
ty-situations. If an activity-process is the form of a ,.hole
'field of consciousness ' and if each field of consciousness is not
only in it3 totality unique (as is now commonly admitted), but has
its elements unique,
. . then novelty is perpetually entering the
world and what happens there is not pure repetition . . Activity-
situations come, in short, each with an original touch. A 'prin-
ciple' of free will, if there were one, would doubtless manifest
itself in such phenomena, but I never saw, nor do I now see what
the principle could do except rehearse the phenomenon beforehand."
(4) Fres-will 3imply means, therefore, that the present is "an
original starting-point of events, and not merely transmitting a
push from elsewhere . " (5) In this form pluralism and pragmatism
accept the notion. "Free-will pragmatically means noveltie s in
the world , the right to expect that in its deepest elements as
well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identically
repeat and imitrte the past." (6)
In comparison with this metaphysical account of free will,
James' psychological account of the two acenings of will is inter-
esting: "The word 'will' can be used in a broader and in a narrow-
er sense. In the broader sense it designates our entire capacities
for impulsive and active life, including our instinctive reactions
and those forms of behavior that have become secondarily automatic
and semi-conscious through frequent repetition. In the narrower
sense acts of will are such acts only as cannot be inattentively
performed. A distinct idea of what they are, and a deliberate fiat
on the mind's part, must precede their execution." (7)
The conception of volition held by James grows out of his
affirmation of the essentially active character of consciousness
.
"Consciousness i3 in its very nature impulsive," although a certain
degree of intensity in consciousness ia required to overcoiae ef-
fectively the natural inertia of the motor processes. ^8) However,
"it is of the essence of all consciousness (or of the neural pro-
cess which underlies it) to instigate movement of some sort." (9)
"We do not have a sensation or a thought and then. have to odd
(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 218.
(2) Ibid., page 141 . (?) Ibid., page tjl
.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, pages 291-2, note.
(5) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 1J9.
(6) Pragmatism, pages 118-9.
(7) Talks to Teachers, page 169.
(8) The Principles of Psychology, vol, II, page 526,
(9) Ibid., page 551.
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something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling
which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is al-
ready on its way to instigate a movement." (1) "The impulsive qual -
ity Gf mental states is an attribute behind which we cannot go, C2)
although the impulsive power of ideas varies greatly. (5)
The simple type of ideo-motor movement is sometimes complicated
by the presence of "an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of
a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate. (4) James thinks
"that the fiat , the element of consent or resolve that the act shall
ensue
. .
constitutes the essence of the voluntariness of trie act. .
It is a constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary actions alike."
(5) Of what nature is this consent or fiat? It is that effort of
attention which is required to enable one idea to prevail in the
mind against all obstacles. "The steadfast occupancy of conscious-
ness" is "the prime condition of impulsive power." (6) "Attention
is the first and fundamental thing in volition." (7) Once the idea
with its associates stably dominates attention, the willing terminates,
and the movement follows as a matter of physiological course. (8)
" The essential achievement of the wi 1
1
t in short , when it is most
'voluntary
.
1 is. to ATTEND to a difficult ob.ject and hold it fast be-
fore the mind
. The so-doing is_ the fiat ; 11 the physiological dis-
charge is a mere incident. (9)
Consequently, "volition is primarily a relation, hot between •
our Self and extra-mental matter (as many philosophers still main-
tain), but between our Self and our own states of mind." (10)
We have seen incidentally that the presence of an end is one
factor in causality, as well as in other forms of activity. Let us
consider the important and intimate place that purpose has in the
activity-situation. In this situation the central place played by
striving for and against has been indicated. Indeed, "One thought
in every developed activity-series is a desire or thought of pur-
pose." (11) "No matter what activities there may really be in this
extraordinary universe of ours, it is impossible for us to conceive
of any one of them being lived through or authentically known other-
wise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt pur-
pose against felt obstacles and overcoming or being overcome." (12)
Not only, therefore, is our stream of consciousness marked by ac-
tivity, but this activity has direction, and an important charac-
teristic of most if not all pulses of thought is their meaning, the
conclusion to which they lead and which becomes one of the substan-
(1
(2
(4
(6
(8
(10
(11
(12
The Principles of Psychology,
Ibid.
,
page 55 1
.
Ibid.
,
page 522
.
Ibid., page 559.
Ibid., pages 559-60.
Ibid., pages 567-68.
A Pluralistic Universe, page ?90.
Ibid.
,
pages 277-8.
vol.
(5) Ibid
(5) Ibid
(7) Ibid
(9) Ibid
II, page 526,
.
page 5^5.
. ,
page 501.
.
,
page 566
.
.
,
page 561
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tive phases of the stream which conception stabilizes. (1) James
holds, in short, that "no actions but such as are done for an end,
and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of
Mind." (.2)
Consciousness seems, therefore, to be essentially a "teleologic-
al function. (5) It is in intelligent consciousness that "real ends
appear for the first time
. . .
upon the world's stage. Every actu-
ally existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a
fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be
ends at all." (4) " The pursuance of future ends and the choice of
means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the
presence of mentality in a phenomenon . " (5)
The teleological character of various mental processes should
be exhibited in detail. (a) This mark is strikingly present in
thinking. As early as 1681 James wrote (6): "The conceiving or
theorizing faculty
. . .
functions exclusively for the sake of ends
that do not exist at all in the world of impressions we receive by
way of our senses, but are set by our emotional and practical sub-
jectivity together." He concludes his chapter on "Conception" in
the Principles of Psychology (7) saying that, " This whole function
of conceiving
,
of fixing , and holding fact to meanings . ha3 no
significance apart from the fact that the conceiver is a creature
with partial purposes and private ends." Again he says, the
"powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends, dis-
cerning which facts further them and which do not." (4)
From these facts it follows that James holds to the "primacy"
of "practical reason." He asserts, "From its first dawn to its
highest actual attainment we find that the cognitive faculty, where
it appears to exist at all, appears but as one element in an organic
mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental powers
—
the powers
of will . " (8) "Man, whatever else he may be, is primarily a
practical being whose mind is given him to aid in adapting him to
this world's life." (9)
The religious life, too, is a life of purpose and of faith;
it consists of "the interest of the individual in his private
personal destiny." It is only by the discovery and possession of
some central and valuable aim or purpose that the religiously
divided self regains its unity and happiness. The divided self
arises when each of two different groups of aims come to struggle
for dominion in consciousness. (10) "Let us hereafter, in speaking
of the hot place in a man's consciousness, the group of ideas to
which he devotes himself, and from which he works, call it the
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 259-261.
(2) Ibid., page 11.
(5) Ibid., page 14; Will to Believe, etc., page 117.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 141
.
(5) Ibid., page 6; compare also, pages 15 and 15.
(6) Will to Believe, page 117; compare, 119.
(7) Pages 482 ff. vol. I; compare page 459.
(8) Will to Believe, page 140.
(9) Talks to Teachers, pag 25; for evidence, see pages 25-7.
(10) Varieties of R-.ligious Experience, pages 1y5> 1 70-5, etc.
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habi tual centre of his personal energy . It makes a great differ-
ence to a man whether one set of his ideas, or another, be the cen-
tre of his energy." (1)
James ought to point out--I do not know that he does—the
logical connection between the pragmatic mothod and the important
function of purpose in the life of the self. The application of
that method requires purposive intelligence in order to see for
what ideas are "useful" or to whom they are satisfying. Without
such a "commanding intelligence," our reactions are neither hurtful
nor useful at all. (2) Survival itself is "an hypothesis made by
an onlooker , about the future." (j)
There remains now for discussion James 1 conception of the
place of emotions or interests in the personal life. They play a
very significant part indeed. We have already described in general
the interested character of consciousness. (4) In fact, "con-
sciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency . " It is
constantly emphasizing and choosing something and "the item em-
phasized is^lways in close connection with some interest felt by
consciousness to be paramount at the time." (5)
One's emotions and interests are intimately linked up with
his active tendencies. In fact, James does not seem clearly and
consistently to distinguish between emotions and instincts. In
Talks to Teachers (6) he says he uses the term, action , in the
broadest sense, to include not only bodily movements, but"ten-
dencies" and "emotional determinations" in the future as well as
the present. (7) On the whole we seem justified in asserting that
for him emotions and activities are only two conceptually distin-
guishable aspects of a single concrete process. It looks as if
the selective agency of consciousness were intended by James to
cover both general activity and emotion. Unless our ideals have
emotional "steam" back of them, they lack driving and creating
power. (8) Actions, preferences, purposes are only distinguishable
phases of a single experience-train which we call personality.
"Personality, desire, and volition . . . are in short the centres
of our dynamic energy," of our personal energy. (9) We are thus
near the final synthetic summary of James' view of personality
which we shall make in a moment. First, a few further points in
connection with emotion should be noted.
Purposes and interests are closely interrelated. On the one
hand, one's interests determine what systems of ideas or purposes
shall central for the moment (10), but, on the other hand, when
a purpose or desire has gained dominance in an activity-series,
"all other thoughts acquire a feeling tone from their relation of
Varieties of Religious Experience, page 196.
Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 141
.
Ibid., page 141 ; compare above
See above, page 25.
Principles of Psychology, vol.
Talks to Teachers, page 27.
Compare Will to Believe, pages
Varieties of Religious Experience, page 264.
Ibid.
,
page 195-
Ibid., page 194.
pages 15- 16.
If page 1p9.
117-8.
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harmony or oppugnancy to thiB." (1) "Both thought and feeling are
determinants of conduct and the same conduct may be determined
either by feeling or by thought." (2)
In concluding this discussion of emotion, we should notice
two characteristics of interests. The first important fact about
them seems to be their dynamic and selective character, and their
power to transform experience. "Interest,
. . .
though its genesis
is doubtless perfectly natural
.
makes experience more than it is
made by it." Interest brings about rearrangements among the items
of my experience and gives them "intelligible perspective." "My
experience is what I agree to attend to . Only those items which I
no tice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an
utter chaos." (5) The "reactive spontaneity," therefore, which is
present in "selective attention," and which transforms the face of
experience, contradicts that view of experience in which it is
regarded as "pure receptivity," as something which is simply
"given." (4)
The second important characteristic of the interests which
come into being with consciousness (5) is that they are the source
of personal values and individuality. Man is distinguished by
possessing many emotions. "Man's chief difference from the brutes
lies in the exuberant existence of his subjective propensities
—
his preeminence over them simply and solely in the number and
fantastic and unnecessary character of his wants, physical, moral,
aesthetic, and intellectual.
. .
His wants are to be trusted. . .
The uneasiness they occasion is the best guide of his life." (6)
The general teaching of The Varieties of Religious Experience
is that personality centers in our emotional life. (7) "Individ-
uality is founded in feeling." (8) It is from the "hot" places of
our emotional life that our purposes and volitions make their
sallies, and it is there that we find the center of our personal
energy. (9) Radical changes in our emotional life bring radical
changes in our sense of values as well as in our purposes and
actions.
An attempt will now be made to present a just and consistent
summary of James' conception of personality. (10) Throughout the
above exposition of James 1 theory of the self, it has been assumed
that he would accept the opinion that his psychological description
of the passing thought meets the metaphysical requirements of the
pragmatic method so far as personality is concerned. To be sure,
he recognizes explicitly the possibility of the existence of a
transcendental ego (11), but his constant implied challenge is:
(1) A Pluralistic Universe, page 590.
(2) Varieties of Religious Experience, page 504.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pagus 402-J. For an ex-
cellent account of the transformation of experience by our interests,
especially the cognitive ones, see Will to Believe, pages 117-8.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 402. (5) Ibid., p.l4w,
1 6) Thr, Will to Bolieve, page 1J1 .
(7) Compare, Varieties of Religious Experience, pages 150, 501
.
(8) Ibid., page 501 ; see above, page 27.
(9) Ibid., page 195-
(10) See Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 400-1 j also,
R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 555-6.
(11) See, e.£., Principles of Paychology, vol. I, page 401
.
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go find it and prove what practical differences it would make that
are not made by the passing thought.
James himself says, "We may 3um up by saying that personality
implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person,
known by a passing subject Thought and recognized as continuing in
time." (1) With this as a text we shall proceed now to state in
an abstract way those phases or points of emphasis in the stream
of consciousness which seem to be the most important elements in
his conception of personality. The disturbing influence of his
philosophy of pure experience upon the theory of personality, especi-
ally as it is set forth in his Principles of Psychology , will be
omitted here but mentioned below. (2)
Returning to the above text, we notice that it refers to both
an objective and a subjective factor in the concrete whole called
personality. The subjective element, however, is not regarded as
something transempirical or transcendental He assents that the
objective port, the "me, is an empirical aggregate of things ob-
jectively known. The £ which knows them cannot itself be an aggre-
gate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to
be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle
liks the pure Ego, viewed as 'out of time. 1 " (5) We have reviewed
his reasons (4) for rejecting all three of the typical formulations
of the self which find its essence in something beyond the^passing
thought. No pure thinker, no substantial soul, no activity-in-it-
self, explains the facts any better than the passing thought. (5)
"The only pathway that I can discover for bringing in a more
transcendental thinker would be to deny that we have any direct
knowledge of the thought as such." The existence and identity of
the latter would be essentially a metaphysical question, and in its
answer the psychological, the spiritualistic, and the transcendent-
alist solutions would alike deserve impartial consideration. (6)
The subjective factor itself may be regarded as a fact of
experience. It may be known in either of two ways. When it is past,
it is known in a purely objective way; when it is present, it is
known immediately through feeling. Indeed, the^atter is the most
adequate way of realizing the passing thought as it moves forward
through time, the most complete method of apprehending personality
in its wholeness an:l reality. (7)
We shall abstract, now, and make a list of, the moat important
features of that section of the stream of consciousness called
the passing thought, which is the central fact in personality in
the teaching of James
.
The first cn aracteristic of personality is its constant change,
its vital movement through time, its incessant activity. The pre-
sent thought passes and its successor inherits all its personal and
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 57 1 -
(2) See below, pages 68-75.
(J) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 400-1
(4) See above, pages 40-44.
(5) See above, pages 44-46.
(6) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 401
.
^7) See above, pages 19-21.
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2'. Activity real possessions. "On the principles which I am defending, a 'mind*
and its or 'personal consciousness' is the name for a series of experiences
iiamediate run together by certain definite transitions." (1) The later
reality. thought is uniquely different from its predecessors because of its
variant environment and inheritance. The novelties that are per-
petually occurring in this onward flux are called, collectively,
free-will
.
The activities which figure as distinctly our personal ones
are movements in our bodies, for the body is the storm center of
those various processes, strivings, resistances, releases, etc.,
which constitute human activity in its concreteness . "The nucleus
of the 'me' is always the bodily existence felt to be present at
the time." (2) It is these feelings of bodily processes, especi-
ally those originating in the head and throat, which introspectively
compose that innermost of our selves called the spiritual self.
Thus the material and the spiritual selves are, to a considerable
extent, identical.
Nov/ the activity of all these processes "is inseparable from
their being." (5) Our perception of them is their reality, for,
according to radical empiricism, "we are only as experients." (4)
The present acting self is the real self. (5) "Our active propen-
sities " are "our most intimate powers." (6) James, therefore,
might modify the Cartesian dictum, as Caird suggests, and say,
ago, ergo sum . James does not find any pragmatic value in the at-
tempts up to date to locate the reality of activity elsewhere than
in these concrete pulses of the individual consciousness.
5'. Cognition. From the summary of James mentioned above (7) it is evident
that a significant feature of the passing thought, perhaps its
most important one, is its cognizing capacity. I am unable to de-
cide whether this power to know or whether activity is, in the
judgment of James, the more fundamental characteristic of person-
ality. Cognition, in any case, is not the only feature. (6) The
passing thought, in the first place, knows directly, and sometimes
also indirectly, its own bodily feelings and activities, as 7,-ell
as its own past selves which it appropriates. In this cognition
of its own past is found the chief mark of memory, which, according
to James, has something of the nature a* iha R&fcuxs of sensation
or perception. (9) We chall ..aake a separate point of memory. In
the second place, the passing thought is constantly dealing with
objects which it does not own as part of itself.
4'. Memory. A third important characteristic of the passing thought is its
capacity to recognize its continuation in time and ilB past selves.
The latter is made possible by the fact that these selves possess
the same warmth as present experiences. Memory, or the recognition
of certain experiences as one's past experiences , is the central
(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 60.
(2) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 400.
foS A Pluralistic Universe, page 579. (A) Ibid., page .
(5) Compare Ibid., page }bh
.
(6) The T7ill to Believe, page 82; compare page 142.
(7) See above, page 56.
(8) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 141.
(9) Ibid., page 22J.
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fact in personal identity. In speaking of personal identity, James
says, "The commonest element of all, the most uniform, is the pos-
session of the same memories. (1) The chief support or abiding
backbone of memory is the felt, persistent sameness of the bodily
sensibilities and motor impulses. Very serious interruptions of
the unity and continuity of our personalities appear when we lose
the sense of this continuity of our bodily feelings. (.2) "The phe-
nomenon of alternating personality in its simplest phases seems
based on lapses of memory." \$)
5'. Purpose. Interwoven in every activity-complex is a purpose or desire.
Consciousness is marked as a "fighter for ends." Human mentality
is distinguished from animal mind by its capacities to adjust means
to future ends. Whenever one section of consciousness develops
into another because it was so purposed in the first, the relation
of cause and effect is present.
Purposes play an especially important part in the development
of the social self and in the ethical life. Moral purposes, of
course, get their real significance when they are acted upon, "it
is
. .
certain that a resolute moral energy, no matter how inert,
or unequipped its owner may be, extorts from us a respect we should
never pay were we not satisfied that the essential root of human
personality lay here." (4) "Real transitions towards real goals
are
. .
things given in experience, and among experience's most in-
defeasible parts. (5)
The capacity for entertaining purposes, or ideas of result,
is a part of one's general intellectual and cognitive capacities.
Purposing is present in thinking, and to make plans is essential to
intelligent action. The fourth important characteristic of person-
ality, then, is action with reference to ends which are more or less
explicitly known.
6 1
.
Interest. The smooth flow of the stream of consciousness is constantly
interrupted by interests w.iich not only introduce novel wants into
the contents of the stream, but give the sense of value to those
purposes which become effectual in the determination of action. The
consciousness of self always involves a paramount emphasis upon and
"care" (6) for certain objects and ideas, i. e.. ideals. "Personality
need not be determined intrinsically any further than is involved in
the holding of certain things dear, and in the recognition of our
dispositions towards these things, the things themselves being all
good and righteous things." (7) In searching for the similarities
between men and God, James suggests that "The two are consanguin-
eous at least in this: that both have purposes for which they care
and each may hear the other's call." (8) To be interested, to have
emotions and affective tones, is a fifth feature of concrete per-
sonality
.
(1) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 572.
(2) lbid., pages 566-7. (3) Ibid., page 579.
(4) The Will to Believe, page 142.
(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 2}9
.
6) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 400.
7) The Will to Believe, ^age 122.
(8) Ibid., page 122.
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7'. Unity.
8*. Final
summary
.
9'. The sub-
conscious self.
We have completed our enumeration of the outstanding aspects
of personality. It should be remembered, however, that all of the
phases of the individual stream of consciousness which have been
mentioned form or possess a peculiar unity due to the presence of a
cert&in T.varmth and intimacy which have been described. (1)
It seems, therefore, that, according to the teaching of James,
purposive, active processes of consciousness, possessing affective
tone or the feature of interest, together with cognition and memory,
when all these factors are blended together into a unity by reason
of the presence of a peculiar interpenetrating warnth, form that
concrete experience-whole which is known as personality or the "in-
dividualized self." In other words, each passing thought as it comes
into being in the conscious present is able to know and purpose, is
the center of various emotions and volitions, and establishes the
fact of its personal identity by appropriating the trains of its past
selves. James speaks of "the organization of the self as a system
of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfilments, or disappointments .
"
(2)
Our account of James 1 conception of personality is lucking in
one respect yet because he thinks that "there is actually and liter-
ally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of.
(5) tfhile he offers reasons for rejecting ten alleged proofs for
the existence of unconscious mental states (4), he finds some facts,
especially in the study of religion, that lead him to postulate the
existence of a subconscious self, which he regards as "nowadays a
well-accredited psychological entity." (5) It is especially in
religious experiences that we feel ourselves connected with a more,"
and this "more" is on the hither side the subconscious continuation
of our conscious life." (6)
If one has "a strongly developed ultra-marginal lire of this
sort," his "ordinary fields of consciousness are liable to incur-
sions from it of which the subject does not guecs the source, and
which, therefore, take for him the form of unaccountable impulses
to act, or inhibitions of action," etc. "Generalizing this phenom-
enon, Mr. Myers has given the name of automatism , sensory or motor,
emotional or intellectual, to this whole sphere of effects, due to
1 upruehes' into the ordinary consciousness of energies originating
in the subliminal parts of the mind." (7) "Psychology, defining
(1) See above, page 26.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page
(5) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page
(4) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 162-176.
(5) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page 5H •
The chief references Aral Ibid., pages 209-11 J 2^3-2^6;
240-242; 48J-4; 5*1 1-515;
The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pages 162-176;
199-212* 227-9; 239;
A Pluralistic Universe, page 207 , etc.
(6) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page }12.
(7) Ibid., page 254.
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these forces as 'subconscious, 1 and speaking of their effects as
due to 'incubation' or 'cerebration, 1 implies that they do not tran-
scend the individual's personality." (1) "There, on the contrary,
the subconscious forces take the lead, it is more probably the bet-
ter self irx posse which directs the operation. Instead of being
clumsily and vaguely aimed af from without, it is then itself the
organizing centre." (2) James quotes with approval the following
description of the subconscious self written by F. W. H. Myers: (^)
"Each of us is in reality an abiding psycnicai entity far :aore ex-
tensive than he knows—an individuality which can never express it-
•
• self completely through any corporeal manifestation. The Self man-
ifests through the organism; but there is always some part of the
Self unmanifested; and always, as it seems, some power 01 organic
expression in abeyance or reserve."
5. CRITICISM OF JAMES 1 PHILOSOPHIC MKTHUD fflTH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SELF. (4)
a. Failure of
James' prag-
matic method.
1
1
. Three
stages in
James ' pragma-
tism, with
criticism of
each.
a' . The right
to believe; it
is useful only
in very rare
instances
.
The exposition of James' pragmatic method and of his conception
of the self has now been completed. A criticism of both is next in
order of consideration. We may begin with the former. In the wide-
spread discussion wh.ch the promulgation of pragmatism has aroused,
various shortcomings in it have been asserted from diverse points
of view. Since, however, the standpoint in the following criticism
is restricted by the bearing of pragmatism upon the problem of per-
sonality, no attempt will be made to take account of other criti-
cisms of it which have been put forward from different points of
view. (5)
There are really three stages in the development of pragmatism
in the philosophy of William James, (a) The first is found in "The
Will to Believe," (more exactly, "the right to believe"), the point
of which is well expressed by J. B. Pratt: "When we are pressed with
a forced option between two alternatives both of which are genuinely
alive, but neither of which is demonstrable, then the course of wis-
dom is for us to choose tentatively that one v/hich is in accord with
our hopes rather than our fears, and to act as if it were true." (6)
This melioristic principle would enable one to make a decision if
he should find two equally good theories of personality, but since
this situation is likely to happen only in a very rare instance,
the principle is of negligible value so far as our problem is con-
cerned.
1) The Varieties of Religious Experience, page 211.
\2) Ibid., page 209-10.
(5) Quoted in The Varieties of Religious Experience, pages
511-12, from Llyers' essay on the "Subliminal Consciousness 1 in the
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, vol. VII, page 205,
(4) Compare above, pages 14-16.
(5) L7ote. I recognise that in some of the points of criticism
wh,ch follow I am unable to make the acknowledgments which are
probably due to many thinkers f
r
m whom I have learned.
(6) J. B . Pratt, Hibbert Journal, Oct., 19 11, page 2}0.
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1". It tends
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dividualistic.
ways of avoid-
ing this in-
dividualistic
tendency
:
a". Admit
contradictions
,
but this means
philosophic
despair
.
(b) The second stage is contained in the pragmatic rule, the
pragmatic cure for disputes! no controversy is justified unless it
has practical bearing upon our lives. This was the particular
doctrine to which James originally attached the name of pragmatism.
He represented it as a means of ending long-standing and stubborn
metaphysical disputes by reducing them to consequences which were
accepted as satisfying or were practically indifferent.
This rule is practically useless, however, because there is no
philosophical debate which has not seemed to have serious conse-
quences to its participants, and that is especially true of the his-
tory of thought about personality. Some theories which seem most
improbable to contemporary philosophers have appeared to their ex-
ponents to be indispensable in guaranteeing the preservation of cer-
tain great values, such, for example, as immortality, truth, or
moral responsibility. Certain disputes are inconsequential and neg-
ligible, therefore, only from the point of view of those confirmed
pragmatists who happen to be indifferent to them, and the pragmatic
rule offers no solution of the disputes to those for whom they are
important. But while this pragmatic panacea does not help to cure
and settle controversial problems, it does tend to sharpen our desire
for a theory of personality which shall do justice to the fulness of
man's practical interests.
(c) The pragmatic rule expresses the demand that ideas make
practical differences to men. The third stage of the pragmatism of
James is the development of a theory of truth according to which any
belief or idea is true which does make a difference to some one,
in the sense of working for him or of bringing satisfaction to him.
(1) This doctrine does not exclude the possibility that a belief
which is true for me because it brings emotional satisfaction may
contradict the accepted knowledge of my scientific neighbor; so that
a group of men might hold opinions which are inconsistent with one
another and yet true for taose who hold them. James admits this
possibility, but asserts that such contradictions often lead most
quickly to the truth. This assertion, however, does not relieve
the subjectivistic and individualistic tendencies which lie at the
heart of his doctrine. Further, there appear to be many excep-
tions to the pragmatic theory because true ideas or real facts
sometimes bring sorrow and suffering to pass and in their cases at
any rate satisfaction cannot be used as a test of truth. The sit-
uation is an unsatisfactory one. In what way may the individual-
istic
.
tendency in pragmatism be avoided? Several ways in which
this may be done will be examined.
(a) James himself admits the relativity of his theory, accepts
outright contradictions in human lit9, and decides irrevocably to
give up logic itself. (2) This choice is a confession of philosophic
despair which only a few easy-going or intellectually exhausted
philosophers would be willing to accept. For diametrically opposite
propositions to be true at the same time for two neighbors seems to
contradict the very notion of truth and to throw philosophy back
to the age of the Sophists. We cannot give up our hopes of
(1) See above, pages 15-16.
(2) See A Pluralistic Universe, pages 207-d.
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b". Make
social
reference,
but this
is impractical;
and, therefore,
The prag-
matic theory
of truth
cannot stand
its own test.
philosophic progress by sacrificing the logic of consistency upon
which that depends.
(b) John Dewey attempts to escape from the slough of subjec-
tivism by applying his social corrective, and by defending tne idea
that beliefs are true which, on the whole and in the long run, are
satisfying. This same corrective is suggested by James' own work
concerning The Varieties of Religious Experience
.
In the long run,
indeed, it is probable that only genuinely true theories would sur-
vive among those which now seem to be true. In the end , then, the
pragmatic account of truth might prove to be true.
This device, however, is a self-destructive reply, for to
answer thus is to deprive us of the very thing we are seeking,
namely, a present test for the truth that is applicable and useful.
The situation reminds one of the proerastimating procedure of cer-
tain quack doctors. When their prescribed medicine does not cure
according to expectations, they advise their patients to wait. Under
those circumstances there are chances that nature herself will work
the cure in spite of the medicine, and then, of course, the latter
is given the credit. If we work and wait long enough, we may find
the truth, but it is exceedingly doubtful whether pragmatism in the
end ce:~. offer any more useful mode of testing the truth of ideas
than it does now. To wait until the end of the long run is not
satisfying to those who seek a present .criterion of truth. W.
Caldv.ell is of the opinion that the pragmatic doctrine of truth is
"useless, seeing that omniscience alone could bring together in
thought or in imagination all the consequences of an assertion. n
(1) It is impractical to wait indefinitely for the tree of truth
to attain its full proportions.
Suppose, however, that we endeavor to find now an answer to
our quest. Then we shall have to determine what is most satisfying
on the whole. This is the test of social reference, and requires
us to go beyond our private satisfactions and to consider the
judgments of others. With regard to this procedure we may object,
first, that it is not a new test and does not deserve a new name.
But our chief objection is that this on-the-whole test is very hard
to use, and, therefore, fails to meet the requirements of the prag-
matic standard itself. It is so hard to apply that in fact it ia
no test at all, but is only an expression of a general desire for
the fulfilment of which pragmatism provides no criterion of such a
character that we may know when that desire has been satisfied.
We conclude, therefore, by propounding a dilemma to the prag-
matist: either he must rely upon private satisfactions as teats of
truth and end in rank individualism, or he must take refuge in a
teat of social reference which is so broad and indefinite that it
cannot be practically applied. If, aB the pragma tiata teach, a
theory mu8t work in order to be true, then the pragmatic theory
itaelf is not true, for it does nol work. Tho pructicul teat of
truth in pragmatism turns out to be bo impractical that it ia con-
demned by its own rule. The word, practical . refers to th. content,
rather than to the criterion, of truth.
(1) Pragmatiam and Idealiam, page 127.
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(c) There is a third way, however, of avoiding the individual-
istic tendencies of pragmatism, namely, by constructing an objective
system of values. But pragmatists have not worked out such a sys-
tem. Their failure to do so is perhaps their most fundamental
shortcoming. The need for such a system is great. It is obvious
that ideas "work" in very different ways, and that there is a great
variety of satisfactions, for example: the success of a scientific
hypothesis in accounting for relevant facts, the hope resulting from
a religious belief, the enjoyment of an artistic creation, the ease
with which a new idea fits in with one's customary opinions, etc.
When one kind of satisfaction conflicts with another, as is often
the case in one' s experience, or when one idea works for one person
but annoys his neighbor, how shall on: decide which is true? Ought
one to prefer a temporary emotional satisfaction to the delight
which comes from rational consistency? How shall one find the truth
when an actual fact brings him very disturbing and unpleasant feel-
ings? How practically decide the- differences that are made by the
assertion that the world is run by matter as contrasted with the one
that it is guided by spirit, without some comparison of the relative
worth of the human interests effected? The answer to such questions
depends upon some scale or system of values in which each kind of
satisfaction has a proper place and which will hold good for others
as well as for oneself. The "face-value" of things cannot decide the
ultimate and bitter conflicts of human ideals.
James is fond of saying that true ideas are those that are use-
ful. It is important to ask, Useful for what? That question
locates the fatal weakness in the pragmatic doctrine. This doctrine
asserts that the true is that which works, but does not say pre-
cisely for what anything should work. The condemning deficiency,
therefore, of pragmatism is its subjective tendency, its failure
to work out an objective system of values. It furnishes no practical
or definite method of deciding in countless particular instances
what is or what is not good or workable or satisfying. If one pins
James down to a fine point and asks for an exact definition of
practical , he will say that it really means particular . and stands
for the facts of concrete experience. This reply leads one into
the boundless world of experience, and one is farther than ever
from a definite description of practical meaning. And we are
obliged to conclude, again, that the pragmatic theory of truth does
not work, that is to say, fails to meet its own test of truth. Its
theory of truth is impractical without a system of objective
values, but James and his pragmatic disciples have failed to pro-
vide this definite scale of values which is required to make their
theory work.
The pragmatist might object to the above arraignment by saying
that the objedtive system of values referred to would be inconsist-
ent with his pluralistic principle, namely, that every man is a
maker of truth, and that that iatrue which works for each. But if
pragmatism cannot aucceed without such a. system of values, as we
have tried to show it ca not, and yet if^cannot harmonize such
a system with its own principles, then its inherent weakness has
been demonstrated.
The pragm-tic theory of truth is marked by a serious incom-
pleteness in that it lacks an elucidation of its presuppositions.
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2'. Prag- One of the most important of these is an active, remembering,
matism failB to intending verifier or interested thinker. Ideas clearly do not
elucidate its verify themselves . The pragmatist should give i an account of how
presuppositions, ideas in the pragmatic sense are ends or leadings whose cash- value
is sought by a striving, intelligent, purposive personality. The
pragmatist has explained to whom the satisfsx^i'ons^ in an imperfect
way, namely, by an indirect, implicit reference to the living or-
ganism. A much fuller and more explicit exposition is needed of
that marvellous being for whom differences and practical consequences
are significant, and who has the satisfactions which are so import-
ant in the pragmatic theory of truth.
Not only, therefore, has James failed to explain in a systematic
way for what purposes or ends true ideas are useful, but also for
whom. G. Papini has recognized the importance of both factors, for,
according to James' interpretation of him ^1), he says, in speaking
of the value of philosophy, that, "philosophic thought will resolve
itself into a comparative discussion of all the possible programs
for man's life when man is once for all regarded a6 a creative being.
The list of unexplained presuppositions could be extended, for
example: How can a concept or idea lead at all unless it already
has some meaning; but if it has some meaning, we cannot expect to
find its whole truth- significance in the satisfying consequences to
which it leads; so that the theoretical process appears to be an
important condition for the practical process of verification.
Again, in the background of the pragmatic expositions lies the as-
sumption that it is an universal and absolute theory which should
be accepted by everyone, and yet, according to its own principles,
truth is entirely relative.
3*. Summary The following statements represent a rough summary of the
of objections objections to the pragmatic method as applied to personality:
to the pragmatic (a) The pragmatic method does not provide a criterion of truth nor
method as ap- a philosophic method which enables us either to discover or to
plied to per- determine the true theory of personality, (b) In trying to escape
sonality. the individualism of pragmatism, its defenders take refuge in a
social-reference test v/hich is neither new nor practical, and which,
therefore, represents a confession of weakness, and a self-contra-
diction in the theory itself, (c) Pragmatism has failed to carry
out that development which i3 needed at once to complete its own
theory and that of personality, namely, a syatematization of the
interests that "make a difference" in human life. This promise of
pragmatism which is most important for a deeper understanding of
personality has not been realized, (d) Pragmatism has failed to
elucidate its presuppositions, one of the moat important of which
is an active, striving self.
The prag- (e) The pragnatic tendency to find the validity of ideas in
atic account the psychological conditions und ,r which riee klM resulted,
ef Bind is too on the whole, in a too biological and utilitarian conception of
biological. mind. The pragmatist has bc-n too much concerned with momentary
wants and animal desires. There is no doubt that in the primitive
stages of mental development coneciousneso was a valuable instru-
ment for the protection and promotion of life, and that to-day con-
(1) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,
1906, page }40.
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8ciouene3a has biological or vital value, but it is a mistake either
to suppose it has no other value, or to infer that its continued
value for life is most important.
D. C. Macintosh asserts that, "Pragmatism, as instrumental! sm,
must remember that instead of consciousness and judgments being
regarded as mere means for the promotion of the physical life, the
physical life is now regarded, even by people of ordinary spirit-
uality, as simply or chiefly instrumental in the promotion of the
conscious life in its spiritual aspects. The ideal interests no
longer exist for the sake of the physical, but the physical for the
sake of the ideal. 'Man began to think in order that he might eat:
he has evolved to the point where he eats in order that he may
think. 1 (1) . . . Truth can be measured by a higher standard than
its function in the struggle for bare existence, viz. by its func-
tion in the struggle for a better existence." (2) J. A. Leighton
points out in an emphatic way how "the instrumentalist errs by
taking one important function of conscious intelligence and making
it the sole function. ". (5)
When personality has once attained an experience which is
ideally valuable in independence of all biological usefulness and
when it is concerned with interests which have no connection with
the fate of the bodily organism, then principles other tnan biological
ones must be found for the explanation of personality, and then
animalistic interests should pl-y a subordinate role. An instru-
mentalistic theory of personality might be acceptable provided that
for which it is useful is a sufficiently exalted ideal and is not
bare organic survival, but in that case some such word as purposive
is preferable to the word, instrumental .
The pragmatic theory which has just been examined is an at-
tempt to explain mediate knowledge. Now some defects in James'
theory of immediate knowledge will be pointed out and the success
of his anti-conceptualism, considered. Trie following objections
may be offered to his immediatism.
Bare knowledge of acquaintance is an abstraction. There
appears to be no such thing in the adult experience in question in
anytheory of knowledge. John Dewey is right in maintaining that
there is "an element of mediation, that is of art, in all knowl-
edge. "(4) There is no doubt that some forma of knowledge contain
more immediate factors than others, which are more abstract, but it
seems impossible to exclude the conceptual factor altogether from
any knowledge which has any meaning. Pure knowledge of acquaintance
is no' knowledge at all. It gets some value as knowledge in the
philosophy of James because of the conceptual element which is
smuggled in under such phrases ae: "knowledge of acquaintance,
"
"perceptual experience," "immediate knowledge;" and .n such state-
ments as this one: it is "impooaible to understand" the flux of
experience by means of concepts; (5) if immediate feeling can give
(1) W. P. Montague, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Methods, vol. VI (1909), pag« '+89.
•(2) The Problem of Knowledge, page A}5
.
(5) The Field of Philosophy, 2d edition, pages ^59-46u.
(k) Influence of Darwin, etc., page 80.
(5) W. James., Some Problems of Philosophy, page 79.

66
2'
. James
overestimates
the worth of
immediate
feeling as
compared with
conception.
us an "understanof of experience, it has ceased to be immediate
feeling. We shall try to show more fully below (1) that intuitive
knowledge derives its value in part from conception. Further, it
is notable that the verification of an idea in immediate experience
is possible only if the verification is the termination of a con-
ceptual leading. It seems impossible to eliminate all conceptual
interpretation from immediate experience and to identify it as a
fact by itself.
In hi 8 high estimate of immediate knowledge James falls into
the usual mistake of the empiricist, namely, of finding the signifi-
cance of knowledge exclusively in its origin. Even if it be true
that "knowledge-about" is a development of immediate knowledge
,
yet
it is a development, and it is hard to see how either kind of
knowledge would amount to thout the help of the other. In
short, to seek truth in either exclusively is to fall into a
vicious fallacy of abstraction.
But if immediate knowledge, taken by itself, i3 not an ab-
straction or contradiction, then it is so poor in conscious meaning
that it is of little significance. James prefers immediacy of
feeling to the wholeness and breadth of conception. His preference
no doubt is dictated by his empiricistic preoccupation with the
given momentary experience, but if reality has a rational structure,
certainly given experience needs to be fitted into a comprehensive
whole by conceptual interpretation, and this whole would then be a
"deeper" reality than merely perceptual experience. Thi3 need ap-
plies especially to the understanding of personality, which, we be-
lieve, cannot be explained alone in terms of the immediate pulse of
experience. The fallacy of James, in contrast with the rational-
ists, consists in over-emphasizing the importance of knowledge of
acquaintance
.
James, however, in his later years, recognized (2) that con-
ception gives a breadth of comprehension which immediate experience
wholly lacks. He confesses that the trouble with aboriginal feeling
is that there is too little of it; we want more, (j) And he says
that instead of wading through the immediate experience of number-
less perceivers, we can get the increase demanded by substituting
conceptual systems. (4) He does not notice that the "wading" re-
ferred to would be itself useless without conceptual interpretation
and preservation of experiences, ^ince memory and purpose are
important phases of personality, concepts will be essential com-
ponents of it.
For my part, therefore, I am unable at present to discover
that the immediate flux of experience contains an "unlimited rich-
ness" apart from the work of intellect; it seems rather to contain
a very limited vagueness and fragmentar iness before intellect il-
luminates it. To take refuge in immediacy is to leave all the pro-
blems of analysis and synthesis unsolved James himself admits
that the less we analyze a tning, the leas we know about it. (5)
(1) See below, pages 16J-4.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy.
W) Ibid., page 96. (A) Ibid., page 97.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 221.
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The objection to the theory of James is that he altogether
underestimates the importance of conceptual interpretation and
exaggerates the importance of immediate feeling. How does he try-
to prove that concepts are inadequate to the fulness of reality?
Certainly by means of conceptual comparison. Hence, the value of
his affirmation that knowledge of acquaintance is the truer form
of knowledge depends upon the validity of his conceptual interpreta-
tion of experience and knowledge.
The danger to be avoided is the fallacy of abstraction,
whether it consists in supposing that either immediate feeling
alone or concepts alone can give us an understanding of personality .
We may expect that a satisfactory theory of personality will rest
upon a fusion or interweaving of both kinds of knowledge.
y. Concepts James is mistaken apparently in asserting that concepts,
may refer to supposed by him to be "static," cannot grasp changing reality. His
dynamic ob- thinking in this connection lacks the first degree of clearness,
jects, as The function of a concept or idea, in his theory of truth, is to
James fails point or lead to an experience which is immediately satisfying,
to recognize. But may not a concept, however static it is, point to something
which is changing as well as to somewthing which is stationary?
A concept cannot point successfuly to anything at all unless it
has some permanence of meaning, and the more static its meaning,
the more useful its meaning, and the more useful it is as an in-
strument for intellectual guidance and conservation. If meanings
were subject to incessant change, the verification of an idea
would be impossible, because pointings or leadings would not exist
long enough for us to follow them out. Further, does not the
awareness of change itself depend upon certain relatively permanent
centers of meaningful reference? V/hat these centers of reference
may be is suggested by James himself when he 3ays that the con-
ceptual "notes" on the flux of reality are "taken by ourselves." (l)
It seems, then, that James is not justified in objecting to
the static character of the meaning of a concept. Further, a con-
cept, as mental event, exists as a part of the stream of conscious-
ness, and as such, is not static. The moment, therefore, that one-
attempts to say in what sense a concept is static, James 1 objection
evaporates into thin air.
A 1
. Other Some other points of criticism may be noted. It was suggested
objections in the last paragraph that his anti-conccptualism is inconsistent
in brief. with a necessary presupposition of his pragmatic theory of verifica-
tion. Again, his own splendid conceptual analysis of activity
belies his assertion that activity is intellectually incomprehensi-
ble. ^2) Further, his anti -conceptual ism perhaps may be due in
part to his confusing the fact that we lack definite concepts for
the interpretation of all phases of reality and experience with
the notion that concepts cannot grasp reality at all.
( 1 ) A Pluralistic Universe, page 257.
(2) Some Problems of Philosophy, page G5.
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b. Objections
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Introduction.
We turn now to a criticism of James' doctrine of the self.
Hxo philosophy and psychology contain no single theory which is
wholly self-consistent, but rather, two conceptions which in some
respects are quite opposed to each other. In the above exposition
no attempt was made to separate wholly the two currents of his
thought. Rather his views were set forth in as systematic and com-
plete a way as the factswould fairly w&rrant. A survey of this
exposition suggests that perhaps it presents a more balanced and
complete view than his writings justify. If this is the case, it
may be explained by the fact that our own predilection as to what
is important in a satisfactory view of personality has resulted in
an emphasis upon some points which occupy a more or less incidental
place in his own exposition. Many quotations from Janes' own
writings have been introduced so as to minimize the improper modi-
fications of his thought in the process of interpretation.
Of the two conceptions of the self found in the works of
James, the weaker appears in his radical empiricism, and the more
valuable one in his psychological and pragmatic writings. In the
first context consciousness is a passive conjunction of neutral
elements, while in the second context personality exhibits some
active, purposive, and interested characteristics. E. N. Llerring-
ton suggests that, "One line fights for a sort of simplicity,
and what looks like a monistic empiricism, while the other contends
for fulness of life, individualism, and pluralism. The key to the
struggle is given, I believe, in the Psychology . where the person
is admitted as uniquely real, and yet is pushed into the whirling
•stream of thought. •" (l) The ambiguity and shifting meaning pres-
ent in the use of the term, practical , is probably one way in which
James easily slips fron one view to the other; practical sometimes
means purely empirical , and sometimes refers to active, personal
values. (2) A criticism of Janes' two views of the self in the
order mentioned above will now be undertaken.
In James' philosophy of pure experience personality disappears
in any recognizable form. J. A. Leighton points out that in "neutral
monism" in general "the self is resolved into an ever shifting
phantasmagoria of neutral entities selected by the brain." (5)
Hence, if personality is to mean a definite reality standing on its
own grounds, it is necessary to show that the reasons why it vanishes
in radical empirlicLiBia are fallscious. We proceed to make this attempt
in the following pages.
In the first place, Janes is self-contradictory in hie theory
of experience. He wavers between a "neutral monism" of pure exper-
ience and a relative dualism of personal selves and their objects.
(4) In his Princl] lea of Psychology he holds that the duplicity
between mental content and activity, between subject and object, is
a fundamental fact, but in radical empiricism, (5) he refuses to
M) The Problem of Personality, page 21.
(2) See above, page 16.
(5) The Field of Philosophy , 2d Litl©n, page 457.
(4) For extensive quotations from the sources bearing upon this
and following pointo, see above, pages 21-2, 25-26.
(5) See above, page 29.
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to sustain his belief in this inner duplicity. The clear and
daring tendency of his later thought is to deny his earlier view
and to dissolve both knower and known into a common medium. The
self and its activities become a part of the content of experience,
and personality is merely one of the relations in which the terms
of pure experience come to stand. Since the two views are mutually
contradictory, we must decide which is the truer one. Some reasons
for believing that the earlier view stands nearer the truth will
now be offered.
In the second place, pure experience seems to be a pure ab-
straction. James has not succeeded in demonstrating its actuality.
He leaves the manner of its existence unsettled. He asserts merely
that it is, and tells us that we must not ask any further questions
about it. We assert that it is not, save as an empty human thought,
and will offer some reasons for this affirmation.
The adjective, pure , is presumably attached so as to call
attention to the exclusion of the subject-object distinction from
experience, and to indicate its simplicity in this respect. But
what does this exclusion mean? Where will we find a sample of
"pure" experience? In inarticulate and low-grade feeling? No;
not in any such thing, because this is characterized by the pres-
ence of consciousness, and pure experience is neither mental nor
physical; it is pure; it is assumed that consciousness is absent
where mind is absent. Pure experience is more like "the boundless"
of Anaximander, of which no samples can be found in the actual
world, than anything else of which I can think.
Now it appears to be an abuse of language to call anything
experience which is not mental or conscious in some sense. The
pure experience of the philosophy of James ought to pass muster
under some more appropriate name, such as, "the neutral mosaic"
of E. B. Holt, (1) and then it could be more easily recognized for
what it is, a barren abstraction, and it could not so easily cheat
its way into the respectable society of significant terms.
I have endeavored to understand the meaning of pure experience
in various ways. I have tried to find its significance in what
James calls the subconscious world, but here I either meet God, who
certainly has different characteristics than pure experience, or
I meet nervous changes, and am lost in the haze of materialism.
I have attempted to grasp its ontological status by comparing it
with the entities of mathematics or mathematical logic, but it
turns out in every case to be what I believe it is, an empty ab-
straction. For reasons which will be presented more fully below (£)
,
I am compelled to agree with J. Laird, that no experience is pos-
sible unless the distinction between a conscious act and its ob-
ject exists in it. This fundamental distinction ie the foundation
of James Ward's whole system of Psychology. (J)
We will now present a positive argument for objecting to
James' doctrine of pure experience, and in doing so, we can fre-
(1) The Concept of Consciousness , chapter VIII.
(2) See below, pages 233-45.
(5) Psychological Principles; see bolow, pa^e 2J7
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y. Actual quently turn his own statements against himself. The chief posi-
experience tive reason for rejecting his view is that there is a personal
at the human aspect of our actual experience which cannot be reduced to or ex-
level involves pressed in the neutral and impersonal terms of pure experience,
a personal That is, we shall remove the contradiction in his thinking by
subject for defending the second of his two opposed views, which are as follows:
the following first, that experience leans on nothing, and is prior to .the dis-
reasons: tinction between mental and physical; that is to say, it is pure;
secondly, that all reality must be experienced by some personal
experient. This experient is taken to mean the acting self possess-
ing "personal" marks such as James himself describes in some places.
The following are the reasons for preferring this second alternative.
a 1
.
Personal Many of our experiences, for example, memories, affections,
experiences are loyalties, sins, acts of worship, cherished moral ideals, etc.,
irresoluble seem to have a personal quality which is simply incommutable. In
into neutral what way such personal experiences, aglow with the fire of our "pri-
terms. vate destinies," can surrender the_r personal attributes and be
transmuted into the pallid "terms" of pure experience is exceedingly
difficult to understand or imagine; the transformation would be as
great a marvel as the transmutation of finite experience by the
Absolute of F. H. Bradley. So long as these experiences exist at
all, they retain the unique attributes derived from their connection
with the vital interests of their owners. When one forgets certain
of his affections and loyalties, he has no consciousness that they
dissolve into a simpler form of existence, such as neutral elements.
In brief, James 1 doctrine of pure experience assumes a relation
between personal experiences and neutral elements which he has not
explained in a convincing way.
b'. Person- James does attempt to explain how consciousness or personality
ality is pre- arises out of neutral elements. Consciousness, he asserts, is one
supposed in all of the relatio.13 or "contexts in which the neutral bits of pure
attempts to experience come to be taken, and the physical world is another such
derive it from context. It is a fundamental question to ask, How these pieces come
pure experience, to be "taken" in either way? His answer is, that "we" "sort" the
terms of pure experience "according to our temporary purposes." (1)
The vicious circle of reasoning which is present in this argu-
ment is evident. The personality itself which is supposed to come
into existence as a function when pieces of pure experience are
sorted in a cert in way doe3 the sorting, and is, therefore, pre-
supposed. The context-theory of personality or of consciousness
assumes what it seeks to explain. This circle of reasoning demon-
strates the impossibility of deriving personality from an imper-
sonal or pure experience. If "our" sorting is required to get
either mental or physical conjunctions out of pure experience, it
looks very much as if pure experience rather than Consciousness
were a nonentity.
In other transformations of pure experience the self is also
assumed. With great boldness James endeavors to account for knowl-
edge without the presence of a conscious subject as distinguished
from the known object. He maintains that knowledge is possible
without assuming the existence of consciousness because one term
(1) See above, page }1
.
L
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may function as subject or knower and another as known. (1) The
notable trouble with this argument is that the knowing subject is
reinstated, and if it is not conscious, it is meaningless.
Again, James declares that pure experience meaus "the instant
field of the present." (2) But now it seems absurd to suppose that
anything is present without its presence being a conscious one, and
anything that is consciously present, must be present to someone.
But for whom is pure experience present? If it is not consciously
present for someone, it is a bare abstraction; we do not find that
James answers the questions, and we draw the appropriate inference.
Further, he asserts that one part of experience may take on a
retrospecti ve function with reference to another. This assertion
involves several difficulties. If experience is present, it is not
retrospective. Again, according to the fundamental principles of
neutral monism, retrospection is impossible because it involves the
conscious continuity of the self and this continuity is not pro-
vided in the variety of contexts which happen to befall the bits of
pure experience.
Again, is not one following a fruitless trail in trying to
express self-consciousness in terms of context? If consciousness
is a context, what is self-consciousness? To say it is a context
of a context is not illuminating. J. A. Leighton asks (3), "Can a
searchlight search for its own searchings?"
In short, the attempts to explain personality in terms of a
context of neutral elements is either meaningless or asaumes what
jcx is to be explained. Not pure experience, but personal experience
ia the "materia prima" of reality. The doctrine that mental and
physical may be distinguished as two points of view toward exper-
ience may be a valuable one, but points of view do not exist apart
from some active interested self who takes them. The philosophy of
points of view needs to be made more explicit.
James deliberately tries to do without the active self in his
doctrine that all relations, "both conjunctive and disjuncti/e" are
matters of experienced contents and belong to the continuum of ex-
perience. This phase of radical empiricism avoids the atomism of
classical empiricism and represents, so far, an improvement upon the
view of Hume. For James, the states of consciousness are continuous
and not discrete. This stream, however, tends to fall into pieces
in his doctrine of a succession of passing thoughts each possessing
an indecomposable unity. In any case, James' continuum of pure ex-
perience is as abstract as Hume's collection of sensations, and both
alike lack a grounding in the personal self. Wm. Caldwell observes
in this connection (4) that "In regard to thio radical empiricism,
I am obliged as a Kantian to say that to my mind it represents the
reduction of all Pragmatism and Empiricism to an impossibility—to
the fatuous attempt (exploded forever by Hume) to explain knowledge
a:id experience without first principles of souejcind or another. . .
A philosophy without first principles, or a philosophy that reduces
tiie relations between experiences to -lere 'bits' of experience,
is indeed no philosophy at all."
"(1) Essays in Radical Empiricism page 55; see above, pt
(2) See above, pa 5e 29.
(5) The Field of Philosophy, 2d edition, page <+57.
(A) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 11, noto 2.
*9.
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James 1 account of experience in his radical empiricism tends
to represent it as quite too passive in character. In certain con-
nections he himself ascribes to experience an active, creative capac-
ity. He declares in one of his latest writings (1) that, "With
concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively
turn tnis way or that, bend our experience and make it tell us
whither it is bound. We change its order, run it backwards, bring
far bit3 together and separate near bits," etc. In his account of
activity, it was noted that he thinks that "real activities" "make
things be" which otherwise would not be. In his Psyehologyhe points
out how interests greatly modify experience. "The interest itself . .
make
8
experience more than it is made by it." (2)
This is the truer account of experience, but needs an active
self to complete it, for the self is required not only if relations
of any kind are to be experienced, but if new ones are to be intro-
duced. The idea that all relations in which the pieces of pure
experience are given—to what?— is inconsistent with the facts
which James himself brings forward. Some relations are experienced
because some personal self desires or purposes that they should be;
they are not immediately but subsequently experienced. James states
in The Principles of Psychology that, "The things are conjoined in
the thought, whatever may be the relation in which they appear to
the thought." (5) A genuine "subjective synthesis" is accomplished
by thought, (j) We conclude, therefore, that at leasee, some relations
are not given but introduced, and their introduction demands an ac-
tive and intelligent self. Another fundamental objection, then, to
neutral monism is, that it does not provide for the introduction of
relations by the activity of the conscious self itself.
James admits the existence of activities, but does not meet
our objection to the too passive character of experience, because
he represents our activites themselves as "eimply given." (4) Even
free will means merely the fact of novelty in our experience and is
phenomenal. (5) Pure experience lacks the push of Bergon's elan
vital. The general tendency, then, of the radical empiricism of
James is to surrender all the initiative of personality to the flux
of the stream of consciousness. This direction of his thought is
corrected by the "humanism" of the British thinker, F. C. S. Schiller,
who emphasizes the importance of personal activity in the constitu-
tion of truth and reality.
James, in his philosophy of pure experience, seldom succeeds
in avoiding entirely those personal selves which in other places he
explicitly
C
regards' as genuine samples of reality. We have seen at
length how he wavers between a pure and a personal account of ex-
perience and consciousness. When he i3 endeavoring to talk in terms
of pure experience, he repeatedly falls into the personal way of
describing experience. . This fact demonstrates the unstable and
abstract character of pure experience. His intellectual circlings
and revolutions are well illustrated in the following statements: (6)
(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, page 64.
Ifc) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page hO;
(3) Ibid., page 5^1
.
(4) A Pluralistic Universe, page }74
.
(5) See above, page ^ .
(6) Some Problems of Philosophy, page I5I
.
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Biography is the concrete form in which all that is, is immediately
given; the perceptual flux is the authentic stuff of each of our
biographies." He changes his point of view in two successive sen-
tences.
That the world of pure experience really depends upon an exper-
iencing subject he himself tends to admit in places. He maintains
that a fundamental principle of radical empiricism is that "nothing
shall be admitted as a fact
. . .
except what can be experienced at
some definite time by some experient." (1) irfhat is the point of
•
• asserting that the stream of thinking is "emphatically phenomenal, 11
(2) if thinking is immediately real and does not depend upon a
thinker? I am unable to discover any thoughts which exist apart
from the self-realizing life of some intelligent thinker or self.
Th~ flux of experience itself cannot account for the abiding con-
ception of itself
.
Indeed, are not the notions of "the stream of
consciousness" and "the passing thought" themselves constructions,
as E. N. Merrington suggests? (5) The latter observes that, "Ex-
perience gives none of these hypothetical moments of consciousness
in which the flow consists.
. .
And further such constructions as
Empiricists put forward are incapable of being made except by the
active mind or Self, enduring through time, and appear to transcend
the terms of the series and connect them into a series." The places
in the writings of James where the active self manifests itself in
no indistinct way are so numerous that I have abandoned my original
intention of listing some of the most important ones, (4)
4'. Summary. We concluded that the doctrine of the self in James' philosophy
of pure experience contains numerous errors a;;d is quite untenable.
He has failed in his attempt to resolve "personal form and activity"
into the contents of pure experience. His efforts to get rid of the
inner duplicity of consciousness has resulted in its reaffirmation.
The personalistic trend of his thought, found in parte of his Princi-
ples of Psycho logy where thoughts and feelings belong to personal
selves, and notably present in his Var i eties of Religious Experience
where reality is most clearly revealed in personal life, is the
sounder of the two currents in his philosophy We can agree with
E. K. Merrington (5) when he concludes that, "Altogether, I feel
that the examination of the efforts of Professor James to provide
for a theory of experience without a Self confirms the opinion that
such a theory, no matter how ingeniously worked out, i3 wholly un-
satisfactory and in its very nature liuble to all trie objections
brought against Hume's view of psychology and metaphysics." We
must leave now J^mes' conception of the self as worked out in hie
radical empiricism, and take up the discussion of the defects and
virtues of his doctrine of the self as found in his psychological
writings
.
(1) A Pluralistic Universe, pa^e J72.
2) Essaya in Ra'dical Empiricism, page 57-
5) The Problem of Personality, pages 177-8
•
(4) For some examples, sec below, pages 7^-60.
(5) The Problem of Personality, page 2^.
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c. Criticism
of James ' view
of the self as
it is found in
his psycholog-
ical and prag-
matic writings
.
Introduction.
1 Janes' imme-
diate datum is
the stream of
consciousness
rather than the
personal self.
2'. James' use
of the term,
thought
, is
misleading.
The second current of self-theory running through the thought
of James is wonderfully fertile in suggestions with regard to the
nature of personality. His conception of personality as it is con-
strued especially in his psychological and pragmatic writings de-
serves very careful evaluation. These writings of course can be
separated only in a very rough way, but there is no doubt but that
they, especially the former, contain by far the richer of James 1
two general views of the self.
In his Principles of Psychology James starts out with the single
postulate that "thinking of some sort goes on." (1) He calls the
process a "stream of thought" or "stream of consciousness, " the pres-
ent changing center or crest of which is designated, "the passing
thought." He "notices immediately five important characters in the
process," and the first of these is that it is personal; "thought
tends to personal form." (2) All thoughts and feelings are parts
of some personal consciousness. (2) The "ele.nentary psychic fact"
is not "thought," but "my thought, every thought being owned." (.5)
Then he asserts, "On these terms the personal self rather than the
thought might be treated as the immediate datum of psychology." (4)
The word, might , should be italicized because the personal self
remains for him only a possible immediate datumj the actual and
ultimate one with which he works is the passing thought or the
stream of consciousness. He maintains that, over and above the
purely objective self and not-self, "there is nothing save the fact
that they are known, the fact of the stream of thought being ihere
as the indispensable subjective condition of their being experienced
at all." (5) In other words, the working point of departure in the
psychology of James is not a personal self which develops and changes
in time, but the stream of thought which has, among other characters,
a personal one. He desires hi3 theory of consciousness to remain
"unemcumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of pass-
ing thoughts or states of mind." The metaphysical question which
appears here i3 whether this stream of thought or the passing thought
can successfully fill thi3 office of a fundamental principle. Some
reasons for denying that it can do so will be put forward.
An objection which easily occurs to a casual reader of James
is that his use of the term, thought . i3 illegitimate and mislead-
ing, for is it not inconsistent to attempt to classify all mental
fact3 under the head of thoughts, when feelings and volitions seem
to have such variant attributes, and is this not especially true
of the pragmatist with his love of action? This appears to be a
valid objection, but James is able to meet it in a very genial and
courteous way by simply reminding the reader thtft he means thought
to include "every form of consciousness indiscriminately." (6) His
usage,' therefore, is very similar to the Cartesian definition of
thought. This is a nominal escape, but actually James ignores
such a possible objection.
(1) Principles of Psychology, v
(2) Ibid., page 225.
(4) Ibid. For further evidence
(5) Ibid., page 504.
(6) Ibid., page 224.
1. I, p. 224.
(5) Ibid., page 226.
Bee above, pages 25-26.
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cultieB and
doubts ar i 3 o
in the at-
tempt to
criticize
Jaae3' the-
ory of the
self.
b 1
.
Since
James personi-
fies thought,
he ought to
talk in terms
of personality
or soul rather
.than of
thought
.
5
1
.
Does James
hold a piece-
meal view of
consciousness?
from much experience I can testify that the critic of James'
theory of the self has a very difficult and doubtful problem in
deciding just what view he means in the end to hold. So abundant
are his observations and so exuberant his rhetoric that one can
find, somewhere in his writings, statements to disprove almost any
adverse criticism brought against him. This fact makes criticism
of him an unpleasant task, because whatever faulx one finds with
30me phasu of his views, one can usually think of some statement
of his own in the light of which the criticism is unfair, at least
in part. One frequently wishes that James had been much more self-
consistent so as to relieve one of the pains of doubt and hesitation
in the interpretation of his thought.
For example, suppose one charges James with defending an im-
personal psychology; he can reply that the passing thought does
the work of the selfj it not only thinks, but it chooses and remem-
bers, and performs other functions of a person. And if you blame
him for championing a self-psychology, he can answer by saying that
the passing thought and not the self is his fundamental datum. Thus
he can ward off objections, by twisting now this way and now that,
but this devious way of varied rhetoric and unreconciled oppositions
is an unstable and dangerous one. The passing thought is neither
a mere thought nor a full self. It is a kind of hybrid which can
pass for either as occasion demands.
In spite of James' clear definition of bis use oi thought , it
is fair to maintain that it is an abuse of terms to include in the
class of thoughts such mental facts as emotions, feelings, choices,
and impulsive actions. This use of thought is quite too broad. If
the passing thought can recollect, act aa an agent, and function as
the principle of personal identity, it is no longer properly called
thought"
. A new name is needed. "Pay not use the term, self or per-
sonality ? It is certainly confusing to avoid the use of a term be-
cause it has certain meanings, and then to reinstate those meanings
as connotations of another term. What James actually has done is
to. " personify thought ." as F. B. Jevons well suggests; the latter
adds, "By personifying thoughts we do not get rid of personality,
any more than the magician's apprentice, by breaking to pieces the
broom-stick, got rid of the pail of water it was fetching. On the
contrary all the pieces fetched pails. So too the result of break-
ing up the unity of the self is that we get a self bewitched into
as many selves as there are thoughts. But this embarrassing result
is a mere piece of magic, which substitutes passing thoughts in
the place of the identity of the thinker." (1)
A closer examination needs to be made of Jameo ' fundamental
peychelogioal assumption, namely, the stream of consciousness,
together with its crest or center, the passing thought. The first
question which arises in this connection is whether he regards the
stream of thought as continuous or atomistic . Whilu James plainly
states that it is continuous, (2) yet when he explains personal
identity, he seems to split up consciousness into a series of
pass-
ing thoughts, every one of which possesses an indissoluble unity,
(1) Personality, page 70.
(2) See above, page 24.
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in James 1 the-
ory of personal
identity. Brief
review of the
theory
.
a'
. The self-
identifying,
ap^ropriative
act of every
passing thought
is contrary to
fact.
and dies before its successor appears. James assertB that "each
Thought dies away and is replaced by another." (1) In this situa-
tion consciousness is no longer a continuum, but a succession of
many selves, each of which is a thinker. If this is a true repre-
sentation of his view, he seems to have made little progress beyond
atomistic sensationalism. F. B. Jevons maintains that this is the
proper interpretation of the thought of James. Accordingly , it is
quite possible to say, as James himself does, that there are as many
selves as there are passing thoughts. In my judgment, this is a
relatively untrue interpretation of James. His most characteristic
view probably is that consciousness is sensibly continuous, although
one should bear in mind the uncertainty connected with this judg-
ment
.
Nevertheless, it is from the point of view of consciousness as
a series of passing thoughts that James explains his theory of per-
sonal identity. What this theory is has been already stated. (2)
A critical examination of it is now in order. The problem is, how
one passing thought connects up with another? The answer is that
one thought notices a similarity, with respect to the qualities of
"warmth and intimacy" between itself and a "distant self,", and, by
an act of comparison, judges that the two are continuous. Every
passing thought, as it comes into existence, accepts and appropriates
as its own certain of the possessions of another dying thought. In
this way James tries to explain personal identity without introducing
any abiding or identical being distinct from the stream of conscious-
ness and without relying upon any hypothesis other than that of the
passing thought. Its appropriation upon the basis of a judgment of
identity constitutes personal identity. Attention will now be called
to some eerious defects In this a_ tjropriative theory of personal
identity
.
In the first place, this appropriative act of every newly-born
passing thought, by which it links its history with another dying
thought and thus establishes and maintains the identity of a per-
sonal biography, is evidently contrary to fact. It is undoubtedly
true that many thoughts do precisely this "trick" in a limited way,
but the warrant is lacking for asserting that many, or indeed that
any large number, of our human thoughts actually perform this trick.
But in order to destroy the validity of the theory of James it is
not necessary that this function be denied to a majority of thoughts,
but only to a few, indeed, only to one in the series of passing
thoughts, for if only one of my thoughts fails, the instant it comes
into being, to adopt its predecessors as its very own, its single
hope of connecting up with any personal past is lost, since there
is, according to Janes, no other identity than that which is made
by the appropriative act of each newly appearing thought. If the
hypothesis of James were correct, it would be possible for a stream
of consciousness to lose all personal continuity if its core, the
passing thought, should become so fully absorbed in a series of re-
flections about a beautiful painting or the solution of a difficult
mathematical problem that it for otto recognize its own ancestors.
TJ The Brinciples of Psychology, vol. I, page 329
.
,2) See above, pages ^6-7
.
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b' . The ap-
propriation of
one's whole
past is too
big a task for
any momentary
pulse of
thought
.
c'
. The appro-
priativo theory
over-emphasizes
the retrospec-
tive character
of conscious-
ness
.
There is good evidence for maintaining that it is possible to find,
in some cases of thinking, activity where there is lacking, as fac-
tors in the situation, any conscious judgment that a present affect-
ive warmth resembles, even if it is present, some past affective
warmth
.
In short, if one link in the chain of appropriations is wanting
here or there, the chain as a whole is worthless. The consistent
result would be, indeed, not a self-continuity , but a aeries of
selves of varying longevity. Some of these selves would be exceed-
ingly poor because of the brevity of their life. The first objection
to James 1 theory of personal identity, therefore, is that not every
pulse of^hought loes, as a matter of fact, stop to accept or repudi-
ate various items of some other dying thought; I have been unable to
verify the theory in my own experience. The newiy-borxi thought does
not always get to the bedside of the dying parent in time to receive
its spiritual inheritance by word of mouth.
A second objection to this notion of personal identity is that
the appropriation of one's whole past is too big a task for any sin-
gle pulse of thought. The items in the past of any normal adult
human being which he would desire to call his own are so numerous
that it is altogether too much to ask each new thought that is born
first to adopt all thet;e items. If it takes some men many years to
write their autobiographies, how can one little passing thought per-
form this task? The theory is top-heavy, and requires the passing
thought to do more than it ia capable of doing, at least in human
experience. The possessions of the self rhica J'i.ues himself mentions
in his chapter on the consciousness of the self are so complex and
elaborate that no single pulse of thought could appropriate them.
The fact seems to be that when we become interested in review-
ing what belongs to our past history, we p rforn the bask in a piece-
meal manner, and we build up a conception of what we are just as we
arrive at the idea of other complex entities, save that the source
of the materials is different, and the conception, when it is con-
structed, is not before the mind in its entirety, at any one moment.
The work which the passing thought is called upon to do is too com-
plicated for the time it has for its performance . James appropria-
tive theory ie certainly an exceedingly bold assumption. That each
passing thought does what he claims for it is extremely doubtful
and hypothetical. Personal identity really disappears altogether
according to this scheme, becauoe in frequent instances links ore
actually lacking, and there is nothing other than the passing thought
to bridge the gap which it fails to brio, i
A third objection to Jemus' doctrine of personal identity is
that it gives to consciousness a character which is altogether too
retrospective and backward-looking to fit the facts. If each new
thought had to appropriate its whole past, it is hard to see how it
would have opportunity to do anything sls«. It would degenerate or
come to a standstill in a stagnant pool of reminiscence. If the
passing thought locks in one direction more than another, it is
towurd'the future rather than the past. Conscious life as we know
it is largely a forwurd-lookin^ afiair, a quust for ends *hich we
experience as relatively permanent. James' theory of personal
identity is too retrospective to fit well with the purposive char-
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theory of per-
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5'. Diffi-
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conception of
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consciousness
.
a
1
. The
stream of con-
sciousness
lacks a con-
stant factor,
i.e. the self,
which alone
makes possible
consciousness
of the stream
acter of consciousness which he emphasizes elsewhere. It will be
indicated below (1) how the concept cf personality involves both
elements
.
These ere the main objections to the appropriati ve theory of
personal identity when it is put forward in an exclusive way as it
is by James. They may be summarized as follows: His mistake lies
(a) in over-emphasizing retrospection in comparison with prospec-
tive seeking, (b) in supposing that the assertion of the connection
of one's present self with one's past is a universal characteristic
of every passing thought, and finally, (c) in assigning to the pres-
ent thought a task which is too large for it to bear. Since these
are serious objections to the theory, it i3 unnecessary to bring
forward other minor one3 which could be urged against it. (2)
It was pointed out above (jj) that F. B. Jevon3 exaggerates his
atomistic interpretation of James' theory of consciousness. On the
contrary, James declares repeatedly that consciousness is "sensibly
continuous." Kis original reason for adopting the metaphor of a
"stream of consciousness" was the implied suggestion that it pos-
sesses "a unity of its own kind." Kis conception of the stream of
consciousness demands careful criticism. The more serious diffi-
culty in J<^mE8 ' theory of consciousness does not consist in get-
ting one passing thought to appropriate its predecessor, but in get-
ting anything in the stream of consciousness that absVLdes amid the
flux, for thought is constantly changing, (k)
The essential difficulty to be noted is that, if the total
mental life moves forward in the stre i of consciousness, the con-
sciousness of the stream itself would .ot ariye. The presupposition
of the consciousness of a stream, as distinguished from the stream
of consciousness, i3 that something, whatever one call6 it, abides
and does not itself also partake of the flux in the same way or de-
gree as other elements. From the point of view of the third part
of this investigation, the active self or personality makes possible
the consciousness of the stream by grasping in a unity the various
passing thoughts or phases of the stream of consciousness. It is
only because such a self is able to transcend any one phase of the
stream and grasp other phases as p^rts of a series or progression
that there is any stream of consciousness at all. One of the merits
of Bowne's theory of personality is an emphasis upon this important
function of personality in making change possible.
But does not James propose something which is relatively con-
stant in the flux of consciousness? Yes, he does so. He maintains
that a group of bodily feelings or sensations persist. It is impor-
tant to ask whether it is as bodily or aa mental processes that they
supply the requisite abiding factor. That they are due to certain
comparatively permanent bodily conditions is unuoubtedly true, but
it is well known that the distinction between before and after in
bodily occurrences is not made by these processes themselves, but
by a thinker who grasps certain bodily events in a single compre-
hensive thought of succession. James makes the same mistake that
(1) See below, pages 262-6^.
(2) Other objections are set forth by John Laird, Problems
of the Self, pages 71 -74.
(5) P^es 75-7.
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page <i2?.
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Hume does: he looks for personal identit^r among phenomena and
naturally does not find it. It is not, then, in the corporeal as-
pect of bodily feelings that we find the principle of permanence.
That principle must, therefore, be sought in their mental
aspect. But these feelings, considered as mental facts, are them-
selves passing thoughts, which, by hypothesis, are constantly
changing. Bodily feelings, then, do not provide the abiding element
which makes possible the apprehension of the stream as a stream.
Indeed, we find ourselves ending in an unadulterated temporalism
where all is flowing and nobody knows it save the radical empiricist.
This is an untenable and impossible situation. The self upon which
alone the consciousness of the stream can lean is not a recognized
part of James 1 theory. A stream of consciousness, flowing on with-
out any one knowing it, belongs in the abstract world of pure exper-
ience, and not in the concrete personal world.
The stream of consciousness itself i3 a scientific con-
struction, selected for the purpose of explaining experience, by an
active, interested thinker who is something more than the mere pro-
cess of experience in which he participates. The passing thought,
likewise, is an intellectual product of thisAsame thinker. As ab-
stract concepts for the purpose of explaining experience, they are
very useful, but when one goes beyond their psychological function,
and inquires for their metaphysical grounds, one aces not I'ind
those grounds in the concepts themselves, but in the x» £x& intel-
ligent personality who builds them for its own purposes. James,
therefore, would have done better to have adopted at the beginning
personal selves rather than the stream of consciousness as the ul-
timate datum in psychology, for we must return to them in the end,
when we seek a philosophic explanation of the stream of conscious-
ness. James himself does not avoid coming back to them over and
over again,, even in his psychological writings, as the following
facts will indicate.
As an example of the suggestions found in James' own words to
the effect that the 6tream of consciousness depends upon something
beside itself, let us take that summary of personal identity where
he speaks of it as one of our "perceptions of sameness among phe-
nomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in
a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the
phenomena compered." (1) It is evident that J&aes here refers, in
a way that is no longer merely implicit, to a factor in the stream
of consciousness which lasts long enough at least to compare cer-
tain phenomena "before the mind."
No.v m ny embarrassin/; questions could be propounded concern-
ing this passage. To whom or to what are the phenomena presented?
Ifho does the comparing, or are comparisons self-starting? Whtt is
meant by the "mind" here before which the phenomena pass in review?
V/ho draws the conclusion? Who makes the judgment of sameness or
identity, and who sees the resemblance? E. N. Merrington reminds
us that, "The judgment itself implies a synthetic activity of the
self." (2) For whom is the continuity? or ia it an abstraction?
who does the perceiving?
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 5^4.
(2) The Problem of Personality, page
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.
Introduction:
examples of
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fies the self
with bodily
feelings
.
This passage is an excellent illustration of the multiple
dii'ficultijas which Jame3 faces in attempting to get along without
assuming anything but the stream of consciousness. It contains
in itself many hidden confessions of the insufficiency of his
hypothesis. He had bettei stick to his assertion that, "The ego
. . .
must form a liaison between all the things of which we be-
come successively aware." (1) He"fights shy," however ox' assuming
any agency of combination outside the stream of thought; when the
work of an agent needs to be performed, the passing thought is able
to perform it; "it i3 the Thought to whom the various 'constituents'
are known," (2) and which chooses among them to suit its own ends.
Objections to this oroad use of thought have been explained above.
(5) what we have here is tue active self making choices. The
thought or agency of thisAself is the fundamental fact.
In the exposition of attention an incompleteness is present
from the philosophical standpoint. James says that attention con-
sists in holding an idea before the mind until it fills tne mind,
and having filled the mind, it results in action. (4) From the
metaphysical point of view, the most interesting feature of this
situation is the fact of "holding." what is the source of it? It
is left by James quite unexplained. He regards it probably as a
metaphysical question which a psychologist should avoid. It should
be noted that some of the above criticisms of James deserve per-
haps to be discounted to some extent because the point of view of
this inquiry is metaphysical, while James clearly states that he
avoids metaphysical implications. He lives up to this intention
very well in his Principles of Psychology , but our criticism may
be entirely justified in view of the way in which ne takes over his
psychological view into his philosophical writings.
We have found several crucial points in James' exposition of
his theory of the self where he identifies tne center of personality
with bodily feelings. The most striking instance is where he avers
that he eamwt discover any activities which figure as personal
ones which are not movements in our bodies, and where he declares
that the body is the center of our interests and actions. Likewise,
when he wrestles in closest quarters with the spiritual self, he
finds no spiritual element at all, but only bodily processes. (6)
Again, the kernel around which are gathered all the elements of
personal identity, especially "warmth and intimacy," is the feeling
of the body. (7) There is no reason for supposing that James would
have hesitated in affirming that the self is indeed the body as it
is experienced. These facts confirm the asse.tion (8) that James
tends to hold a too biological conception of mind. These points
suggest certainly a very striking doctrine which calls for careful
examination. We shall mention here In summary form certain
(J) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 242.
(2) Ibid. /page 5^0.
(5) See above, pages 74-5*
(4) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 564.
{J) See above, pages 49-50-
(6) See above, page 35-
(7) See above, pages 59-40.
(8) See above pages 64-65-
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objections which seem relevant to Jakes' view and return to the
subject below. ( 1
)
The first defect in James" generi identification of the self
with bodily feelings is that he here confuses the psychological and
physiological conditions under which one becomes aware of tne self,
or under which the idea of the self appears, with the meaning of
that idea. It may be that bodily feelings are the constant back-
ground of our personal life, and it is possible tuat sometimes, if
we halt in the pursuit of our usual interests and try to introspect,
we may find nothing but these feelings, not because they ire the
self, but just because they are not the self, the self being pri-
marily the life of desire and purposive activity which we have
momentarily forgotten or neglected in the confinement of our atten-
tion to the bodily processes which condition or accompany our cus-
tomary preoccupations with varied personal ends. If introspection
cannot give us any self except bodily feelings, we raust either
reject it or supplement it.
When we are realizing our personal life with the greatest
intensity, for example, when we are discovering our love for some
one, struggling with remorse for some sin, or deciding on a life
work, who would agree, if asked to identify himself, that his spirit-
ual and central self was "breath moving outwards, between the glottis
and the nostrils?"1 (2) or "some bodily process, for"the most part
taking place in the head? (5) or "intracephalic muscular adjust-
ments?" (2) Who but a man consumed with biological interests would
think of locating the essential self in cephalic movements? These
may be discovered subsequently as accompaniments of certain psychic
events, "but we are not usually aware of these facts until our
attention is drawn to them." (4) Further, when our attention has
turned to and discovered that certain bodily processes did accom-
pany certain interests or emotions, we very frequently may regard
those processes as irrelevant and insignificant in contrast with
the personal worth and relevance of those interests or emotions.
James makes the mistake of supposing that the self i3 essentially
bodily feelings just because these usually do accompany our per- .
sonal activities. It is unnecessary to deny tha. bodily feelings
represent one subordinate aspect of our conception of ourselves,
but there are apparently good reasons (5) for protesting against
making them the central part. In any case, it is well to call
attention to the danger of mistaking, as James seems to do, the
conditions of genesis or of awareness for the significant meaning
of the self.
This negative argument needs to be supplemented by a more
positive one, namely, that there are essential aspects of the self
which are properly called spiritual, and which, in my judgment,
cannot be reduced to bodily feelings. Let us admit that emotions
may be in part an awareness or sensation of bodily events, but they
also have another
,
preferential feature. They possess an aspect of
liking or disliking, which we seek to preserve or to hinder, and
(1) See below, 200-1 1 . See J. Laird .Problems of the Self, 6jW4.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, pa^e 57-
(j5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page J00.
(k) John Laird, Problems of the Self, page 67.
(5) See below, pages 200-11.

82
this aspect la cert-inly very different from the sensory one.
Many emotions are connected with ends which we seek to realize,
but the sensed bodily processes which may accompany this realiza-
tion are placed in a subordinate place In any judgment of value as
to what, in the situation, i3 essentially ourselves. James him-
self admits that these bodily feelings in themselves are insignifi-
cent, unimportant, and uninteresting except as they help in the
control of "things and actions before consciousness . " (1) Purposive
control see.as
,
therefore, to be the really important fact, tfhy, then,
not look for the self in purposive, interested activity rather than
in physiological events? 13 it not possible to distinguish between
bodily and psychical activity, as J, Laird does? The latter points
out (2) that James gives an inadequate account of emotions because
he finds their differentia in their bodily expressions, that is,
really, in sensations of bodily processes. (5) J« Ij&ird, however,
maintains that we can distinguish psychical feelings from bodily
sensations. (4)
James admits that there may be something in the self besides
these bodily processes, (5) but he leaves the question open as to
what this remainder may be. (5) When he criticizes the survival-
theory of consciousness in his chapter on "Mind Stuff" in The
Principles of Psychology , he makes an eloquent appeal for something
more than merely the requirements of bodily survival in order to
explain our human interests; it is intelligence which acts with
reference to ends, but such an activity is certainly distinguish-
able from the sensation of bodily processes. Again, when one
asserts that hi3 present self is continuous with hi a self of the
previous week, and aska what it i3 that is continuous, may he not
truly affirm that his whole plan of life to-day is relatively
similar to his plan last week? and may he not describe this identity
in other terms than resemblance of bodily feelings? in terms, for
example, of constancy of purpose? In the statement of this question
reference has been made to a few personal facts which seem to be
different from bodily feelings. Since this aspect of the thought
of James will be subjected to further criticism in the positive
exposition of personality, It may be left here at this point,
c'. Bodily A third point of objection to Jamea 1 corporeal theory of the
feelings them- self is that trie bodily feelings themselves, with wiiich he identifies
•elves presup- the nuclear self, presuppos a thinking and acting self for whom
pose a self of they exist. F. B. Jevona observes that, if they are feelings, "they
different are felt by nobody, they are feelings which -re not felt--that ia
Character. to say, they are a self-contradiction." (6) The owner of the feel-
ings is left out. "According to James a ma^'a aelf conaiata of all
that can be called his (7) but does not include the owner." (8)
( 1 ) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pfge 502.
(2) Problems of the Self, pages 66-67.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page hj} .
(4) See further below, pagee 200-11.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pi gee 305, 219.
(6) Personality, page ^4.
(7) Principlee of Psychology, vol. I, page 291.
(8) F. B. Jevone, Personality, page 50.
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F. B. Jevons maintains that James falls into essentially tae 3ame
error as Hume did in looking for the self among the objects of ex-
perience without inquiring for whom those objects exist. James does
not avoid the difficulty by saying that consciousness is personal,
in the sense of possessing a peculiar "warmth and intimacy," be-
cause tho latter consists essentially of bodily feelings, and the
subject of these experiences is still lacking.
And without this active self for whom the bodily feelings have
significance, they are essentially impersonal abstractions. When
the central self is described as consisting in certain motions in
the head, we have reached the borderland of materialism, in which
personality is an alien. If kinaesthetic feelings can exist with-
out being felt by someone, they are very different from anything we
know in our concrete experience; in short, they are abstractions.
James' localization of the spiritual self in bodily feelings
may be due to a certain scientific blindness with reference to
personality. Perhaps he misses the essential features of the self
because of that requirement of the scientific attitude which leads
him to look for what is actually going on in his mind instead of
asserting himself in the interest of self-development and of dis-
covering his real nature in the quest for the realization of his
purposes. There is a limited validity in the contention of H.
MHhsterberg that a different method is required in the study of
purposive psychology than in the study of descriptive psychology,
and this method consists in living out one's life with all its
fulness of meaning and purpose. He declares ^.hat, "We do not find
our inner life as an object, but we know it immediately as our pur-
posive deed." (1) This view is in harmony with what G. T. Ladd
maintains, (2) namely, that those who identify the self with the
body are talking about an infantile stage of self-development
.
These men may elaborate their doctrines with literary technique,
but its principles are similar to those which the child early
comes to possess.
There are some places where James approaches the recognition
of a spiritual activity which is different from the feeling of
bodily processes. He speaks in one passage, for instance, (.5) of
one's spontaneity in reacting to various furtherances and hindrances
He recognizes that some of the resistances which one meets in the
activity-processes are "not muscular but mental." (4) Again, he
states that,"This voli ,ionul effort pure and simple must be care-
fully distinguished from the muscular effort with which it is
usually confounded. (5) We cannot help regretting that he did not
explicate this Line of raggestion more fully instead of holding in
general to an essentially corporeal theory of personality.
We leave the adverse criticism of James with a sense of Hav-
ing corns upon a multitude of intrinsically valuable observations
concerning* the nature of personality, but with a distinct feeling
(1) Psychology, General and Applied, page 295.
(2) The Secret of Personality, ohapter IV.[ml m s ret, 01 p au ^cx
(J) Principles of Psychology, vo, I, pagc-s 297 & W, bottom.
(4) Some Problems of Philosophy, Puge 211.
(?) Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 562, note 2.
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d. Difficulty of incompleteness with reference to systematic organization and
of determin- of uncertainty concerning the determination of fundamental princi-
ing fundamental pies. James has left the self in the shape of a heap of parts so
principles in beautifully dismembered that he alone could solve for us the, puzzle
James 1 doc- of which is head and which is heart, and of how the sections fit
trine of the together into an organized whole, if such is really the case. Some
self. instances of these two points may be mentioned.
In the first place, the different pha3e3 of James 1 exposition
1'. James 1 of the aelf are not correlated. We are left in doubt as to the
expositions . of exact relations of the stream of consciousness, the spiritual self,
the self lack the passing thought, the will, the empirical self, the non-existent
correlation. consciousness, the bodily self, the experience of activity, the
bodily feelings and processes, the purposive and personal conscious-
ness, the moral self, etc. These various abstractions lack coordin-
ation. In one place consciousness is a "fighter for ends," and in
another it i3 a nonentity. He distinguishes the spiritual self
from the bodily self, but under introspection the former turns out
to be bodily feelings—why then distinguish them? In one connection
personality is the most perfect reality, and in another it is sub-
ordinate to something more ultimate, namely, pure experience. His
view as a whole is devoid of unity. It will be seen that the main
line of conflict is between views expressed in the Essay s in Radical
Empiricism and those in his other writings.
2'. And the Even if James offers no systematic conception of personality,
basic princi- is it possible to discover what he thinks is the fundamental feature
pie of person- of personality? This is very difficult to determine. One cauiot
ality is uncer- say with certainty that the basic principle of the self is thought,
tain. feeling, interest, activity, or something else. Judging from his
use of thought in his Principles of Psychology , one might think
that the cognitive function of personality were chief, and yet
even there he sometimes subordinates that function to the purposive
activity of consciousness (1); and in The Meaning of Truth (2),
feeling usurps the chief place, and is used as the generic term for
all states of consciousness; while in his discussion of activity,
one gets the impression that all other phases of consciousness are
logically subordinate toAit. Since the spiritual self, personal
identity, and the passing thought, in the last analysis, all center
in bodily feelings, these have a high claim to the fundamental
place in his conception. He searches with animation for the nuclear
self in the "passive subjective thought" (5), but it ever eludes
him except in the form of the rough whirl of bodily feelings which
are always at the edges, if not plways in the center, of the stream
of consciousness
.
Although the stream of consciousness actually
functions in hi3 thought aa the "immediate datum" of psychology,
he says that "personal Belves" might do so. Perhaps the best esti-
mate with respect to what he regards as the fundamental principle of
the mental life is just this stream of consciousness inclusive of
all such facts as he thinks fall under the terms, thought and
feeling— "thoughts which no person thinkti and feelings which nobody
(1) Principles of Psycnology, vol. I, page 14.
(2) Pages 1-2.
(5) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page }71
.

85
feels. (1) James 1 doctrine of the self, therefore, suffers from
metaphysical disorder, and if one seeks for a well rounded and per-
fected conception of personality in his writings, he probably will
not find it.
e. Some Instead of looking for contradictions, let us now look for some
contributions contributions of James to the study of the self. There t^re several
of James to inspiring and satisfying features of his view as a whole, and of
the study of certain particular phases of it, provided One does not ask too many
personality. critical questions about details or interrelations of fetors. His
work exhibits several marks of personality which are distinctive
products of his pragmatic spirit, what is now said must be regarded
on the whole as the spirit rather than the letter of James' prag-
matic view of personality.
1'. Empha- The first point to be noted is his emphasis upon the active
Bis upon the features of personality. It is certainly in harmony with the
active spirit of his pragmatism, if not with the verbal expression of it,
features of to interpret personality fundamentally in terms of action or of
personality. interested activity, we shall not do more here than recall the
unfortunate way in which this and other central features of per-
sonality tend to be reduced too exclusively to bodily feelings,
including kinaesthetic sensations. The way of pragmatism for
personality is the way of all human action, the way of volitional
reality. Miss M. I . Calkins reminds us that ire owe a debt of
gratitude to the pragmatista for emphasizing the non-cognitive
aspects of experience. It is characteristic of James' view of
the self that it should be always doing something. He avoids the
still waters of rationalism, and studies personality in its animated
moveaient along the stream of consciousness toward the realization
of its hopes and purposes.
2'. The The will to act which the pragm^tist emphasizes is, however,
purposive and directed to the future, and is a seeker after ends. Its nature and
changing aspedt its world are alike unfinished, and it is called upon to take
of the self. responsibility for their completion. The self must t^ke risks, and,
in the presenceof uncertainty, assert its right to believe in that
which best conforms to its hopes and desires rather than to its
fears. (2) Accordingly, personality is in part an hypothesis, an
act of faith, to be expressed in coming life, to be verified by
that to which it leads. To be a "fighter for ends," to undergo
progress and to suffer retrogression, is its order of development.
The whole life of the self, including our ideas in the form of
"working plans of action," represents a striving for satisfying
practical expression; in short, it is teleological
.
James, therefore, not only emphasizes the activity of the
self, but its interested activity. It is a being that seeks to
realize its ends; in a word, is a valuing creature. Thiu phuse
of hit> view may be expressed by saying that emotions come into the
closest cooperation with actions. Indeed, Jn:.-.cs does not clewly
distinguish between instincts and emotions. On the whole, it ie
characteristic of Jame3, the pragm^tist, to make fundamental thj
conative aspects of personality.
(1) P. B. Jevons, Personality! pages 55-56.
(2) Compare the essay, The fill to Believe.
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From those remarks it follows that the self is not an imputable
and self-identical being, but is in constant change. In James' view
it is represented as a dynamic factor rather than a static thing.
It is steadily growing and is different in each successive moment.
Duration and change are of its essence. It is progressively un-
folding and transforming its past in the light of the present and
the future. It is probable, however, that Jaa^s carries this tem-
poral emphasis too far, and permits the self to be lost in the flux
of consciousness. That there is a large element of truth, however,
in his conception gives it significance.
J'. He em- The general insistence of James upon a concrete study of
pha8izes the personality should be noted especially. This is his greatest con-
concrete study tribution— the bringing of the study of personality into close
of personality, contact with life and action. This is the outstanding merit of the
empirical way which James honestly seeks at all times to follow.
He tries to avoid abstractions as he would shun a fever, and will
not tolerate the cutting of consciousness into bits, whatever one
chooses to call them—this is the spirit of his thought. Conscious-
ness must be considered in a "concrete and total manner. 11 (1) It is
characteristic of him to say that, "The 'train of experience' kind
of self gets its unity after the facts only;" (2) and, again, "in
actual experience
. . .
there is in general no separateness needing
to be overcome by an external cement." He seeks to know personal
life at its "face value," and to avoid anything that is not "given."
A result of this empirical point of view is a lack of sympathy
and even unconcealed impatience with metaphysical endeavors to
understand personality. James is especially careful to avoid sus-
picious intercourse with the traditional conception of the soul.
E. G. Spaulding declares that, "Toward the problem of the nature
of consciousness, Pragmatism offers no positive contribution,
except by elimination. It does, however, get away from any explicit .
teaching, that there is an ego or substance-like and indivisible,
simple soul, or that consciousness in its several phases is a
substance or energy ." (5)
By reason of his empirical standpoint and his brilliant analy-
sis, James has left a multitude of observations concerning the
personal life which are full of fruitful suggestions and constitute
a valuable mine of facts upon which the metaphysician may draw.
His writings contain a mass of fresh and varied descriptions of
human life. His service consists in greatly increasing the wealth
of our knowledge of concrete mental facte rather tha-n in any meta-
physical doctrine of the self. By his "insistence upon the rights
of reality in life and experience," (4) he certainly hae contrib-
uted largely to a more concrete and genuine understanding of aumun
nature.
James, therefore, is a per3onalist in spirit, if not in
metaphysics. And is he not a personalist in metaphysics when he is
led to reject the Absolute as a result of his psychological
(1) Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 221.
(2) See above, page 46.
(j) The New Rationalism, page JOJ.
(V) E. N. Merrington, The ProDlem of Personality, \}9.
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investigations? (1) But if he is not surely a personalist, he
certainly is a humanist, f. |. Fenn says (2), "The affirmation of
man is the important thing in this general movement; he is super-
ior to his ideas, for his ideas do not exhaust him. Man is a val-
uing and appreciating being also."
B. THE SELF IN THE NEW REALISM OF RALPH BARTON PERRY
.
1 . The his -
torical ante-
cedents of new
realism
.
New realism
neglects the
problem of the
self because
of:
a. Its aver-
sion to subjec-
tive idealism;
and
b. Its affin-
ities with im-
mediate empir-
icism and log-
ical idealism.
The transi-
tion from psy-
chological
idealism to
pure empiri-
cism
.
The philosophy of Ralph Barton Perry, one of the most brilliant
of American new realists, will serve to represent the latter move-
ment for the purposes of this investigation. In the lingering in-
fluence of certain historical antecedents of new realism may be
found some of the reasons for its defective theory of the self. The
starting point and goading inspiration of Perry and his philosophi-
cal kinsmen is their vigorous antagonism to idealism, especially of
the subjective or psychological kind (2), the doctrine, namely, that
the existence of objects is entirely dependent upon their being con-
sciously experienced by a psychical subject
. These thinkers even
proudly characterize their anti-subjective attitude as "an achieve-
ment of critical reflection." (4) Also, opposition to certain sub-
jective tendencies in pragmatism and personal idealism mediates the
transition from disintegrating absolute idealism to new realism. (5)
The main thesis, of these philosophers is that there are enti-
ties and complexes "independent" of mind. (6) This center of inter-
est requires them, on the whole, to turn their backs upon the self
as a negligible side-issue, and "against anthropomorphism." (7) It
is characteristic of and appropriate to the whole movement both to
disregard the problem of the self and to refuse to consider it as
preliminary to understanding the world. Perry is ostensibly quite
exceptional, then, when he speaks of the "fundamental problem of
mind," and "proposes first to discover what manner of thing mind
is" before attacking other problems of philosophy. This fact qual-
ifies him well to represent new realism in this inquiry where the
self is the central issue.
The historical and logical transition from psychological ideal-
ism (represented preeminently, in Kerry's opinion, by George Ber-
keley) to new realism has been "radical empiricism," or the philos-
ophy of pure experience. (8) The dialectic of this development has
been expounded clearly by D. C. Macintosh. (9) He suggests that
radical empiricism arises when the principle of psychological ideal-
ism is applied not only to objects but also to the subject, (now as
object), so that both subjects and objects, both selves and things,
come to be regarded as depending for their existence upon a pure or
neutral experience. Representatives of this movement who have
especially influenced Perry are "U. James, E. Mach, and R. Avenarius
end
CIj See A Pluralistic Universe, chapter >.
(2) Oral lecture on Theism, Harvard University, Nov. 1915
(5) The New Realism, page 11. (4) Ibid., pages 41, 14?,
(5) Compare, Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 219.
(6) The New Realism, page 142.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, puge 29
.
(8) This theory is also called pure or io..iediate mpirioiam
empiriocriticiara
.
(9) The Problem of Knowledge, pages 219 ff., 109 ff.
(10) Ibid., page 109.
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The transition
flrom pure empir-
icism to r.ev.
realism.
Influence of
logical
realism.
2. Statement
of Perry's
doctrine of
trie self
.
(1) In consequence, the subject loses its unique position in found-
ing objects, end is given a place like other things in the pre-sub-
jecti/e, "neutral mosaic". (2) This step is the first one towards
new realism, and the dethronement, of the self.
The last Btep to essential new realism is taken when the ana-
lytical elements of pure experience are regarded as "neutral enti-
ties," (2) existing or subsisting independent of being experienced
at all. Macintosh points out that (5) "if contents, as new realism
claims, are independent of any relation to a conscious subject, it
seem3 the natural conclusion to infer that they are real independ-
ently of their being experienced. This view . . is the position of
new realism. It starts over again from the very beginning; its
doctrine coincides with that tacitly assumed by the most uncritical
naive realist."
The remnants of pure empiricism appear here and there in the
philosophy of Perry; but instead of pure experience, he thinks of
neutral entities or beings. He declares, for example, that "the
simple qualities themselves evidently cannot be subjective any more
than they can be physical
. (4) That tne above sketch represents
the development of Perry's thought is seen in his suggestion that
Hume lost his chance of becoming the founder of a new realism by
failing to teach that the "ideas" to which he reduced both mind and
matter were "elements or qualities" existing independently of mind,
which could no longer properly be called "ideas." (5)
The influence of logical realism, the immediate descendant of
logical idealism, according to which logical and mathematical en-
tities subsist apart from thinking subjects, has no ioubt been great
in helping to make new realism both plausible and conceivable to
its exponents, and in illustrating its method. The effect of this
influence has been in large part due to the mathematical studies of
B. Russell. Indeed, a mathematical form of exposition is fre-
quently used, for example by E. G. Spaulding, in describing the
neo-realistic method of analysis. (6)
In the above study of the historical antecedents of new realism,
we have noticed how the self first became lost in the impersonal ab-
etractions of pure empiricism, and how it has not been rediscovered
in the more impersonal abstractions of new realism. In spite of
this result, Perry attempts to present a theory of tne self; we must
now address ourselves to its examination.
Perry's doctrine of the self may be understood by a progressive
delimitation of hi a theory of mind or consciousness. He thinks
(1) See R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, index.
(2) Ibid., page 516.
(5) The Problem of Knowledge, pages 109-10.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 524 j compare also,
page 510, and The Ne./ Realism, page 128.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 157, 306-7.
(6) The New Rationalism, e.g. chapter XXII.
(7) These terms arc treated apparently as synonomous: in The
New Re?.li
Tendenc
i- sm, conoare page 141 with 142; also, Present Philoaophicul
icies, page 284.' The chief references to Perry' a treatment of
5lf are: Present Present Philosophical Tendencies; The Hew
Realism, pages 99-1JU Present Conflict of Ideals, especially pages
J76-9; and the three articles in the Journal of
Philosophy, Psychol-
ogy, and Scientific Methods, vol. Vl(1909)« »ee bibliography.
L
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a. Conscious-
ness, action,
and the self;
consciousness
is tae most
general cate-
gory applicable
to uie self.
Kature of
consciousness
:
1
1
. It is in
general a
relation among
entities
j
2 1 . but a
relation in-
volving action;
nature of
mental action:
that consciousness, explained in a certain way, may be taken "as
the most general category defining a self." (1) Now the " complex, " (2)
consciousness or mind, is not an entity to be found among the
original elements of reality, because they are simple, and, further,
because they have "no generic character" which can be called mental
,
being neither physical nor psychical, (j) But if consciousness is
not an entity or a quality of existents, it can only mean a relation
between or among entities or objects that are experienced. These
suggestions were made by James in his influential essay, "Does
Consciousness Exist?" where he comes near to the confession of a
new realist.
Perry maintains that, "it must, of course, be assumed that
consciousness i_s a relationship." (4) The peculiarity of mental
contents is due to the "grouping and interrelations" which "com-
pose" them. (5) Consciousness itself "is homogeneous and inter-
active with its environment ... in the sense that it is composed
ultimately of the same elements. But the particular combination
of elements which distinguishes consciousness differs from other
forms of combination, such as bodies or mathematical systems." In
speaking of the object-side of consciousness, he observes that,
"The theory of the immanence of consciousness means that these con-
tents or objects are parts of the environment, borrowed by the mind,
but not exclusively appropriated and owned by it. . . Mind and
the surrounding world interpenetrate and overlap." (6) He complains
of the vagueness of this grouping relation which constitutes con-
sciousness. Its specific nature needs to be more exactly set forth.
He attempts, in his own way, to explain the principle of it, and
in doing so, presents his view of the self, so fur as he has one.
Perry's further specification of this consciousness-relation
is contained in his conception of action. He is convinced "that
consciousness is not a relation betv/een objects unless there is
also an activity of one object upon other objects." (7) The
mental character of certain things is not inherent, but is a property
derived "from that which acts" on them. (6) He agrees "substan-
tially" with the view that "action of mind is not itself content,
but is the unifying correlate of all content." (9) Mental contents,
therefore, require "the agency" of some sort of "general action,"
which "defines content as such, and give-o it its cn^racteristic
unity." (1C) Her. appears a clear distinction between two aspects
of uind: its contents and it3 action. "Eve/y type of consciousness
exhibits this duality" between action and content. (11) In The
Present Conflict of Ideals (6) he speaks again of the two sides of
consciousness, namely, consents and "'subject 1 or activity of mind. 11
(1) Psychological Review, vol. XI, page 296.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 202, }10; The
New Realism, page 127.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 27/.
(4) Ibid., pageB 222; The New Realism, page 142.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 277.
(6) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 276-7-
(7) D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 291.
(8) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 279, 222 -
(9) Ibid., page 279; compare ,284
.
(10) Ibid., oages 264-5. (H) Ibid., pa^e 274.
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In his theory of mental action we co.ae in close quarters
with his doctrine of the self. It is very hopeful to find .lim ap-
proaching the oelf from this fruitful point of view. His elabora-
tion of it is full of interest, especially because of the astonish-
ing conception of mental action which forma the climax of his argu-
ment.
a'. It is not He sets aside two co.omon interpretations of mental action,
spiritual (a) In the first placs, he rejects the view thut it is a kind of
activity; irreducible spiritual activity which is known by intuition. His
first reason for disclaiming this conception is that activity is
complex and "is not an ultimate term." His second reason is that
analysis, and not intuition, is the proper method of knowing action.
"The most cursory examination reveals" that it can be furtiier analyzed
and defined. (1) "Spirit, if we wish. to retain the term, is not a
discontinuous substance which can be discovered only by the unique
method of introspection—by the inward awareness which each spiritual
being has exclusively of himself." (2) Perry does not find in the
depths of his own nature "a power to do, which is clear, simple,
and self-sufficient," but only a "manifold of terms in relation ,
"
of bodily sensations and feelings. (}) Activity, as it appears in
experience, is fused; the supposition that iz is simple and ultimate
is a case of the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity; for, when it is
analyzed, it is found to be a "composite experience containing
specific elements in a specific configuration." (4) In this view,
a b^sic dynamism is mown down by the keen edge of analysis.
b 1 . Nor a (b) We cannot "define mental action in terms of the feeling of
feeling of bodily activities," because feeling is itself a content of mind,
bodily and also because it is required that that principle of action which
activity. defines this and all other mental content shall not itself be a
content, for if it were, our reasoning clearly would be circular. (6)
"The defining relation of mind is a kind of action, and it will not
be found amidst the content which it defines." (5) This argument
requires the rejection of James' view that the only thing intro-
speetion can catch that might stand for spiritual activity is a
group of bodily processes. (6)
c'. But The true solution, according to Perry, is very simple and lies
bodily action near at hand. He defines "mental action ... in terms of bodily
itself is the action itself," (7) when this is controlled by the interests of the
key to mental organism. "Consciousness is a species of function, exercised by
action. an organism, . . . correlated with an environment from which it
evolved and on which it acts." (8) Hence, "as mind. appears in
nature and society, it consists primarily in interested behavior,"
(9) or the selective behavior of an organism in a homogeneous
environment.
(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 26j.
(2) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 277.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 99-100.
(4) Ibid., page 72.
(5) Ibid., pages 279-80.
(6) Ibid., page 264-5.
(7) Ibid., page 285.
(8) Ibid., page $22.
(9) Ibid., page ^00.
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1". Two as-
pects of mental
action: nervous
eys tea and in-
terest.
Summary of
Perry's view
of mind.
If one considers the "subject" side of consciousness, or the
active side by itself, one can say that that "consists of the acts
of perceiving, thinking, remembering, etc." But according to the
realist theory of immanence, this aspect of consciousness is also
"homogeneous with its surroundings.
.
Spirit is one of the many
kinds of things that may be found by any observer in the same field
of observable experience with mountains rivers, and stars. It is a
peculiar combination of elements .-,ith a peculiar set of properties."
(1) Now , if the content and the action sides of consciousness are
put together, "there results the view that consciousness is a mode
of interaction within one homogeneous world, an excerpt of things,
which a cerebral 1;/ equipped organism selects for its special purposes
from its surrounding environment . " (2) In this way, he thinks, con-
sciousness is admitted "into the natural world as a genuine dynamic
agent," and "may operate effectively" by interaction with its envir-
onment. (5)
Mental action, therefore, has two aspects or phases, "mental
action as nervous system," or physical body, and "mental action as
interest." (4) Actions are governed by desires or interests. (?)
Thus the final explanation of consciousness "is_ found in the capa-
cities and action of the organism :I (6) in relation 'go an environ-
ment. That portion of the environment which the organism, in its
response, "picks out" or "takes account of" becomes contents of
mind in virtue of this selective action. (7) It is interesting to
compare this view with the declaration of E. B Holt (8) that con-
sciousness is a "cross-section of the infinite realm of being, and
a cross-section that is defined by the responses of a nervous organ-
ism; "that entity is in consciousness to which the nervous system
responds with a specific relation."
Hence, "the human mind, like the heart and lungs, is an organ,
calculated to assist the adaptation of one body to an environment
of other bodies." (9) Consciousness is "taken to signify selection
within the realm of things." (10) "The natural mind, then, is an
organization possessing, as aspects, interest , nervous ays tea , and
contents
.
or, in other words, externally observable action and in- .
dependently existing contents ."(11)
Perry thus summarizes his view of consciousness: (12) "Conscious-
ness is a process containing a nervously endowed organism, a specif-
ic type of response to stimulation, and ^rtions of an environment
selected by the response. . Furthermore . . this operation as a
whole is interested or teleological . " Interest is used in a strictly
biological sense, and hia view looks like an attempt to combine in
a syathesis the essentially physical and the physiological concep-
tion of consciousness. (15)
(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 577-6
•
(2) Ibid., page 576. (5) Ibid., page J79
Ik) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 501;504.
(5) Ibid. , page 545.
(6) The New Realism, page 156.(7) Ibid., ^agea 147;47;.
(8) The Concept of Consciousness , pages 206;217.
(9) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 50.
(10) Psychological Review, XI, pa e .
(11) D. C Macintosh. Problem of Knowledge, page 564; compare
Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 504.
(12) The New Realism, pa. e 154.
(15) D. C. Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge ,. page 264.
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a". The self
is primarily
the interest-
phase of mental
action; it is
an "entity
capable of
desire.
"
b. Interests
and disposition
aa bases of
personality
.
Introduction.
1
1
. Interest
ia the act of
a constant bio-
logical sub-
ject.
As a further specification of Perry's theory of the self, we
should note that he identifies the self primarily with the interest-
aspect of mental action. He thinks that "my interests are myself,
in the deepest sense.
.
They are the defining forms of my life.
They mark me and give me my place, humble or obscure, in the open
field of history." (1) "An individual life is distinguished by what
it seeks to preserve and promote." (2) "An entity capable of desire"
is what Perry really means by the self, for he says that "desire is
a variety of consciousness and
.
.
an entity capable of desire is a
subject of consciousness." (5)
Desire seems to be the "introspective factor" or aspect of in-
terest, but
;
as mere mental content, it is "not desire at all." (4)
Its genuine form is seen only when it is in effective action, when
it is a form of determination. (4) Vfaenever the action of an organ-
ism is controlled by its interests, its action is said to be pur-
posive, (5) teleological , (6) or desiderative. (7) A little fuller
account of this factor of interest must now be given.
The idea of "the self as an entity capable of desitre" will be
unfolded under the heading, suggested by Perry: personality as a
sum of dispositions. (8) This discussion will start from interest,
and will involve the place of dispositions and of purpose in the
concept of personality. This important phase of his doctrine of
personality will be constructed by combining fragments derived from
his lectures on "the theory of value", delivered at Harvard Uni-
versity during the first semester of 1915-16, (9) and from pages
16 and 17 of his book The Present Conflict of Ideals .
In explaining the general nature of value, he says that, "The
act of interest is the generating principle of value." (10) "In-
terest is an ultimate of consciousness." (11) Value exists when-
ever one is interested in any object. "Interest is a way of acting
upon the environment." (12) But while the objects of human inter-
est may vary, the "subject term is constant; it is the biological
or the conscious subject." (15) Now the reason for the constancy
of the "valuing subject" is that it possesses certain more or less
permanent dispositions. "tf03t interests are functions of the dis-
positional rather than of the conscious." (14) "The disposition
( 1 ) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 501
.
(2) Ibid., page 343. (5) The Ne* Realism, page 141
.
(4} Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 301.
(5) The New Realism, page 141 .
(6) Ibid., page 1*4; Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 200-1.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page J04.
(8) The Present Conflict of Ideals page 17.
(9) The following quotations from these oral lectures are re-
ferred to by dates upon the basis of the practically complete short-
hand notes taken by the writer while in attendance upon this course.
Prof. Perry has kindly granted permission to make tnis use of his
lectures
.
(10) Lecture, Nov. 1, '15. (11) Lecture, Nov. 22, '15.
(12) Ibid. 03) lecture, Nov. J, '15.
(14) Ibid.
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in the organism must not be ignored," (1) since it is to that the
stability of interests is due. His account of dispositions, there-
fore, v.-ill be briefly described.
c
.
"ouuio rp^Q dispoaitions here concerned are, of course, connected with
of dispositions,, the human organism. "There is a physiological mechanism there,
but not substantial or transcendent in the old sense; there is an
actual correlation of nerves and possibly of muscles." Now, "a
disposition is some constant relation between the valuing subject
and the achievement (2) despite the variability of the action.
TChen a person regularly attains a certain achievement, you say he
has a disposition, under different circumstances, to bring about
the sane end. So you cannot dissolve the subjective sides of
behavior into act3, for you would lose this constancy. (5)
Let ue consider some concrete situation. !'If one takes
avarice or amibioa, acts and circumstances vary; acts so vayy
and combine with the circumstances as to produce the same general
results, although the acts may all be different. Then one .vould
say that there is something in that subject, some permanent senti-
ment. Thi3 is the correlate, on the subjective side, of a series
of achievements. Disposition is extremely important; a certain
constancy in the subject is needed in order to account for tae con-
sistency of his behavior. So one might think of value relative to
the disposition, and not to any one particular reaction. A dis-
position cannot become conscious, but it is that whicn happens when
you evoke all the latent attitudes by a series of images. Dis-
position consists of many attitudes, but these may be realized
through the exercise of the imagination." (4)
Dispositions of the human organism, then, are the "springs of
action," and, we may also say, of conscious interests. "Wars are
due, not to the operation of mechanical laws of the astronomical
sort, but to the passions, purposes, decisions, and volitions of
men.
. .
There are enormous differences in the causal power exerted
by different minds." (5) The stable ground of our interests, as
we have seen, is to be found in the dispositions waich correspond
to them. They dictate the actions whioh we perform.
Personality can be defined now in terms of these interests,
or of the dispositions upon wnich they rest. "Each of us is a
bundle of interests, a little colony of different impulses, wishes
and aspirations. They are bound together eo that no one of them
can act itself out withou affecting the others. Given any one
of these interests, all tae rest of the personal Household of in-
terests act as a check upon it. The more unified a person is, the
more character or consistency or purpose he has, the less is any
of his interests left to itself. Each interest has got somehow
to satisfy the rest. . . Getting reasons for an action . . . means
securing additional incentives to its perfermance--getting the
5'. Person-
ality as sum
of disposi-
tions
.
(1) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915-
(2) On the nature of achievement, see below, page 95.
(5) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915-
(4) Ibid. On the place of imagination in action, see below
pages 95-96.
(5) The Free Man and the Soldier, page
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sanction, and perhaps the active, dynamic support of ray whole
personal complex.
. .
The .justification o f action , in short , is
the means of securing the adoption of the act by the self as a whole ;
so thai it may enjoy the support of the '.vhoie 3 urn of dispositions
that cons titutes an active personality . " ( 1
)
The science of ethics is occupied with the st,udy of the inter-
action and organization of human interests or desires. The "moral
task" of the individual is the achievement of a harmonious organiza-
tion of his own interests and of these interests with those of
others. Personal value, in the best sense of the term, originates
in this organization of interests. Speaking of this. Perry says,
"A more significant meaning of personal values would be the organiza-
tion of values in the subject, where the values of one subject have
been harmonized by a process of discipline, and have ^een made con-
sistent with one another. The whole set of harmonious values, con-
stituted as a unified group, make up one's personal values. The
meaning of personal value would be found in terms of organized har-
mony." (2)
Such unity as these personal interests may possess is a product
or moral organization, and is not to be explained as the expression
of a single fundamental or comprehensive interest, for Perry say6
that he "should not now speak of a general interest in Belf-pre-
servation." (5) The basic character of the self, therefore, is
not to be sought in a central interest, at least of a native kind,
which unifies the rest.
Another important phase of Perry's theory of value is his
endeavor to present , from the behavioristic point of view, a de-
scription of teleqjjy in action. He rejects the introspective stand-
point"because of the ambiguity in the words, desire , fgelljag, and
will in psychological literature," (4) and also because, in the end,
he thinks, "you will have to adopt behavioristic criteria" anyway (5)
in order to get intelligible distinctions among these terms. Hence,
he "begins with behavior," since "interest in an attitude or act of
favor or disfavor towards an object—for or aginst it. It embraces
will, desire, and feeling." (6) "Behavior v.lll be the stable center
around which" move "will and desire." (4)
A behavioristic account of interest or value require* a behav-
ioristic teleology for the reason that "action is always away from
something to something. Action is always substituting existence for
r existent.non-existence. It makes U_l non-existent and Uf (7) It is,
from—to. It has 'sense.'" (4) "My liking is causing to exist; it
has been described by reference to some future existence. So I
think you have to define value in the direction of a possible or
(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 16-17.
(2) Lecture, Dec. 20, 1915
(5) Unpublished letter of January 9, 1920; thio view
supersedes
a contrary one expressed in Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.
(4) Lecture, I.'ov. 8, 1915-
(5) Lecture, Nov. 24, 1915-
(6) Lecture, Nov. 1, 1915-
(7) U is an abbreviation of uWebunfc , i.e.. for one
environ-
mental situation. Perry here adopto the symbolism of R. Eisler,
Studien zur Werttheorie, pages 2} following.
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hypothetical existence whica is its end, towards which it proceeds.
But the account of value is an existential accoung." (1)
Now the End 1age in the second period of time, as distinguished
from the Anfangslage in the initial period, is an important situa-
tion requiring analysis. "Behavior is always substituting a new
state of things for a previous one." (2) Perry adopts the word,
achievement
,
for the resulting situation because of its "teleologi-
cal suggestion." 11 Achievement is the outcome or result of the ac-
tion,— the reaction of the organism,—but would not be regarded as
outcome unless action had this in prospect." (5) "One cannot think
of this without the prospect of the achievement determining the act.
The relation between act and achievement is a curiously reciprocal
relation; the achievement is the final cause or motive of the act.
Achievement implies both of these." (2) It is impossible, there-
fore, to avoid the concept of teleology, "in valuation, as theory,
there can be no questin as to the existence of ends. There is
apparent teleology, whether or not there is real teleology. The
first step, anyway, is to get a clear description of apparent tel-
eology." (2) "The assumption is that teleology is present where
there is life and consciousness and conduct." (4) Let us endeavor
to get an "end-distinguishing behavior as differentiated from mere
automaton." (5) "what is the meaning of teleology?" Perry's at-
tempt to define this from the behavioristic point of view is very
interesting.
After critically rejecting three current doctrines of teleol-
ogy, he adopts, as his own, "anticipatory adjustment." (6) The
essential point of this view is that whenever behavior is modified
by the presence of the consequence, in the form of an anticipation
or memory, purpose is present. "You do not have the genus, tel-
eological, until you get to associative memory, wuere the expecta-
tion concerns the sequel, where the action is not a constant func-
tion of the environment, but where it is qualified by some expecta-
tion of the end-situation to come. Tais is what occurs when an
animal learns by experience. We make the response a function of the
stimulus, qualified" by the stored memory. Here you cannot explain,
an act without reference to what is to come. You strongly suspect
you have the same thing in instincts. So some biologists call in-
stinct a racial memory. It is hard to say that fear is not an an-
ticipation of getting hurt. It is so ..ith all human reactions. I
know no reason why there should not be congenital anticipations,
but you don't get the same kind of empirical evidence of antici-
pation there as in modifications of reactions in associative mem-
ory. We conclude that it is only where the principle of associa-
tive memory is operative, where we can show that the organism is
influenced by its past experience, that it is proper to eoy that
the action has taken place because of the end." (5)
(1) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915- (*) Ibid -
(5) Lecture, Nov. e, 1915-
(4) Lecture, Nov. 15, 1015.
(5) Lecture, Nov. 17, 1915-
(6) Ibid. See bibliography for three articles written by
Perry concerning purpose.
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In general, then, we nay say that, "when the action is modified
by the consequence, you have the process in question; the attitude
here is behavioris tic
. If you must refer the action to a consequence
of certain past action, then you must qualify by that consequence.
So far as a reference to the consequence that has been previously
experienced has to be used for the explanation of the action, then
it is oroper to say that the action is a function of the consequence."
(D
"In case of the operation of ideas, one gets another instance
of this operation by consequence. In case of ideas you have a cen-
trally stimulated process of some sort—it may be articulatory or
kinaesthetic or internal speech, etc.—which may become definitely
associated as the sign of some environmental situation, in which
case you may act to an environment which is not now present at all.
This is the fact in most human reactions— a response to an idea or
an image or a word. This is the most characteristic change of char-
acter as you pass from animals up to human beings; it is more and
more difficult to explain action in terms of the environment; it is
more and more a function of certain futures or possibilities which
are mediated by the existence in the organism of an idea or an image
or sign-character which represents the environment. No psychology
could get along without the view that actions, coming through asso-
ciative memory, set up action." (2)
The situation can be expressed in the form of symbols. "In
the organism the non-teleological action is U + A E. (5) Where
the E is present as anticipation or memory, you have teleology;
thus: U + (E) f- A - E. The trend of this discussion would be to de-
fine value in terms of some kind of behavior: the object would
possess value in so far as behaved to in a certain way. The constant
would be primarily a mode of behavior." (4)
"All the different factors involved in behavior may become
topics of consciousness, "where achievement is the object of con-
sciousness, you have the image or idea of the end, as we say." (5)
The responding organism also may come into consciousness—act and
organic accompaniments and disposition. (5) "Conscious value would
occur where there is anticipatory adjustment—where the organism
reacts not to what is given but to what is to come." (6) We might
say that there was unconscious value in case of compensatory ad-
justments, illustrated by increase in heartbeat, when one runs. (6)
We are left to draw our own inference as to the coruiection of
this analysis of teleology with the concept of personality. The
relation, however, seems to be clear. Since achievement is the re-
sult of most acts of interest, and since the active personality is
the sum of an individual's dispositions in which his interests are
rooted, it is fair to conclude that not only interested behavior,
but also and therefore, purposive behavior, is characteristic of
the human personality. In other words, since the active person-
(1) Lecture, Nov. 20, 19 15-
(2) Lecture. Nov. 22, 1915-
(5) These letters are abbreviations of UmEebun,, , kiSun^u
la t ;o
.
and Endlage, respectively.
(4) Lecture, Nov. 24, 1915-
(5) Lecture, Nov. 10, 1915-
(6) Lecture, Dec. 6, 1915-
1
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ality ia a sun of interests rooted in certain more or less constant
dispositions, and since these interests are acts in the performance
of which one seeks the achievement of varied ends, one may infer
that personality is not only made up of organized, interested be-
havior, but that personal behavior is also essentially purposive
behavior
.
The logical progression in xx Perry's conception of the self,
so far as it can be determined, has now been set forth. This dial-
actic of consciousness , from existent to relation and from relation
to action (of the physical organism with its nervous system), is
characteristic of the historical movement of American new realism
as a whole. (1) According to Perry's theory of action, personal
action is interested, organized, and in general teleological . His
complete view of the self, however, will not be plain until the
methods of reasoning and investigation by which he seeks to estab-
lish it have been examined.
Y/e can learn much about Perry's conception of the self by
studying his .methods of procedure because he requires this concep-
tion to be formed within the limits strictly determined by that
dominating method of analysis which he champions. He thinks there
are really two fundamental and "right" methods of knowledge: the
observational, experimental method which science has perfected; and
the logical or analytical method of intellectualis Lie philosophers
and mathematicians. (2)
The first step in an investigative procedure is that of general
observation, for which mind is well fitted, because mind, "so far as
knowledge of it is concerned," is "as generally accessible, as free
to all comers, as the .notions of stars or the civilization of cities. "(5)
He "treats mind as thougn, like any other thing, it were open to
general observation." (4) It is not necessary to infer the existence
of other selves or other consciousness because "it is observed pre-
cisely as physical phenomena are observed." (5) It is easy to ob-
serve mental action because it is bodily or physical. The knower
is to be known in the same way as the things it knows. (6) General
observation, therefore, is the one a^d only successful and dependable
method of studying this "mind abroad," (5) the _ind which lies in the
"open field of experience." (5)
Perry objects strenuously to the opinion that the mind is
accessible, in a peculiar way, to introspection. (7) We cannot
find mind by introspecting some unaharable something. (S) "It is
(1) Compare, D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 291.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pa e 264.
h) Ibid., page 275-
(4) Ibid., pages 266 and 255. Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 577-6.
(5) The New Realism, page 1 A7
•
(6) Ibid., page 55.
(7) See the following series of articles in the Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. VI, 1909 » The
Hiddenness of the Kind, pages 29-56; The Mind's Fumiliarity with
itself, pages 1 1 5-122 ; The Mind 7/ithin and the Mind Without, pages
(8) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 279.
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impossible to find the common bond of things mental, until we
abandon the introspective method and view mind as it operates in
the open field of nature and history." (1) Again, he declares,
"I am confident that the nature of mental action is discoverable
neither by an analysis of mental contents nor by self-intuition;
that it is necessary, in short, to abandon the method of self-
knowledge altogether and substitute that of general observation."
(2) We are, therefore, to study mind "like any other thing" (5)
by observing the open action of the body, the public behavior of
the organism.
V/e are rightly surprised, therefore, when Perry expresses
the intention of coking use of introspection by presenting a view
of "the whole mind," which is "in reality one," (4) which will
combine "the mind within" and "the mind without," "the mind at
home" and "the mind abroad" in other words, by unifying the re-
sults obtained by the methods of introspection and of external ob-
servation. (5) This proposal is so misleading and gives such lit-
tle promise of consistent fulfilment that it is hard to take it
at its face value. This difficulty is increased because of his
rejection of traditional introspection, and also because of the
puzzle connected with distinguishing between his conceptions of
introspection and of external observation.
Introspection, in his system, might mean one of two things,
(a) It usually means the analysis of mental contents, (6) but when
thi3 is done, we find tnat the objects we discover are the same as
the elements of the environment to which the "bodily complex" re-
sponds. Introspection of our own experience only reveals "a cha-
otic manifold of fragments of other- than-nind. " (7) "A subjec-
tive complex can always be analyzed into elements, or even into
lesser complexes that are 'objective.'" (8) It seems pardonable,
therefore, to suggest that one looke for the "mind within," when,
by hypothesis, one may expect to find only "other- than-nind.
"
(b) But there is another meaning of introspection which at
last gives a definite meaning to Kant's phrase, "the internal
sense." Introspection, for Perry, might consistently mean taking
account of proprio-ceptive sensations. (9) In that case we might
learn "the whole mind" of our neighbor by supplementing our ob-
servations of his behavior with his account of those organic pro-
cesses which circumstances especially favor his securing. (10)
The whole mind, therefore, means a combination of behavior and
those objects in the environnent to which the organism responds.
(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 279.
(2) Ibid., page 285. (5) Ibid., page 286.
(4) Ibid., page 274. (5) Ibid., pages 275-5; 504-5.
(6) Ibid. , page 505.
(7) flournal of Philosophy, Psychology and Jcientific Method,
VI, 1909, page 170-1
,
(8) The New Realism, page 145. On meaning of sub.jectl/e . see
Ibid.
,
page 156
(9) See xxa description of our observation of these sensa-
tions in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods, IX, pages 119-21. (N. K. Smith)
(10) Ibid., also Present Philosophical Tendenciea, pages 274;
29^-5-
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We have reached the conclusion, then, that, "the person best
qualified to report on the nature of my aenta%Jwould be not myself,
the user of it, but the physiologist or moralist who is the be-
holder of it." (1) Of course one can learn something at least
about himself by noting those proprio-ceptive sensations which his
neighbor, by reason of physiological circumstances, finds difficult
to observe, although it is perfectly possible for him to gain knowl-
edge of them. One's neighbor is fully able to observe what is es-
sential to another' 3 mind; nothing that is "typical" escapes his
observation.
Now it might be supposed that one's interests, whicb consti-
tute his essential self, are not public property and open to gen-
eral observation. This is a Berious mistake, however, for they
"are evident to any intelligent observer." (2) Genuine interests
and desires belong "to mind at large in nature and society." (2)
"And precisely as a mind's interests are evident to general obser-
valion, so are the objects on which it acts interestedly." (5)
Indeed, the desiderative or purposive elements of mind are least
likely to escape observation. (4) "This element of my mind is
revealed even in my gross action, in the motions of my body as a
whole.
.
The content of my purpose, that is, the realization pro-
posed, and my more or less consistent devotion to it are in your
full view. (5) The consistent conclusion, therefore, of this phase
of new realism is a radical and extravagant form of behavioristic
psychology, which is, in fact, practiced by many of the new real-
ists themselves, e. g. , Perry and E. B. Holt.
How, then, does Perry solve the question with reference to
how a mind, which is subject, can also be object? The solution is
easily and wonderfully accomplished. That organism which is sub-
ject, in virtue of its interested response to selected phases of
its environment, becomes object whevever someone else observes or
responds to it. I, as an acting agent, become object when my
neighbor watches my behavior. That which responds is subject; when
this subject is responded to by another organism, it becomes ob-
ject. In this way the subject then becomes object. (6) "The
difference between subject and object of consciousness is not a
difference of quality or substance, but a difference of office or
place in a configuration." (7)
When one comes to seek those most general elements and sys-
tems with which philosophy is concerned, the method proper and
all-important is that of analysis. By this method truth is reached,
and problems are solved by resolving complex things into their
elements. (8) It is "the method of exact knowledge in general." (8)
It "means simoly the discrimination and specificntion of the detail
of experience. It has led to the discovery of certain elements and
relationships that possess a remarkably high degree of generality,
such, e. g., as those of logic and mathematics. (9)
(1) Presen
(2) Ibid., page 501
L Philosophical Tendencies, pa^e 29-.
(5) Ibid., pages J01-2.
(4) Ibid., page 295. (5) Ibid., pares 295i 297, etc
(6) Ibid., page 290; The New Realism, pages 144-5.
(7) The New Realism, pa e 476.(8) Ibid., page 24.
(9) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 2}l .
L
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Analysis everywhere, of course, should be thorough-going. No
field of investigation, no aspect of experience, should, in the end,
be reserved from it for any reason, lest one fall into confusion and
dangerous errors, such as that of "pseudo-simplicity." Perry is es-
pecially fearful lest philosophers, by reason of insufficient anal-
ysis, should smuggle into respectable thought some peculiar kind of
mental activity that can be" revealed to the agent himself in an
immediate intuition," for he thinks that, "when the so-called exper-
ience of mental activity is so analyzed, no activity-element is
found." (1) Hu-ne refuted the doctrine that mind is a unique activ-
ity accessible only to a special intuition, when he showed, Perry
believes, "that the most exhaustive introspective analysis reveals
no such 'creative power' but only a manifold and nexus of contents."
(1) The man who believes in the reality of mind can find no theo-
retical justification (1) for not carrying through that method of
analysis which ends by finding that mind and spiritual activity
are composed of elements which have no mental character. This dom-
inating method will be the first topic of our criticism. (2)
c. The self in Our study of Perry's theory of mental action and of his methods
the light of of investigating mind leads to the surprising conclusion that the
these methods: self or psychical agent is the behaving bodily organism. Mental ac-
it is the phys- tion is bodily action, for it is "bodily process which in my own ex-
ical organism. peiience functions as mental action;" "mental action is a property
of the physical organism. (5) "The subject is the living and re-
sponding organism." (4) "The knower ... is homogeneous with the
environment, belonging to one cosmos with it as does an attracting
mass, or physical organism and may itself be known as are the things
it knows." (5) As a re^ilt of our elaborate philosophical analysis,
we reach the profound conclusion that the self is the physical
organism, an opinion identical with that of the primitive savage who
naively identifies himself with his body. Thio substitution of bod-
ily action for mental action is one of the most cold-hearted and
daring attempts in the history of philosophy to replace, froa the
objective side, a self which has been robbed of its familiar and
customary meaning.
d. Classi- To classify Perry's conception of the self is not at all easy,
fication of Its most dominant features would require us to classify it as an
Perry's view objective type among the immanent theories. This exclusive placing
of the self. of it, however, is of doubtful validity if we take account of the
whole context of his view. The following considerations should be
no ted
.
(a) While mind lies in the "open field of experience," (6)
and the "selective consciousness," in which the self is found, is
identified with "experiencing," (7) yet the elements of this selective
consciousness, when analysis isolates them, are regarded as existing
quite independently of their being experienced. Thus, while mind,
( 1 ) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pa^e 280.
(2) See below, pages 101—1 1 5
.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 296.
(4) The New Realism, page 126.
(5) Ibid., page 55. Compare The Preaent Conflict of Ideals,
pages 577-8.
(6) Present PhiloHophical Tendencies, page 275.
(7) The New Realism, page 150.
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when it is present, is i;amanent in experience, yet analysis shows
that the elements which compose it are transcendent. Accordingly,
Perry's idea of the self should be put among theories of the imma-
nent-transcendent type.
(b) In the^econd place, while the self is primarily an object
to be observed by others, "like other things," yet, from a different
cognitive point of vantage, this same object may become a subject.
Further, Perry purposes to take account of "the whole mind," "the
mind within," (studied by what he calls introspection), and "the
mind without."
(c) One who tries to classify such a complicated theory will
find that his classification of it wil_ be determined by reference
to what aspect of the theory he considers to be most fundamental,
or by reference to the amount of respect he pays to phases of the
theory which seem unimportant to hie:. If or.e actually recognize
all the details of Perry's view, he will be obliged to classify it
as both immanent and transcendent, and as both subjective and ob-
jective; for when mind exists in experience, it is either subject
or object according to one' 6 cognitive point of view, 'but it con-
tains elements which do not depend upon experience for their exis-
tence. But if one considers that the transcendent factor is incon-
sistent and the subjective factor a misnomer, he till properly clas-
sify this view as an immanent one of the objective tpe. If one
considers that the important place of emphasis in the neo-realistic
metaphysics, is upon the transcendent factor, the view might be
placed among the transcendent theories. Because of these compli-
cations I have felt obliged to put it in all three places. (1)
The criticism of Perry's theory of the self which will now be
undertaken is qualified by the following considerations; these ap-
ply equally well to the critical discussion of James:
(a) The criticism is largely destructive and assertory because,
in an inductive study, like this one, of several views, space forbids
the introduction of constructive and evidential argument in connec-
tion with each theory. Such argument may be presented with greater
economy and appropriateness in the last part of the investigation.
Criticism must consist chiefly in pointing out inconsis tencies and
inadequacies
.
(b) The criticism is b.-sed upon t :e most general and charac-
teristic lines of the theory in question, and, therefore, may be
inconsistent with some minor and isolated phases which are no doubt
discoverable in a view which is unsystematic and divergent within
within itself. (2)
(c) Some important defects in the theory are due to its imper-
fect method, but it is beyond the scope of this investigation to
work out a complete theory of metaphysical method. The same remark
holds good of the theory of reality and of knowledge.
An attempt will be made to show that Perry's conception of the
self is inadequate. The first reason for this proposition will be
found in the inadequacy of the method to which he re-strictu hirauelf.
If one accepts hio method, with its assumptions, one must, apparent-
ly, agree to his view of the self. Since, therefore, hie notion of
(1) See above, pages 5, 7, p nd 9.
(2) See notes to this effect concerning Jamee' theory, above,
page 75-
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1*. Correla- the self is essentially correlative with his method, it is important
tion between to briefly examine the latter.
Method and An interesting question in logic and psychology would be to in-
self- theory, quire how far devotion to an exclusive method of procedure has led
Perry to his theory of mind, and how far an original supposition as
to the nature of reality and of mind ha3 determined his method of
inquiry. The reader gets the impression, ho ..'ever, that he advocates
the method he does because he supposes the universe to be such as it
is
,
and that lie compels personality to fit into a methodical mold
which distorts it.
2'. The under- Nov/ the analytical method of new realism which Perry defends,
lying assump- when applied excluaiveiy to the study of personality, is objection-
tions of his able expecially because of the family of underlying assumptions
method. which it confessedly implies. Let us first notice what these as-
sumptions are; the chief ones are as follows:
(1) That the subject matter with which science and philosophy deal
is capable of analysis into ultimate elements; so:
(a) That the universe is a "complex" or "evident composition,"
an indefinite "mul ticiplity" of distinct and not-further-
analyzable terms; (1) and the experiencing of these facts
makes no difference to them, (2) that is, the terms are
"neutral entities";
(b) That the mind is a "complex capable of being analyzed into
more primitive terms"; (J) and mental activity has an "un-
mistakable multiplicity" of character; (4)
(2) That these analytical, simple terms may stand in an indefinite
number of relationships, but their being and nature is not
"dependent" in any sense; (5) that is, relations are extrinsic
or external to the being of the terms;
(5) That, therefore, the truth about anything, or its reality, may
be known by pushing analysis through until one reaches its
simple elements and their arrangement; (6)
(a) That, therefore, a whole is identical with the totality of
its components; (7) so that it may be known by analyzing
it into its parts; "that wholes are to be regarded not as
indivisible unities, but rather as collections or sums of
the natures and values possessed by their parts"; (8)
(b) That, then, the combination of elements into wholes does not
introduce new characteristics into the terms, (and should,
therefore, be called in strictness an arrangement, "sum,"
or "complex," rather than a whole);
(c) That, therefore, the surest way to avoid such errors and
confusion as ure found, for example, in dynamiBm and all
mystical philosophies , which mistake complexes for simples,
is to carry a.alysis to the limit. (9)
(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 2^6; Ne.\ Realism, p. $5.
(2) The New Realism, page 105.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 510.
(4) Ibid., page 256.
(5) The New Reuliam, page 126.
(6) Ibid., pages 32, 127. (7) Ibid., page 24.
(e) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page J74.
(9) The New Realism, pages 127-128.
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b 1 . The need
of making as-
sumptions is
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they should be
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criticism
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Only a few of the fundamental passages upon which the above
summary is based will be inserted. "The analytical method does imply
that reality consists of terms and relations." (1) "The procedure
of logic and mathematics- -any procedure, in fact, which employs the
method of analysis—is necessarily committed to the acceptance of
the externality of relations. The method of analysis presupposes
that the nature and arrangement of the parts supplies the character
of the v.'hole. If such were not the case the specification of the
parts and their arrangement would not afford a description of the
whole, and one would have to be content with an immediate or mys-
tical apprehension of it." (2)
"If they" (change and activity) "turn out to be reducible,
then they must be identical with the totality of their components."
(5) "The world is of an articulate structure that is revealed by
analysis, consisting of complexes, like bodies, persons, and socie-
ties, a8 well as of simples." (4) These "elements, processes and
systems" which constitute reality "are independent of being: exper-
ienced . " (5) "A neo-realiat recognizes no ultimate immediacies
nor non-relational -nor indefinable entities, except the simples in
which analysis terminates. The ultimate terms of knowledge are the
terms that survive an analysis that has been carried as far as it
i3 possible to carry it." (6)
"Mind and body are both complexes capable of being analyzed
into more primitive terms. Neither mind nor body is really sim-
ple.
.
When they are submitted to analysis it appears that the more
primitive terms of which they are composed are, in many cases at
least, interchangeable. . The same elements compose both mind and
body. " (7) "The expression, 'neutral entities,' will perhaps serve
better to emphasize the indifference of the terms of experience, not
only to their subjective relations, but to their physical relations
as well." (6)
One is obliged to recognize, of course, that it is inevitable
that any philosophical approach or method must make certain assump-
tions. The assumptions, however, should be the result of criticism,
and ought to be self-consistent and as simple as possible. Certain
fallacies and shortcomings into which Perry falls in the use of the
method of analysis will now be pointed out.
( 1 ) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 254.
(2) Ibid., page 519. (3) The New Realism, t,age 24.
(4) The New Realism, page 39. (5) Ibid., pages 105-4, also p. 1
(6) Ibid. , page 52
.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pa.es 510-11.
(8) Ibid., page 516. See the context of these pussages for
further evidence. The difficulty of stating neo-realis tic presup-
positions in a way that might be acceptable to even several new
realists is recognized, and is not attempted here. 3ee, for ex-
ample. E. G. Spaulding's somewhat variant conception of analysis
in The New Realism, pages 257-247.
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Instead of characterizing his method as dogmatic, waich may
fairly be done, we will speak of it as fallacious in various re-
spects. A fallacy of "exclusive particularity," as Perry calls it,
or of "definition by initial predication," is present in these as-
sumptions concerning the analytical method. The great value of the
analytical method in the study of human personality need not be
doubted, but it will be maintained that it is a one-sided and in-
complete method; and, being such, it is fallacious to assume that
it is the only method necessary to know the full truth about per-
sonality, waich is what Perry assumes.
The error present consists in supposing that, when the analyst
has found the ultimate elements of the self, if taere be such, he
has, therefore found the full meaning and reality of the self. ..'e
deny that this is the case, and the supposition that it is, is a
fallacy of "exclusive particularity," so well described by Perry
himself. (1) Any one who declares that the so-called intuitive
method is the only one th c~t will reveal the real personality, as
II
.
Bergson tends to affirm, falls into the same error in an op-
posite form.
Perry condemns the intuitive method because the objects of in-
tuition, self, change, activity, etc., are presumably complex, and
the truth about them can be ascertained by complete analysis of
them without resorting to any unique intuition. He explicitly
3tates a disjunction which requires one to choose either one method
or the other; indeed upon the validity of this disjunction rests his
"most general argument for realism." The steps in the argument are
as follows:
(a) If the doctrine of the externality of relations is true,
realism is established.
(b) But this doctrine is true, because it is necessitated by the
method of analysis
.
(c) He must adopt either the method of analysis or trie (uncriti-
cal) method of mystical apprehension.
(d) But we adopt the analytical rather than the intuitive method,
because the structure of the universe is Buch that only by
it can we reach a true description of the universe. (2)
This disjunction may be challenged upon the ground of its
imperfection. The function of a method is to discover reality and
not to prescribe its nature in advance. The a priori and exclu-
sive determination of method in the realism of Perry may be re-
garded as a fallacy of "initial predication" although of course
further reasons for thi3 opinion need to be offered. (5)
There seems to be no initial reason why a synthesis of both
mettiods referred to, or of these two and some others, might not
yield the truest results. It might be that after any elements
which the self may contain in analysis had been exhibited, some
other method would be necessary to reconstruct and apprehend the
whole. In particular, the process or test by which one might
judge in his own experience of the truth of the analysis of per-
sonality might not itself be a process of analysis, however val-
uable the latter might be as a stage on tho way to reality For
(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 128; The New
Realism, page 12.
(2) See above, 99, 102. Present Philosophical Tendencies,
pages 519-520.
(5) See below, pages 176, 1 7^-67
.
L
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example, it may be that when a work of art, such as a painting of
a landscape, has been analyzed into all of its physical, chemical,
aesthetic, and psychological factors, some kind of an enveloping
appreciation may be necessary before one really grasps the picture
as a beautiful individuality, and that this judgment of individu-
ality may be something in addition to anytaing included among the
termini of the analytical method. The need of some such supple-
ment to the analytical method is proved by its failure in dealing
with the self; this failure will be explained more fully below. (1)
The first reason why Perry and the new realists have such con-
fidence in the analytical method its. probably is its success, not
indeed in their own thought, but in the fields of natural science
and mathematics from which they have borrowed it The definite and
authoritative results obtained by these sciences, in determining
the quantitative character of the world, undoubtedly inspired the
use of the same method in philosophical endeavor. (2) V/e recall
how Descartes many years ago felt a similar impetus. The details
of recent historical developments cannot be recited here.
A striking example of the genetic connection suggested may be
seen in B. Russell's development of neo-realis tic principles out
of his mathematical studies. In this respect he and other new real-
ists have fallen in to the "fallacy of mental make-up" or "individ-
ual prepossession," in that they have become fascinated by a single
methodical point of view which seems in need of correction from
other standpoints. The hypothesis is suggested that the doctrine
of the externality of relations has gained much of its esteem among
new realists by reason of mathematical influence; namely, from the
analogical reasoning, of uncertain validity, that other entities
besides numbers might enter into numerous relations without suffer-
ing an alteration of their intrinsic values. The neo-realistic
world of subsistence is, to all appearances, a daughter of mathe-
matics
.
Now it is well known that the attempt of naturalism to uni-
versalize scientific method, as applied especially in the physical
sciences, has not brought insight into the nature of the self. It.
is beyond the scope of this investigation to prove this assertion,
or to show how, for example, impersonal monism, represented by E.
Haeckel and W. Ostwald, has failed to give a satisfactory account
of personality. (}) B. P. Bowne and James ward are ..o table antag-
onists of naturalistic views of the self. (4) It is very probable
that philosophy may henceforth neglect, so far as principle is
concerned, those naturalistic theories of personality.
Now when the new realists adopt, in their metaphysics, the
analytical method which in principle is identical with that used in
mathematics and physical science, ..e may expect to find the same
failure when they deal with the problem of personality. We may
: . 1 V. influence see 1 T
(1) oee below, *>agea 109-12.
(2) For a specific recognition of
Marvin, The New Realism, pages 04-7.
(5) See below, pages 194-200, in connection with the nature
of mental activity.
(4) See Bowne' s Metaphysics and Pureoisalian* and Ward a
Naturalism and Agnosticism, and The Realm of Ends.

106
expect that the sins of the fathers will fall upon the cnildren
unto tne first and second generations. The evidence in support of
this hypothesis will appear in the following criticisms. The char-
acteristic attempt of new realism is to get consciousness out of a
combination of elements which themselves are not conscious; the
reader may judge whether this is an improvement over E. Haeckel's
derivation of consciousness from elements endowed from eternity
with a primordial sensibility,
b'. The In the adoption of his method Perry falls into the fallacy
fallacy of of exclusive particularity, and in the use of it, into two falla-
abstractio'n. ' cies : (a) the fallacy of abstraction, or of the universal, (1) and
(b) the analytical fallacy, as I shall call it. (2) It is the
former of which naturalism is especially likely to be guilty.
Perry verbally intends to avoid it by recognizing that the abstract
quality of the elements of mind is itself just an added fact which
is irrelevant to the real nature of mind. In spirit and fact, how-
ever, his doctrine of the self suffers from all of the faults of
this fallacy. Just how this happens will now be explained.
The world which the method of analysis "discovers" is regarded
by most new realists as being the real world. It is supposed to
consist of an arrangement of ultimate, simple entities like "sensory
qualities and logical indefinables . " But "the simple qualities them-
selves evidently cannot be subjective, any more than they can be
physical." (5) We have seen that the same is^rue of the elements of
the mind, (4) for Perry declares that, "The elements of the intro-
spective manifold are in themselves neither peculiarly mental nor
peculiarly mine; they are neutral and intercaan^eable . " ( 5) In other
words, the components of mind are neitner subjective nor objective,
neither physical nor mental J they have a "neutral" existence,
—
rather subsistence,—until the peculiar grouping called conscious-
ness endows them with an accidental mental cnaracter.
This account of mind seems to remove its elements about as far
from concrete human experience as one can well imagine possible.
If I had to make a choice, I should much prefer that the truant of-
ficer, called "Ego-centric Predicament," should confine me in the
prison of solipsism, with its limited but concrete life, tnan that
Perry's Selfless Predicament should exile me and make me a homeless
wanderer in the abstract and hypothetical world of neutral and in-
different elements. Perry abstracts from the subject-object char-
acter of actual experience, as well as from the spatial-temporal
character of the physical world as we know it, and conceives certain
pre-mental and pre-physical elements as being simply what they are,
whatever that may be, without feeling obliged to loc; te them any-
where. (6) This is the very height of abstraction, and tolls us,
as J. Royce tries to prove, (7) "absolutely nothing."
(1) For exposition of this ffillacy, see B. P. Bowne, Theory
of Thought and Knowledge, pages 244-259.
(2) See below, pages 107-9.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendenciee, page JlA.
(4) See above, page 98.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pu ue 277; compare JIO.
(6) Ibid., page 516.
(7) The World and the Individual, vol. I, page 1 57
.
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We know that Perrjr desires to escape the abstractions of sub-
jective idealism and of naturalism. He does it by what D. C. Mac-
intosh calls a "homeopathic treatment" of these abstractions—namely,
by making one more abstraction. And the "independent" world he
reaches is so abstract and unreal that its status is quite unintel-
ligible. And that to which the whole process most clearly points is
the reality and the marvelous activities of the conceiving mind. He
supposes that he avoids the presupposition of the latter by speaking
of "discovering" entities, and byAtalking of "elements" rather than
of phenomena or experiences. Actually, his vigorous analysis is a
testimony to the initiative and creative power of the self. His suc-
cess in escaping from mind is seen in the following striking proposi-
tion: "Thus the case for realism rests on showing that to be content
of mind, is not to be dependent on a mind." (l) If this assertion
does not involve a self-contradiction, or a too restricted defini-
tion of dependence , then mind has been reduced in fact to a state
which James described as pure diaphaneity. For, if entities can
become contents of mind without depending upon mind in any signifi-
cant sense, then mind appears indeed to have become a nonentity, or
at least a negligible abstraction.
The term, "general observation," however, is a good camouflage
for this abstraction, for does not observation give concrete ele-
ments? Certainly but if mountains and rivers and consciousness all
belong to the "same field of observable experience," (2) they are not
neutral entities at all, but facts of conscious and interested ex-
perience.
c
1
. The The fallacy paramount of new realism needo to be christened
analytical with a special name. It may be called appropriately, the analytical
fallacy. fallacy, because it arises from an assumption made in connection
with the analytical method, the assumption, namely, that completed
1 . Meaning analysis reveals the .vuole or essential truth about any object of
of this observation. No objection need be raised against the assertion that
fallacy. completed analysis yields part of the truth. But Perry appears to
be mistaken in supposing that he has found reality when he has ana-
lyzed anything so far as he can. His conception of a whole is that
of a complex which is to be understood by examining all simple com-
ponents which stand arranged in it. The error lies in neglecting
any significant character which an organized whole may have over and
above the individual characters possessed by the terms which compose
it. It is true that Perry hints in places at a recognition of such
a whole-character, but the spirit of his writings and the use of his
method is to neglect it as insignificant, and to rush ahead in the
endeavor to find reality in the ultimate and independent elements
in which analysis terminates. In short, the fundament il error in
the analytical method, as used exclusively in new realism, seems to
be the fallacious assumption th t entities that enter into a whole
produce nothing which cannot be understood by examining its elements.
b)
This fallacy cannot be charged indiscriminately against all
new realists. E. G. Spaulding, for example, clearly states that
(1) The New Realism, page
(2) See above, pages 97-99.
(5) Compare J. Lair., Problems of the Self, pages lA0-6
L

it is "a matter of great importance" to note that "new properties or
new values appear ... in the actual synthesis ... of existential
wholes out of parts." (1) In proportion as this conception is
recognized, and in proportion as analysis is regarded as bringing
changes in the real properties of things, (2) a way is opened for the
active functioning of a self, and for a conception of personality
in which the latter cannot be explained in terms of a composition
of neutral elements. Perry's position with reference to the bear-
ing of the method of analysis upon the problem of the self is very
dii'ficult to make out, for at the same time that he asserts that
"philosophy is necessarily involved" in the " isolation " of its mater-
ials, he affirms that the logician deals "in a very direct and rigor-
ous way with relation ." (5) On the whole, it is fair to charge him
definitely with the analytical fallacy as it has been described,
a". It is the This fallacy is the converse of that of pseudo-simplicity,
opposite of which he charges against the idealistic view of consciousness and
the fallacy of spiritual activity. He thinks that the idealist errs in believing
"pseudo-sim- that the simplicity of the self, activity, consciousness, the will,
plicity." etc., which is present when these things are as yet unexplored,
belongs to these objects themselves. (4) When a complex experience
has been analyzed into its elements, there is no unique central
" that " left over, which must appear among the elements. (4) So he
argues that dynamism is false because it rests upon activity, which
is complex. True simplicity is that wnich comes after analysis, and
it belongs to the object itself. (5)
2". Antithe- This certainly is a curious kind of argument. The underlying
sis between assumption is that simple elements are the proper foundation of a
simplicity and philosophy. This, I say, is an assumption, and a very questionable
value as found- one. Why should one assert in advance that a complex may not be the
ation of philos- foundation of a metaphysics? or an individual whole? The contrast
phy. here suggested rests upon a difference in judgment as to whut a good
foundation for a philosophy is. (6) The whole issue turns on wheth-
er that which is simple or that which is valuable, whether that
which initiates or that which crowns evolution, should be the ground-
work of metaphysics.
The correlation of this antithesis with new realism and ideal-
ism is evident. It may be maintained that the simplicity of Perry's
independent ultima tes does not compensate for their philosophic
worthlessness . The thesis to be defended below is that personality
is the moat illuminating point of view from which to understand the
world regardless of how complex the concept of personality may turn
out to be. (7) If it is a success as a metaphysical principle of
(1) The New Realism, pages 258.
(2) Ibid. , page 242.
(5) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific
Methods, vol. VII, pages 627.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pu^e 257.
(5) Ibid., page 265.
(6) Compare Janes plea for a balance between "udb tract monotony
and concrete* heterogeneity," between wholeness and oeparatenead , in
"The Sentiment of Rationality," pages 66-7 of The Will to Believe, etc
(7) See below, pages J4 1 -5.
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explanation, we will not feel that any lack of simplicity which it
may have will militate against this success, provided any lack of
simplicity which may be present is duly recognized.
I think, however, that Perry has attached excessive worth to
analysis, and that this over-emphasis deserves to be called the
analytical fallacy. We have often heard of thinkers missing the
forest for the trees. Ttus is. the special danger into which the
method of analysis is likely to fall. It is unnecessary to decide
whether or not mind is a complex before proceeding to show that the
attempt to represent the self as a complex of such elements as Perry
claims it is, is a failure. The justification for charging him with
the analytical fallacy will appear more clearly in the following
discussion
.
One who falls into the analytical fallacy is likely to face a
serious difficulty in accounting for that unity of mind which seems
to be a fact of experience. The analytical method, used exclusive-
ly, does not provide a solution of this difficulty, which fact Perry
himself recognizes. He admits that, "it is necessary, as the spir-
itualists and transcendentalists have rightly maintained, to suppose
some kind of action that shall bring contents together, and give
them the peculiar wi thin-mind unity which they possess." (1) He
rejects the usual idealistic solution, (2) in which mental unity is
found in the "immediate apprehension" of some spiritual activity
or substance. His reasons for this are, first, that the "only pos-
sible justification" for it is the doctrine of internal relations,
which he rejects; (5) and, secondly, that the solution is a case of
the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity. (4) His attempted solution im-
plies the doctrine of external relations, and will be successful
only if he gets together certain elements which by hypothesis have
no dependence upon one another.
Now he thinks that " there are two ways of unifying experience
.
11
One is, to refuse to analyze: that is, to carry analysis back only
to its vanishing point in bare feeling, which means an experience
which is not the experience of anything, and is equivalent to
solving the problem by going to sleep. The other "way is to carry
analysis through . and discover the connections of the parts, and
the articulate structure of the whole." (5) It is not at once
clear how this analytical process .vill explain the unity of conscious-
ness without assuming it, but let us do our best to see fhat Perry
might mean by the unity of the mind.
The inadequacy of the analytical method as employed by Perry
is clearly evident .hen we examine the different kinds of mental
unity which it makcB possible. Now we can imagine how it might be
supposed that one of the ultimate, simple entities of new realism
might be regarded as possessing a certain kind of unity, but Perry
thinks that the mind is not an entity, but a complex of entities,
and we must look, therefore, for some way in which a complex may
( 1 ) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 284.
(2) For example, that of T. H. Green or J. !4 . E. I<icTaggart.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 157.
(4) Gee above, page 108 . The passing debate concerning ex-
ternal and internal relations is too complicated a problem to be
introduced into the discussion of tais investigation.
(?) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 2J7-6.
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be regarded as being unified. In any case, it iB obvious, of course,
that one of these basic entities is too simple to account for the
felt variety that may be present in a mental whole.
Another possible kind of unity is that of a series, the unity
of which would lie in its definition, but while E. G. Spaulding
makes use of such a unity (1), I do not know that Perry does. B.
P. Bowne sought in various ways to prove that the conception of a
series presupposes a self which abides through the series; (2) so
that we cannot define the self in terms of a series without circu-
lar reasoning.
The kind of mental unity characteristic of Perry and the new
realists in general is defined by the idea of class. The mind or
self is a class of elements; it is an "intersecting" class; that
is, the elements are interchangeable with those of other classes.
(5) For example, the elements composing a given individual con-
sciousness may also, under other circumstances or from a different
point of view, enter into the composition of a pliyaical class or
of another mind. The question arises now as to what constitutes
the class?
In the first place, the complex, mind, is not a class of men-
tal elements . There is no point of resemblance among the elements
themselves which can be called mental. The contents of mind have
"no generic" character. That is to say, the elements which go to
form a unique class called mind do not possess in themselves any
essential characteristics by reference to which they may be classi-
fied as mental.
In the second place, any unity which the class possesses must
be derived from the relation of its members to some other thing.
This is the case in Perry' 3 view. These members are united in a
specific way, and form a definite class, because they have a rela-
tion to a particular thing, namely, a behaving body. Wind has as
much unity as is present in a class of elements selected out of
the whole uhiverse of things by the reaction of a definite nervous
organism. Those things in the environment which are selected or
taken account of by an interested organism become thereby mental
contents, and the behaving, reacting body becomes thereby mental
subject or agent, and the whole thus composed is mind or conscious-
ness. So Perry asserts that "The objects selected by any indiv-
idual responding organism compose an aggregate defined by that re-
lationship. TTnat such an aggregate derives from consciousness will
then be its aggregation , and no thin,; ...ore . A subjective manifold
will be any manifold whose inclusion and arrangement of contents
can be attributed to the order and range of some particular organ-
ism's response." (4) "Several sounds listened to or heard jointly
compose a mental unity." (5) -ind, therefore, is a class or com-
plex constituted by the selective response of an organism.
(1) The New Rationalism, pages 160 ff.
(2) For example, Metaphysics , pages 61 ff,
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 2tiQ.
(4) Ibid., page 325.
(5) Ibid., pa ;:e 285.
(5) Also, The Hiddenncas of the Mind, Journal of
Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Method, VI, pageo 29-J6
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The chief and sufficient criticise of this theory of unity is
stated by D. H. Parker (1): "But you cannot define mind as the
class of elements reacted to by a body for this one reason at least,
namely, that many of the elements do not exist previous to their
existence as elements of mind, and so -re incapable of being select-
ed out through the body's action." For exaaple'. it is absurd to
suppose that the organism reacts to memories, to ideas of invisible
objects, to purposes, trains of reasoning, and various sentiments
and ideals, just as it reacts to light, heat, or sound. How can the
kind of mind which Perry describes "collect my past experiences?"
(2) These various facts referred to, however, evidently must be in-
cluded in mind, but how shall we get them out of mind in order that
the organism may react upon them and thereby constitute them mental?
This unreasonable and impossible terminus of the hypothesis con-
demns it as insufficient to account for the facts.
Further, this theory of unity presupposes an exact knowledge of
how objects in the environment and the nervous system interact. (5)
It appears quite probable, however, that mind may be known quite
apart from any knowledge of the body or the brain, for it was com-
paratively well known before the nervous system had been dissected.
We are dangerously near the old materialism which attempted to
conceive mental unity in analogy to the parallelogram of forces.
And if we take Perry literally, the unity of tiie mind is the unity
of the bodily organism, which is noz mental unity at all. (4)
D. H. Parker gives another interesting reason why mental unity
cannot be described as a class or collection. He observes that (5)>
"It is characteristic of a class or collection that when you take
away or adjoin an element, you alter only its numerical and ordinal
properties. But this is not true of the mind. The loss or ad-
junction of an element produces changes both in the mind as a whole
and in the individual elements of the whole." For instance, the
sudden emergence of pain will cause the disappearance of many ele-
ments and those that remain will be suffused with dissatisfaction;
the relation of clearness and unclearness will be reversed. As a
matter of fact in the mind "there is a mode of combination of one
element with another, an interfusion which no mere enumeration can
describe. . In short the elements of a mind are a whole, not a
mere class," (5) and this whole cannot be explained or described
by means of reactions of B body to elements of its environment.
The most successful kind of unity which is possible for the
self in Perry's thought is the unity of interest, if only a fuller
psychological account of it were offered. We might suppose then
that mental action is unified when a single interest dominates the
behavior of the organism and its selection of objects in the en-
vironment with ref rence to .vaich it acts. Since Perry identifies
the interested and the teleological , we huve here the suggestion
that conscious life may be unified in terms of purposive action.
(1) Tha Self and Nature, page 15.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 275
(5) The New Realism, page }4
(h) See below, especially pages 20^-6.
(5) The Self and Nature, page 16.
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The idea of unifying the mental life in terms of interest or pur-
pose is highly commendable and promising as an hypothesis, but
Perry has not worked out ttaia suggestion, and he denies that human
nature contains a single dominating interest. (1)
a". Diffi- His own description of interest tends to destroy the apparent
culties in Per- unity promised by the concept of interest. Sometimes he uses in-
ry's view of teres t as the name for the whole behavior- si tuation, which, by hy-
it. pothesis, is a complex. Or again, interest sometimes seems to be
a phase of bodily or instinctive structure which again is complex,
and which does not at once exhibit the sense in which it is mental
• at all. Further, what is the relation of the varied and successive
interests to any one which might be regarded as a central one?
Strictly, according to the neo-realis tic method, they ought to be
regarded as elements, but this view would destroy the unity we
seek. Kence we do not find unity in any of these directions.
When Perry^ in his theory of value, regards interest as an
"ultimate of consciousness" and the generating principle of all
value, he violates his own analytical maxim, for it seems clear
that interest is not an ultimate simple, but that it can be ana-
lyzed further; or, as v/e should prefer to say, can be sho.n to
have several aspects, such as active, affective, and cognitive
phases. A very serious difficulty threatens one also if he at-
tempts to explain how the great variety of human interests can
possibly arise from simple and neutral elements. Having assumed
that such elements compose reality, Perry should explain how they
come to form such facts as human interests in their great variety
and mutations
.
b" . Is per- In concluding this study of the relation of the analytical
aonality a com- method to the problem of cental unity, I suggest that tte initial
plex at all? definition of mind as a complex might be challenged on good
grounds, for it may be that personality is a unique^ (2) in spite
of Perry's conception of mind. It might have various aspects or
modes of activity, but these might be mistakenly called elements
in a complex.
V . Need of If the analytical method is the only metaphysical method, it
correction in should yield some fruitful results in its application to the
Perry's method, problem of personality. The neo-realis tic philosophy in which it
is used contains many opportunities for analysis which have been
passed over entirely up to date. A serious pragmatic objection to
its exclusive use in the study of the self is that, in the hands of
the new realists, it has not produced valuable results. Perry has
not illuminated by analysis any significant phase of personality
,
except its teleological aspect. A true method should yield better
results than have yet appeared. Yfhen the analytical method is re-
ferred to in this way, it is considered as being integrally associ-
ated with the family of neo-realiatic assumptions noted above. (5)
The method of analysis ,when separated from these assumptions and
considered in general , is of course n valuable and necessary part
of philouopaical procedure.
(1) See above, page 9A
.
(2) See below, pages 30y-20.
(3) See above, page 102.
V
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c. Errors in
Perry's theory
of mental ac-
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1». His
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is circular.
Further objections might be raised against Perry's use of the
analytical method in connection with personality. Certain objections
to his conception of introspection, to his thorough-going behavior-
ism, etc., might be introduced. However, probably enough has been
said to indicate that his mode of procedure needs to De supplemented
in itself and corrected in its use. A metaphysical method in the ap-
plication of which personality vanishes in any recognizable form or
familiar aspect, as it does here, is thereby shown to be inadequate.
To be sure, the self hovers in the background, unrecognized and un-
discovered, as the ever-present, active analyzer and the constant
giver of value. But what he calls mind is so masked with behavior-
istic and physiological verbiage, and so distorted by the method,
with its accompanying metaphysical presuppositions, which has been
applied to it, that we do not recognize it.
And not only in appearance but in fact his method confessedly
explains mind in terms of what is not mind. (1) No metaphysician
has a right so to define and limit his method in advance that he is
led to a completely insufficient explanation of so important a fact
as human personality. The exclusive use of the analytical method,
as interpreted by Perry, does not bring to light a satisfactory
theory of personality, and, therefore, either must be rejected or
supplemented, preferably the latter. It is well to bear in mind
that methods of procedure and categories of explanation are not ends
in themselves but instruments for making experience and reality in-
telligible
.
We turn now from the study of Perry's method to an examination
of the concepts of mental action, consciousness, and others, which
have an important bearing upon his theory of the self. V<e consider,
first, errors in his doctrine of mental action, especially the cir-
cular reasoning which is present in it.
One of the most striking promises in Perry's doctrine of the
self is that we should expect to find the key to it in the concept
of mental action. He agrees with the spiritualists in arguing that
mental action is necessary to explain mental contents; that mental
contents or objects become such by virtue of a "general action of
some sort." If this is the case, then we cannot regard mental ac-
tion itself as mental content without circular reasoning. (2) These
are the limits set for the inquiry. Let us examine the actual re-
sults .
It turns out that mental action is bodily action, and this ac-
tion is to be studied by the method of general observation, espet
cially as carried out by my neighbor. "For those bodily actions
which now become most significant are only accidentally, if at all,
felt by the conscious agent himself." (5) If these statenente truly
represent Perry's conclusion, it is evident that mental action has
become indeed mental content. This result violates the limitations
set upon the argument ahich were mentioned in the last paragraph.
The point t issue is whether or not action JLc a mental con-
tent? In P9rry*s doctrine of general observation th?re is no doubt
about the answer to this question. Mental action ia a kind of mental
(1) See above, page 98.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages 279-80
(5) Ibid., page 285-
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content. He himself falls into the vicious circle against which he
counaed a warning. That unifying action which at first was pro-
mised and required as a presupposition to give mental contents theirdistinctive character is lost in the broad field of mental contents
and our hopes are disappointed. Perry has not succeeded in restor-ing that activity which consciousness lost when James denied the ex-istence of the latter. Mental action must gain some other meaning
than oodily action if it is to retain any significance.
Perry might reply by saying that what I have called his circlein reasoning is ray fallacy of exclusive particularity; that I errm supposing that mental action may not be botn mental action and
mental contents under varying circumstances. This rejoinder wouldbe cog.nt provided mental action were ever anything different thanbodily action, which it is not in his theory, so far as I am able
to understand it; and bodily action, if it appears at all, always
appears, m my judgment, as mental content; but it cannot even thus
appear without the presence of a self very different from that de-
scribed by Perry.
Here the bankruptcy of Perry's theory of the self appears in
its clearest light. His untenable conclusion is that mental action
is bodily action. All genuine mental action has vanished, and the
phrase is preserved as a sop to those who, before they become new
realists, suppose they have active minds. He apparently prefers the
term, action, to that of activity because of the physical and phys-
iological connotations of the former. The barrenness of his theory
of mental action is concealed by the ambiguity in such frequent
words as reaction, response
, etc. These words su-gest some sort of
mental dynamism. This suggestion is useful in giving a measure of
plausibility to a theory which in fact has no place for mental ac-
tivity. What really is selection? It is the reception by a sense
organ of certain stimuli for which it is fitted by nature to receive.
Selection means the specific response of an org^n to the stimula-
tions appropriate to it. The bodily action present is called raental
action. But if it is bodily action, why call it mental action? Or,
if it is mental action, why call it bodily action? The whole argu-
ment and phraseology is thoroughly misleading. Reaction, too, is a
physical or organic response, and in no Sense a creative act of mind.
Hi3 behavioristic teleology reveals so:ne factors which are
not items of behavior or objects in the environment. This is seen
in his account of purpose in terms of "anticipatory adjustment." (1)
In a case of purposive behavior the organism adjusts itself to an
environment which does not yet exist, and it does so by means of
images, especially the free iiaages of memory. Here is obviously a
factor which cannot be reduced to the reaction of the organism to
its environment, for how can an organis.-a respond to an environment
which is not present or yet existent? It is clear, therefore, that
if "anticipatory adjustment" is to mean anything different than
mechanical reaction, it invol/es a "mental" activity or factor
which is different from organic response or behavior. It is no
doubt correct to say with Perry that most of our human actions are
thus reactions to an environment hich is to come, but this does not
fit in with the realistic conception of mind as bodily action.
(1) See above, pages 94-96.
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Let us examine now some phases of his conception of conscious-
ness. It consists in a complex relation between a sentient and in-
terested organism and some parts of its environment." (1) This is
clearly a circular definition, for it includes that which is to be
defined. If one starts with "a sentient and interested organism,"
obviously one will have no difficulty in getting consciousness.
What is required is a definition which does not assume that which
is to be defined, or a clear recognition that such a definition is
logically impossible. In Perry's later statement of his theory of
consciousness, (2) in The Present Conflict of Ideals , he asserts
that it is made up of elements from the environment that are "bor-
rowed by the mind." The circular character of his description of
mind is here exhibited in still clearer light. If the mind is re-
quired to select elements in order to get consciousness, it looks
as if consciousness were the presupposition rather than the pro-
duct of the interactive process in question.
Another serious defect in this definition of consciousness is
that it is too narrow. That organic response which is essential to
consciousness cannot "take account of" countless objects and facts
of which we are actually conscious, because they lie in a different
realm than that of the "natural environment," which he treats as
made up of "sensory qualities and logical entities." (5) How can
ray body react to memories and intentions, to ideas and ideals of
any kind, tqhistory and facts of change in things, to future con-
tingencies and religious aspirations, to the claims of the analyt-
ical method and new realism? A person who was just becoming ac-
quainted with new realism might well reckon that one of the most
difficult things for the body to react to would be an independent
real. These objects cannot enter that environment to which re-
sponse is made. It is not at all clear how the action of an or-
ganism can bring a logical entity into a mental ^roup. Whatlight
is thrown upon recollections referred to my youth, upon the pic-
tures of my creative imagination, and the syllogisms of my reason-
ing, by saying that my consciousness of them depends upon my bodily
reaction?
Two of the chief mysteries in neo-r.alistic doctrine are the
prospective and the "retrospective functioning of my body." (4)
It is said these consist of certain ..:odificationa of the cerebrum,
of certain central, active processes, but in experience these do
not mean the past or future until some mind makes them do so.
The whole problem of meaning i8 unsolved. The comprehensive
grasp of vast orders of logical and mathematical systems which
Perry himself exhibits in his writing requires a mental activity
very different from the bodily action which he describes. Neither
a business man nor a philosopher could succeed if Perry's account
of consciousness were true and complete. Life is more than con-
tact with environment. It may be indeed that it coneista in ^art
in this, but it is also an inner and purposive development. If
the new realists themselves do not feel spiritual strivings, their
(1) The New Realism, page 1^7; compare Present Philosophical
Tendencies, page 52^-
(2) See abovi page 69.
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page J10.
(4) Ibid. , page 296.
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metaphysics must explain the presence of these in others, and
should not explain them away.
We have seen that in the conscious-complex Perry regarded
the behaving body as the mental subject. This is not confirmed,
but refuted by experience. It is simply contrary to every-day
facts to suppose that when we become conscious of objects in .our
environment, the body is either experienced or regarded as the
subject of these experiences. They have often a center of refer-
ence all their own which is very different from the body. Only
when one possesses a considerable measure of scientific knowledge
doe6 he infer indirectly that certain mental processes are prob-
ably conditioned by certain nervous changes, but even then he never
says, "My cerebrum is aware of this book." But further, if we are
able to prove that the self is the necessary condition for the
spatial- temporal representation of the body apart from which the
body has no meaning, (1) then it is fallacious to turn about and
declare that the self is corporeal. The error in this procedure
is excellently expounded by G. Kafka. (2)
We have seen how Perry tries to describe mind or consciousness
in terms of action, but have noted that what he calls mental action
really means bodily action, one among the "interacting things" in
the universe. As a matter of fact, therefore, we are thrown back
upon the relational theory of consciousness. Consciousness then is
a "complex" which arises when an organism responds to a limited
group of objects in its environment. Now this important question
arises: Does consciousness precede or accompany this "aggregation"
(5) or complex? There are passages which permit either answer.
In the first place, we read, for example, that " the presence
of some elements together in one complex is dependent on the com-
bining action of consc iousness , " and in this way the elements are
"correlated" and "are determined exclusively by the agency (selec-
tive and combining) of the subject of consciousness." (4) Again,
"Consciousness is the means of bringing thirgs within the range of
purposive action. It determines the limits of the environment
•taken account of, 1 as :Iis Unguis hed from the total environment.
The range of consciousness defines a field of things liable to ac-
tion.
.
The actual dealings of the organism with such objects, the
process of art itself, is guided by consciousness. The modifica-
tion of the object is not in this case directly due to conscious-
ness." An object "is made dependent on the body by the action of
the mind," etc. (5) The neo-realis tic version of immedialien is
that concepts are discovered and not made; that intellect ie an
organ of"discernment" rather than of fabrication. (6)
The passages just quoted seem to indicate that consciousness
is in part something which precedes . and in part is something
which determines the complex which is called mind. We ask then,
What is this consciousness? Perry's reply 1st It is the group
(1) See below, pages 200-11; 259-60.
(2) Versuch einer kritiechtm Darstellung der n
ungen Uber das Ichproblcm. Archiv fUr die gesamt© P
bd. XIX, 1910, page 216.
•n Anschau-
dogie,
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page JZ?.
(4) The New Realism, pages 159-40. (5) Ibid., page 141
.
(6) Present Philosophical Tendencies , pages 2J9-41
.
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of objects to which the behaving organism responds. This complex
of objects, however, we decline to call consciousness. We are.
therefore thrown upon the other alternative: consciousness must
accompany, or first appear in, the complex to which its name is
applied. This is on the whole the interpretation which is most in
harmony with the thought of Perry. But it does not solve the prob-
lem of consciousness for various reasons, 3ome of which will now
be noted.
In the first place, if this resultant combination is called
mind or consciousness, it is inconsistent to speak of "the combin-
ing agency of consciousness," (1) as if this were some activity
which preceded the complex. If consciousness is ever a combining
agency, the relational hypothesis falls to the ground; for, then,
the complex which results from it3 combining operations is a prod-
uct of consciousness, and cannot logically be ct.lled upon to ex-
plain consciousness itself. On the whole, however, consciousness,
in the philosophy of Perry, is not an antecedent of the group of
elements called mental, but only an accidental (2) accompaniment
of it, or perhaps a consequence of it. But, in this case, to speak
of consciousness as an agency is mistaken, and is alike the cause and
the result of confusion in thinking. That w^ich produces nothing
should not be called activity or agency. The survival of the
phrase, "agency of consciousness," however, shows the lingering of
a fact for which the theory in question has no place.
Suppose, in the second place, that we should try to catch
consciousness in the "aggregation." It is not itself an entity
for. by hypothesis entities are "other-than-nind. " It is x.ot the
bodily action, for bodily action is bodily action and not conscious-
ness. It is not an agency of any kind because, first, such agency
cannot be found by inspection, and al30 because consciousness is
only the accompaniment or result of the agency of the behaving
organism. Consciousness must, therefore, be a relation, but how
shall we conceive or imagine a relation which is accidental and
absolutely external to the terms related, as neo-realists assert?
and how would such a relation initiate itself or make itself known?
(5) I confess that I cannot find consciousness in Perry's exposi-
tion of it. Our wanderings through the labyrinth of neo-r talis tic
argument in search of mind bring us in the end to a kind of epi-
phenomenal fairy so diaphanous that it evades all our attempts to
capture it for examination,
c'. Person- Let us ms.ke another attempt, however, to understand the rela-
ality in con- tional theory of consciousness in new realism. Let us do eo from
nection with the point of view of epistemological monism which Perry is interest-
Perry's doc- ed in maintaining. (4) For him consciousness is not strictly epi-
trine of the phenomenal, but is completely "immanent." In either caee, however,
immanence of
consciousness. (1) The New Realism, page y^t
.
(2) Present Philosophical Tendencies, puge 265.
(5) Here would be the proper place to explain the bearing of
the important dispute over the externality of relatione upon the
problem of the self if time permitted its introduction.
(A) See The Present Conflict of Ideals, pagee J76-80j D. C.
Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 509, etc,
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it is entirely passive, and the self can only mean the bodily or-
genism. The situation seems to be about as follows.
Perry develops his idea of "the immanence of consciousness"
from the standpoint of the "homogeneous" things of the environment
rather than from the point of view of a spontaneous and conscious
self. (1) In this development consciousness, and therewith the 3elf,
is dissolved into the same stuff as "the remainder of the world."
Personality, therefore, loses all uniqueness which some claim for it
in distinction from the objects of its "natural environment." "Con-
sciousness is ... an excerpt of things
, which a cerebrall;/ equipped
organi sm selects for its special purposes from its surrounding en-
vironment
.
" (2)
According to this doctrine, consciousness produces nothing, but
is a product or combination defined by the group of environmental
factors to which a behaving organism responds. Consciousness, to be
sure, is immanent in this group of things, but it so completely
lacks influence and significance with reference to them, that it is
also said to be "external." It, is not external^n the sense of be-
ing a second fundamental principle of explanation, for Perry rejects
dualism along with the spiritualists. (5) Consciousness is external
in the sense that its presence makes no difference to and does not
determine the being and properties of the elements which compose it.
These independent entities of the "natural environment" constitute
what is fundamentally real. In some of these consciousness is im-
manent, not as an agent which does something, out as a bare relation
of togetherness of certain things in the world of nature. In terms
of these consciousness is to be explained. The result is that con-
sciousness loses all ordinary meaning, and becomes either an empty
and impotent abstraction, or, more exactly, becomes absorbed in and
indistinguishable from the vast and neutral realm of the "natural
environment." So far as the problem of personality goes, this is
the real meaning of the idea of the immanence of consciousness as
interpreted by the new realists. Any agency which consciousness
sometimes is said to possess really belongs to neutral entities,
or to physical things. That seems to be Perry's meaning when he
speaks of "r alism . . . admitting consciousness into the natural
world as a genuine dynamic agent." (4)
The consistent development, then, of epia temological monism
from the realistic standpoint means trie reduction of personal ex-
perience to the same stuff as things. Spirit and mental activity
are explicitly classed with or di3dolved in the midst of things.
(5) All spontaneity and efficacy which they some time's are supposed
to possess are transferred to the environment. In this case the
denial of dualism a..d the assertion of a metaphysical aomogeneity
means the denial of personality. An understanding of personality
is not a condition for a knowledge of the neutral universe, but
any significance which it may possess is borrowed from the latter.
This conclusion is quite in harmony with E. B. Holt's statement (6)
(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, pages 576 ff.
(2) Ibid., page 578. (5) Ibid., pages 576-9.
(4) Ibid., page 579. (5) Ibid., pages 577-6.
(6) The Concept of Consciousness, page 156.
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that "the real object of this book" is "the interpretation of the
universe as a purely neutral universe, or, in other words, the de-
ductive showing of how a neutral universe can contain both 'physical'
and 'mental' objects." The particular place in this universe where
a thinker, supposing him to exist, would look for data for the under-
standing of personality would be in the vicinity of a behaving, hu-
man organism. (1) Our study of the neo-realistic doctrine of the
immanence of consciousness has brought us to the border land of
materialism without revealing to us a significant understanding
either of consciousness or personality
. (2)
In short, "Perry
. .
has not succeeded in coraliing conscious-
ness in his definition," as D. C. Macintosh says. "In adding to-
gether the results of the two methods, Perry has succeeded in' round-
ing up' all the important associates of consciousness, but conscious-
ness itself is hot to be found in the aggregation; other- than-mind
added to other- than-mind does not give otner than otaer- taan-mind.
. .
To be sure, the terms 'mind' and 'consciousness' may be used
with radically altered meaning, and arbitrarily applied to the
aforesaid sum of elements; but it ought to be no less acceptable to
the neo-realist, as it would be far less misleading, if he were to
employ instead of these terms some neutral algebraic symbol. His
definition would then be stripped of the false greatness that has
been thrust upon it by calling it a definition of mind. . It might
very well be that mind was the cause of both the selection of the
object and the organic response, and not a mere effect of their
occurrence together, much less a mere name for their combination."
(5)
d 1 . Ambiguity One of the reasons for the plausibility of the neo-realistic
tt "selection" . doctrine of consciousness lies perhaps in the convenient and adapt-
able ambiguity of the term, selection . How much and what does it
include? Knowing, for example, perception of an object, emotional
attitude to it, choice for or against it for the sake of an end,
and reaction to it—all of these? or -ore or less? The suggestion
of mental activity in this word makes it very useful as a key-term
in a philosophy in which consciousness is interpreted as a purely
passive and external thing. This term is in dire need of expli-
cation. As interpreted by the new realists, it refers too much to
the present, is not sufficiently prospective in its connotation,
and actually means as a rule a mechanical or organic response,
e. Perry does A final objection to the neo-realistic doctrine of the self is
not show in that no definition of its reality is offered. Perry bas not yet
what sense mind consistently answered this central question: What is the reality of
is real. personality? He presumes to have found the reality of mind when,
(1) For criticism of the behavioris tic conception of cental
or perso:ial activity, see below, pages 200-11.
(2) There are no doubt other interpretations, for example
that of D. C Macintosh, of epistemological monism, which would
not lead to this negative conclusion concerning personality
.
(5) The Problem of Knowledge, pages 264-5 and note 5.
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after a thorough analysis, he reaches a group of simple elements
which nave a character of their own independent of being exper-
ienced. (1) These ultimate entities do not depend upon exper-
ience in order to be. What, then, is it to be real? There is no
clear reply. Perry points out that "the realist does not propose
to define reality in terms of its independence." (2) In fact,
' there is no sense in which simple entities can be said to be de-
pendent at all." (5) "The realist must be satisfied to say that
in the last analysis the elements of experience are not anywhere;
they simply are what they are. They find a place when they enter
into relationships; but they bring into these relationships a char-
acter which they possess quite independently and by themselves." (4)
This is his last word about reality. This net metaphysical
result of new realism is disappointing. We do not intend to set
forth the difficulties in the theory of reality here involved. (5)
That is beyond our purpose. We merely notice the negative and in-
significant result ao far as the problem of personality is con-
cerned. A metaphysics which does not solve that important prob-
lem is inadequate.
Since Perry accepts the results of the various sciences, he
might refer us to behavioris tic psychology for an empirical answer
to the question concerning the nature of the self. What we desire,
however, is a metaphysical solution and not a psychological one,
least of all a behavioris tic solution, if Perry is a representative
behaviorist. (6) He himself does not add, save by generating fog,
to the description of the world offered by physics, psychology and
logic. (7) He does suggest that reality is more than "this bare
term-and-relation character," but what it is in addition to this
abstraction is quite unclear. (6)
In the course of our study of the thought of Perry there were
many places where the active self was assumed without be-in^ recog-
nized as such. Some of these instances may be specified. The pro-
cess of analysis, for example, docs not appear to sustain itself in
the air of abstractions, but presupposes and rests upon a capacity
to make distinctions and grasp wholes which points to a mental ac-
tivity of a very different sort than sensory specification or bod-
ily ada-3tation. The adoption of the analytical method is not well
described by saying that it is an organic response or an adaptation
to some objects in the environment. How this method, with its as-
sumption of the existence of "independent" entities, is connected
v/ith self-preservation is far from being evident. In short, the
analytical process itself points to a living and active analyzer
or thinker which Perry has failed to explain. In speaking of er-
ror, he points out how, through "the intervention of mind, a law
may be misapplied to an event." (9)
(1) The New Realism, pages 1 k9-^>0. (2) Ibid., pages 117 ft.
(5) Ibid. , page 126.
(4) Present Philosophical Tendencies, .age 316; compare The
New Realism, page 12fl.
(5) Compare J. Royce, The World and the Individual, for a
criticism of it.
(6) Compare below, pages 200-11.
(7) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page 310. (6) Ibid., p,
(9) Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific I bbod,
XIII, page 515.
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This is only one of the many unexplained aspects of the mind
which could be mentioned. Some others are implied in the follow-
ing statements: "In so far ag I am reflective, my impulses and i-
deala are repeatedly the objects of my contemplation and scrutiny.
They are defined, adopted, rejected, or reaffirmed in every moral
crisis." When Perry considers the foundations of morality and
religion, he demands "a world in which consciousness
. .
may oper-
ate effectively, and in which there is therefore a chance of its
bringing the world into accord with its interests." (1)
Some of the valuable elements in Perry's theory of the self
will now be pointed out. (a) The first is his emphasis upon the
importance of the analytical method in the study of personality.
There is a real need of observing better than he himself does his
injunctions regarding logical clearness and exactness in the
study of consciousness and the self, 'we may recognize the great
worth of the analytical oe thod without committing ourselves either
to the exclusive or to the neo-realistic use of it, and without
accepting uncritically the various assumptions which Perry ties
up with it. w"e may regard analysis as an important stage on the
way to insight into the nature of personality, and as a part of a
true philosophic method.
(b) He seems to be on the road to a correct understanding of
personality in pointing out that action of some sort is the dis-
tinguishing character of mind. The word is acceptable, although
his interpretation of it is quite objectionable.
(c) However, his interpretation of mental action in terms of
bodily action brings into the foreground certainly the importance
for personality not only of the bodily life, but also of the rela-
tion of personality to its environment. It is a warning against
overlooking the significance of the objective realization and
study of human purposes. His idea that the permanence of person-
ality is to be found in the more or less constant dispositions of
the biological subject should be noted also.
(d) Perry's most important contribution to the theory of per-
sonality, in my judgment, is his view that interest is the essence
of the self, that the active personality consists in the whole of
an individual's interests and of the dispositions upon which they
are founded. (2) Another valuable suggestion that is implied in
this connection is that the unity of the mental life might be
found in the control of action by a single dominating interest.
His metaphysical grounding of his doctrine of interest needs to
be greatly altered, especially in the way of granting to the
interest-self an autonomy which it lacks in his general theory.
Some suggestions for this remodeling may be round in Perry s
own thought. His idea that the source of value lies in interest
or desire might easily be reinterpreted so that we might say that
values are to some extent the oroducte of mental activity. He
says that desire is a "form of determination," (5) and that there
is sufficient ground . . in reason and in fact, for asserting tnot
interest s operate , that things take place because of the good they
(1) The Present Conflictpf Ideals, pag
(2) Ibid. , pag© 576 •
(5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pa toe J01
.
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promote. And this, I think, is the meaning of freedom, both as
an actuality and as a prerogative.
.
Action
. .
is in a measure
governed by desires and intentions. And this measure is capable
of being increased.
.
The unit of life, the animal and human
individual, is a moral and not a mechanical constant. An indi-
vidual life ia distinguished by what it seeks to preserve and
promote. Purposes are "effectual" in the world. "The ^ood isboth objectively real and actually operative." (1)
^e) Finally, tie offers a suggestive analysis of teleological
action from the behavioris tic point of view. It appears that for
him most human interests and action involve a direction towards
an end which is more or less consciously present in the form of
an anticipation or expectation which arises as a result of past
experience. Hence, not only interest, but teleology plays an
important part in Perry's account of personality.
C. THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY
IN THE PER30NALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF BORDEN PARKER BOISE.
William James asserted that the soul belongs only to "scho-
lasticism and common sense." (2) It will now be indicated how
this is too narrow a reference because there is another form of
philosophy in which the soul has a logical and welcome home.
The third and last type of personality- theory which will be
considered is found in the personalistic philosophy of the late
Borden Parker Bowne. The intrinsic importance of his conception
is out of all proportion to the meager recognition which it has
received in the literature of the problem. His view is character-
ized by being simple in its outlines, and strictly metapnysical
in its genesis and setting. His manner of exposition is fre-
quently polemical, but his reasoning is regularly vigorous and
luminous. His method of argument consists largely in disproofs
of objectionable theories and in the affirmation of his own upon
the basis of a constant and direct appeal to experience. His
form of presentation is somewhat systematic, and we shall, there"
fore, feel obliged, in our exposition, to quote freely from the
sources. His standpoint is distinguished by the fact that he
considers personality to be the fundamental principle of philo-
sophic explanation, while personality itself is an ultimate fact
to be accepted for what it is known as in experience.
All of the essential features of his conception are found
in Part III of his Metaphysics
. (5) and in chapters IV, V, VI
of Personalism
.
while some important supplementary material is
located in Introduction to Psychological Theory
.
Part I, chapters
V, VI and VII.
Bowne' 8 destructive criticisms of certain theories which he
regarded as erroneous are elaborated in his writings in ouch a
detailed way that they cannot be set forth here. Hie chief rea-
sons for rejecting these theories will be presented in only the
moat summary way.
(1) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pages J42-4.
(2) A Pluralistic Universe, page 20c.
(5) See especially pages 55O-V4; 421-9.
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1*. The mate- The materialistic or general naturalistic view of the soul
rialistic or 3eems to have been dealt a knock-out blow. (1) The main reasons
naturalistic why Bowne thinks that matter in any form cannot explain the soul
theory. are as follows: (a) Its physical characteristics are entirely
unlike mental facts; a feeling, for instance, having nothing in
common with matter and motion. (b) Matter is multiple or made
up of parts, and, therefore, cannot explain the unity of the mind,
which is not in any sense a composition or union of spatial
parts. (J) (c) Matter itself is phenomenal, and, therefore pre-
supposes a mental subject as knower, and also an intelligible be-
ing as dynamic ground. Hence, the existence of both matter and
materialism is conditioned by that active intelligence which is
denied by materialism, (4) (d) If intelligence is a product or
aspect of the brain, thoughts should give information about the
nature of the brain processes, but it is a notorious fact that
they fail to furnish such knowledge. (5) ,
2'. The theory The following are Bowne 'a reasons for rejecting the attempt
of association- of the associationis ts to compound the soul out of mental states,
ism. They are quite similar to the above objections to materialism.
This resemplance is due to the mechanical and spatializing ten-
dencies common to the two views
. (6)
(a) In the first place, just as physical elements cannot ex-
plain the unity of mind, so abstract states of consciousness can-
not explain that unitary consciousness of states which comprises
and owns many states in an individual's life. (7) "Such units of
conscious feeling could never constitute a unitary consciousness."
(8) The spatial analogy fails because the mental life is essen-
tially non-sp&tial (9)
(b) The most important objection to the associationis t at-
tempt to construct the soul is found, however, in the fact that
sense impressions or particular states of consciousness, regard-
ed as oemponent units of mind ; are fictitious abstractions and
exist only for a mental subject. The latter, therefore, is not
the product or consequence of their composition, but the pre-
supposition of their existence. (10) The theory fails to show
where or for what sensations and ideas"are associated." (11)
(c) The attempt to account for trie self as a series of men-
tal states fails because there is no abiding subject to compre-
hend the series as a whole. The associationis t doctrine fails to
account for personal identity and for memory.
( 1 ) The chief recor Is of the conflict are to be found in
Introduction to Psychological Theory, Part I, cnapter Ij Meta-
physics, pages JjOO-Jtj Perbonalism, chapter V.
(2) Metaphysics, page 302. (3} Ibid., page }06.
(4) Ibid., page 317. (5> Ibid., page 320.
(6) See especially Metaphysics, Pnrt III, chapter III;
Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Part I, chapter II.
(7) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 23-24.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 239.
(9) Metaphysics, page 383.
(10) Ibid., page 390; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pa^e 23.
(11) Theory of Shought and Knowledge, pages 23-4.
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v d) States of consciousness as described by the association-
xsts cannot account for self-consciousness or the objectivity of
thought, for "by hypothesis no one knows itself to say nothing ofknov/mg its neighbors " (1)
All realistic theories of the soul are inconsistent with the
general type of metaphysical idealism which Bowne defends. "We
have repudiated the subs tra turn-notion as the product of sense-
bondage.
.
We admit no substance behind the- subject and outside of
knowledge. The ego which thinks, feels, and acts is all there is
to Know." A substance behind "the conscious, active ee-o" is a
myth. (2) -a
The Kantian doctrine that the self is a phenomenon is self-
destructive because "where there is no perceiving subject there
can be no phenomena; and when we put the subject among the phenom-
ena, the doctrine itself disappears." (5) The self cannot be re-
garded as phenomenal in the same sense as other phenomena without
contradiction. Bowne doubts if any one was ever convinced by
Kant's argument, and concludes that either we have valid knowledge
of the transcendental or noumenal ego or it "vanishes from thought
altogether," because the categories cannot be applied to it in any
way. (4) He thinks the ego i3 the "abiding self revealed in
thought and consciousness as one." (5) These are the chief theo-
ries which he attacks.
Bowne has a very definite conception of the function of epis-
temological principles in explaining personality. Hid theory of
knowledge is grounded in part upon his conception of personality,
for the reason that knowledge arises and is constructed only through
the proper and free activity of a unitary and intelligent self. The
latter builds the structure of knowledge organically from within in
accordance wita the principles, called categories, which are imma-
nent in its own nature. "The principles or knowing are primarily
immanent laws of mental activity." (6)
The doctrine that the categories are immanent in personality
is an important one. Their "formal" application in the understand-
ing of phenomenal reality presented to the self is different from
their use in comprehending intelligence itself; the latter is
their "real" application. (7) "The soul itself as object of knowl-
edge does come under the categories; but it does not come under
them as abstract principles imposed from witnout, but as the liv-
ing principles of intelligence itself revealed and understood in
experience." (8)
"As we have so often said, intelligence cannot be understood
through the categories, but the categories must be understood
through our living experience of intelligence itself. Intelligence
is and acts. Thit; is the deepest fact. It is not subject to any
(1) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 25.
(2) Metaphysics, page 555. (5) Personalism, page 66.
(4) Metaphysics, page 556. (5) Ibid., page 555.
(6) Personalism, page 57. See also especially: uletaphysics
,
pages 516-7; 421 ff; Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages iii-iv;
10-11
.
(7) Metaphysics, page 556. (6) Ibid.
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laws beyond itaelf, nor to any abstract principles within itself.
Living acting intelligence is the source of all truth and reality,
and is its own and only standard. And all the categories, as ab-
stract principles, instead of being the components of the mental
life, are simply shadows of that life, and find in that life their
only realization. This may be called my transcendental empiricism."
(1) "In thinking of the soul we rauat not look for a lump, nor for
a category, nor for a picture, but for the agent which thinks and
feels and wills, and knows itself in so doing. And this soul is
neither in the heights nor in the depths; it is very nign indeed,
for it is simply the living self." (2)
It is a fundamental and oft-repeated idea of Bowne that per-
sonality cannot be explained by the categories. He offers various
reasons for this view, (a) One is that categories are abstract
while personality is concrete and is to be grasped in a living,
not in a formal way; the abstract presupposes the concrete.
(b) A second reason is that the categories are the result or
the product of personality, and "all explanation lies within tae
sphere of the products of thought and must not be extended to
thought itself. «7e explain the work of intelligence by tracing
it to intelligence, but intelligence itself simply is. It accounts
for everything else, but it accepts itself. Y/hen we seek to con-
strue intelligence in any way we fall into illusion. . When we
come to intelligence we must stop in our regress and understand it
as intelligence. Here our transcendental empiricism again appears.
Intelligence has no means of understanding itaelf as product. It
i3 the source of all products and for knowledge of itself it must
fall back on experience." (5) Again, "Our analysis of the mind
gives not components but aspects, distinctions rather than divi-
sions. And the mind is not to be understood through these aspects,
but, conversely, they are to be understood through the mind." (4)
Since personality itself, therefore, is the starting point of all
explanation, we fall into a vicious circle of reasoning if later
we regard personality as a product.
(c) In the third place, the attempt to understand personality
in terms of the categories reduces it to a lower degree of reality,
namely, phenomenal, than it actually possesses, and at the same
time undermines the solid foundation for metaphysics wnich person-
ality furnishes.
It is evident, tnen, that according to Bowne intelligence it-
self as an accepted fact is the starting point from which all ex-
planation must proceed, and that If it is to be understood at all,
it must be understood in terms of itself. (5) For example, he
says, "Reality for intelligence is intelligible in the forms of
intelligence," (6) and we have to assume thot intelligence knows
"what it is doing and why it does it." (7) Personality as it liveB
(1) Metaphysics, pages 424-5; see also Ibid., pagus 66, }41 , etc
(2) Ibid., page 559. (5) Ibid., page 42fl.
(4) Ibid. , page 261
.
(5) Compare Uetapnyeics , pages 186; 401; 42>6; Theory of
Thought and Knowledge, pageu 97-8) Personalis, pages 215-6, etc.
aphysics, page 422 (7) Ibid., page 42c.
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itself out contains the richest and most original principles for
the comprehending of reality in any form. Bowne' s philosophy may
be called personal idealism in the sense that he is convinced,
after thorough-going criticism, that personality is the fundamental
postulate of netapaycics
, and furnishes the principles for the un-
derstanding of everything else in the universe, while personality
itself is to be understood only as an actual, self-realizing life.
"When we make active intelligence the basal fact, all other facts
become luminous and comprehensible, at least in their possibility,
and intelligence knows itself as their source and explanation." (1)
In Bowne' s effort to construe personality , it is evident that
he constantly follows the guide of the actual experience of person-
ality. (2) Since personality is an actual fact of experience,
there can be no doubt as to its possibility. (5) Also, in his
description of many of the special phases of the self, such as
self-determination, the nature of the categories, personal identity,
and self-consciousness, he makes constant appeal to experience. ^4)
:Viong the original items of experience is the self-experience,
which is one phase of self-consciousness. When we come "to the
possibility of self-knowledge, experience only can decide. We have
no knowledge of any core, ffhich can deal with this problem apart
from experience." (5) He regards self-consciousness as an import-
ant feature of developed personality. (6) Self-consciousness ex-
ists in various stages of explioitness , but is rooted in an origi-
nal and unique self-experience. This self-experience may be supple-
mented by self-knowledge, which is a conceptual construction of the
self upon the basis of the various phases of the self-experience.
Self-knowledge and self-experience are the two distinguishable ele-
ments in self-consciousness. He describes these as "(1.) our
thought, or conception, of ourselves, and (2.) our experience of
our thoughts, etc., as our own." (7) kot us set forth in order
Bowne 's view of these two elements. (6)
Self-knowledge is a product of thought and is not given. "Our
conception of self is a variable one, and . . is least of all an
original and constant datum of consciousness. Even yet it is not
complete, as appears from the oft-repeated question, What are we?
It not only does not appear what ye shall be; it does ,.ot even ap-
pear what we are. If complete self-Knowledge were gi /en in im-
mediate consciousness, this could not be the case. In this sense,
then, the idea and knowledge of self are developed, and the his-
tory of the idea can be given." (9) "The conceptions ve form of
ourselves are manifestly acquired like oui conceptions of any
( 1 ) Personalism, page 216. (2) Metaphysics, pae 429.
(5) Personalism, page 2(M .
(4) For example, see Metaphysics, 411-12, 429, 5^6, 42J.
(5) Ibid., page 556. (6) See below, pages 1 32-55.
(7) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 244.
(8) The chief sources are: Ibid., Part I, chapter Vllj
Metaphysics, pages 255-6; Personalism, pe-ges 2J6-9J Theism,
pages 165-6.
(9) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 245.
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other object; and this conception, like all others, may be more
or less accurate," ( 1 ) or "adequate." (2)
But self-knowledge alone would not give us self-consciousness,
for we might have a conception of self without having any immediate
experience of it. Bovme points cut that this "conceptual self-
knowledge is by no means identical with self-consciousness; indeed,
we can conceive a mind to have the fullest conceptual knowledge of
itself, and yet have no proper self-consciousness at all. . And
there would be nothing in its experience to explain that peculiar
intimacy and vividness of self-consciousness which makes each mind
for itself, not merely a specimen of a class, but a special case
which
t
;uts all other things and persons into absolute antithesis
to itself.
.
These conceptions" of others "lack entirely the
vividness and reality of our experience of ourselves, (j) Hence
we must go below self-knowledge to self-experience,
b' . Self-ex- The "original and constant" datum upon which self-knowledge is
perience. It grounded is our immediate experience of the self. "The experience
is an original of self is primal. The conception of self is secondary." (4) Liv-
datum. ing experience is the source of all our knowledge of personality.
(5) "The personality of others we merely conceive; our own per-
sonality we experience. Our mind is not merely a mind; it is our
mind. The simple categories of the intellect would affirm only a
mind; we pass from a mind to our mind, because we do not merely
grasp ourselves in conception, but also realize ourselves in im-
mediate experience. It i3 this self-experience which attends all
our mental states which interprets to us what is meant by our ;
and if it were lacking, there would be no way of telling what is
meant thereby. This self-experience is the original and irreduc-
ible factor of self-con3ciousness . It is in the life of feeling,
desire, emotion, interest, that selfhood acquires any vividness
and reality." (6) "No deduction of this self-experience is pos-
sible. It is something unique and can be understood only in terms
of itself." (7) "This self-conscious experience is truly the ul-
timate fact." (8)
Bowne frequently refers to the self- experience in other writ-
ings than his Introduction to Pa vcsio logical Theory . In this exper-
ience he finds the "concrete meaning" (9) for personality of which
he is in search. "Self ... is one of the surest items of exper-
ience." (10) "For each person his own self is known in immediate
experience." (11) Intellect "knows itself in living and only in
living." (12) The soul "is what we all experience as ourselves ."( 15)
(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 244.
(2) Ibid., page 249. (5) Ibid., page 245.
(4) Ibid., page 249-
(5) Personalism, page 264.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 245-6.
(7) Ibid., page 246.
(8) Per3onalism, page 265-
(9) Metaphysics, page 541.
(10) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 27.
(11) Peraonalism, page 269.
(12) Ibid., page 215.
(15) Metaphysics, page 350.
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"Actually
. . . it is the self that thinks and feels and wills,
and in this activity experiences and knows itself as the active
and abiding subject of this inner life." (1) He states, again, that
"The ego knows itself as the subject of its acts." (2) Indeed, he
declares that, "the knowing self is
. . .
the only reality of -.vhich
we have proper consciousness." (5)
"Hence we hold that self-consciousness rests on an immediate
experience of self. This self-experience is tne raw material out
of which our developed conceptions of self are wrought Experience
does not intensify it, but only furnishes us with clearer ideas
whereby to interpret it.
. .
We conclude, then, that all conscious-
ness of which anything can be said has In it this element of self-
expericnce and that this element is primal and undeducible. The
self does not stand behind experience as its mysterious noumenal
ground to be reached only by inference, but, reveals itself as pres-
ent in experience. 11 (4)
His most striking statement of the relation of self-experience
to self-knowledge is found in Personali3m ; (5) "When it comes to
the self-knowledge of intelligence, there is always an element which
mere conceptual knowing can never adequately grasp. We have seen
that concepts without immediate experience are only empty forms,
and become real only as some actual experience furnishes them with
real contents. Hence there is an element in self-knowledge beyond
what the conceptions of the understanding can furnish. This is
found in our living self-consciousness. We conceive some things,
but we not only conceive, we also live ourselves. This living in-
deed cannot be realized without the conception, but the conception
is formal and empty without the living. In this 3ense intelligence
must accept itself as a datum, and yet not as something given from
without, but as the self-recognition of itself oy itself. Intelli-
gence must always have a content for its own recognition. The recog-
nition would be impossible without the content, and the content
would be nothing without tne recognition."
Bov/ne warns the reader over and over again against supposing
that personal life can be understood in abstract forma alone. 'In
'
general the self taken abstractly is worthless. . . But the self
is not to be abstractly taken. It is the living self in the midst
of its experiences, possessing, directing, controlling both itself
and them." (6) It "can be realized only in life itself. . . All
warmth, richness, vividness, and immediacy are found in the living
experience; and the logical form is only an instrument for its
realization." (7) "When we have lived and described the personal
life, we have done all that is possible in sane und sober specula-
tion! If we try to do more, we only fall a prey to abstractions." (8)
(1) Metaphysics, page 5J0j see also, pages 559 , ^18.
(2) Ibid., page 555-
(5) Ibid., page 551.
(4) Introduction to Psycnological Theory, page 247-
(5) Personalism, page 258.
(6) Ibid., page 262.
(7) Metuphysics, page 400.
(8) Personalism, page 265.
I
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By means of this distinction between the experience and the
conception of thyself, Bowne solves the old dispute concerning
whether or not we have direct consciousness of the ego. The nega-
tive arguments are "valid for our conception of the nature of the
self}" the affirmative arguments are "valid for our immediate ex-
perience of our thoughts and feelings as our own." (1)
Our author emphasizes the fact that the soul "is not something
which can be sensuously presented; it is what we experience as our-
selves. It is not a sense object, it is the living subject in un-
changeable antithesis to all sense objects. It is not an object,
it is the subject which is the condition of all objects." (2) "Per-
sonality and corporeality are incommensurable ideas." (2)
"Self-consciousness may remain on the lowest level of self-
experience; and it may advance from this to a distinct conception
of self, and to an affirmation of self as the controlling subject
of experience. Only in that case would self-consciousness be per-
fect. This state is reached only as the mind comes into reflective
self-possession and self-control. In childhood there is an abun-
dance of self-experience, but no reflective self-knowledge.
. .
Even in our mature human life, self-consciousness often remains on
the level of self-experience, without any distinct reflection upon
self as the subject of our experience.
. .
It is possible that,
in the case of lower animals, self-consciousness may remain per-
manently on the level of simple self-experience without further
rationalization of that experience." (4)
Since consciousness in general has the antithetical form of
subject and object, which "is as valid for self-consciousness as
for any other," (5) it is an interesting question as to just what
this relation can mean in case of self-consciousness. "3elf-con-
sciousness has been declared a contradic tion^ i'or if the self be
the subject, it has no object; a. id if it be the object, it has no
subject." (6) Bowne' s solution, in essence, is that "the distinc-
tion of subject and object, on which consciousness depends, is
only a mental function and not an ontological distinction." (7)
"All this quibbling disappears upon remembering that the distinc-
tion of subject and object represents primarily the form under
which consciousness takes place, and not any ontological separa-
tion between them." (8) "The possibility of personality or self-
consciousness in no way depends on the existence of a substantial
not-self, but only on the ability of the subject to grasp its
states, thoughts, etc., as its own." (7) Neither subject nor ob-
ject may be absent from consciousness at any time, but "the mind
may direct its attention to either to the neglect of the other,
or rather
. .
consciousness may be focused upon either of its
(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 247-6.
(2) Metaphysics . page 220. (2) Peruonalism, page 266.
(4) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 246-9.
(5) Metaphysics, page 117.
(6) Introduction to Peychological Theory, page 24J.
(7) Theism, pa,;e 166.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 242.
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elements, according to our interest at the time." (1)
We have seen, then, that Bowne, in order to ascertain the
facts about the reality of the soul, is constantly thrown back
upon the world of experience. It is an ultimate fact and a datum
which we must accept as trustworthy. "Experience stands abso-
lutely in its own right and is independent of our metaphysical
theories concerning it." (2) It is to be admitted rather than
explained. (5)
Experience, in Bowne' a system, has several important charac-
teristics, (a) It is essentially a living thing, and "change is
the most fundamental feature of experience." (4) (b) Further,
the experience in which he finds the meaning of the categories "is
not the passive experience of sense, but the active self-exper-
ience of intelligence. " (?) "Intelligence itself is the great
constitutive factor and condition of this experience." (6) "A
rationally passive mind" could not "attain to articulate con-
sciousness at all." (7)
"Experience, apart from the constitutive action of the mind,
is an elusive phantasmagoria without intelligible contents, and
. .
articulate experience is possible only as the mind imposes its own
rational forms on the sense matter." (6) These rational principles
"are not conscious possessions of the mind prior to all experience,
but they reveal themselves in and through the experience .vhich they
alone make possible. 11 (9) It is clear, then, that "in all artic-
ulate experience the self appears a3 the abiding subject,' 1 (10) and
as the one who owns the experience. (11) The self that owns the
experience is the soul. (12)
(c) Hence, experience is not only active, but it is also per-
sonal. "We are in a personal world from the start " (15) Reflec-
tion gains a concept of personality by a critical interpretation
of this original owner of all articulate experience. Let us con-
sider, then, the rationalistic elements in Bov.ne 's philosophic
me thod
.
While we "begin with the data of experience,
.
we do not end
with them. We find ourselves compelled to transcend them by giving
them a rational interpretation." (14) Although the celf is given
in experience, it is the business of the metaphysician to ask,
"How must we think of it?" (15) and in this way try to "satisfy the
(1
(2
(5
pages 5
(5
(7
Cfl
(10
(11
(12
(<?
(14
Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 249.
Personalism, pages 25, 27.
Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 9o; Metaphysics,
6. (4) iietaphyoicc , page 44.
Metaphysics, page 424. (6) Personalism, page 1^0.
Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 555-
Ibid., page 546 (9) Ibid., page 564.
Metaphysics
,
pa
fce 299.
Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 25.
Metaphysics, pages 299-^00.
Personalism, pages 2 1) 26.
Metaphysics, page 6. (15) Ibid., page 552.
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rational demand for a sufficient reason for the mental life." (1)
The only way we have of dealing with reality is by forming concep-
tions of it. (2) Bowne is rationalistic in the sense that he be-
lieves there is no other way to "grasp reality than by thinking
of it." (5) He describes his method as "critical" of experience
rather than "creative" of it. The phrase, rational criticism,
then, might fairly represent the general character of his philo-
sophical method.
He devotes much energy to the destructive criticism of theo-
ries which he believes to be erroneous. One of his characteristic
ways of demolishing an opponent's view is by showing how it assumes
what it is intended to disprove. For example: "This self has never
been other than verbally denied, and
. .
when denied, it is always
forthwith reaffirmed in some figure of speech, or assumed in the
language employed. The very nature of thought and language make it
impossible to maintain the denial without self-contradiction." (4)
He is relentless in ferreting out the hidden assumptions in objec-
tionable theories and in refuting them.
Bowne' s view of personality is rationalistic, however, only
in a restricted sense, namely, in the sense that his method of
studying personality consists in critical thinking or interpreta-
tion, in the endeavor to "rationalize" experience. (5) Reason,
however, must not be thought of as a separate faculty of person-
ality distinct from the will, for In Bonne's philosophy, thought
and will are intimately united; thought itself is a form of activ-
ity; he says, "I am not thought but I think." (6) Further, he
does not expect reason to exhaust the meaning of personality be-
cause he says, "Our reason is not contradictory, but limited. .
And when knowledge fails, we^ have to fall back on belief based on
the necessities or the intimations of practical life. Here the
test of truth is not speculative insight, but practical necessity
or practical absurdity." (7)
Bowne is very insistent on the point that the soul cannot be
imagined but only may be experienced or thought. (£) This fol-
lows from its non-sensuous character. (9) "The soul and it3 pro-
ducts cannot be pictured in tneir proper existence." (10) It is
essentially unpicturable. (11) Such an ontological reality as it
is "can be grasped only in the unpicturable notions of the under-
standing." (12)
The main part of the exposition of Bowno'e thought, namely,
his conception of the general nature of personality is the next
topic to be considered. He uses quite a number of terms beside
(2) Ibid., page 5(1) Metaphysics, pr.ge 557 •
(5) Ibid., page 552.
(4) Ibid., page 217. For other examples of this use of tne
principle of contradiction, see: Theory of Thought and Knowledge,
26, 2o-9; Metaphysics, 97, 5 1 1, ^ofi ; Peraonnliam, 26}
.
(5) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 98.
(6) Ibid., page 28.
(7) Metaphysics, page 427. (8) Ibid., page
(9) See above, page 129.
(10) Metaphysics. <kv
(11) Ibid., page 352; page, 371.
(12) Ibid., page 28.
L
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personality to designate the same object. He does not make any
important distinctions between personality, soul, self, spirit,
intelligence, mind, ego, mental subject, or personal agent. He
uses these words interchangeably. (1)
The following sunmary of Bowne's conception of personality will
fall into three main parts: (a) descriptive phases of personality;
(h) two fundamental conditions; and (c) its reality and substan-
tiality. This outline has been devised for the purposes of facili-
tating systematic exposition in this review.
The chief marks of personality in his conception may be noted
first. He affirms that, "Selfhood, s elf-knowl edge , and self-direc-
tion are the essence of personality." (2) Again, he declares that,
"The essential meaning of personality" is "self-consciousness, self-
knowledge, and self-control." (5) If we adopt the terminology in
his Introduction to Psychological Theory , then the two fundamental
features of personality would be self-consciousness and self-direc-
tion or self-determination. Let us consider these phases in order.
Only the main implications of self-consciousness need to be
referred to here, since it has been explained already at length. (4)
That the ego is conscious is of course assumed, (5) for this is a
part of its self-consciousness, and consciousness is "the specific
feature or condition of all mental states . . . which constitute
them mental states." (6) It is "an essential property" of all men-
tal activity. "The field of consciousness is simply that of imme-
diate experience without admixture of inference." (7) The distinc-
tion between subject and object is the unique form under which con-
sciousness in general exists, (8) and this distinction, along with
consciousness itself, cannot be spatially represented, but can only
be experienced. (9) Wherever there is consciousness which is ration-
al, or of which anything can be said, the mental subject or self is
present, for "consciousness by its very nature must depend on a
unitary activity." (10) "The conscious self grosps all its elements
in an indivisible act, and thus makes consciousness possible." (11)
In any endeavor, then, to understand consciousness, we must start
with the active self as its central element. "Only as the states
are discriminated from self as their subject, and are united in
the various rational relations, does any intelligible consciousness
arise." (12)
Bowne usually includes self-knowledge in his enumeration of
the fundamental phases of personality. This is one of the two ele-
(1) For example, see Metaphysics, pages 66, 502, 554, 5.55.
(2) Theism, page 162.
(5) Metaphysics, page 116. See a similar statement in
Personalism, page 266.
(4) See above, pages 126-126.
(5) Compare, Metaphysics, page 558.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 257.
(7) Ibid., page 257; compare Theory of Thought A Knowledge, 19.
(8) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 256.
(9) Metaphysics, pages 564; 149.
(10) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pu^e 559. Introduction
to Psychological Theory, page 247.
(11) Metaphysics, page 195 -
(12) Introduction to Psychologic" 1 Theory, pages 259; 241, 15.
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meats of self-consciousness. (1) Self-knowledge involves "the
Intelli- power to know," which Bowne mentions as one of the basic charac-
gence and teristics of personality. (2) This power is "the only thing essen-
personality. tial to intelligence." (5) So important is intelligence in person-
ality that Bowne uses intelligence freely as a synonjca. It is to
be identified especially with "the relating activity" of the mind,
the source of the rational relations which characterize all articu-
late consciousness. (4) Indeed, there is "no consciousness without
some knowing." (5) In the most elementary experience "the mind does
not yet possess reason, but reason possesses the mind. Under the
guidance of the immanent reason we see the mind lifting itself above
the flux of impressions into a rational world, which, while poten-
tial in it from the beginning, only slowly becomes its conscious
possession." (6)
Intelli- While the laws of thought which are immanent in intelligence
gence and itself are fixed, they require the "ratification by the free spirit;"
freedom. so that we become truly rational "by our own free act." (7) "The
mind must accept these laws and govern itself in accordance with
them." (8) Thus in intelligence t..ere is mysteriously united a
strict uniformity with an element of self-determination. Indeed,
"there is no effective rationality without self-control." (9)
Knowing, therefore, can be separated from will, as also from feel-
ing, only in abstraction, for it is in the light of intelligence
that the will, or active side of personality, determines itself.
(10) In fact, thought and act are essentially one. (11) "In de-
veloped self-coneciousness the soul is aware of it3 aims and ideals,
and directs its activities accordingly." (12) Hence, the step from
self-consciousness to self-direction is very direct. Before dis-
cussing the latter, hov/ever, one other important element in self-
consciousness must be noted,
c'. Selfhood When Bowne mentions the essential characteristics of person-
snd feelings. ality, he sometimes includes selfhood, (15) but its meaning and re-
lations to self-consciousnes3 and self-kr.o.,led-e r<:t.ir. very uncer-
tain. We are left to guess that by self.vio ] he means that original
and unique 3elf-experience which has been described above as one of
the "elements" of self-consciousness. (14) Just ..hat he means by
this primal self-experience which is given I have been unable to
determine
.
Prom one or two statements we might infer that it ia akin to
feeling. At any rate, feelings play on important role in personal
(1) See above, pages 126-7-
(2) Pereonalism, p ge 266.
(5) Metaphysics, page 118. (4) Ibid., page 167
•
(5) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 255.
(6) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 44.
(7) Personal i am, page 206.
(8) Ibid., page 20?. (9) Ibid., page 520.
(10) Metaphysics , page 415; on freedom, see further below,
pages 154-58.
(11) Personal! Bm, page 2^9.
(12) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pt-^e 249.
See above, page 1J2.
See above, pages 127-8.8
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life. He asserts that "experience first acquired living realityin feeling.
.
Mental functions become personal and significant
only as our feelings and interests inform them with life and mean-in Our feelings and interests are the deepest thing in usUl and understanding have no significance except as instruments
ol this throbbing and aspiring sensitive life." (1) In ano taerbook he states that, "Man has been considered solely as an intel-
lect or understanding, whereas he is a great deal more. Man is -
Will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far sore
powerful factors than logical understanding. Man is also a prac-
tical being. (2) Bowne thinks that the affective "feature of our
life must be ascribed to a special reaction of the soul against
the incitements of its physical and cognitive experience." (5)In the chapter on feelings in the Introduction to Psycholog-
ical Theory, K h) Bowne emphasizes very clearly the idea that "few
of our experiences have value in themselves, as passive gratifica-
tions of our sensibility; their value lies rather in the elements
of personality which we have put into them.
. All significant
values in experience are seen to be constituted by their relation
to self in self-consciousness." (?) He shows in detail how va-
rious feelings get their worth from their reference to certain
personal aspirations.
Self-consciousness also involves unity and permanence. (6)
The second outstanding characteristic of personality in
Bowne 's conception is its power of self-direction or self-deter-
mination, which is one of the ultimate and mysterious facts of our
existence. (7) The "measure of self-control or the power of self-
direction" which we experience "constitutes us real persons, or
rather is the meaning of our personality." (8) This feature calls
forth some of Bowne '3 most fervent eulogies. If one aspect of
personality is more fundamental in his theory than any other, it
is this one. "Self-determination
. .
can only be recognized as
the central factor of personality." (9) It is most akin to that
fundamental activity in which we shall expect to find the reality
of personality. Let us consider now the nature and some of the
more direct implications of self-determination. (10)
"By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direc-
tion, the power to form plans, purposes, ideala, and to work for
their realization. We do not mean an abstract freedom existing by
itself, but this power of self-direction in living men and women.
Actual freedom is realized only as one aspect of actual iife; and
(1) Introduction to Psychological Tneory, page 217. The de-
sires are secondary to feelings and "form the transition from know-
ing to willing. In feeling and knowing, we have the condition of
desire; and in desire we have the condition of proper volition!! Ibid,
(2) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 576.
(5) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 165
.
(4) Part I, chapter V. (5) Ibid., paLe 194.
(6) See below, especially pages 159-Al; 144-5.
(7) See, for example, Metaphysics, pages 404, 415, 102.
(6) Ibid., page 102; Persoiialisa, page 260.
(9) Metaphysics, page 416.
(10) Chief references arei Introduction to Psychological Theory,
Part I, chapter VI; Personalism, chapter IV; Metaphysics, Part III,
chapter IV.

135
c
1
. Evidence
for freedom.
d'
.
Purpose
and causality
in the per-
sonal life.
it must always be discussed in its concrete significance." (1)
"If anything is free, it is the soul, and not the will; for the
will is only an abstraction from the volitional activity of the
soul. And this free soul is also the knowing, prevising, ethi-
cal soul." (2)
Bowne identifies "the power of self-control with the will."
"The will is the power which the soul has of controlling itself
within certain limits, and a volition is an act of such control."
(3) "In the intellectual life self-control is chiefly manifested
in the form of attention, and the guidance of our cognitive
powers towards a desired end." (4)
Bowne offers various reasons for believing in personal free-
dom, (a) It is a fact of experience. (5) "We have some exper-
ience of it as actual," while we "have no experience of necessary
agency." (6) In volitional activity we have a "peculiar conscious-
ness
. .
of being the cause and source of the activity." (7)
(b) Again, freedom is "a necessary factor of rationality ." (1
)
Indeed, we would not have any personal or rational life without
the power of self-determination. (8) "The purest illustration we
have of self-direction is in the case of thinking itself. We di-
rect and maintain attention, we criticize the successive steps of
the argument, we look before and after, we think twice and re-
serve our decision.
.
This life itself spontaneously takes on the
form of freedom." (9) "in conducting . . a train of thought we
have a very clear conviction that it depends upon our volition
whether it shall go on or not, and that the volition depends upon
us." (10) In another place Bowne declares that, "in the field of
thought proper, everyone, in spite of himself, assumes that reason
is a self-controlling force. Freedom in thought cannot be ration-
ally disputed without assuming it." (11) Freedom is especially
important in making error possible. (12)
(c) Freedom is also a "necessary postulate of conscience."
(15) The fact of the sense of moral responsibility implies free-
dom. (14)
"The soul determines itself, not in the dark of ignorance,
or in the indifference of emotionless and valueless life, but in
the light of knowledge and with experience of life's values," (15)
and, as a reault of this purposive self-direction, introduces new
(1) Metaphysics, pa_e 40^.
(2) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 2^1; see also,
Metaphysics, page 4 1 5
-
(5) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 222.
(4) Ibid., page 255.
(5) Metaphysics, pages 4l6-7» Introduction to Psy. Th. , page 2^2.
(6) Metaphysics, page 4lp.
(7) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 222-J.
(8) Metaphysics, page 406. (9) Ibid., page 406; see also p. 407.
(10) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 22J; alao, 227.
For an especially excellent account of tne part of freedom in knowl-
edge, see Ibid., pa e 333.
(11) Metaphysics, page 40o. (12) Ibid , pares 40c-7; Intro-
duction to Psychological Theory, page 227.
(15) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page ^52.
(14) Metapaysics, pa,-e 404; Introduc tlon to Psy. Th. , page 22J.
(15) Metaphysics, pa^e 415-
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departures and genuine novelties into reality. Bo.me ha3 some
clear words on the place of purpose, as .yell as of causality, in
the conception of personality.
"The causality of freedom means self-determination. This is
a causality which looks to the future and is not driven by the
past. It is a causality which forms ideals and plans, and devotes
itself to their realization. Instead of being shoved out of the
past, it is self-moving into the future. It may posit an order
and maintain it. It may conceive purposes and realize them. Our
experience of such causality is limited to the inner life, but it
is in fact the only form of proper causality of which we have any
experience whatever." (1) "The great distinction between mechan-
ical and intellectual" (rather volitional) "causality is that the
former is driven from behind while the latter is self-determined
towards ends which lie before. As looking towards future ends it
is called final causality—that is, it is purposive. Final cau-
sality is the causality of will informed by intelligent purpose.
"Hence in our experience of intelligence we find its activ-
ity taking on the purposive form The whole range of volitional
activity
. .
is otherwise unintelligible. And everywhere the
mind seeks to relate its objects as means and ends, or to comprise
them in a scheme of purpose or an all-embracing plan. Moreover,
we experience a peculiar satisfaction when we are able to trace
relations of purpose.
. Thought must become teleological before it
can complete itself." (2) In order to get the systematic totality
in our conceptions of the world which we desire, "the unity and
system demanded must be internal, and this true inwardness can be
found only in self-determining, self-conscious causality, guiding
itself according to plan and purpose." (5)
It should be noted also that "the idea of new beginning" is
"involved in volitional causality." (4) The causality of conscious
intelligence
. .
possesses and directs itself. Here v/e have a
cause that can make new departures without losing itself in the
infinite regress,—a cause that was and also is,—a cause that
does not lie temporally behind the process, but is immanent in the
process as the abiding power on which it forever depends." (5)
Since "generally volition implies foresight and intention,"
(6) the place of purpose in connection with personality must be
considered. Bowne maintains that "purpose is a category involved
in the nature of free intelligence. 1 (7) Explanation in the terms
of purposive intelligence is the highest form of explanation and
takes up all lower forms into itself. (6) The soul can "estimate
motives and reasons; it can foresee consequences; it can compare
(1) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 96-7.
(2) Ibid., pages 106-7 . (5) Ibid., page 105.
(4) Ibid., page 97. (5) Ptrsonalism, page 197.
(6) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 222.
(7) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 106
(6) Ibid.
,
page 255.
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its principles with the law of right." (1) But "a purpose as such
is only a conception, and demands some means for its realization.
The realization of our purposes through mechanical neans, so that
the result is an expression at nee of purpose and of mechanical
,
necessity, ia one of the most familiar facts of our experience. (2)
4 . Freedom In various ways freedom or self-determination is linked up
and law. with fixed law. (?) In the realization of our purposes we make use
of mechanical laws. (4) In moral obligation the self lays upon
itself a duty which it plans to follow. (5) The most striking com-
bination of freedom and law is in the operations of pure thought.
.
.
'Here we have a self-directing activity which proceeds according to
laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by itself." (6)
The process goes on within reason itself, reason supplying the
motive, the norm, the driving force. 11 (7)
Hence, "in both physical and the mental realm the believer in
freedom finds an agent acting in accordance with an order of law
and, by means of that order, freely realizing his own aims." (8)
Indeed our freedom presupposes the order of law as its condition,
so that "an element of uniformity must always be allied with free-
dom." (9) The self-determination of personality, therefore, is
not arbitrary, but it is a "life of freedom as well as of law " (10)
While these two ideas may be contradictory in the abstract, in con-
crete life they coexist and. therefore, their union is not only
possible but real. (11) "Thus we discover freedom and uniformity
united in reality: or rather we discover reality as having these
opposite aspects.' (12)
e
.
The limi- There are certain limits to the personal po„er of self-direc-
tations of self- tion. "We cannot regard ourselves as self-sufficient and indepen-
direction. dent in any absolute sense.
.
Now our independence means just that
experienced limited self-control; and our dependence means just
that experienced lack of self-sufficiency. How these two aspects
of experience can be combined in the 3ame being we cannot tell, (13)
any more than we can tell how freedom and uniformity can be united
in the same being. But we find them thus united nevertheless . " (14)
When we ask by what self-determination is limited, we find
that Bowne replies in a very clear manner in his Introduction to
Psychological Theory
. "It is limited, on tae one hand, by our men-
tal and physical constitution; and, on the other, by the intensity
of the desire3 and impulses which it has to control
. . Within these
(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 2^1 .
(2) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 110.
(5) See Peroonalism, pages 204-12. (4) Ibid. , page 206.
(5) Principles of Ethics, page 195 -
(6) Metaphysics, page 408.
(7) Ibid. , pa,-e 406.
(8) Ibid.
,
page 414.
(9) Ibid. , pages 412;41 1
.
(10) Metaphysics, page 419; see also, Porsonaliam, page 206
(11) See Personaliam, pn~es 204-5; Metaphysics, page 411.
(12) Metaphysics, .jage 412.
(15) Compare Metaphysics, page 41 5
•
(14) Personaliam, page 261.
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limits freedom has its realm.
. The outcome of volitional action
is habit, fixed disposition, settled character. The soul may
freely bind itself with chains which it can never undo.
.
Freedom
may choose the seed, but it can neither determine nor escape tne
harvest.' (1) He expands these ideas further by saying that,
'Some factors of the mental life are entirely withdrawn from vo-
litional control. Thus the essential nature of the susceptibil-
ities and the constitutional activities is independent of volition.
The laws of mental procedure and of mental change and combination
also admit of no volitional control. Such are the interactions of
thought and feeling, the laws of formal thought, and the judgments
of conscience. These are forever secure from volitional modifica-
tion. These laws furnish a basis of uniformity of which the free
soul may avail itself, and without which freedom itself becomes
meaningless. Of the feelings we have little or no direct control*"
But "within
. .
limits the soul can elicit or guide, inten-
sify or repress, its activities, according to a preconceived rule,
or for the realization of a preconceived end." (5)
We human persons are also limited by the fact that the ground
of our existence and nature is found in the Infinite. "The finite
is dependent on the infinite.
.
The result is taat the finite
spirit has only a limited and relative existence at best." (4) God
alone has perfect and complete personality. (5) "Hence, in the
finite consciousness, there will always be a foreign element, an
external compulsion, a passivity as well as activity, a dependence
on something not ourselves, and a corresponding subjection." (6)
'The personal finite, the spirit, must be viewed as created."
(7) "Creation seems to posit something in existence which, apart
from the creative act, would not be." (8) "Where and when the di-
vine plan, which is the law of cosmic activity, calls for it, there
and then a soul begins its existence and development." (9)
In self-consciousne33 and self-determination we have found the
two fundamental characteristics of personal life according to the
teaching of Bovne
.
These two phases of personality are prominent
in all of his descriptions of it. Let us now turn to certain as-
pects of personality with which these are very closely bound up,
and which I have called, for convenience, tne general conditions
of personality.
One chief condition, not only of volitional activity, (10)
but of all mental life, is consciousness. Bo.me's conception of
it has been already set forth. (11) It ahould be added, perhaps,
(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 25^.
(2) Ibid., pages 252-5.
(5) Ibid., page 222; for an excellent statement, see also,
Metaphysics, page 415-
b) Metaphysics, pa e 100. (5) Ibid., page 118.
6) Theism, page 16o.
(7) Metaphysics, page 99; see also, Theisa, page 206.
(6) Theism, page 206.
(9) Metaphysics, page 575» ««« also .Metaphysics , pa^e 579.
(10) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 222.
(11) See abo^e, page 152.
r!
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Conscious- that consciousness is always "living;" this attribute is frequent-
ly referred to by Bowne. (1)
The second general condition of personal life is to be found in
identity, that is, in a certain abiding character of the self. The
identity of personality has to be considered in close connection with
certain other questions, especially intermittent consciousness, change
time, and memory.
Let us firBt consider Bowne's belief in the fact that personali-
ty is a permanent reality. (2) "In all articulate experience the
self appears as the abiding subject, the same yesterday and to-day."
(5) Further, the self "knows itself as the
. . . abiding subject of
the inner life." (4) "The soul, then, is real and abiding or iden-
tical." (5)
When we come to define more closely the nature of this personal
identity, we find that several inadequate explanations of it have
been proposed, (a) Identity cannot be found in a series of par-
ticular mental states; for they are only a succession of perishing
and mutually external existences. "For if we suppose the particu-
lar states to be in time, they vanish as fast as they are born, and
if there be nothing which abides across this flow and unites the
past and the present in the unity of its continuous and identical
existence, once more tne judgment becomes impossiole . " (6)
(b) Likewise, the attempt to find identity in tne streaa of
consciousness fails, for the reason that "it is a stream only for
that which is not a stream*" (7) If the stream of consciousness is
nothing but stream, how does one part of it transcend itself and
apprehend some other part so as to compare the two parts and as"
sert that they are connected?
(c) Further, "identity is not to be viewed as any rigid core
of being." (8) "There is no way of seeing how the soul as bare
subst:uice could ever provide for the identity of consciousness,"
for "we have done away with the soul as lump or inert substance."
(5) Brain substance or transcendent substance cannot explain
identity, for all these are abstractions.
These various attempts to account for personal identity assume
that some principle of identity can be found outside of the soul
which will explain its p rmanence. This inverts the true order of
explanation. We have already seen that no abstract category can
constitute the soul, but soul itself explains each and all of the
categories. (9)
Having eliminated these erroneous conceptions of identity,
Bowne finds that "experience shows only two kinda of permanence,
fixity of meaning and permanence of the thinking subject." (10)
a' . Identity
or permanence
of personality
.
1". Inade-
quate explana-
tions of iden-
tity.
a". A series
of mental
states
.
b" . A stream
of conscious-
ness
.
c". Bare
subs tanc e
.
d". Identity
explains the
soul
.
(1) Percionalism, 2%, etc.
(2) See Metaphysics, pages 359-V*9.
(5) Ibid., page 299. W Ibid., page 55O.
(5) Ibid., page 559.
(6) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, page 22.
(7) Meta physics , page 5^0. (6) Personalis^ . pago 12J.
(9) Metaphysics, page j40; see above, pages 124-125.
(10) Personalism, page 115.
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2". Identity The former is logical identity, and in the latter alone do we find
found only in the key to identity in the concrete. Identity is "provided for only
consciousness. in consciousness." (1) "Consciousness not merely reveals, but makes,
the only identity worth talking about." (2) "if we would know what
concrete identity is, we must not look about for an abstract cate-
gory to tell us, but must rather consider the self-identifying ac-
tion of intelligence. There is no other real identity; indeed,
closely considered, real identity has no other meaning than that
which emerges in the self-identification of intelligence," (5) in
"the self-equality of intelligence through its experience." (4)
And this self-identifying intelligence is nothing but the soul it-
self. It is the "conscious soul" which is identical. It comprises
the successive mental states "in its own unity; it must distinguish
itself froa them as the abiding subject, and must work them over inT
to the forms of intelligence." (5) "The conscious subject remains
as the only fixed point to which everything, both permanence and
change, has to be referred. Self-consciousness is tae origin of
ordinates in this field." (6)
a". Memory Locke is mistaken, Bowne thinks, when he asserts that memory
and person- makes identity. The fact is, "memory does not make but reveals the
ality. fact that our being is continuous." But continuity does not yet
mean that identity is present, for these two concepts are different.
Continuity "means only that the being which now is tias been devel-
oped from the being which was." But to "raise continuity to proper
identity or sameness," we need a "fixed factor" in tae flow. "And
this can be done only as the agent himself does it; and the agent
does it by memory and self-consciousness, whereby a fixed point of
personality is secured, and the past and present are bound together
in the unity of one consciousness. The permanence and identity,
therefore, are products of the agent's own activity. we become the
same by making ourselves such. . . Proper identity is impossible
except in consciousness." (7) It is the living mind, too, v.hich
performs for itself "the unique act of memory." (fl) "it distin-
guishes itself from its affections, and affirms itself as abiding
through the^:." (9) It i3 the "self-identifying intelli bence
,
"
then, which constitutes permanence in the midst of its essential
change. (10)
If the identity of the soul depends upon a self-identification
of conscious intelligence, the question arises as to the meaning
of the permanence of the soul after a period of unconsciousness?
"What of the soul when it is unconscious? 11 (11) The realist would
reply that only some "back-lying substance" can meet this difficulty,
(1
(2
(5
(4
(5
(6
(7
(8
(9
(10
(11
Metaphysics, page 559.
Ibid., page 559; see Peraonalism, page KJ.
Ibid., page J41; see also Personaliam, page 260.
Peraonalism, page 125
.
Metaphysics, page 540.
Peraonalism, page 124.
Metaphysics, page 64.
Ibid., page 545.
Ibid., page 57.
Ibid.
,
page 66.
Ibid.
,
page J41
.
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b" . Inter-
mittent con-
sciousness
and personal
identity.
b'
.
Personal-
ity and cha:-., :e
.
1". Self-
identical per-
sonality alone
explains change
for if sameness can endure across unconsciousness, something be-
sides consciousness must constitute it.
Bovme acknowledges the great difficulty raised by the fact of
intermittent consciousness, such as periodic sleep illustrates. He
tries to meet it by emphasizing the unreality of time and tne de-
pendence of the soul upon God.
(a) He points out, first, tnat it is false to assume that there
is a real time in which anything can exist apart from self-conscious-
ness, to which alone time is relative. (1)
(b) In the second place, he says, there may be continuity with-
out the identity which is made by .-onsciousness
,
although it is
hard to say what this continuity is. It means some sort of de-
pendence of the finite upon the infinite, for whom alone the com-
plete notion of existence is realized. (2) "The soul has its ex-
istence primarily in the divine thought and act, and it may remain
on the plane of existence for others without at once attaining to,
or always possessing, existence for itself. Apart from the latter
the soul has its existence and continuity solely in the divine
thought and v/ill.
. .
How that which begins without selfhood and in
absolute dependence can yet attain to selfhood and a measure of in-
dependence is the mystery of finite existence." (5)
In any case we must not hunt for, or at least expect to find,
any kind of identity apart from what we experience; for in exper-
ience, if anywhere, we can understand identity. The self-identifi-
cation of the soul is the best proof of identity, for identity has
no other meaning. Whatever may lie beyond this must be sought,
not in the realm of metaphysical abstractions, but in the thought
and self-consciousness of the Iiifinite. (4)
In the permanent or self-identical subject which has just
been described is found the "fixed factor" which alone make3 change
intelligible. (5) The abstract contradiction between change and
identity disappears when we consider that the free personality
initiates changes without being itself involved in them. (6) V/e
would not have even the notion of change if tne thinking subject
itself were also a part of the flux of things. In order to get an
idea of how there can be change in the phenomenal v>orld, "we are
thrown back upon the conception of an underlying intelligence
which is at once the seat of the idea and the source of the real-
izing energy. Otherwise we can only oscillate between an imposuible
realism and an impossible idealism." (7) "And the change which we
find is not an abstract change running off in an abstract time, but
is simply the jucceesive form under which the self-equal intelli-
gence realizes its purpose and projects the realizing activity
against the background of its self-consciousness." (8)
(1) Metaphysics, page *>h\ .
(5) Ibid. , page J&J.
ft) Ibid.
,
page 60.
(6) Ibid. , page 191
.
(7) Ibid, page 62.
(6) Personalisra, page 255.
(2) Metaphysics, page }42
(4) Ibid., pages 54J-4.
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nates temporal
relations
.
1"'. The ori-
gin of the
present and of
the future in
finite exper"
ience
.
b"
. But in-
telligence it-
self is time-
less
.
Time, then, is not an ontological fact but is essentially a
function of self-conscious intelligence.
. No one can deny time as
a form of our experience, and, in this sense, as a fact of reality.
But this time exists only in the experience of a self-conscious in-
telligence. (1) It has no meaning apart from such an intelligence.
It is the mind alone which gives ideas "temporal form and fixes
their temporal relations." (2) "Here the identical posits an order
of change and abides unchanged across it." (j) If, then, any ideas
or events are to have a temporal order, active intelligence must
set them in that order. (4)
One of Bowne's most profound insights into the relation of
personality to time is found in bis idea that the limitations of
our consciousness require us to regard the actual as the present
and the future as the unpossessed. He declares that, "The present
is relative. We have seen that we cannot have experience in the
present, but we constitute the present by the actual in experience.
But the range of thill experience varies with the range of our pow-
ers. One able to comprehend a large body of objects or events with-
in the field of consciousness would have a more extensive present
than another who could grasp but a few. If we could retain all the
objects of experience in equal vividness and immediacy they -would
be alike present. A mind which could do this would have no past.
Again, a mind in full possession of itself, so that it does not
come to itself successively, would have no future. Such a being
would have a changeless knowledge and a changeless life. It would
be without memory or expectation, so far as itself was concerned,
yet it would also be in the absolute enjoyment of itself. For such
a being the present alone would exist, and it3 no., would be eter-
nal." (5) "Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative to the
range and contents of self-consciousness." (6)
The same striking idea is expressed in Personalien ; "The pres-
ent of experience is simply a relation in self-consciousness which
gives the origin for all time measures and judgments, and the
range of this present depends solely upon the range of the appre-
hending quality of the mind. The present, therefore, is no fixed
measure, but is relative to our mental po.ver." (7)
But if intelligence establishes temporal relations, it cannot
itself be constituted by them, so that 11 the finite intelligence,
in so far as it is intelligence, is timeless; that is, it has no
real before-and-af ter in it, but it establishes temporal relations."
(8) Personality originates changes and abides self-identical
across them. (9) This is the actual fact, although we cannot tell
just how it is possible. (10) Persouality, therefore cannot be
described in temporal relations since it is itself the source of
time. Time applies only to phenomena, but personality is not a
phenomenal but an ontological reality. (11)
( 1 ) Metaphysics , page 166.
(5) Ibid., page 91.
(5) Ibid. , pages 186-9.
(7) PersonaliBm, page 144;
(6) Metaphysics, page 187.
(10) Metaphysics , page 191
.
(11) Ibid., page 195.
(2) Ibid., page 595
.
(4) Ibid., page 66.
(6) Ibid., page 195.
see also pageB 14^-7
.
(9) Personelism, page 197.
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c" . In what
sense the soul
is temporal
.
d" . The .devel-
opment of the
soul
.
c ' . Summary
of how change
and permanence
are united in
personality
.
The only sense in which the self can be said to be in time is
that its activities are limited, as we have indicated above. (1)It is largely subordinated to a great cosmic system. "This rela-
tion manifests itself in a certain temporal character of our exper-
ience. The self is limited; it comes and goes, has beginnings and
endings, and unpicturable pauses and variations which are imposed
upon it from without. In this sense our life is temporal; and in
this sense temporality is only the shadow of our finltude and limi-
tation. And this temporality is not in time; it is simply an as-
pect of our experience." (2)
In view of these facts Eowne's conception of how personality
develops is very interesting. He observes that, "the soul, as
substance, forever changes; and, unlike what we assume of the phys-
ical elements, its series of changes can be reversed only to a
slight extent. The soul develops, but it never undevelops into
its former state. Each new experience leaves the soul other than
it was* but, as it advances from stage to stage, it is able to
gather up its past and carry it with it, so that, at any point, it
possesses all that it has been. It ia this fact only which con-
stitutes the permanence and identity of self." (3)
He concludes, therefore, that "in personality, or in the self-
conscious spirit, we find the only union of change and permanence,
or of identity and diversity. Tne soul knows itself to be the same
and distinguishes itself from its states as their permanent sub-
ject. This permanence, however, does not consist in any rigid
sameness of being, but in thought, memory, and self-consciousne3s
,
whereby alone we constitute ourselves abiding persons. How this
is possible there is no telling; but we get no insight into its
possibility by affirming a rigid duration of some substance in the
soul." (5)
"We must remember that the soul, as substance, comes under the
perpetual flow. We are not conscious of a permanent aubstance, but
of a permanent self; and this permanence is not revealed, but con-
stituted by memory and self-consciousnesa
; for, if we abolish them,
and allow the soul to sink to the level of an impersonal thing,
identity is degraded into continuity, and permanence passes into
flow. Consciousness
,
then, does .ot simply reveal permanence in
change; it is the only basis of permanence in change.
.
If, then,
the idea of being must include permanence as well as activity, we
must say that only the personal truly ia. All else ia flow and
process." (^) "in the consciousness of self as identical through-
out change we have the only example of identity in change. The
conception of a permanent thing with changing states ia founded as
conception, aa well aa realized in being, in the fact of the con-
scious self." (5) "Only the personal can combine change and iden-
tity, or flow and permanence." (5)
(1) See above, page 142
.
(2) I-Ietaphyaica , page 168.
(5) Ibid., page 65.
(4) Ibid. , pagea 64-5.
(5) Ibid. , page 66,
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1
. The uni ty
and individual-
ity of person-
ality.
a'
.
Unity a
fact of con-
sciousness
.
b'. This
unity is not
a composition.
c'
. This
unity has va-
rious phases.
The third general condition of personality to be considered
is its unity and individuality. ''The uaity of the true ego is nec
essary to the existence of any mental life." (1) "This unity ap-
pears on reflection as the absolute postulate of the mental life."
(2) without this unity the thought life, indeed the mental life
as a whole, would fall asunder. (3)
Unity is given as a fact of consciousness. "The ego knows it-
self
. .
as one in the unity of its consciousness." (2) For Bowne
the unity of consciousness and the unity of the self mean the same
thing. (4) The very fact that we are conscious proves that con-
sciousness has unity, (5) for "the conscious self grasps all its
elements in an indivisible act, and thus makes consciousness pos-
sible." (6) "Only in the unity of consciousness can the category
of unity be realized" in its concreteness
. (7) Here, as elsewhere
a fundamental category gets its significance from personality and
cannot be used in turn to explain personality. "The free and con-
scious self is the only real unity of which we have any knowledge,
and reflection shows that it is the only thing that can be a true
uni ty
. ( £
)
We must not try to picture this unity as any kind of "an ema-
nation, budding, fission division, and composition." (9) It can-
not be pictured in spatial or sensuous terms, for it is :.ot a com-
bination oi" parts. "Personality can never be construed as a prod-
uct or compound." (10) Further, we cannot grasp the unitary na-
ture of mind by bringing the various mental factors of analytical
psychology under a class term and calling that personality. (11)
Such terms are empty until they are filled with the concrete
reality of personal life.
The unity of the self, however, is not a bare and "abstract
unity without distinction or difference, but a living, conscious
unity, v.hich is one in its manifoldness and manifold in its one-
ness. (12) Intelligence, will, and feeling do not exist in a
pure state; they can be distinguished only in abstract analysis;
in reality they constitute the concrete unitary whole of the self-
directing, 3 elf- conscious soul. "We are not abstract intellects
nor abstract wills, but we are livin^ persons, knowing and feel-
ing and having various interests " (13) "I" the actual mental
life, all its factors exist in complex synthesis from the start.
In our study of that life, we must consider its factors succes-
sively and one by one." (14) "The simplest mental fact is coa-
(1) Metaphysics, page 333' aee al BO , Page 373.
(2) Ibid. , page 335.
(3) Ibid., pages 337, 339; Theory of Thought and Knowled^
pag^ c
(4) Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 25.
(5) Ibid, page 26,
(7) Metaphysics, page 66.
(9) Ibid., page 373.
(11) Metaphysics, page 39£
.
(12) Personalism, page 262.
(14) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pago 235.
(6) Metaphysics, page 193-
(6) Ibid., pa Ce 91.
(10) Personalism, page 264.
(13) Ibid. , page 263.
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plex; and the elements into which we break it uo in our analysis
are only the different phases of the one indivisible conscious
state." (1)
Hence, "unity is entirely intelligible as the unity of the
self in the plurality of its activities." (2) "in our experience
ot free intelligence
. .
we find a unity which produces plurality
without destroying itself. Here the one is manifold without being
many. t5j Here is a unity which in the oneness of consciousness
can posit plurality and remain unity still." (4) Bowne's conclu-
sion is that "we insist that in the face of all the facts we must
•
•
think of it (the self) as one and not many, as simple and not com-pound
. ( 5
)
d'. Individu- He holds to "the ontological individuality and separateness
ality and per- of souls," and "the metaphysical separateness and incommunicability
sonality. of each individual." (6) He speaks of "the inalienability of per-
sonal experience," (7) and asserts that we finite thinkers "have
an inalienable individuality and personality." (8)
4 Person- Bowne maintains that the relation between soul and body is best
ality and the conceived as that of interaction. (9) By this he simply means that
organism. each affects the other. "The union of the two has no other mean-
(
ing than this fact of mutual influence." (10) In this way "the
a
.
Inter- organism seems to be a kind of link between the inor~a- ic physical
actionism. and the mental. As physical, it is allied 00 the world of matter;
and, as living, it is allied to the world of mind." (11) "The
statement that the soul is in the brain means only that the soul is
in direct interaction with the brain; a change in the brain is at-
tended by a change in the soul, and conversely." (12) This recip-
rocal influence is the only definite meaning that can be given to
the question as to the seat of the soul. (15) "The actual organ-
ism is only a stimulus to mental unfolding and a servant of the
unfolded life.
.
At present however, the organism is mentally con-
ditioned and the mind is organically conditioned, in the sense of
mutual concomitance in their respective cnanges." (14)
However, "we do not see that the body is necessr.ry to con-
sciousness.
.
The relation, whatever it is, can only be viewed as
factual and contingent. The actual body, then, is no analytically
necessary factor of ^ur inner life." (15)
(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pag s 257-8; aluo,
page 250. (2) Personaliom, page 260.
(5) Metaphysics, page 91 . (4) Personaliam, page 197.
(5) Metaphysics, page 552. (6) Ibid., page 577.
(7) Ibid., pa ce 102. (8) Ibid, page 105.
(9) The chief passages dealing with the relation of body and
mind are: Introduction to Psychological Theory, Part II, chapter
IV; Metaphysics, Part III, cnapter II.
(10) Metaphysics, page 551 . (11) Ibid., pa^e 555.
(12) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 500.
(15) Ibid., page 500* Metaphysics, page 168.
(14) Metaphysics, page 546.
(15) Ibid, page 576.
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.
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sonality.
a
1
. The rela-
tion of agent
to his action.
We have noticed above that the soul is created by God; (1)that is, the soul is posited by God and, under the conditions setby him, builds and maintains the orgaidsm arhicfc "becomes a visible
expression of the personality, a means of personal communion and
also a means for controlling to some extent the inner life. n, (2)The laws of interaction between soul and body "must be sought in
the plan and agency of the infinite." (2) " Seeing that the soul
is that with reference to which the organism has its existence we
may also speak of the soul as the builder and maintainer of the
organism. There is no reason to think there would be any organism
if there were no inner life." (5)
The soul, therefore, has two phases: "it has a phase of or-
• ganic activity and one of conscious activity. Both of these are
united as the expression of the nature of the one soul." (4)Bowne distinguishes four stages in the development of these phases.
Conscious activity based upon and growing out of the organic ac-
tivity is the final stage. Thus the continuity of the organic and
the mental world is in a measure assured and some reason given for
their intimate interrelations." (4) Whether Bowne means to accept
this idea in this form is uncertain from his account on these
pages. (5)
Let us turn now to the central question in the metaphysics of
personality, namely, the problem of its reality. The fundamental
principle of personality in Bowne' s conception is activity, which
guarantees its existence, its substantiality, and its reality.
The soul is a proper agent acting out of itself;" (6) and because
it, acts, we know that it exists and is real; for whenever anything
is able to assert itself in activity," it "acquires the right
to be viewed as real and substantial
. .
and existing. In like
manner the soul has no being in it; it knows itself as active and
as acted upon; and in this fact and knowledge it has the only pos-
sible mark of reality." (7)
We cannot, however, make any real separation between the
agent, its being, its action, unless we confuse "logical with tem-
poral antecedence. The postulate of action is an agent, but this
agent is not temporally antecedent to the action. Action is a dy-
namic consequence of being, and is coexistent rith it. Neither
can be thought without the other, and neither was before the other.
. .
Both being and action are given in indissoluble unity. Being
has its existence only in its action and the action is possible
only through the being.
.
Metaphysically considered, being is self-
centered activity, without distinction of parta or dates. In our
thinking, we separate the agent from the agency but, in reality,
both are posited together; indeed, each is but the implication of
the other.
.
We deny that the agent can, in reality, be separated
from the agency." (£)
• (1) Page 156.
(2) Metaphysics, page 566.
(5) Ibid., page $69; see also Introduction to Psychological
Theory, page JOO
.
W Metaphysics, pages 556-7.
(5) Compare Introduction to Psychological Theory, pa^es J00-1
(6) Metaphysics, page 5OO. (7) Ibid., pa6e 555.
(6) Ibid., pages 24-5.
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These agents, again, have in them no antithesis of passivebeing and active energy, but are active through and through " (1)
rne only gulf in the case is that between the agent and the act,
>
tae doer and the deed. We may trace the deed to the doer, but to
trace it into the doer involves confusion and nonsense. The pro-
ducer is not the work, but he is revealed through the work; and
the work is understood through the producer. This is a relation
which is perfectly intelligible in experience; and beyond it we can-
not go. (2) Agents themselves are ultimate facts, and why they
are is not a question to which we finite human beings can be ex-
pected to give an intelligent answer. "How the soul can act there
is no telling.' (5) "The reality is always an agent. How an agent
can be made, we do not claim to know.
. How an a-ent can act is
also unknown; but it is plain that we get no insight into the pos-
(
sibilityby positing a rigid core of inert reality in the agent." (4)b. Forms of if we cannot go beyond the agent, we can start from the in-
activity, dividual personal agent, when it first appears in consciousness, and
describe the various forms of its activity. In fact "activity'in
_
general, like being in general, is impossible." (5) Rather should
we consider the different, particular mental states waich are gen-
erated by the activity of the soul. We must look "for the agent
which thinks and feels and wills," (6) and which, although it is
unitary, yet produces a plurality without destroying itself. (7)
.
Only when we find such "definite" kinds or forms of'activity do we
find any real activity at all. (8)
- "Things differ only in the form or kind of activity." (8)
The definite and different characters of agents are to be found in
the law of their activities. "V/e define the nature of a thing as
that law or principle which determines the form and character of
its activity." (9) One agent is distinguished from another by the
"form and sequence of the activity." Prom these we derive certain
"laws of action." ( 10)
In one sense, all forms of mental experience, including even
sensations, are modes of action; as they express a mental reaction
against either external or internal stimuli. The mind when passive
is not properly inactive; but the form of its activity is deter-
mined by its circumstances, according to some fixed law." (11)
"Mental states in general
. .
are not things, but mental acts or
functione." (12)
That this is true of volitional and constitutional activity
is clear. "Attention may mean simply the direction of our activity
toward a given object. In this sense it is a form of self-deter-
mination, and is a condition of mental action." (15) The important
(1) Metaphysics, page 27. (2) Ibid, pages 428-9.
(5) Ibid., page 559. (4) Ibid., page 2}.
(5) Ibid, page 50.
(6) Ibid., page 559.
(7) Ibid. , pages 91; 559.
(6) Ibid, page 5°.
(9) Ibid., page 59. (10) Ibid., pages 50, 40.
(11) Introduction to Psychological Theory page 220.
(12) L'.etaphysics
,
page 594.
(15) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages k40-1.
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kind of activity to which attention leads is the "rational or
relating, activity of the mind; and this it is waich has such hi^h
significance for consciousness." (1) The various -.odes of think*
WOg or intellectual experience, then, nay be described as forms of
self-conscious activity. (2) Sensations are not themselves agentsbut are the "flowing forms of action." (5) Categories are "modes
ol intellectual manifestation." (4) And in general, knowing is aform of mental activity." (5)
Because personality acts and is acted upon, it is real "The
reality of the soul consists in its ability to act; other realityit nas none. (6) "What we mean by calling the soul real is just
what we mean by calling anything real, namely, that it acts and is
acted upon, and that it is a determining factor in the world of
change and effects." (7) "The evidence in favor of the reality of
the soul is indefinitely stronger than for the reality of matter."
(6; There is no escape from regarding the soul as something sub-
stantially real. It abides, acts, and is acted upon; and these are
the essential marks of ontological reality.
.
No other finite thing
can show so good a title to the name of reality." (9) "The self is
the only reality of which we have any knowledge, and the only thing
which fills out the notion of reality in distinction from phenom-
ena. (10) Again Bowne asserts that "Active intelli-ence is tae
only reality." (11) Even if there be a greater "absolute reality,"
this "does not remo/e the fact that we still are real in the sense
that we can act and be acted upon." (12)
Since "that which can act and be acted upon is the essential
idea of substance," (13) the soul or personality is also a sub-
stance. "When we have found the mental subject, we have found the
mental substance, for subject and substance are identical." (14)
Again, "Substance and subject, or agent, ara identical." (14) Ob-
viously Bowne has no objection to calling the soul a substance in
this sense. It is a substance, not in the sense of being a self-
sufficient or "rigid core" of being, but in being "the subject of
action and passion." (15)
Bowne's theory of personality belongs in the class of immanent
theories. While personality is primarily the subject of experience,
it includes in its wholeness various objective aspects. (16) It is
(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(6
(10
(11
(12
(15
(14
(15
(16)
Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 241
.
Personalism, p. 212; Theory of Thought <fe Knov.ledge, page 9
Metaphysics, page 567. (124-125,
Ibid., page 424; see Personalism, page 57; see ubove, pp,
Introduction to Psychological Theory, page I93.
Metaphysics, page 559. (7) Ibid., page 557.
Ibid., page 358. (9) Ibid., page J49.
Ibid., page 317; see also, pages J02, 337.
Ibid., page 316.
Ibid.
,
page 336.
Ibid., page 335.
Ibid., page 335.
Ibid.
,
page 101
.
See above, page
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general char-
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method of
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.
characteristic of him to regard a person as essentially an active
subject immanent in experience. He is especially careful to ex-
clude from personality anything which might be said to transcend
experience. One of the two outstanding marks of personality is self-
consciousness j and while personality is grounded in the infinite,
knowledge of its grounds is not essential to the esperience of its
reality, but only knowledge of its own activities. Strictly, per-
sonality is not to be understood as an object which we can perceive,
but rather an experience which we can live out, and a reality we
may conceive and think about.
The above survey includes the main elements in Bowne's theory
of personality. Our effort to present an orderly and condensed re-
vidw of his conception gives it, as in the case of that of James,
the appearance of possessing more system than it actually has. A
thoroughly systematic exposition of his theory is not to be found
in any particular section of his writings. His characteristic mode
of procedure is to set forth various panoramic views of personality.
In each of these one gross feature may occupy the foreground, but it
is usually bound up closely in language and logical connection with
other important features. Consequently, there ia much overlapping,
and much repetition and restatement, as the above quotations illus-
trate. The several aspects of personality are not finely distin-
guished, and then exactly joined together into an integrated whole.
This loose tendency is seen in his use of many different oerms for
personality without any clear distinction between them. (1) This
generalizing tendency of his presentation has involved necessarily
much repetition in our account. In his own account it has resulted
in some loose ends and numerous unsolved problems of detail.
Certain general defects in Bowne's method of studying person-
ality should be noted. On the whole, his method is too rationalistic
(2) He spends so much time in hunting logical flaws in the theo-
ries of others that he has too little time for laying a solid founda-
tion for his own, and in the end his view rests too much upon asser-
tion and too little upon e/idence.
Again, his references to experience are as a rule quite too
general. I'e lean:, heavily upon the authority of a general appeal
to experience for t.ie solution of many difficulties. When any one
of many problems connected with personality cannot be conceptually
solved, he calls upon experience to shew forth tha acLuul solution.
His numerous appeals to experience are so similar and so general
that they beco.ac largely useless. Many of the obscure places in
his theory might je clarified by means of a closer analysis of ex-
perience. How various aspects of personality, such as self-deter-
mination, selfhood, activity, agency, subject, intelligence, etc.,
are actually differentiated in experience, if at all, is undeter-
mined
.
In particular, an important question which he does not ade-
quately discuss in view of its importance is tne meaning of that
"constant and original" datum which he calls "self-experience." (3)
He fails to say just what the constant self is which we experience.
(1) See above, page 132, top.
(2) Compare, W. James, Varieties of Religious Experienc<
page 502, note 2.
(3) See above, pages 127-6.
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If it cannot be described, he should say so more explicitly, and
give us more guides for its identification, ffhile he says intel-
ligence cannot recognize itself without "content," (1) he does not
explain exactly what content it is which he has in mind.
In his references to experience it is sometimes unclear wheth-
er or not he means experience to be a more ultimr.te philosophical
postulate than personality. It was stated above (2) that he pro-
bably means personality, or "the active self-experience of intelli-
gence," to be ultimate. (5)
On the whole, however, his method of studying personality
should be highly commended so far as it goes. It deserves to be
carefully considered by those who- seek the proper method of treat-
ing personality.
His treatment of activity is altogether too meager and simple
in view of the importance cf the concept in his metaphysics and in
his theory of personality. Activity must be comprehensive, of
course, in order to serve as the first principle of reality, but
since he regards concrete activity as the only real kind, he should
explain more definitely how we may identify it in our experience,
what are its psychological marks, and especially how it is related
to the other varied phases of the mental life. He does this, to be
sure, by reference to the idea of form. But form is quite too ab-
stract a term to be used without some more concrete or psychological
filling. The various forms or kinds of activity need to be more
carefully distinguished and their interrelations exhibited. It is
very regrettable that Eowne has not explained more fully the nature
of activity, since it plays such a central part in his conception
of nature and mind.
He falls, in fact, into the following logical difficulty: per-
sonality, in his view, is essentially activity, and therein its
reality consists; but activity involves, certainly, change; yet he
says personality is one and the same. This is a fundamental incon-
sistency in his system which he does not explain.
It is interesting to note that A. Vannerus points out a simi-
lar difficulty in his summary and criticism of W. Wundt 's conception
of the soul
. (4) Wundt vigorously opposes tcie theory of a substance
existing behind conscious stetes. He regards the soul life as an
immediate actuality or reality whose essence is activity, but he
emphasizes the activity so strongly that it seams to pass over into
mere change, and the permanent factor is ignored. On the other
hand, in his criticism of asoociatioiial psychology, he closely ap-
proaches the substance theory. Evidently Wundt meets the same dif-
ficulty that 3owne passes by, namely, how provide for permanence if
the soul is regarded as essentially activity.
The point of objection, then, is that the relation of activity
to change and permanence is especially unclear in the philosophy of
Bowne, so far as I can ascertain. Personality is essentially
activity and yet it is permanent; then the permanent changes or
(1) See above, page 126.
(2) See above, page 150.
(5 J Metaphysics, page 424.
(4) Archiv ftlr systematische Philosophic, vol. I, 1695.
pages 565-400.
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the active abides. The permanent self i6 the "same yesterday and
to-day," and yet "each new experience leaves the soul other than
it was." (1) It may be fair to say that he suggests incidentally
the solution in principle of this paradox by asserting that while
personality, as substance, is continually changing, yet its purposive
or rational self-determination gives it a permanence amid its changes.
But certainly this very important doctrine needs much more careful
treatment than the general statement that experience actually solves
it for us.
It should be noted, however, that the difficulty of the pro-
blems which Bowne faces is very great. It is much easier to point
out the dark places in his theory than to find means of illuminat-
ing them any more than he does. It is easier to count up the con-
tributions of his conception of personality than it is to find im-
perfections in it.
Bowne' s gross method of explaining personality mentioned above
is really, from one point of view, a chief merit of his treatment,
because thereby he gains a breadth of comprehension and an emphasis
upon essential principles which is notably lacking in most other
theories, and also because in that way he is able to accentuate the
main features of personality without losing perspective by reason
of too many details. Bowne certainly deserves credit for bringing
into the foreground of attention problems in connection with person-
ality which are undoubtedly fundamental.
To mention all of the outstanding features of personality
upon which he dwells would require the repetition here of most of
the outline of the above exposition of his view. This rehearsal
is unnecessary
.
Only a few of his especially notable contributions
will be indicated.
Among his valuable points of indefatigable emphasis is that
personality is a ground principle alike in epistemology and meta-
physics. It is a fertile source of explanatory concepts, and in
its concrete life gives meaning to basic categories which other-
wise would be hopelessly irreconcilable and abstract- Personality
alone fills out the complete meaning of reality, and it becomes,
therefore, the rational key to all lower forms of existence. Bowne
has done a signal service in contributing largely to the establish-
ment of personality in the central place in philosophic inquiry,
and in criticizing other theories, especially materialism and associ-
ationism, which fail to give personality ita due philosophic recog-
nition. His conception of the relation of the categories to person-
ality is another important contribution.
Since personality itself is a first principle of explanation
and since it makes the categories intelligible, the categories can-
not be applied to personality itsell', except in a peculiar way,
without circular reasoning. In our search for ultimate principles
we find a right, and indeed, the need of stopping with personality.
We find its nature by a direct recognition in our living experience.
We discover that ita reality consists in its activity. Because it
can act and be acted upon, it exists and is rightly called a aubatan®.
The aoul is substantial in no other eenae, but this la tue important
meaning of substance. To have emphasized this meaning of substance
in connection with personality ia one of the important servicea of
(1) See above, page
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One of the most significant points of emphasis in Bowne 's
theory of personality consists, in my judgment, in his conception
of the relation of activity to purposive intelligence, to willing
and thinking. (2) Activity and intelligent purposing constitute
an essential unity in that personal activity is self-directed in
the light of various purposes or ideals which it is the function
of intelligence to furnish. He makes the suggestion, (5) without
developing it, that change is due to the fact that intelligence
is seeking to realize certain purposes. He loses an opportunity
to go a step further and to point out that perhaps the future is
dependent upon the fact that we have certain desires or purposes
that are unfulfilled. He maintains that the future is due to the
limitations of our finite perception, and that if we were omnis-
cient, we would have no future, for we would not need any more time
to know things. Here the rationalistic tendency of Bowne breaks
out. Even if our knowledge were complete, still it might be neces-
sary to have a future in order to realize certain of our incomplete
purposes. Nevertheless, Bowne 1 s emphasis upon the central place of
intelligent self-determination, upon the purposive character of
personality, deserves strong commendation.
Only a few of the valuable points in Bowne' s conception of
personality have been mentioned. One who is seeking a metaphysi-
cal theory of personality will find his conception the most prof-
itable starting point, perhaps, of any that can be found in the
history of philosophy. Such a seeker could hope to improve upon
Bowne* s conception by systematizing it, by offering stronger
proofs for certain aspects of it, by connecting it up with the new-
er movements in psychology and philosophy, and by elaborating cer-
tain details which he too lightly passed over. The importance of
Bowne' s theory will appear ..ore clearly in the course of the his-
torical summary of current movements which follows.
( 1 ) No attempt is made in this investigation to exhibit the
connection of this active character of the self as set forth by
Bowne with certain other classical philosophical conceptions, for
example of Aristotle and Leibniz.
(2) See above, pages 1 55—6
.
(5) See above, page 14^.
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The detailed study of the personality- theory of a representa-
tive of each of three typical current movements in American philos-
ophy has now been completed. A comparison of the results obtained
in this investigation provides a basis for a resume which will em-
phasize some of the present tendencies, summarize the positive re-
sults of our study, and finally indicate some of the unsolved prob-
lems
.
Various avenues of approach to the problem of personality may
possibly be adopted. In this investigation the metaphysical one has
been chosen. The business of the metaphysician, so far as personal-
ity is concerned, is to set forth systematically its fundaaental
principles and. ontological status. His construction should be based
upon whatever relevant and significant facts he can gle^Ji from bi-
ology, psychology, sociology, etnics, law, religion, theology, epis-
temology, aesthetics, literature, observation of every-day life, or
any other phase of human activity. The several partial aspects of
personality which these disciplines reveal should be organized
critically by him into an interpretation of the nature of personal-
ity which will be comprehensive, unified, and well-ordered.
The most fundamental approaches to personality, apart from the
general metaphysic ?.l one, are the biological, the psychological,
the legal-ethical, and the religious or theological. Biology, in
the course of time, should provide facts which will throw light
upon the place of life and individuality, heredity and development,
dispositions and character, in the concept of personality.
Psychology, more than any other single science, should con-
stantly yield an abundance of data of use to the metaphysician in
his endeavor to determine the first principles of human nature.
Our study of James shows how the psychologist furnishes or may fur-
nish very much empirical evidence of which the metaphysician must
take account in his constructions. G. Wobbermin affiris that, "The
chief reasons why recent philosophers ascribe existence to the ego
as an enduring real are psychological." (1) Because of the great
importance of the moral component in most modern conceptions of
personality, I regret that space and time have forbidden the pre-
sentation of the personality-theory of a representative Aaerican
ethicist, such as, for example, G. H. Palmer.
In the consideration of historical views of personality, the
study of law and theology is especially significant because it is
from the old discussions of the law of persons and the meaning of
personality in the Godhead and in Jesus Christ that the concept of
personality first finds its way into modern philosophy. The con-
viction, in common teligioue thought, that what one is has u para-
mount bearing upon his destiny brings about the result that relig-
ious thinkers want to understand personality, and consequently
often make valuable contributio.is to its comprehension. It is in
metaphysics alone, howe/er, that a complete and ultimate view of
personality properly :aay be found. Many theories of personality,
through deficiencies in metaphysical sotting, err In tncomplete-
(1) Theologie und Metaphysilc, page 151
.
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nese rather than in positive misconception. The metaphysician
should feel it his duty to present, as soon as ne is auie,a con-
summate and complete conception.
Our historical study in not intended ou include current rep-
resentatives of all possible modes of attacking the problem. that
have been referred to. The three representative thinkers whose
thought has been reviewed approach the problem from the metaphys-
ical point of view, except that James 1 original and dominant'
standpoint is psychological; he became metaphysical in his later
years. Our survey warrants us, therefore, in pointing out some of
the present metaphysical tendencies concerning the theory of per-
sonality, together with some preliminary notes on psychological
tendencies.
b. Two current metaphysical tendencies concerning the self.
1'. The development of James 1 theory.
a'. Perry and Bowne develop two tendencies in the thought of James.
General inter
relations of
James, Perry
and Bowne.
The two cur-
rents in the
thought of
Janes
.
These illus-
trated in hie
treatment of
personality
.
I have reviewed the thought concerning personality of three
reprecentati ve American thinkers for the purpose of seeing how cer-
tain metaphysical questions with reference to it have actually been
ansv/ered. Originally the personality- theories of Perry, James, and
Bowne were considered in the order named because tais seemed to be
the order of their increasing worth. Later the first two were
interchanged with a view to accentuating the logical-historical
development from James to Perry.
There is no evidence that Bowne exercised any influence upon
either James or Perry. His own essential view was set forth in
the first edition of his Metaphysics (1682), eight years before the
appearance of James' Principles of Psychology . However, the theory
of Bowne is properly regarded as the logical, even if not the ac-
tual historical, development of one line or aspect of the thought
of James. The conception of Perry represents both a historical
and logical development of a second current in the thought of
Jame s
.
It has been indicated already (1) that the writings of James
contain two currents so fax as the problem of self or personality
is concerned. One may be called the personalistic and the other
the "radical" or empiricistic trend. James does not champion
either in an exclusive and completely consistent way. On the
whole, the first trend dominates his earlier works on psychologi-
cal and religious topics; in these writings the second trend is
present as an undercurrent, and cornea to be the dominant view in
his later works dealing with phases of "radical empiricism."
The two divergent tendencies in his thinking sometimes may
be distinguished in his treatment of the same problem. The per-
Bonalistic trend is illustrated in his conception that conscious-
ness is a "fighter for ends" and is sometning which is always per-
sonal; the radical trend appears when he declares that conscious-
ness is a nonentity and a functional, resultant relation among
certain bits of pure experience. Personal identity sometimes is
represented as an act of appropriation on the part of each newly
born thought; and sometimes it is described as a sensible contin-
(1) See above, page 66.
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uum given in experience} in the first case it is the product of
self-activity and in the second it is passively given. Again, in
the personalis tic context, he holds to the distinction in conscious-
ness between content and activity, while in radical empiricism all
such inner duplicity is stoutly denied. (1)
The thought of Perry may be regarded as starting from James'
empiricistic trend and developing into a bold realism. The per"
sonalistic trend in James' thought, on the other hand, stands in
much more harmonious relations with Bowne's conception of person"
ality. In general, these two thinkers may be regarded as devel-
oping, respectively, two tendencies which are present in the thought
of James. These two lines of development will now be pointed out
in a more specific way.
We may begin by reviewing certain transitions in James' own
theories. The conception of the self in his pragmatic writings oc-
cupies a very uncertain middle ground between the personalis tic and
radical extremes to which reference was just made. There was
reason to expect his pragmatism to contain a real contribution to
the problem of personality, especially because its emphasis upon
practical activity and individual values touches central features
of personality, but also because James originally strove in his
pragmatism to correct the impersonal cult of absolutism and intel-
lectualism by advocating a more adequate recognition of the finite
and concrete life of the historical individual. For example, he
complains that the Absolute is "the great de-realizer of the only
life we are at home in." (2) In this reaction against intellec-
tualiBm James stands in the company of numerous other great con-
temporary thinkers, notably A. 5. Pringle-Pattison, F. C. 3. Schil-
ler, and Henri Bergson. We should expect that his negative pro-
test against reducing the practical life of man to intellectual
terms without remainder would lead to a positive metaphysical the-
ory of the self in his pragmatic writings. Our hopes in this di-
rection were strengthened also by his much talk about pluralism,
and about the individual worth and independent significance of the
finite life. But these promises of a more adequate conception of
personality
—
promises justified by the personalis tic trend in his
psychology and by the essential principle* of his pragmatism and
pluralism—have not been fulfilled. As a matter of historical
fact, his thought took a very different direction.
The actual conclusion of his philosophy was a doctrine of
"pure experience" in which the fulness of real personality has be-
come a memory only. That the germs of his radical empiricism were
present in his earlier thought, of course cannot be denied. I have
already pointed out how a person, starting from ais psychology,
might set forth two possible ways of explaining how he came to hold
the doctrine of radical empiricism. (5) To be sure he started in
his Principles of Psychology with personal experience, or with a
stream of consciousness which has a personal "character.
1 The
( 1 ) See above, page 29.
(2) A Pluralistic Universe, page 49; see the whole of chapter
2. His opposition to absolutism is already appearing in his Prin-
ciples of Psychology; compare chapter I, pages 555, 566-7.
(5) See above, pages 29-50
•
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latter becomes more and more incidental as his philosophy devel"
op3; the stream of experience becomes more and more the great ul-
timate and absolute fact which leans on nothing. In his pragmatism
he demands verification in experience, but his conception of ex-
perience becomes less and less private and more and more a public,
abstract, and general affair. He ends in a metaphysics of pure
experience in which the finite self is lost in a neutral and im-
personal whole. That this is no necessary conclusion of the prag-
matic dialectic is proved by the very different conception of per-
sonality which has been reached by other pragmatists, for example,
the British philosopher, F. C. S. Schiller.
The gradual development of the thought of James, then, rep"
resents actually a steady decrease in the richness and the depth
of his conception of personality. In trying to escape the barren
deserts of intellectualism and absolutism, he passed along the path
of radical empiricism until he faced the borderland of the neo-
realistic waste. He himself did not boldly enter this land— cer-
tainly not a land of promise—although he, in a way which is not
characteristic or him, admits that "things of an unexperienceable
nature may exist ad 1 i oi turn . " (1) The step which James did not
take was taken by Perry and other new realists.
Perry develops the radical empiricism of James and boldly
champions a realism in wtiich the pure experience of James falls
apart into countless transcendent elements. Their existence as neu-
tral entities does not depend upon their being experienced at all,
and their reality is quite independent of knowing mind or intelli-
gence. (2) Just as the pure experience of James is homogeneous, so
the ultimate entities In Perry's metaphysics are neither physical
nor mental but just "neutral." For James' later thought experience
appears to be possible without a self; for Perry things exist in-
dependent of any mind. The :.-iost important logical link between the
thought of James and of Perry i3 to be found in James 1 doctrine
that consciousness is not an existent, but a relation among exis-
tents. Consciousness thus becomes a product or function of primary
or pre-existent entities and thus the door is opened to realism.
These are the general points concerning the manner in which
Perry carries out the radical empiricism of James. A mor; specif-
ic way in which Perry develops the latter's psychology needs to be
mentioned. While Perry holds to a relational theory of conscious-
ness, he also maintains that this relation comes about only as the
result of an activity of one object u;>on other objects. Now that
which acts is the living organism. The subject of the activity i3
the behaving body. The self is the behaving organism with its
numerous dispositions.
This doctrine represents a development of two aspects of the
thought of James. It connects up with that excessively biological
conception of the self which was mentioned as characteristic of
American pragmatism. (5) In the second place, the attempt of
Perry to give a purely behaviorio tic account of the self is a
(1) The Meaning of Truth, Preface, or. ;e xii.
f 2) On pages £7-8 above I have .ut down briefly the ante-
cedents of new realism, and explained how Perry develops the
thought of James
.
(5) See above, pages 64-5.
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radical development of James' doctrine that the nuclear or spiri-
tual self iB to be found in the feeling of bodily processes. Perry
is fond of quoting James 1 opinion that the essential person is to
be found in bodily activities.
Thus the mental activity which James strove to analyze, and
finally identified with the feeling of bodily stresses and strains,
is boldly identified by Perry with bodily behavior itself. The
changes in the stream of consciousness become bodily movements. The
active life in pragmatism becomes organic behavior in new realism.
The result is the doctrine that the mental subject is the behaving
body. The real and fundamental agent turns out to be the nervous
system. (1) J. A. Leighton declares that, "Since the brain is the
real selective and attentive agency, the searchlight which makes the
illumination which is consciousness, neutral monism is but a new and
specious name for materialism . " (2)
When this conclusion has been reached, the metaphysician loses
his claim to the problem of mental activity, and it p;\s3es into the
hands of the physiologist or of the psychologist who uses a purely
behavioristic method. In consequence, some of the new realists
themselves are ardent promoters of this method in psychology, for
example, Perry himself and E. B. Holt. Behavioristic psychology
urgently needs a more solid metaphysical foundation, but this is
not to be found in new realism as it has developed up to date. The
presuppositions of behaviorism need to be brought to light and sub-
jected to thorough philosophical criticism. (5) Perhaps this turn-
ing of the problem of human behavior over to the psychologists
accounts in part for the barrenness of neo-realis tic metaphysics so
far as personality is concerned.
Behavioristic psychology, however, is no necessary culmination
of the pragmatic movement with its emphasis upon activity. The hu-
manist, F. C. S. Schiller, and some new realists, for example, 3.
Alexander, have attempted to describe the activity, which is so
important In the life of the 3elf, in mental instead of bodily terms.
The English realists on the whole have maintained also that con-
sciousness is an activity, but the activity of a mental subject
upon physical and other objects. 'v 4)
The result of our study of the interrelation of the thought of
Perry and James is the discovery of three distinct conceptions of
mind, (a) There is, first, the view of the English new realists,
who regard mind as a peculiar psychic activity which is to be dis-
tinguished from objects or sense data. In some parts of his Prin-
ciples of Psychology (5), James approximates to the same view, and
this view resembles the one held by Bowne. (b) Jamee later held
a different notion, according to which mind and phyoicnl things
are two orders or complexes of the homogeneous pieces of pure ex-
( 1 ) For criticism of this doctrine, see below, pages 200-11.
(2) The Field of Philosophy, 2nd edition, page 457.
(5) A meager beginning in this direction has been made; and
even a confession of the need is hopeful. See H. H. Bawden'e ar-
ticle, "The Presuppositions of a Behavioristic Psychology,
"
Psychological Review, vol. 25, pages 171-190. 191-
.
(4) Compare, D. C. Macintosh, the Problem of Knowledge, page 25§>
(5} For references, see above, page* 27-6.
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perience. (1) This is the relational theory of consciousness to
which the American new realists adhere: the mind is a peculiar
grouping of neutral entities, (c) When Perry, starting from this
conception of consciousness, nevertheless thinks that activity
somewhere is necessary in order to constitute a mental group, we
reach a third conception, the behavioristic one, according to which
the self is the selective, behaving organism; in connection With
the latter consciousness appears whenever it brings together a
group of objects by reacting to them in a certain specific way.
Here the mental subject is the behaving organism.
When we attempt to judge the worth of Perry's theory of the
self, we are compelled to assert that it represents a distinctly
retrogressive movement. The chief reasons for this proposition
are as follows:
Perry represents a backward step so far as trie theory of per-
sonality is concerned because he attempts to explain it in terms
of impersonal elements. New realists have met with no greater suc-
cess in this endeavor than the materialists and associationists be-
fore them. The difficulties of all three types of thought are very
similar in principle, (2) although, of course, they differ among
themselves with respect to the character of the real elements with
which they begin. The neo-realis tic entities are more refined but
very much more indefinite and intangible than the elements of ma-
terialism. In general they resemble mathematical units more than
physical things. Just as the materialistic conception of the soul
grew up under the influence of a successful physical science, so
the neo-realis tic view of the self is coming to be more and more
determined by the influences of mathematics and its younger broth-
er, "symbolic logic."
The greater the number and variety of the failures that oc-
cur in the attempts to derive personality from neutral or imper-
sonal elements, the surer is the conclusion that that endeavor is
a mistaken and hopeless one. The neo-realis tic definition of mind,
therefore, has at least a negative value. Our inductive study
certainly enforces the conviction that personality must be ex-
plained, if at all, in terms of personal principles or realities.
A second retrograde tendency in the philosophy of Perry is
the endeavor to explain personality in objective terms. The new
realists are anti-subjective, and take pride in that attitude. The
only subject required in their system is an object, namely, an
organism capable or behaving by reacting to certain selected things
in its environment. This onti-aui-jective spirit fits well the
method of an exclusively behavioristic psychology. Purposive ac-
tion, for instance, is described in terms of anticipatory adjust-
ments, and images are explained as incipient motor reactions. Perry
promises to take account both of the "mind without" and the "mind
within," but he never really reaches the "mind within;" while he
seems to admit its existence, he neglects it; and in the end the
self is lost in the world of things. Some reasons will be pre-
sented in the third part of this investigation which will tend to
(1) See above, pages 29-5°.
(2) See below, page 159.
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show that it is impossible to give a purely objective account of
personality, especially because it is, in part at least, a subject
or agent which acts in varying ways. (1)
Perry returns to a form of mental atomism in his attempt,
born of his analytical method, to explain consciousness as a peculiar
grouping of primordial entities. This view is similar to the older
associationism in that both doctrines teach that mind is a compound
of elements. Perry himself recognizes his affinity with Hume, and
rebukes the latter for not making himself more famous by taking the
easy step to new realism. (2) For associationism, however, the
elements of mind are at least states of consciousness to begin with;
for materialism they are physical facts j but for Perry they are
neither mental nor physical. He is really farther from the truth,
therefore, than Hume. All the objections v/hich hold against the
aiisociational doctrine of the self hold against Perry's view, and
other objections also. Perhaps the fact which his theory meets the
greatest difficulty in explaining is the actual unity of the mind,
(j) New realism, associationism, and naturalism all alike are ship-
wrecked on this rock of every-day experience. Personal identity is
a second problem for the explanation of which Perry has no theory
to offer.
His excessive rationalism leads to too abstract a theory of
the self. He robs personality of much of its concrete vitality and
richness. It is incidental product in an unmeasured multitude
of neutral entities, the real meaning of which in human experience
is obscure, and which are derived by a process of abstract analysis.
The result is a conception of the self which is as barren and un-
real as any absolutistic account ever was. The rationalistic ten-
dency of new realism is developed in a striking way in the New
Rationalism of E. G. Spaulding. This book is especially significant
because it emphasizes the need in new realism of setting forth its
underlying assumptions and of defining its peculiar method. Since
this need is obviously very great in the metaphysics in question,
Spaulding 's work represents a forward step in that he tries to
meet it.
Perry's use of his analytical method is dogmatic because he
not only uses it in an inexcusably exclusive way, but because he
fails to set forth its presuppositions. He is dogmatic also in
that he does not think it is necessary to consider the problem of
the self as preliminary to understanding the world. It is charac-
teristic of new realism to neglect this problem. If one searches,
for example, through the cooperative volume. The New Realism
, in
the hope of finding something to illuminate the problem of person-
ality, he will find that the latter is utterly neglected.
Not only, therefore, is the neo-realia tic method dogmatic,
but it has beer, actually fruitleee, at least so far as the problm
of personality is concerned. Perry might have set up tne analytical
method, as interpreted by him, as an hypotheoie, and then proved
its usefulness by trying it out. He has not followed this more
cautious mode of procedure, but has aeauaed its perfection. Its
if] See below, pages 255-45.
(2) See above, page 88.
(5) See above, pages 109-111.
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exclusive use, however, is of extremely questionable value, and ao
far as he has applied it to the problem of the self, the results
may be regarded as negligible.
The self, which was sick and dying in James' radical empiricism,
is dead and buried in the strange and unknown realm of everlasting
neutrality. Whether its death was due to neglect or to the sharp
edge of the analytical method does not matter. Just how Perry's
neutral elements make personality more intelligible than the sub-
stantial substratum against which the new realists, notably E. G.
Spaulcing, rail, is a wonderful uncertainty.
The several elements of relative worth in Perry's view of the
self have already been summarized. (1) The one significant point
at which he makes an advance beyond James is to be found in his at-
tempt to work out that objective system of values which seem to be
necessary to save pragmatism from subjectivism. (2) Perry grounds
this system of values in inherited and acquired dispositions and
their correspondix:g interests. In this notion we have a positive
suggestion as to the permanent basis or ground of personality. On
the whole, however, the positive results of new realism so far as
the understanding of personality goes are negligible.
We have now seen in general how Perry and other new realists
have transformed the "radical" trend in the philosophy of James
into a realistic metaphysics with a somewhat characteristic concep-
tion of the self'. Let us now turn to another aspect of that phi-
losophy, namely, its personalistic and pluralistic undercurrent.
We have noticed already (5) how in several places (4) James eulo-
gizes the ultimate reality of personal experience. He says, for
example, in the first reference, that "the axis of reality runs
solely through the egotistic places," and in the second, "the fons
and origo of all reality ... is ourselves." This doctrine might
form the starting point for a conception of the self which would
turn out to be very different from the one in which the realistic
development of James' thought has actually ended.
The disciple of James who has elaborated most explicitly this
personalistic phase of his thought is Miss Mary W. Calkins. (5)
She even selects James as a representative of personal idealism.
(6) We recall that the first mark which James mentions in his list
of the characters of consciousness is its personal quality. This
is also a primary factor with Miss Calkins. She states that,
"Y/ith ... a great company of philosophers, the writer finds that
consciousness is not mere idea or series of ideas, but that it is
the unique subject of ideas." (6) Hence, she develops "psychology
as science of selves." (7)
(1) See above, pages 120-122.
(2) See above, page 6j.
(5) See above, pages 27-8.
(4) Notably in The Varieties of Religious Experience, pages
499-502, and in The Principles of Psychology, vol. II, pages 296-6.
(5) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4th ed., pages 405-10.
(6) Ibid., Jrd ed., page 556.
(7) See article by this name in Psychological Review, 1900,
pages 490-501; also her book, First Book in Psychology. See a list
of numerous other writings in bibllogruphy below.
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Not only does she make the self the unit of psychological in-
vestigation, but she develops a personalistic metaphysics. She
points out that the existence of such a self as she descriueo can-
not be proved to one who finds only momentary ideas, "for proof
means bolstering up an assertion by a more fundamental one, whereas
the self, supposing it to exist, is fundamental to ideas." (1) Her
conception of the outstanding features of the self or person, and
its use as a fundamental principle or metu^aysicai expiration, are
set forth in an article, "The Personalistic Conception of Nature."
(2) The characteristics of the self here are essentially the same
as she has defended all along.
Miss Calkins no doubt has done a real service in promoting a
personalistic philosophy, and especially in keeping the matter of
a self-psychology before the minds of psychologists and philosophers
by her intermittent articles and reviews on that subject. Her
point of view, however, is primarily psychological, and her meta-
physical elaboration of the concept of personality is brief. I
have, therefore, preferred to select Bowne as a representative of
personal idealism because his standpoint, like that of this in-
vestigation, is primarily metaphysical, and because he has a com-
prehensive theory of personality.
From the above order of exposition it should not be inferred
that Bowne derived his personalistic philosophy from James, because
he probably had developed his own conception of personality before
the appearance of James 1 important works, and also because Bowne
was singularly independent both of contemporaries and classical
philosophers. In his writings he seldom refers to either save as
exemplars of mistaken views. The one important historical influ-
ence effecting his conception of personality is H. Lotze, to whom he
dedicated the first edition of his Metaphysics . He held a dis-
paraging view of the value of the historical study of philosophy,
and preferred the systematic approach.
Nevertheless, Bowne' s view of personality has close affinity
with, and may be regarded as the logical development of the minor
or personalistic trend in the thought of James, and, as such, forss
a striking contrast to Perry's realistic development of the major
or empiricistic current. Bowne' 8 Personal ism and the self-psycholo-
gy of Miss Calkins are both somewhat older than the chief works of
new realism. The latter, according to its exponents, is in part a
reaction against certain over-subjective tendencies in personal
idealism as well as in pragmatism, just as the latter were in part
a humanistic reaction against the impersonal tendencies of absolute
idealism. New realism, however, has failed to clarify the problem
of personality, and has ended with a conception of it which is not
only incomplete and vague, but which is as impersonal as that of
absolute idealism, and in some respects less a atisfactory . Perry
states clearly that new realism reacts strongly against anthropo-
morphism in philosophy as well as against absolutism. (5) J. Royce
is in general a mediator between absolute and peroonil idealism in
1) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 4ed., page 407
2) Philosophical Review, vol. XXVIII, March, 1919.
5) Present Philosophical Tendencies, page J9.
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that he tries to maintain the integrity of the human person as
well as of the Absolute; he calls himself an absolute pragmatist.
Over against absolutism, personal idealism and pragmatism
seek philosophic defense of finite individuals with their freedom
and their varied practical interests, and with their sense of pri-
vate worth and uniqueness. As Perry says (1), "Personal idealism
represents the party of man within the idealistic movement, seek-
ing to save the essentials of moral responsibility." In explain-
ing human life, pragmatism on the whole tends to make biological
categories basic, while personal idealism tends to make ethical
categories fundamental. Both alike refuse to assign a central
place to mechanical principles. Both tend to emphasize the his-
torical or temporal phases of life. The pragmatism of James runs
into a thorough-going pluralism, while Bowne, with histheistic
doctrines, stands cloeer to absolutism, of which he has been
falsely accused.
In these statements the relation of personal idealism to sev-
eral philosophical movements has been indicated from the stand-
point of the problem of personality.
A considerable number of points of resemblance between the
views of James and Bowne have appeared incidentally. Others will
come to light in the summary below. A few may be noted here.
(a) Both of them make a constant appeal to concrete experience in
the course of their endeavors to verify their hypotheses. (2)
(b) While James speaks of personal identity in certain places as
a kind of appropriation, upon the part of each passing thought, of
its whole significant past, Bo-.vne describes it as a conscious
"self-identification of intelligence." (5) (c) Y.'e have noted in
several places that the self, with its capacities of thought, in-
terest, and spontaneity, is regarded as a sample of reality. This
idea is suggested by James and is developed by BoWBS as a basic
metaphysical principle. (A) For him personality is the key to the
real world and it alone makes intelligible the fundamental cate-
gories of explanation;
The general result of the philosophy of i-owne is to put per"
sonality into the central place in philosophy. He makes personal-
ity the first principle in philosophical explanation. It is the
key to reality and provides the categories for the understanding
of all else besides itself. Personality itself is grasped by be-
in^ lived, by an act of self-recognition. Here is a powerful em-
phasis upon the importance of life as well as of individuality.
Personal idealism "proclaims the irreducibillty of the soul," as
Perry expresses it. (5)
The* features of personality which Bowne and the personal
idealists emphasize are its active, self-de teraining, teleologi-
cal, and moral—in general, its spiritual characteristics. These
points of accentuation stand in strong contraot to the teachings
of naturalism, and in part, too, to those of absolutisn,
emphasis is one of its chief contributions.
Thin
(1) Present Conflict of Ideals, page 201.
(2) See above, pages 15-16 and 127. 1?C, 1^0.
(j) See abo/e, pages J7 and 140.
(4) See above, pages 27-6 and 146.
(5) Present Conflict of Ideals, page 8.
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In the "personal idealise" of the Oxford philosophers similar
factors are put at the center of their conception of personality.
They seek to defend "the reality of human freedom,
. .
the valid-
ity of the moral valuation, and the justification of working en-
thusiasm for ideals." (1) The whole movement emphasizes the spon-
taneity of personality, points out its responsibility in the world
of knowledge and of morality, and strengthens its sense of inde-
pendent worth.
This conception of the central place of personality in phi-
losophy is being developed by other recent and younger thinkers;
for example, by John Laird (2), and E. N. Merrington (5). These
men seek to elucidate, in the light of historical criticism, cer-
tain problems in connection with personality. The historical
manifestations and relations of personality, as contrasted with
its metaphysical status, have been worked out in an original way
by W. E. Hocking. (4)
The need for a more systematic exposition of ttie concept of
personality is becoming increasingly evident. The three theories
to which most attention has been given lack such elaboration. At-
tempts at such a comprehensive interpretation have been made al-
ready with a measure or success, notably by C. G. Shaw (5) and by
G. T. Ladd, (6) as well as by W. Stern. (6)
A summary of some of the general results or the above study
of personality with respect to methods and problems is now in or-
der
.
First, in connection with each of the theories of personality
examined special attention has been directed to the problem of
method in order to ascertain whether there is any correlation be-
tween a philosopher's method and his conception of personality.
The number of ca3es studied does not warrant a certain conclusion,
but they point to the probability that there is a close corres-
pondence, provided a system has been worked out with some degree
of consistency and completeness. Some evidence for this general-
ization may be derived from a review of the representatives who
have been studied.
(a) Bowne's conception of personality as an active subject of
experience fits his "transcendental empiricism" or personal ideal-
ism with its method of rational criticism of a given experience
which is regarded as originally personal and spontanebus.
(b) Perry's rejection of introspection and hie adoption of
the method of "general observation" of" the mind at large" (7)
lead3 logically to the conception of the self aa the behavin or-
ganism. Again, when he proceeds to reduce reality, by the method
of analysis, to neutral and independent elements or entities, it
is fitting for him to find the distinguishing marks of conscious-
ness in a functional complex of these elements which lacke any
(1) Personal Idealism, edited by H. Sturt, page vi
.
(2) Problems of the Self: see for instance pages
(5) The Problem of Personality: sec pages 170-2.
(4) Human Nature and its Remaking.
(5) The Ego and its Place in the World, 1915-
(6) The Secret of r-ersonality , 1916.
(7) See above, pages 97-8.
(8) Person und Sache.
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clear principle of unity or any really personal factor. (1) A de-
ficient and dogmatic feature of this conception lies in his fail-
ure to explain more fully the conditions under which this complex
comes into existence and is known at all. H. Dreyer (2) points
out explicitly tnat realism works in the domain of analysis and the
relative; personalism, in the domain of synthesis and the absolute.
When new realists analyze reality into countless ultimate en-
tities, the existence of which does not depend upon relations to
mind, it seems thai the most appropriate mode of apprehending them
would be a kind of intellectual intuition, of the sort of Platonic
contemplation, which would not utilize such incidents as relations
to distinct minds. This consistent conclusion, however, is pre-
cluded, not only by their dread of introspection, but also by the
fact that they do not nave a mind to apprehend these entities un-
til the entities themselves become grouped in certain ways. Hence
they are in the anomalous position that their only recourse in
knowing tneir own elements and in explaining consciousness is to
make use of terms of non-essential mental relations. The doctrine
of the immanence of consciousness is really, from one point of
view, an attempt to express the idea of immediate apprehension,
but we have noted the difficulties involved in consistently and
profitably working out this doctrine when no personal subject is
presupposea. (5)
It is not surprising, then, that the analytical method, with
its assumption that it can reach ultimate simples wnich will ex-
plain everything by their combination and with its easy-going dog-
matism, should result in a conception of the sell which really
robs it of all personal character and allows it only an incidental
place in the universe,
c'. In prag- (c) The fact that no characteristic doctrine 01 tne self is
matism. actually correlated with the pragmatic method does not discount
tne general conclusion mentioned above (4), but merely goes to con-
firm the opinion thai, tnis metnod is really not at all a uistinct
one. As a matter 01 fact, it could be used to aeiend any concep-
tion of the self wnich might make a signiiicant aiiference to some
one. Ir we consider it generously ana generally, however, it is
fair to affirm that the inteiiectualis tic conception 01 personal-
ity is inconsistent with it, and that a pragmatiat would aefend,
most appropriately, a view of the selr in wnicn volition and emo-
tion are central, and in which the quest of ideals witn a sense
of risk is characteristic.
2'. Contribu- These last statements oring to notice the importance of
tions and prob- considering how personality may best be known. James and Bowne
lems in connec- wrestled ?dth this question. Our study warrants us in setting
tion with the down certain contributions which they have made, and in indicating
method of know- some of the problems in connection with the method of knowing per-
ing personality, conality.
(1) See above, page 102.
(2) Personalismus und Realismuu, W05, page 52.
(5) See above, pages 117-9.
(4) See above, pa ,e 165.
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a'. Importance (a) A general observation needs to be made first of all. Our
of studying study has demonstrated the need of a fuller and more specific con-
method in con- sideration of the problem of method in connection with personality,
nection with Many thinkers are clear in the general opinion that we do not know
personality. personality in precisely the same way as we know other objects or
realities, but a satisfactory and thorough-going explanation of
how we do know it is still lacking,
b' . The cate- (b) Bovme's criticism enforces the need of choosing whether
gories and per- or not one will adopt the principle of personality a3 his starting
8onality. point in metaphysical explanation. If he accepts it, the catego-
ries which it supplies out of its abundant life cannot be applied
in the same sense to it as to other things without falling into a
fallacious circle of reasoning. He defends this alternative with
great vehemence.
But if the philosopher does not adopt personality as his fun-
damental principle, it is incumbent upon him to set forth his as-
sumptions or his starting point, and to exhibit how they explain
personality. The failure of the attempts of natural ism, radical
empiricism, and new realism to account for personality in terms
of elements which are not personal is evidence against the latter
alternative. A brief criticism of Bradley below (1) will also
bring out the notion that even his system presupposes personality
as the ground of his principles, notably the principle of con-
sistency
.
Our survey has shown the need that every philosophy of per-
sonality should set forth plainly its basic presuppositions. It
is interesting to note that there is a close resemblance between
* James' "knowledge of acquaintance" and Bovme's "real" application
of the categories to personality,
c'. Self- (c) In any case the problem of self-knowledge appears for
knowledge and solution. This problem is complicated by several facts. First,
its problems. two of our philosophers are convinced that something besides con-
ception is essential in order to grasj personality. James finds
it difficult to know the self in terms of concepts because he
thinks the latter are 6tatic, while the self has a flowing and
dynamic character. (2) He has failed, however, to set forth ade-
quately the legitimate part that conception does play in the
knowledge of the self.
1". Inadequacy Bowne claims also that conceptual description is incapable of
of mere concep- setting forth the full meaning of personality, (j) but he puts a
tual knowledge much higher value than does James upon conception as a means of
lot personality, understanding and enlarging our knowledge of personality. While
Bowne holds that the self, in a sense, is given in experience ho
believes nevertheless that a true and valuable conception of it
may be gained by intellectual effort. (A) Thus James and Bowne
are in harmony upon the point that conceptual construction by it-
self is an inadequate means of knowing personality as a concrete
and living experience. Both agree that an adequate comprehension
of it requires that conceptual knowledge be supplemented by some
(1) See below, pages
(2) See above, pages 17-6.
(5) See above, pa;e 126.
(4) See abo/e, pages 126-7.
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kind of direct or perceptual experience. Bowne's combination of
immediate and conceptual apprehension is an important step in the
right direction, but their relations and development need fuller
explication.
It is well knovm tnat P. H. braoiey finas discrete thought
utterly incapable or attaining a conbititent interpretation of the
self. H. Mttnsteroerg is especially insistent that a scientific
or causal description of personality tells only half the story and
touches only the surface, (l) It is fair to say, therefore, that
there is a rather general tendency at the present time to demand
that conceptual construction witti reference to personality be com-
pleted by some more immediate form of knowing.
The problem of self-knowledge iias often been stated in terms
of selr ana object: if personality is the suDject of the mental
life, how can it ever Decome an object to itself? Perry makes a
wild thrust at this problem by simply asserting that since the
body is the subject of the mental life, it can of course be ob-
served as an object in the same way as stars and trees. James de-
nies in his "radical empiricism" that there is any such fundamen-
tal distinction in experience, and solves the relation between
subject and object by saying that any particular bit of pure ex-
perience may function at different times as either subject or ob-
ject. In his Principles of Psychology , where he holds to the in-
ner duplicity of experience, he believes that the subject which
is present in any mental situation may become an object, not at
the same time, but at any later moment, when Janes
,
however,
comes to identify the subject, he finds that it consists of bodi-
ly feelings, but since these are clearly objective, the problem
in question disappears altogether from his consideration. This
is James 1 typical treatment of it.
Bo7/ne holds that the distinction is not an ontological one,
but is purely formal, although it is essential to the structure
and nature of consciousness. He thinks, however, that conscious-
ness can direct itself now to one, and now to the other. (2) He
thinks that the subject of the mental life may know itself as an
acting and choosing agent.
H. Mtlnsterberg defends (5) a unique method of knowing the
subject of the mental life. He bases his thorough-going distinc-
tion between causal, empirical, or descriptive psychology upon
the one hand, and purposive psychology on the other, upon the
postulate that the contents of consciousness are known in a dif-
ferent way than the agent of consciousness. Causal psychology
"treats man as an object, the other as a subject. We dp not find
our inner life as an object , but we know it immediately as pur
purpos ive deed . . The deed of the subject is the first, the caus-
al interplay of the objects the dependent reoiity. Our mental
life is free, end through an act of freedom we decide to consider
it as a mental mechanism in which nothing is free." (A) "Our
real inner acting creetes the thought of causal connection , but
is never subject to it." (5) Purposive psychology proceeds on
(1) See below, this page.
(2) See above, page 129.
(5) Psychology, General ond Applied.
(4) Ibid., pages 295-6. (5) Ibi<* page J00.
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the assumption that "in our immediate reality of pulsating life
we know ourselves as the subjects of our will." (1) These spon-
taneous activities of the living self, he thinks, are not to be
described, but to be appreciated. "To understand a single act,
.
to enter into the purposive expression of the self, is simply
life, not science." (2)
Bowne, James, and Mttnsterberg agree that the real personal-
ity is to be apprehended, in part at least, by 3ome form of an
immediate and living experience. Bowne and Llttnsterberg employ
almost identical phraseology in accentuating the idea that the
subject of the mental life, the free personality, grasps itself
most adequately in its own purposive and spontaneous activities,
and James bids us seek an immediate acquaintance with "the active
sense of life which we all enjoy." He prefers the "concrete and
total manner" of studying the mind. He emphasizes the "warmth and
intimacy" of the self-feeling, while Bowne speaks of the "vivid-
ness and reality and immediacy" of the experience of the self. (5)
All three demand a concrete method of apprehending personality.
It may be noted in passing that the British "humanist", F. C. 3.
Schiller, also emphasizes repeatedly the need of studying the whole
personality a3 the starting point, and perhaps also as the end, of
philosophy. Bowne, too, says we should speak of aspects of per- •
sonality rather than of its elements or parts. (4) There is, there-
fore, a definite tendency in American philosophy to regard person-
ality as immanent in experience and a3 something dynamic.
The attitude of these men stands in striking contrast to the
abstract method advocated by the new realists. It is appropriate
that Perry should confess kinship with associationism, and that
Bowne and James should both reject it, because of the abstractness
of the elements out of which its exponents seek to construct the
mind
.
Merrington has pointed out (5) that there is a general ten-
dency at the present time to begin with experience in the study of
personality. Bowne constantly appeals to experience to solve
problems which reason cannot solve. James' "pure experience" and.
Bradley's "centers of finite experience" are notorious. And while
Perry avoids^he appeal to experience, he adopts the method of gen-
eral observation of the mind at large, which, if explained, would
lead to the same appeal. Of the three men whom we have studied,
Bowne alone defends to the end the originally personal character
of all articulate human experience.
The above criticism of three theories of personality has
brought to light certain results with respect to its nature.
These need to be summarized now. A number of points of agreement
among our philosophers may be noted first.
Bowne and James agree in rejecting several theories of the
self, (a) One of these is the old substance-theory, according to
which the mental life is to be explained by postulating a rigid
core behind conscious phenomena. Neither thinker will suffer any
(1) Psychology, General and Applied, page 292.
(2) Ibid., page 297. These ideas are atated at length in
Chapters 21-22 of this book.
(5) See above, pages 126-7. (4) See above, pa,,e 125.
(5) The Problem of Personality, Part II, chapter I.
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transcendent factor in his conception of the self. (1) (b) Again,
both present elaborate arguments against any view which tries to
explain the mind in terras of physical atoms, energy, or matter.
Bovme is notably vehement on this point. (2) (c) Both, also, find
the old doctrine of associationism quite inadequate. (5)
2'. Evidence Probably the most important positive result of our study of
from various three American philosophic movements is the discovery that all
movements for present dynamic conceptions of personality. Somewhere in each, ac-
the central tivity has a central place in the concept of the self. Other move-
place of activ- ments tend in the same direction. Let us consider in some detail
ity in person- the evidence for thin general conclusion.
ality. (a) The spirit, if not the logic, of pragmatism points to the
practical or active life as the basic factor in personality. The
a'. Pragma- self is revealed in its effort to find satisfaction in the realiza-
tism. tion of certain desires and ends. It has been pointed out that the
actual, historical forms of pragmatism have not consistently worked
out this appropriate and valuable doctrine. The logic of James is
not sufficiently rigorous nor developed in connection with this
problem. He does, however, find "the experience of activity" to be
regularly present in all mental life, and he has had greater suc-
cess than either of the other two philosophers studied in giving
an adequate and concrete description of this experience. (4)
1". Biological In support of the practical character of the mental life, the
influence in pragmatists are in the habit of offering biological evidence, and
pragmatism. of connecting the theory of mind with the general theory of organ-
ic evolution. James himself points out (5) that the great contri-
bution of physiology, outside of its own realm, has been to show
that the willing side of human nature is the dominant one, and he
asserts also (6) that the theory of evolution is chiefly account-
able for the new emphasis upon the practical aspect of mind. The
reason, no doubt, is that when the biological theory of evolution
is extended to mind, ideas are included in the class of instrumen-
talities that are useful in the active adaptation of the organism
to its environment.
The result of this biological influence in the philosophy of
mind is sometimes very surprising and paradoxical. By intention,
the instrumental conception of the higher forms of the mental life
emphasizes the fundamentally active character of the mind. But
when this biological doctrine is made thorough-going, the mind
loses rather than gains spontaneous chr.racter, because it becomes
thereby merely a machine for an adjustment that is all one-aided;
that is, mind yields itself entirely to the determination of the
environmental forces, and its autonomy io surrendered to the push
and pull of physical nature.
But this one-aided adjustment is untrue to the facts of mind,
for the mind, by means of its purposes and Ideas, may sometimes
adjust the environment to itself. In a highly developed and pow-
( 1 ) See above, pages 40-42 and 124.
(2) See above, pages 40 and 125
.
[ (5) See above, pages 45-44 and 125-4.
4) See above, pages kC-ky .
5) The Will to Believe, page 114.
(6) Talks to Teachers, page 25.
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erful personality , this is regularly and notably the case. We
say that a great man changes the course of history, or gains con-
trol over nature. The true view is probably that the adjustment
works both ways, in which case the mind is seen to have a measure
of self-control, and thereby demonstrates its active nature.
In the "humanism" of F. C. 3. Schiller we find also the doc-
trine of the primacy of action in personal life. (1) He insists
"on bringing out the active character of experience." (2)
h 1
.
New In the new realism of Perry v;e find expressed also the in-
realism. tentiou of presenting a "dynamic" view of mind. He holds (5)
. . that some kind of "general action" or "agency" is necessary if
there are to be any mental contents at all It turns out, how-
ever, that the kind of mental action in which he believes is to be
defined "in terms of bodily action itself." In this notion Perry
is in agreement with the radical behaviorists in psychology. In
this form of psychology it is evident that a dynamic conception of
the self is in general the only consistent one, although the par-
ticular conceptions of action held by its various exponents may not
always be tenable. Below (4) I shall offer reasons for supposing
that attempts, including that of Perry, to explain the self in
terms of bodily behavior are inadequate. Miss li. W. Calkins ob-
serves, "There is, however, no inherent reason why the term be-
havior should not be used as well to designate the response of the
self, as to designate the response of the body, to environment." (5)
Some of the English new realists entertain a different concep-
tion of mental action than the behavioris tic one of American real-
ists. (6) These thinkers also defend the importance of activity
in the mental life, although they regard its character as psychical
rather than merely bodily,
c'. Personal In personal idealism activity in a spiritual form comes into
idealism. clear and striking predominance as the central feature of person-
ality. Bowne uses the term activity explicitly and repeatedly, and
finds the reality and substantiality of personality to consist in
it. G . H . Howison too (7) defends at length the doctrine that the
self is a spontaneous and active existent; for instance, he af-
firms that (8), "It is .juut in thinking all these elements in an
active
,
originating unit- thour.ht , or on '1 1 , that the essential and
characteristic nature of man or any other r eal intelligence con-
sists
.
1
Since Bowne refuses to separate the will, save in abstract
thought, from other aspects of the unitary personality, it ie in-
exact to call hi3 view voluntaria tic , but it is fair to do so if
( 1 ) See, Studies in Humanism, pages 408, 447.
(2) Ibid., page JO. (5) See above, pages 89-91, 95~7, 116.
(4) See below, pages ^00-11.
(5) Psychological Bulletin, vol. 16, pa^e 112.
(6) See the articles of S. Alexander, for instance, in the
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, for the years: 1907-8,
1908-9.
(7) The Limits of Evolution.
(8) Ibid., page 47.
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by voluntarism one means simply to emphasize the basic position
of volition or activity in the individual self. Bowne'3 view,
however, is raore adequately characterized as activistic or person-
alis tic
.
A novel standpoint in psychology, called "dynamic psychology,"
ha3 recently been put forward by R. 3. Y/oodworth. (1) It is in-
tended to be an improvement upon behaviorism, especially of the
type in which the mind has lost its spontaneity as suggested
above. (2) Y/oodworth describes this standpoint as "the science
of the workings of the mind." His interest centers in the "springs
of human life," rather than in the structure of mental processes.
He talks constantly about the "drives" behind our activity, the
secret principles which actuate our mental operations, the causal
relations of mental phenomena, etc. (5) He believes that "A well-
integrated personality is organized about its master motives, these
acting as selective agencies with respect to other tendencies." (4)
He thinks that it is the task of psychology 11 to be working always
toward a clearer view of the mental side of vital activity," and
to be seeking "for an understanding of the complete processes of
mental activity and development." (5) It is to be hoped that in
the near future much light may be thrown upon the nature of per-
sonal activity by psychologists working from this standpoint. This
point of view needs to be supplemented, however, by a functional or
purposive psychology, which asks: for what ends do men act? and by
a metaphysics, which asks, what acts?
The concept of activity is also frequently employed by natural
scientists who seek to develop a philosophical monism which will
unify the physical and the mental realms. In other words, when
these men pronounce views upon the philosophy of mind, they favor
the idea of mental activity because of the promise it holds out of
leading to some kind of continuity between physical energy and
psychic activity or energy. For example, B. von Grot holds that
the concept of psychical energy is as justifiable as that of phys-
ical energy; that in the human organism there is a continual trans-
formation of the one into the other; and, further, he finds no
logical or factual grounds for denying the possibility that the
universal application of the law of the conservation of energy some
time ..ill be demonstrated. (6) R. miller likewise asserts that, (7)
"The primary cause of all subjective existence is recognized to be
psychic energy, as our scientific study of the soul has shown, and
this energy is the fundamental cause of all conscious and uncon-
scious life."
The energetic monism of V/. Ostwald is the best-known example
of the naturalistic tendency in question. (6) He declares, for
instance, that, "There is really an idea wmch bridges over not only
(1) See his book by that name. (2) See above, page 166.
(5) See Dynamic Psychology, pages J4-7.
(4) Ibid., page 126. (5) Ibid., page J6.
(6) Die Begriffe der Seele and der psychischen Energie in der
Psychologie, Archiv ftfr sys tematieche Philosophic , vol. IV,
pages 257-555-
(7) NaturwiooenschafUiche Seelonforschung, vol. Ill, pages
564-90.
(8) See classification of theories above, page 4.
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the chasm between force and substance, but also that between mind
and matter, and which is of a nature sufficiently manifold to em-
brace the totality of our experiences, the interior as well as tiie
exterior. This idea we term energy." (1) He says, again, "in all
that we know of intellectual processes there is nothing to hinder
us from regarding them as a particular form of energetic activity."
(2) But he does not desire to leave the impression that he thinks
that the subordination of psychical phenomena to the idea of energy
is as yet fully proved. (5) He confesses that "what seems to be
the most difficult is to comprehend the fact of self-consciousneas
,
the ego or personality, as a phenomenon of energetics." (4) This
form of monistic naturalism evidently makes important the concept
of mental activity, however imoerfect the interpretation of it may
be.
f. Classical That philosophers who stand in the line of Kantianism and of
idealism. classical idealism should cling to the significance of activity in
the mind need not be pointed out. C. C. J. Webb points out that
the impulse, present in much recent speculation, to find the funda-
mental characteristic of personality in will rather than in cogni-
inore m
tion, is probably duetto Kant, with his doctrine of the "primacy
of practical reason," than to any one else. (5) J. A. Leighton
observes that, "The conception of intelligence as an active organ-
izing principle is the last remaining legacy of the objective
idealists, from Plato to Hegel, which our newest instrumentalists
have preserved." (6) As a notable idealistic representative of
activism, Rudolph Eucken may be mentioned, for he strongly urges
the recall of a view of personality which will preserve its autonomy
and spirituality.
It is evident, therefore, that numerous contemporary intel-
lectual movements emphasize the active character of personality.
No doubt many ethical writers would desire to be added to the list
of those who defend a dynaaic conception of personality. The facts
in the preceding paragraphs constitute evidence for the proposition'
of H. H. Bawden (7) that "we are coming to regard all science a3
the study of activity." He believes that "the sciences meet in
the concept of action," and he speaks of action as "the common de-
nominator of all science."
5*. Purpose That personality has an essentially purposive character is a
and person- second important point of agreement among our philosophers. Perry
ality. may be included among the advocates of the teleological character
of the self. (8) His interesting analysis of teleology is a sincere
R. B. Perry. attempt to explain pur r ose frora the behavioristic standpoint. His
problem is how a behaviorist can describe an action which iB a
(1) International Quarterly, vol. VII, p.
(2) Ibid., page (5) Ibid., page
(4) Ibid., page J14. For a criticism of these views, see be-
low, pages 194-200, and reference in bibliography to C. G. T. Reute.
(5) God and Personality, page 59.
(6) The Field of Philosophy, 2d ed., page 4^9.
(7) Principles of Pragmatism, pares 62-64.
(8) See above, pages 9^-96.
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response to a future or ideal situation, and not to anything pres-
ent in the physical environment. He tries to meet the difficulty
by the concept of "anticipatory adjustnent . " Y.'hen, however, he
comes to ask how or where we learn about the absent object to
which adjustment is to be made, his behaviorism breaks down, as it
must necessarily do, and he approximates very closely to the in-
trospective standpoint, without of course acknowl edging it. There
is no doubt, from his discussion, however, that he believes in the
fundamentally teleological character of mind. This conclusion is
reenforced by his opinion (1) that the self is primarily an "en-
tity capable of desire."
James and There is no doubt that James, in the personalistic trend of
Bowne. his thought, holds to the teleological character of mind. (2) In
his Principles of Psycho logy he uses the well-known phrase that
consciousness is a "fighter for ends," and he holds that mental ac-
tivity always has a "direction. 1 For Bowne, too, intelligence or
personality is fundamentally purposive. Indeed, without purpose
there could be no thought at all. (5)
It should be noted, also, that in all three of our philoso-
phers purpose and activity are intimately united. The same holds
true of the conception of the self entertained by J. Royce.and G.
H. Howison.
4'. Personal Bowne and James (in his personalistic trend) each have an
identity. interesting theory of the nature of personal identity. The latter
explains it as an act of appropriation upon the part of every new-
ly-born passing thought. (4) Bowne 1 s view is very similar (5), for
he speaks of the self gathering up all of its past and carrying it
along with it. Bowne 's more characteristic way of expressing his
view of personal identity is "the self-identifying action of in-
telligence." Both agree that identity is a result of momentary
activity, and is not to be referred to some abiding core which
does not appear in consciousness.
5'. A general In conclusion, we may note certain contrasts among the views
comparison of of the thinkers whom we have studied. James 1 conception of person-*
our philoso- ality is characterized by abundance of empirical evidence; Bowne' s,
phers. by a comprehensive metaphysical attack; Perry's, by confusion, dog-
matism in method, and general paucity of results. For Perry and
for one line of James' thought, the self is a product of simpler
neutral elements; while for Bowne and for James, in the other line
of his thought, personality is an original reality. faila we have
difficulty, in connection with both Janes and Perry, in deciding
upon the first metaphysical principle of personality, we have no
such problem in the cese of Bowne, for he is the only one of the
three who attaches a clear and definite meaning to the reality of
the mind.
.
Contributions Bowne 's theory of personality has the merit of covering the
of Bowne. central problems and of presenting clear-cut conceptions. Some
of his more notable contributions are:
(1) Sec above, page 92.
(2) See above, pages 25, 52-55,
(5) See above, pages
(4) See above, pages J6-7.
(5) See above, pages 1J9-41.
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for diver-
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sonal i ty-theo ry
,
The fact of
great diver-
gence in views.
Reasons for
the divergence.
(a) His idea of the relation of the categories to personality;
(b) His conception of self-knowledge as a self-recognition of
intelligence
.
(c) His finding of the reality and substantiality of personality
in its active character.
The enumeration of the points of agreement among our philoso-
phers should be followed by a list of their differences, but this
list will be omitted because the solid grounds of agreement are
our chief interest, because diverse views have already been pre-
oented in the classification of theories in the first part of
this investigation, and also because some of the main points at
issue are stated in the list of unsolved problems mentioned a
page or two below.
It has become evident that there is in present philosophy
great confusion, indefinitenesa, incompleteness, and even contra-
diction with respect to the meaning of personality. It is clear
that it is no "transparent unity" to be solved without severe in-
tellectual effort. 7/ithout some native and common-sense acquaint-
ance with himself, one would not recognize some of the strange
doctrinal creations which have been published under the name of
personality, and which have not yet been confined, where they be-
long, in the museum of metaphysical monstrosities. The motley
collection of theories i3 disconcerting and discouraging to one
who, for the first time, seeks light upon this problem. The fact
that popular usage is as vague as philosophical definitions are di-
versified shows that the concept is no simple one. However, the
great variety of terms which are used to name the fact we are seek-
ing to isolate and describe confirms the relief that there is some
persistent reality there if we could only grasp it clearly. (1)
There are several fundamental reasons for the existence of
the astonishing divergence among theories of personality,
(a) Since the self or personality is or ought to be an important
principle in any philosophical system, when these systems them-
selves clash, oppositions also are likely to appear with reference
to the concept of personality. This concept is so intimately im-
plicated in the various problems of philosophy that any differ- •
ence in these is likely to be reflected in conflicting conceptions
of it. The difficulty of agreement is enhanced by the fact that
many philosophers assign the concept of personality to a subordi-
nate place in their systems, or quite neglect it.
(b) Another ground of difference in the notions of personality
is that the sources from which the metaphysician must draw belong
to such varied and contftrao ting disciplines that few thinkers are
prepared to consider them all in their completeness. Conflicts
arise because of the very different points of emphasis in connec-
tion with personality which appear according to whether the domi-
nant interest of a thinker is psychological, legal, theological,
ethical, biological, sociological, metaphyai cal
,
aeethetic, etc.
There is great need for a more systematic and comprehensive treat-
ment of the problem of personality.
(1) Ilote: for lengthy collections of different viewa in con-
densed form, see articles on Seele, Person, Ich, Selbat, in Kirch-
ner's WOrterbuch der philosophiechen Grundbegriffe, 6 Auflage,
edited by C. L'.ichaBlia, 1911. Also W. II. Thorburn, What is a
Person? in Mind, II. S., vol. 10J, July, 19 1 7
.
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(c) The problem is confused by the great variety of terras
which are used for personality and the self. Nearly every one of
them has a connotation which more or less overlaps the meaning of
related terms. This lack of agreement in terminology makes the
problem very much more difficult. Some of the terms in question
are: personality, soul, self, ego, psyche, subject, person, self-
consciousness, individuality, selfhood, spirit, "I" or "me,"— to
say nothing of the great variety of such phrases as: transcen-
dental unity of self-consciousness, synthetic unity of appercep-
tion, the passing thought, the empirical ego, the moral self,, etc.
(d) Another reason, pointed out by 77. B. Pillsbury (2), for
the contradictions in theories of the self, is found in the* fact
that different methods are used. Opponents do not accept the same
methodological principles. This confusion needs to be corrected
by a more adequate consideration of method in connection with
personality.
c. Some of Our re'sumi of current tendencies with reference to personality
the chief un- has brought before our attention several fundamental questions
solved prob- which remain unsolved. Some of the .moat important of these are as
lems with ref- follows:
erence to (a) that is the nature of an adequate method for interpreting
personality. personality?
(b) '.That is the meaning of self-knowledge? 7/hat is the place of
self-consciousness in personality? Is there an original
self-experience?
(c) What is the nature of mental or personal activity? It should
be noted that the very complexity of the motives reviewed
above which converge in the concept of personal or mental
activity, naturalism, idealism, behaviorism, pragmatism,
dynamic psychology, ethics, is perhaps the chief reason for
the present confused status of this concept, and its very
vagueness makes it useful in these different contexts.
(d) What is the place of purpose in the concept of personality,
• and how is it related to activity, memory, and to the
affective life?
(e) What is the relation of value to personality?
(f) What is the nature of the continuity of personality, i. e.
,
personal identity?
(g) In what does the unity and individuality of personality con-
sist?
(h) Above r.ll, in what sense is personality real?
We now turn to B systematic and constructive treatment of
some of the basic problems in connection with .jerscu.ali ty
.
(1) Compare E. II. Merrington, The Problem of Personality,
Part II, chapter II.
(2) Philosophical Review, vol. 16, pagoa J87 ff.
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A. STATEMENT OF PHILOSOPHIC METHOD ADOPTED
IN THE FOLLOWING STUDY OF PERSONALITY.
1 . Importance
of studying
method as a
preliminary to
unaera tanding
personality
.
a. Introduc-
tion.
b. Illustra-
tions of im-
perfect meth-
ods
.
2. The condi-
tions of an
adequate meth-
od of dealing
with personal -
ity.
,
a. The funda-
mental require-
ment of such a
method
.
The historical criticism of several £heories of personality
which now has been completed has brought^ clearly not only the im-
portance of adopting an adequate method as a condition for a com-
plete understanding of personality, but also several of the chief
factors that must enter into a systematic theory of personality.
A presentation of the latter will follow a brief exposition of the
salient features of a proper method of dealing with personality.
The chief reason for the need of considering such a method
consists in the danger that a method which is imperfectly adapted
to discover and express the full meaning of personality will lead
to a partial view of it, because of the close correlation between
method and the results of metaphysical theorizing. (1) We have met
already several examples of how a one-sided conception of personal-
ity results from the use of an Incomplete method. We found, for
instance, that the exclusive use of the analytical method by R. B.
Perry led to a neutral and atomistic theory of the self in which
genuine personality vanished. (2) Again, the exclusive employment
of an intuitive method results in a view of the self which is too
short in its time-span and too devoid of the comprehensiveness of
meaning with which conception or purposive and universalizing in-
telligence may supplement the insights of bare intuition. (5)
William James and B. P. 3owne, on the whole, stand bet-ween
the extremes of the rationalistic analytical method and the radi-
cally empirical method of intuition. James, however, does not
sufficiently recognize the value of conceptual interpretation, and
is inexcusably uncritical respecting tae presuppositions of the
pragmatic method which he defends. Bowne, on the other hand,
might profitably have been more empirical and leas rationalistic
in his procedure. Evidently, then, it is worth while to give
careful attention to the problem of personalistic methodology in
order not to arrive at an imperfect view at personality as a re-
sult of a hasty initial adoption of an inadequate method.
Only a few of the important features of an adequate method
of dealing with personality will be explained here, for it is be-
yond the plan of this investigation to present a system of per-
sonalistic methodology and to answer completely all the questions
with reference to method which, as it was noted above, (4) may be
propounded in connection with the numerous theories of personality.
Perhaps the most fundamental, general requirement of a satisfac-
tory method is that it should lead to as complete an insight into
the nature of personality as is possible for human intelligence
at its present stage of evolution; in short, it must be a suf-
( 1 ) On the summary of our results concerning the correlation
between philosophic method and pereonality-theory , see above,
pages 16*~4.
(2) See above, pages 104-115, 117-9.
(5) On meaning of intuition, see below, pages 180-2,
(4) See above, page 12.
/
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b. Recognition
of the possible
evolution of
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sponding to the
development of
personal ex-
perience
.
ficient instrument for reaching the reality concerned; and since
one cannot be sure in advance of what this reality is, he should
especially avoid adopting an unmodifiable method at the beginning
of his inquiry. An adequate method should neither conceal nor
warp the relevant facts. It must be nothing but an aid in the
understanding of personality, for we must remember that our point
of view is metaphysical, and that we are in search of knowledge
of real personality and of its essential principles.
The general character of our method, then, will be determined
by the reality, namely, personality, with which we are concerned,
but since our initial understanding of this reality is undoubtedly
imperfect, it will be difficult to lay down in advance a method
which surely will turn out to be perfect. Rather, our view of
personality and of an adequate method will interact, and, on the
whole, their development will proceed hand in hand; so that really
we would be better able to present in conclusion the outlines of
a proper method as a kind of inductive review of the methodological
principles involved in our best constructive efforts to understand
personality. We cannot be certain but what our expanding compre-
hension of personality will reveal new requirements for a metnod.
liiese ooservutions warn us against prejudging our conception
of personality by an unalterable, initial prescription of method.
They remind us of the probability that our experience undergoes
growth and transformation in the course of philosophic interpre-
tation. A person who has won a thorough understanding of his own
nature and of its position in the universe as a whole may possess
a richer personality than before his attainment. (1) Experience
is not a fixed magnitude, but may greatly increase in significance
with the progress of personal life and of metaphysical insight and
organization. Rational criticism may reveal principles and rela-
tions which will enlarge the meaning of the passing pulse of ex-
perience. If this is true, we should rightly expect to find a
great variety of conceptions of personality. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the business of the metaphysician to enlarge and enrich his
original experience by bringing to light the principles of its ex-
istence and development. If it is true that personality is funda-
mentally a purposive reality, then a criticism of personal exper-
ience may open up new and valuable possibilities of future self-
realization.
One of the conditions, then, of an adequate personalistic
method is the recognition of the possible evolution of method to
correspond with developing personal experience. Because of this
intimate correlation, the conscious study of method with reference
to personality may help us to understand the latter better.
Now, in the study of personality the metaphysician will draw
of course upon his personal experience. He cnnnot avoid making
the assumption of his own total experience. F. J. E. V/oodbridge
observes (2) that, "reality cannot be defined intelligibly as a
system absolutely external to the one who formulates it, nor a
(1) E. G. Spaulding, for example, points out that alterations
and new properties appear in things as a result of analysis and
synthesis. The New Realism, page 242.
(2) Philosophical Review, 1°0J, page
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system in which the one who formulates it is a mere incident, or
of which he is a mere product." But when he adds (1) that nothing
can be defined without a "point of view .which allows an independent
position over against the matter to which it is directed," the
question arises as to how a person who is seeking to define himself
can take such a position?
The reply is that in the study of oneself, one cannot take
such a point of view, for in every case the person taking it is the
one to be defined. This fact brings to light a striking peculiar-
ity in the criticism of personality which it is important to notice,
namely, that this study consists in the explication of principles
immanent within the personal life of the thinker himself, and only
in this sense can one take a point of view at all in a first-hand
examination of personali ty . That is, a proper personali3tic method
ought to start from the human individual himself in his endeavor to
gain a coherent and satisfying understanding of his own total ac-
tivities
.
From this requirement it follows that the investigator of per-
sonality should make every legitimate use of introspection. The
justification for Perry's summary rejection of the latter seems to
be lacking; (2) its value is confirmed by the significant results
which Janes attains by its use. Tne latter urges us, in his inimit-
able way, to "bury ourselves in the thickness" of immanent realityj
(5) we should strive to put ourselves at the point of view of the
"interior doing" or the burning focus of personal living. Bowne,
too, points out the need of a kind of self-recognition or self-ac-
ceptance upon the part of a person, if he would know the "concrete
meaning" of himself. (4)
It is easier, however, to attain this concrete standpoint than
it is to describe personal experience, for a serious obstacle is
met in the limitations of verbal expression. Language is so objec-
tive and spiritually lean, so ill adapted to the expression of the
subjective life, that it takes one out of himself, usually into a
sensuous or mechanical world, as soon as he undertakes to tell what
he is in himself. The difficulties of literary expression are so
great for the personalis t that he often sympathizes with the mystic
who, after doing his best to symbolize the deepest phases of his
inward life, denies what he has said, and resorts to an assertion
of its ineffability. These limits suggest that some sort of intui-
tion or feeling of personality may well supplement the conceptual
interpretation of it. (5) Consequently, the metaphysician is of-
ten less occupied with exploring strange realms of personal life
than he is in devising an adequate medium of communication whereby
he can state in an orderly and intelligible way what most people
already believe; he must agonize to describe what is more or less
familiar. His difficulties in this connection have been somewhat
relieved by the discovery of the judgment of individuality; its
use in the comprehension of personality will be explained below. (6))
(1) Philosophical Review, 190J, page 576.
(2) See above, pageB 97-96. (5) See above, pages 19-21.
(4) See above, pages 125-6.
(5) See below, pages 184-5.
(6) See below, pages 165-7.
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We must expect, then, that the living principles within per-
sonality itself will, when elaborated by personal intelligence it-
self, explain that intelligence 30 far as it can be explained. The
peculiarity in a discussion of the nature of personality is, there-
fore, that we must assume implicitly at the beginning that which in
part we reach explicitly at the end. The conception of personality
which we shall have constructed will be simply a clarification and
systematization by a free and personal thinker at work upon those
facts which he recognizes as his own real and inward life. A proper
method must provide for this comprehension of experience from within.
If it is true that there is a close correlation between meta-
physical method and the reality studied, we should expect that an
adequate personalistic msthod would be composite because of the
highly complex character of personal life, but we should expect
especially that it must provide a means of grasping personality as
a unique whole. Let us consider these points in order.
A personality-method is composite in that it will include any
valuable metaphysical methods that are applicable to personality,
such as the analytical method, as ordinarily understood. We shall
grant only relative and not absolute value to the latter, however,
and thereby avoid the fallacy of "exclusive particularity" into which
Perry falls in his use of it. (1) Analysis regularly goes hand in
hand with synthesis; they are really only two distinguishable as-
pects of a total developing process of thought. In analysis the
emphasis is upon the discrimination and differentiation of factors,
while in synthesis their organization and systematization is accom-
plished.
It is assumed that the synthetic conception of personality at
which we may arrive in the end must be consistent within itself and
in its derivation. It will be noted below (2) that this demand for
consistency is a striking revelation of the nature of personality
itself and its esteem of a certain kind or cognitive vulue, and ia
achieved only in the unifying and active work of personal intelli-
gence. The latter fact is frequently overlook® so that consistency
is sometimes assumed to be a kind of agreement floating in an ab-
stract universe apart from a personal thinker.
In our historical review of personality (5) we discovered a
warm debate respectiiig the relative value of conception and intui-
tion in apprehending personality. James, (4) Bradley, (5) and
Bergson (6) alike argue that so far as the self is concerned, a
conceptual construction of it is, in varying ways, inadequate to
the facts, while Perry maintains that it is only by conceptual
analysis that we find the real elements of personality, although
these elements exist independently of thought. An adjustment in
this controversy is easily reached by recognizing that both con-
ceptual interpretation and intuitive revelation may contribute to
(1) See above, pages 104-105.
(2) See criticism of Bradley, below,
(5) See above, for example, pages 17-18.
(4) See above, pages \6j-6.
(5) Appearance and Reality.
(6) See, for example, Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 15
to 19.
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our insight into the nature of personality. (1)
Rational criticise or rather rational self-criticism, however,
will be the chief mark of our method of procedure, since we are
primarily seeking for a conceptual interpretation of personality,
and since we believe such an interpretation is possible and valuable.
There may be other forces or phases of human nature beside intel-
lect, but the philosopher must take account of these by means of
concepts. But concepts in the service of a philosopher who is hu-
manistic need not be empty of emotion nor devoid of contact with
personal reality.
Intellect has alv/ays been the peculiar tool of the philosopher
in his effort to understand himself and the world, even in taose
cases where the basic principle of personality at which he arrives
is something other than intellect itself. However meager the re-
sults may be, most thinkers are not willing, at the present stage of
culture, to surrender the hope of there appearing some day an ade-
quate rational or conceptual interpretation of human personality.
Consistent and persistent thought, then, is the pathway to our goal.
In this rational construction, however, the philoso. her draws
fully and freely upon whatever revelations of his own nature may
come in his aesthetic or practical life, or in any other forms of
conscious experience; and he can build concepts which will refer to
these forms of experience without falling into the mistake of sup-
posing that his concepts exhaust their essence, for in the very
moment when one forms a conception of himself, his real self is the
conceiver. V/hen an understanding of personality does come, it will
be no doubt a notable intellectual achievement; for, apart from
strenuous intellectual labor, we know of no way of attaining that
clarification of personal experience which many intelligent men
treasure highly and eagerly long for. Even if a finally satisfying
view of personality should be relatively simple, it might represent
the result of an immense amount of mental effort upon the part of
many thi nke r s
.
James, and Bergson too, maintains that the static character of
concepts prevents their truly representing the dynamic reality of
personality. It has been pointed out, however, (2) that the static
character of a concept need not be attributed to the real objects
to which the concept may refer, and that in fact its value lies in
its permanence of meaning, albeit that meaning may be activity.
Hence, just because one's apprehension of personality may be con-
ceptual, it need not be untrue, provided one has recognized its ab-
stract character, and provided further that it has been verified in'
or rests upon concrete experience. James himself has pointed out
that conception has a genuine, though greatly restricted value in
knowing active life because it gives a breadth of perspective that
percepts lack. (3) It should be emphasized, however, that intellect
after* all is an abstraction from concrete, personal activity. (4)
(1) Compare J. M'K. Stewart
1
-
explanation of Bergson's in-
tuitive method, and its relation to intelligence, Introduction of
hi3 Critical Exposition of Bergson' 8 Philosophy.
(2) See above, paje 67.
(5; See above, pages 18-19.
(4) See below, pages 26^-91
.
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A conception of personality, therefore, may have great prag-
matic value as a guide in enabling one not only to recognize per-
sonality when he has it, but to comprehend better its vast impli-
cations and its significance. The intellect is capable of a com-
prehensive envisagement of its objects, and of providing a univer-
sal setting for them, and for these reasons a conceptual interpre-
tation of personality may have real worth.
But in the recognition of the validity of the conceptual in-
terpretation of personality, as well as in its concrete origin, is
there not an intuitive element? There probably is such a factor,
both in the immediate character of the activities from which that
interpretation starts, and in the final verification of it by an
immediate recognition ox it3 truth. In the second case our ideas
of personality lead us, as a pragmatist would say, right up face
to face with our real, personal experience, and in the recognition
that the idea is actually more than filled out in that experience,
we have a kind of intuition in which I say, It is I, or, more ex-
actly, I am I . D. C. Macintosh thus describes Bergson's view of
supra-intellectual intuition as applied to the self: (1) "The true
nature of the self, as of duration and change, is given immediately
in our own direct self-experience, whereby, instead of merely
circling about the object in conceptual flights, we penetrate into
the very heart of it and view it from within." Several qualifica-
tions, however, need to be attached to the statement that intuition
plays a part in the apprehension of personality.
A general definition of intuition will not be undertaken, be-
cause this perplexing problem would take us too^ afield, if it is
true that there are at least eight varieties of intuition in phi-
losophy. (2) In metaphysical discussions the root idea of intui-
tion is that of directness or immediacy of acquaintance with reality,
as contrasted with representative, abstract, or mediate knowledge
of it. (5) If we neglect the rare moments of mystical ecstasy
and certain other exceptional states of mind, and consider only the
usual experiences of the normal individual, it seems that any ac-
quaintance with reality involves the presence of soae intellectual
and discursive factor. But if intuition is regularly mixed in this
way with mediate elements, it follows that pure intuition is an
abstraction.
This inference is in line with W. E. Hocking's promulgation
of the idea of the cognitive value of feeling, and with his asser-
tion that "all feeling means to instate some experience which is
essentially cognitive." (4) H. Bergson, too, includes an Intel"
(1) The Problem of Knowledge, page 40Jj see H. Bergson, Crea-
tive Evolution, page 176, and Introduction to Metaphysics, pages
1, 9, 22, 45.
(2) So A. C. Armstrong, Jr., in article, "Intuition," in Bald-
win's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. For an excellent ac-
count of Bergson's philosophy which is unified by constant reference
to the intuitive method, see J. M'K. Stewart's A Critical Exposition
of Bergson's Philosophy.
(5) See reference to Armstrong in preceding note.
(4) The Meaning of God in Human Experience, page 66.
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lectual aspect in his definition of intuition: "By intuition is
meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself
within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and
consequently inexpressible.
. . We may sympathize intellectually
with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our 07m selves."
(1) As a matter of fact, intuition seems to be as much an abstrac-
tion from the concrete whole of personal experience as reason or
sensation. But if intuition is an abstraction, how is immediate
acquaintance with reality possible in it? The difficulty here seema
to be analogous to the self-contradiction present in the hypothesis
that there is immediate knowledge. Even the mention of the intuitive
method implies that one has gone beyond the original intension of
intuition and added a mediate factor. In other words, if one is to
mean by intuition of personality anything different than the actual
existence or functioning of personality, he is obliged to recognize
the presence of a mediate factor. Hence, intuition is either a
self-contradiction or an abstraction; the latter alternative is un-
doubtedly preferable, for there ia some genuine value to be found in
retaining the term.
This discovery that pure intuition does not exist under ordinary
circumstances, confirms the need mentioned above (2) of pursuing our
study of personality by a progressive explication of the living
principles that are immanent in it. This result is also in harmony
with our proposition that James 1 "knowledge of acquaintance" is an
abstraction. (5)
Nov/ the particular meaning of intuition which we shall adopt
as an element in our personalistic method has already been suggested,
(4) namely, the perception of the self as active in its activities.
It means one's familiar feeling of active presence, and this feeling
is immediate in the temporal sense of being mine here and now; the
personal present is what the self recognizes as now being experi-
enced, as now involving a purposive act. This interpretation of
intuition makes it practically synqmous with perception as used by
James in connection with one's awareness of his own activities. (5)
It is also almost identical with what Bowne apparently means by
"self-experience" when he speaks of it as an original datum. (6)
W. R. Sorley refers to it as "an apprehension which io immediate
—
which is lived in the moment that it is known." (7)
Bergson calls this intuition of the self a "coincidence of
the person with himself," (8) or"a taking possession of the spirit
by itself." (9) "It is to the very inwardness of life that intuition
leads us." (10) He asserts also that, "There is one reality, at
fO Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 7, 9.
(2) See above, page 177.
(5) See above, pages 65-67.
(4) See above, page 180, top.
(5) See above, page 19; for a description of his conception of
knowledge of acquaintance, see above, pages 20-1.
(6) Sec above, pages 127-8.
(7) Moral Values, etc., page 262; see pagea 262-6 for hia
view of the intuition of the self.
(8) Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 4-5.
(9) Creative Evolution, page J6C.
(10) Ibid., page 176.
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least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by
simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through
time—our self which endures." (1)
Intuition, in other words, is the living and conscious union
between the personal actor and what he does which constitutes his
experience; or it is the awareness that one has of his personal
experience, which is suffused with the warmth, intimacy, and im-
mediacy which James so often recalled. (2) This kind of intuitive
experience is. not strictly a self-reference, but rather a conscious
self-assertion, or self-being, for the moment one speaks of an in-
tuition of himself, he has gone beyond the immediacy which is sup-
posed to characterize intuition^
And yet the introduction of a mediate or intellectual factor
is inevitable. Intuition must be thought of as intimately bound
up with an intelligence-factor from which it was abstracted a mo-
ment ago for the purposes of exposition. The term, intuition, how-
ever, may be retained profitably to call attention to the living
and relatively immediate character of certain of our personal ex-
periences as contrasted with the more thoroughly mediate or con-
ceptual character of certain others. It emphasizes the fact that
the experiences out of which one builds a conception of personality
are concrete and present in an active way. But it is out of these
self-intuitions, permeated with intelligence and existing as a
kind of undeveloped or uncritical self-consciousness, (5) that the
personal thinker constructs an idea of himself.
In other words, as a result of our interpretation of our in-
tuitive and every-day life, we may build a synthetic conception to
express what our personalities mean to us. (4) In this develop-
ment the personalis tic philosopher will draw his materials from a
long series of intuitive acts, for, as Bergson suggests, (5) one
does not exhaust his reality in a single act of intuition, "in
every effort of intuition the philosopher sympathizes with reality
in only one of its rhythms." (6) This expanding character of our
acquaintance with ourselves which this interpretation of intuition
makes possible provides a necessary elastic element in personalis tic
method. (7) By the cooperation of intuition and conception one may
gradually enlarge his insight into his own personality.
The final synthetic conception of personality which an in-
vestigator may reach cannot be said to be itself an intuition, but
it leads simply to one more new and significant intuition as de-
^ribed above in which a person can, within certain limits, verify
his idea of himself by a kind of self-recognition. (6) Such a
(1) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 9.
(2) See above, page 26.
(5) See below, pages 55^"5«
(4) Compare Bowne's account of the relation of self-knowledge
and self- experience in self-consciousness, above, pages 126-8.
(5) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 56.
(6) J. M'K. Stewart, A Critical Exposition of Bergson'
s
Philosophy, page 27.
(7) See above, page 176, where the need of providing for the
possibility of a growth in personalis tic method was pointed out.
(8) See below, page 356.
1
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self-intuition is the logical culmination, so far as personality
is concerned, of the pragmatic doctrine of verification. (1) But
"even for the direct contact of the self with the self, the final
effort of distinct intuition would be impossible to any one who had
not combined and compared with each other a very large number of
psychological analyses." (2) We may discover the truth of our
judgment about ourselves in our immediate experience, (j) but so
long as intuition and conception have distinct meanings, the guid-
ing idea of the self and the living personality will not entirely
coalesce. The idea will retain a comprehensiveness and perspective
which the momentary intuitive self cannot possess; while the latter
will have a warmth of life and fulness of reality which the concept
can never completely envisage.
It seems, then, that intuitive revelation and conceptual con-
struction always unite in a concrete and personal whole. The pre-
dominance of one over the other at any time, or the interest of the
moment, determines whether that whole shall be called an intuition
or a conception. Again, sometimes the fulness of intuitive life
leads to conceptual interpretation, and sometimes conceptual inter-
pretation calls for intuitive verification. In both cases intuition
means essentially the same thing: the turning of attention to the
experience or perception of the self as active in its activities.
In neither instance can intuition be separated from the factor of
intelligence which is ever present in personal experience. This in-
timate blending of intuition and intelligence, of immediacy and
mediacy, in acquaintance with oneself, perhaps may best be called
interpretation, in the expression of which judgments of individuality
play an important part. (4)
While, therefore, the view of personality which results from
conceptual interpretation may be verified in part by reference to
an immediate or intuitive experience, it is very important to note
that such intuition v/ill reveal the real person because the thinicer
so purposes
.
Intuition in connection with the apprehension of per-
sonality gets its value from association with intelligence. The
worth of intuition of personality is rationally determined, and in-
tuition reveals personality because conceptual interpretation has
led us to value such revelation.
Bergeon's reasonings undoubtedly have enhanced greatly the
authority of intuitive experience in metaphysical discussions. But
if this mental function has such marvelous powers to grasp reality,
why is its worth not easily and generally recognized? Because the
assertion of that value is a product of long and painstaking intel-
lectual effort; because the discovery of the significance of intui-
tion is made by thought. (5)
(1) See above, page 28. From this point to the neo-realis tic
doctrine of the immanence of consciousness the path is apparently
direct and short; see above, pages 11 7-6.
(2) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 92.
(5) Compare, D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, p. A55.
(4) See below, pages 185-7.
(5) Bergson himself hints at this idea: Introduction to Meta-
physics, pages 89-92; see above, page 185, top.
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The chief value of intuition in connection with personality,
therefore, comes at the end of the process of conceptual construc-
tion; namely, in that final moment, when, after intellectual syn-
thesis has done its best, I assert myself to be just what I have
found myself to be, and say, Here am I in the fulness of my immed-
iate existence. (1) But such fulness and significance as I dis-
cover in this concluding insight will be a reflection of the
rational interpretation which has preceded. Intuition reveals the
real personality because the thinker intends that it should, and
he thus purposes because he has found its worth in rational criti-
cism.
It seems to be a fundamental mistake of the intui tionist3 to
suppose that intuition by itself, apart from discursive thought,
makes significant deliverances. To make this supposition is to
fall into the fallacy of abstraction, for intuition on the plane of
our human intelligence must mean something—it must at least mean
the quest for reality,—but this meaning which gives intuition its
value is something added to intuition by reflective reason. A recog-
nition of this fact saves us from over-estimating, as James tends to
do (2), the importance of immediate feeling.
But reason itself also is an abstraction, and the concrete
fact is that there are human individuals or personalities who, in
various ways, may seek to understand themselves, but who can never
permanently reduce themselves to the level of either purely intuitive
feeling or of purely rational thought. Both of these are inextric-
ably interwoven with the activity of personal intelligence. Intel-
lect and intuition alike are abstractions from the concrete person-
ality, in which indeed one or the other may be preeminently present
at some particular times.
The most satisfactory view, then, is to regard the intuitive
(including the empirical) and the rationalistic (including synthesis
and analysis) methods as supplementary and cooperative. Each of them
has its value in the study of personality, but neither has absolute
or exclusive value. On certain occasions it makes for clearness,
however, to distinguish between these methods. "Both are regarded
as due to creative psychical activity, but at the same time as being
moulded upon the independent reality presented in and through that
activity. It is convenient, however, to U3e the term intuition in
connection with the more original and immediate states of conscious-
ness, and the term category in connection with those that are more
mediate and derivative." (3) In the constructive discussion which
follows we shall present a conceptual interpretation of personality,
and at the end we shall consider the problem of self-knowledge and
the place of immediate apprehension or intuition in it.
There are various reasons for regarding the two types of method
as supplementary. First, this recognition will save us from falling
into dangerous abstraction.
In the second place, the need of supplementation arises from
the nature of the human person, who has capacities both for feeling
and thought, and cannot maintain his human integrity if he suppresses
(1) See below, page 556. • See slso the discussion of how a
person learns to know himself by acting purposively, below, page 240.
(2) See above, pages 66-7.
(5) D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, page 4£>5.
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either function in the exclusive interest of the other. The "con-
crete universal" is a fact of human experience.
Finally, for minds that are admittedly finite, we need just
the universalizing work of intelligence to exhibit the relation of
our immediate and personal feelings to the rest of the universe.
Without intelligence that transcends the momentary processes of
consciousness, these feelings would seem to be of little signifi-
cance, and would be shut off from intercourse with the common or
social world of knowledge. The community of knowledge is made
possible by the work of intellect, and this community is a precious
human function. Conceptual interpretation then gives to the reve-
lation of intuition both significance and a place in the universe.
So far we have not come upon any novel features which charac-
terize a proper personalis tic method, and in general probably none
such exist, except perhaps the very strong emphasis which this meth-
od puts upon the use of what has been called "the judgment of in-
dividuality." This is well described by J. Creighton: "By Judg-
ments of Individuality, we mean judgments which regard some complex
object as a real whole with a definite nature of its own. Judg-
ments of this kind are also frequently called Judgments of Purpose,
or Teleology. . This form gives expression to the organic unity and
wholeness of things, and emphasizes the way in which the parts coop-
erate for a common purpose or end. Thus we regard the parts of a
plant as a unity cooperating in a common purpose, and a man as a
conscious system of ends. . The mark of individuality, on the other
hand, is the power of origination, or self-determination. If, then,
there exist any genuine individuals, they are something more than
causally determined phenomena...
"Ethics
. .
has to begin with the individual. It does not re-
gard mind au a thing or substance (that is the naive point of view
against which psychology rightly warns us), but as a self-conscious
system of ideas, purposes,, and feelings, which possesses the power
of initiating action, and of determining itself in accordance with
some purpose. The judgment of Individuality, as a more concrete
form, must use the results of judgments of Causal Connection. What
it really does is to interpret what for the psychologist is a sum
of mental processes in terms of a system which has a real unity of
its own. For it is only when a person is regarded as a self-con-
scious and self-acting individual, that he can be supposed capable
of conduct to which the term 'moral' and 'immoral' can properly be
applied." (1)
We shall resort frequently to this kind of judgment to express
the concrete whole of a purposive kind in which personality con-
sists and from which we start in our study. This judgment is an ex-
pression of the nature of personality, and is not something which is
introduced from outside in order to explain it. If this is true,
then to tell what individuality is and how it applies to personality,
would be to tell what personality is. The self objectively con-
sidered or conceptually expressed is a judgment of individuality in
its most typical form, for it is in the self and in the self alone
that individuality first gets its meaning. (2)
(1) J. E. Creighton, An Introductory Logic, pages 570-72.
(2) See the discussion of individuality below, pages 185-7.
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The judgment of individuality, then, is not something which
explains personality, but it merely provides a means of expressing
the meaning of a real self which it presupposes. The special ad-
vantage of this type of judgment is that it furnishes a mode of
interpreting the inward and purposive unity which personality pos-
sesses in the nidst of the multiplicity of its aspects; other kinds
of judgments, such as those concerning quantitative and causal
series, often presuppose a certain externality or succession of parts
which is foreign to personal life. The use of the individual judg-
ment enables one to avoid the "analytical fallacy" (1) into which
Perry falls when he supposes that the method of analysis alone can
fully reveal and properly express the nature of personality. W. R.
Sorley points out that, "in this immediate knowledge of the self we
find the two marks of wholeness which are absent from analysis and
its results." (2) A judgment of individuality is always one con-
cerning a purposive and organizing reality which is in some measure
self-contained. This is precisely what personality is, for "no one
doubts that the self has a degree of individuality, (5) and that it
develops to a large extent from within itself. The judgment of in-
dividuality, therefore, appears to be a very useful mode of expres-
sion in describing the facts of personal life. It conforms to our
general rule that a true personalistic method should be determined
ultimately by the nature of personality itself.
It is very interesting in this connection to note B. Croce's
suggestion that, "That famous intellectual intuition . . . should
be declared, with the full rigour of letter and concept, to be no-
thing but tae individual judgment; which is, in truth, intellectual
intuition or intuited intellection." (4) This opinion supports the
contention above (5) that intuition and intelligence are intimately
associated. In the case of the self we may say, in the words of
Croce, that "there is certainly a case for thinking, but also one
for looking, or for thinking while we look, and for looking while
we think." (6)
Our fundamental problem will be to understand the various fac-
tors which £o to make up the individual or unified whole of any par-
ticular instance of personal life. Instead of studying the elements
of personal activity, we shall speak rather of its implications or
its aspects, for we can never escape from its original unity. We
shall try to understand this unity by examining its actual operation
rather than by reducing it to elements or powers.
We shall not expect to defi/ie personality in terms other than
itself, but shall seek only to understand the various phases of per-
sonality as it is manifest in e/.perience. We do not start with the
(1) See above, pages 107-1 13
.
(2) Moral Values, etc., pages 265-4.
(5) B. Bosanquet, Logic, 2d ed., vol. II, page 258; compare p.
255; see also the whole of chap. VIII, of Book II, in which he ex-
plains the theory of logic which he holds in relation to absolutism.
(4) Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, page 1^4; see the
whole of the Second Section of this work.
(5) See above, pages 181-16J.
(6) Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, page 1^4.
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expectation of finding the sole meaning of personality in either
intellect, will, or feeling, but our general expectation is that all
will be necessary for an understanding of it, and that all will
prove to be intimately interwoven in concrete personal life. Our
interpretation of personality will be meaningless to any one who is
not himself a person. K. Oesterreich observes, concerning the ego,
(1) that it "is a kind of thing which one cm merely indicate, but
which one can as little demonstrate to the I-blind as one can dem-
onstrate a color to the color-blind." A final test of our concep-
tion of personality will consist in whether or not it justifies it-
self in that kind of intuitive self-identification or self-recogni-
tion in the verification of it to which reference has already been
made
. ( 2
)
The fundamental difference between this conception of method
and that of the new realist lies in our assertion that the personal
whole is an original fact, and not a derivative one which may be
explained by analysis into elements. 7.'ithin the given whole we may
gradually distinguish and correlate various aspects, and thus come
to a better understanding of our individuality, but in no sense is
personality to be regarded as a sum or correlation of parts, In the
way that the realist sometimes seems to maintain. Once personality
is a fact of experience, it may experience itself in a multitude of
ways; that is, it may act with reference to different purposes, but
it never surrenders its original unity.
We may conclude our discussion of method, then, by saying that
the investigator of personality should make use of any .nethod which
will enable him to know, to feel, to understand, or in any other
wey, to grasp the meaning of personality. He should seek a concep-
tual interpretation of personality by way of rational criticism, and
make what use he can of intuition. Judgments of individuality should
form one of his most important modes of interpretation.
The genetic method of studying personality is of insignificant
value, for the reason, first, that when personality has in fact ap-
peared in the universe, its unified life is so rich in categories
thai nothing apart from itself is sufficient to explain its nature;
in particular, it cannot be built out of simpler forms of sensitive
life which may have preceded it in the course of natural evolution
Secondly, v/hen personality has been developed, it may take on novel
forms, by reason of its capacity of self-determination, which may
be distinct from anything that went before it in evolution.
The fundamental assumptions which we make have been suggested
already in the discussion of method. The first is the whole subject
matter of experience as we normcl human beings have it. V.'e are un-
willing to prejudice our problem by regarding our experience as made
up of discrete elements, such as the ideas of traditional associa-
tionisrn, or by any abstract doctrine of "pure experience." We have
presented above reasons for rejecting this latter conception. (5)
This original experience of man is not at first orderly, but is
in need of organization and interpretation, and this task, in its
general form, is the primary one of the philosopher. We assume
(1) Die Phfcfnomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblem^1,page 197.
(2) See above, page 182, bottom, I63.
(5) See above, pages 69-7^» compare Bowne's conception of ex-
perience, above, pages 127-C, 1 5° J 8ee also, E„.N. Merrington,
the Problem of Personality, Part II, chapter I.
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that a consistent construction of it is attainable by the work of
thought, for v/e know of no way of avoiding the postulate of consis
tency as at least one of the marks which real things must possess.
Since we who seek a systematic view of personality are our-
selves persons, we must develop trie meaning of personality by set-
ting forth the principles wnich are already implicit in our exper-
ience from which v/e start. These, then, are the main assumptions.
Our task will consist mainly in a progressive explication of our
personal experience.
B. PERSONALITY AND ACTIVITY.
1 . Reasons for
beginning with
the concept of
activity ; in-
troduction.
a. Predomi-
nance of dy-
namic views of
the self in
contemporary
philosophy.
The above criticism of several historical theories of person-
ality has served as orientation for the constructive metaphysical
argument which will now be developed. Our critical studies have
provided us with a fruitful point of departure amid the bewildering
variety of views and implications of the concept in question. (1)
That base of operations is the idea of activity, which oners a
means of systematic exposition and a touchstone or relevance for
material in the discussion. In other words, the third part of this
investigation consists in an attempt to throw light upon the nature
of personality from the standpoint of the concept of activity; and
aspects of personality which are not organically related to this
concept will be neglected as a rule.
Both in every-day lire and in scientific thought there is
abroad a general conviction that somehow a person is a doer or
deeds, an active seeker after ends which he esteems. This common
sense or agreement probably rests at once upon the consciousness of
a genuine feature of personality and upon a convenient indefinite-
ness and breadth in the notion of personal activity itself. (2) Out
of the numerous possible approaches to the problem of personality (1)
tliis notion is adopted because there are many reasons for believing
that it is a fundamental feature or personality. The reasons for
this belief also furnish grounds for beginning our inquiry by an ex-
amination of the idea of activity. The chief reasons referred to
are as follows:
In the first place, abundant evidence has been presented al-
ready (5) to indicate that there is a widespread tendency in present
scientific and philosophical thought to regard activity as a very
important factor in the concept or personality. It is unnecessary
to review here this evidence for a strongly dynamic trend in con-
temporary theories of personality. Some of those thinkers who either
defend or fruitfully discuss the active feature of the self are list-
ed below in a special bibliography on "Personality and Activity,"
which stands arter the general bibliography.
( 1 ) For some of these, see (a) the classification of Part I,
pages 5-11 J and (b) the corresponding methodological questions,
page 12; (c) as well as various avenues of approach to the problem
of personality, pages 155"^»
(2) See above, pages 168-171, for various contexts where the
concept of activity is employed.
(j) See above, page 10.
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This predominance of dynamic views has not, however, brought
a general understanding as to the concept of activity, and there
is great need in both psychology and philosophy for a more satis-
factory elucidation of it. This need is expressed by E. D. Faw-
cett's strong appeal (1) ±'or an investigation of this "vital prob-
lem." Its various phases saould be analyzed, and its implications
and conditions should be set rorth. The question concerning how
activity is possible is considered quite too rarely.
In the second place, the adoption or the standpoint of activ-
ity enables us to draw upon the evidence for the dynamic character
of human nature which is furnisned by biological and psychological
sciences. The human organism, in the light of these sciences, ap-
pears to be a persistently active creature, a living, responsive,
moving, behaving entity, which exhibits its capacities for action
by adapting itseir in a multitude of ways to complex and novel sit-
uations in its environment. Now the idea of activity offers an op-
portunity to gain the support of the relevant results of these im-
portant sciences. In them the outstanding character of mind is it3
selective adjustment to its surroundings in the interest or its own
ends . The metaphysical conception of personal activity snoula De
developed with reference to otaer .cinds or activity, if there De
such
.
In modern biology we learn that the old notion that the organ-
ism is passive in relation to its environment has been supplanted
largely by a dynamic conception. Tae idea or adaptation stresses
the activity, not the receptivity, of the organism, and suggests
that the organic individual must exert itself ii it would success-
fully meet its environment
. (2) Indeed, ail living beings seem to
possess a measure of spontaneity, and the higher they are in the
scale or lire, the greater it is. (5) The organism is the center
of numerous actions which make ror the sustaining and maintaining
of itself, and these arise from within itselr oecause or its im-
pelling organic needs, such as nutrition and reproduction.
Numerous authorities may be quoted in support of the active
character or the organism. J. A. Thomson, for example, asserts
that, "The organism is u.n active, 3elf-aesertive
,
self-adaptive,
living creature—to some extent master or its own fate." \,4J
H. 3. Jennings maintains that "the organism _is activity." (5) And
C. H. Judd declares that "Every animal is a reacting Deing. All
its functions relate to what it can do." (6) Activity , as used
here, is a general term covering many specific acts, each of which
is complex and forms a little "action-system." (7) Correlated
bodily behavior, based upon a coordinated nervous system, is char-
acteristic of human beings as of other developed organic beings.
(1) Und, N. 3., vol. 27, pagea 92-5, 1918.
2) Compare C. H. Judd, Genetic Psychology for Teachers, page 147
5) Compare H. 3. Jennings , behavior of Lower Organisms,
pages 261, 285-5.
(4) Heredity, page 172.
(5) Behavior of the Lower Or n-..isms.
(6) Psychology, page 152.
(7) Compare H. S. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, page 107
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The starting point in contemporary psychology i3 frequently
the coordinated behavior of the human organism. In fact, so im-
portant is the fundamentally dynamic character of the life of the
animal and human individual that one school of psychologists, the
behaviorists , restrict the subject matter of their science to the
acts of a responding organism. The limitations and dogmatism so
frequently connected with this standpoint need not blind us to its
value in emphasizing the active character of human nature, and in
thus bringing psychology into closer relationship with biology.
It is clear that the same emphasis is present in the newer point
of view called, "dynamic psychology," (1)
A chief difficulty in behaviorism is its inability to describe
consciousness, especially in its higher forms . That consciousness
or mind in its origin is intimately connected with bodily activity
is generally agreed. The function of consciousness seems to have
appeared in the organism, as a means of ordering behavior, when its
purely physiological mechanism became incapable of meeting the de-
mands of a complex and varying environment. (2) In short, it is a
"master device" for perfecting the adaptive operations and satis-
fying the needs of organic life. The dictum of Tj'illiam James, that
"all consciousness is motor " (5), has become a foundation stone of
modern psychology, and has been developed by many others. B. B.
Breese, for example, affirms that, "From its very first appearance
in the life process, consciousness has been connected with the
motor responses." (A)
Now our expectation is that this primordial function of con-
sciousness in the control and coordination of human behavior will
be preserved in the higher forms of mental life, and, if so, we shall
have grounded the fundamentally active nature of personality upon
well attested facts of biology and psychology, and, also, we shall
have attained a certain continuity in the forme of human action.
IT. E. Ritter, a biologist, objects to the separation of organic and
psychic action, and says, "That the individually active and creative
power of the human organism on its psychical side is not a whit less
real, less objective, less a natural phenomenon to the natural his-
torian than is the individually creative power of physical growth
and variation, and reflex and tropistic action." (5) This expecta-
tion warrants us in stopping to note the dynamic character of the
organism and of primitive consciousness, and also in beginning our
study of personality with the notion of activity.
The active character of original human nature is exhibited by
a review of several other series of facts: the abundance, the var-
iability, and the exceesiveness of human tendencies to action. Let
us notice these points in turn.
It is well known that man's native tendencies to action are
very numerous. James 1 view that "man has more instincts than any
other mammal, w (6) is familiar. The number of these tendencies
(1) See above, page 1 7°
•
(2) Compare H. Bergson'e view of the practical function of
intellect, Creative Evolution, index.
(5) Psychology, Briefer Course, page 570.
(4) Psychology, page 597.
(5) The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, page 227.
(6) The Principles of Psychology, vol. II, pages 40J-A1
.
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tends to increase with the development of psychological knowledge.
The latest "classification of reflexes, instincts," etc., contains
al.aost a hundred of them. (1) ;.lan is richly endowed with specific
as well as general capacities for action.
From personal experience we can testify to the presence in our
nature of many deep and powerful impulses which sometimes are dif-
ficult of control and which are hard to get rid of. We find our-
selves constantly adopting new purposes which we energetically seek
to achieve, and we find ourselves shaping the course of our think-
ing and the face of our environment.
4'. The var- The variability of man's actions is also notable. His origin-
lability of ' al nature prepares him to respond to certain situations without al-
man's actions. ways determining in a precise way what response he will make; so
that in learning to make a successful adjustment to the same par-
ticular situation, he sometimes carries out many responses before
he hits upon the right or satisfying one. This fact has been called
by E. hi Thorndike the law of "multiple response or varied reac-
tion." (2) He says, for example, that, "In the pronunciation of a
foreign language, in force and coherence in English composition, or
in skill in billiards ox- tennis, the right responses cannot be guar-
anteed beforehand;" so that "in very many cases . . multiple re-
sponse is the first step in learning." (5) Indeed, "this principle ,
will be found to pervade at least nine-tentns of animal and human
learning." (4)
We are justified, therefore, in saying with f. E. Ritter (p)
that, "The third certainty about reflex and instinctive activities
is that they are by no means so stereotyped and invariable as older
cursory observation or as much theorizing . . has held them to be. .
The principles of 1 random movements , ' 'avoiding reactions, 1 'trial
and error, 1 and others, are thoroughly established." A summary of
a long list of experiments aimed at demonstrating numerous kinds
of variability in the actions of organisms may be found in the part
of Ritter's second volume to which reference has just now been made.
(5) This fact of variability in action, certified to by an eminent
psychologist, biologist, and philosopher (6), furnishes further
evidence for the dynamic character of human nature. It points to a
striking, original spontaneity of the organic individual, and makes
many actions possible.
5'. The ex- A third line of evidence for the originally active nature of
cessiveness of man is to be found in the excessi veness of his actions. This fact
organic actions, is also based upon the testimony of a well-known biologist, who says
(7) that, "The fourth and last certainty about reflex and instinc-
tive activities
.
.
is their tendency to excessiveness— their way
of going beyond what is necessary or even really safe for the wel-
fare of the organism." He believes thut too little attention has
been given to the marvelous exuberance of animal activities. He
( 1 ) H . C . Warren, Psychological Review, May, 19 19 , vol. 21,
pages 197-205.
(2) Educational Psychology, Briefer Course, pages 56-6, 143-4.
(J) Ibid., page 143. (4) Ibid., page 1J2.
(5) The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, pages 2p1-2.
(6) See below, J. Royce, page 192.
(7) W. E. Ritter, The Unity of the Organism, vol. II,
pages 256-261
.
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thinks that animals are "notorious repeaters." "Think of the mo-
notonous repetition in the croaking of frogs, the chirping of
crickets, the stridulations of cicadas, and so on'." He presents
much specific evidence for his conclusion. These facts point to
the presence in the organism of a kind of general capacity or in-
stinct for "trying " as R. B. Perry describes it: "it seems to be
necessary to predicate two springs of action in the docile organ-
ism: (a) the more deep-seated, sustained, and general propensity,
which accounts for the increased reactivity called 'trying,' and
which prescribes when this shall be brought to rest; (b) the more
superficial, transitory, and specific propensities, which are ren-
dered hyper-excitable by the former, but are ordinarily released
by sense stimuli." (1)
J. Royce's These facts of variability and excessiveness in human actions
theory of men- form the conditions of mental initiative according to J. Royce . (2)
tal initiative. His "thesis" is that " the restless over-activity of the organism
in carrying out its ins tine tive processes
, or in seeking opportun-
ity for the establishment of new functions , is the principal con-
dition of every significant form of mental initiative ." (5) Upon
this principle all theories of "activity must be founded." (4)
He offers numerous illustrations in defense of his thesis.
"Ordinary active attention is a process of restless persistence in
advance of adaptation," (5) and represents "an eagerness to get
into some kind of relation to objects or to ideas." (6) The plays
of children too, are examples of " the restless overflow of activ-
ities that the playful organism shows." (7) Children persist in a
great number of ineffective or useless movements just " because of
the inner impulse to try them again and again . " (8)
Royce believes that this disposition to perseverance in active
trying is a general instinct of human nature. It functions when we
discover that we are in a position where we have undertaken some-
thing and have so far failed. It predisposes us to no particular
kind of action, but only to a persistent trying. (9) It keeps us
ever attacking the situation which faces us until either the feel-
ing of restlessness disappears with success, or until we suffer
fatigue. It produces "novel forma of conduct," which in the phys-
ical world are analagous to the "spontaneous variations" in biol-
ogy. It can be explained neither by heredity, the environment,
nor docility (10), but must be regarded as an original and general
instinctive tendency. It is a condition of all mental initiative
and novel adaptations, and is certainly a powerful testimony to
the dynamic character of human nature.
Transitional Probably enough evidence from biology and pbychology has now
note. been presented to establish the general proposition that the human
being is by nature active in some sense. This conclusion is a
second reason for beginning with the concept of activity in the
study of personality. Our defense of it has brought before us
( 1 ) Docility and Purposivenes6 , Psychological Review, vol.
XXV, page 19.
(2) See his interesting discussion in Outlines of Psychology,
chapter XIII and Preface. (5) Ibid., page 518.
(4) Ibid., page 55O (5) Ibid., xxiii.
(6) Ibid., page 55O. (7) Ibid, page 521.
6) Ibid.
,
page 507.
9) Ibid., pages 507, 514, 517, xi.
( 10) Ibid.
,
page 5O5.
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.
numerous facte which will prove of value in the course of our dis-
cussion.
In the last section some of the natural active tendencies of
man were described. In this section attention is called to the
available evidence for the dynamic character of human nature which
might be derived in great abundance from a consideration of human
history, institutions, and culture. E. Krieck, who has written a
"critical foundation for a philosophy of culture," under the title
of "PersOnlichkeit und Kultur," asserts (1) that, "the living and
free personality is the vital kernel of culture"; and in the last
paragraph of his book (2) he declares that, "Every artist who has
attained the supreme height of life and art, and who has become
self-conscious of his work of creation and the sources of his art,
becomes an idealist; he becomes conscious in himself of the freedom
and the divine intrinsicality , the sovereignty of life over all
existence and contingency."
It is unnecessary to multiply illustrative facts in this con-
nection. Certainly the building of cities, steamships, and canals,
the setting up of governments, schools, and varied institutions,
the tilling of the soil and the manufacture of countless things,
the writing of books and the painting of pictures,— these and un-
numbered other products of man exhibit a being which is persis-
tently transforming and harnessing the forces of nature, and is
essentially active. This general point is clearly indicated in
L. F. Ward's description of two branches of sociology; he believes
that "while in pure sociology the constructive direct affects of
human effort only were dealt with, in applied sociology it is the
success of such efforts in supplying human wants that is taken
into account." (5) The latter branch, he says, is concerned with
enforcing the truth that man can adapt to himself an imperfectly
adapted environment. (4)
Other advantages of beginning our study of personality by an
analysis of the concept of activity could be mentioned. This idea
seems to offer an opportunity for a synthetic exposition and con-
ceptual unification of several fundamental features of personality,
and we are proceeding on the hypothesis that this will prove to be
the case. This development will be possible if a typical concrete
activity turns out to be a complex possessing several important
phases in intimate union.
The notion of activity also fits in with the present tendency
to emphasize the progressive development and the constant flux of
the mental life. James talks much about the stream of conscious-
ness and H. Bergson defends a radical temporaiism. It is out of
philosophic fashion to suggest a study of personality by starting
from some fixed or abiding substance. The real justification for
beginning with the concept of activity, however, must be found in
its success in illuminating the problem of personali ty
.
( 1 ) Page xi
.
(2) page 512.
(5) Applied Sociology, page 6.
(4) Ibid., page 7-
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.
Statement
of this view,
as illustrated
by W. Ostwald.
2»
. Ostwald
avoids the cen-
tral issue of
the ego
.
The above exhibition of the general dynamic character of hu-
man nature pepresents only a rough beginning of our task, for we
have offered as yet no precise definition of activity; but "it is
to be hoped that the impression begins to grow in your minds that
we are very active beings." (1) Let us turn to answering the
question: What is the meaning of that activity which is called men-
tal, or perhaps personal? We must first clear our path by getting
rid of two inadequate views concerning the nature of mental activ-
ity which have been proposed. According to one of these, mental
activity is to be identified with "psychic energy," and according
to the other, with "bodily behavior." These may be referred to as
the energetic and the behavioristic or corporeal theory, respec-
tively, of the self
The interpretation^in terms of "psychic energy" or energetic
activity" is especially popular in monistic circles where the at-
tempt is made to bridge the gulf between matter and mind by the
concept of a universal energy which is regarded as taking on var-
ious forms to meet the contingencies of philosophic explanation.
Judging from the descriptions which these monists put forward and
from their naturalistic turn of mind, one infers that the phrase,
psychic energy
.
is an adaptation from the idea of energy of the
mechanical or physico-chemical sort.
Little needs to be added to the general statement of this con-
ception of mental activity which has been made above. (2) W. Ost-
wald asserts that, "I deem it possible to subordinate to the idea
of energy the totality of psychical phenomena." (5) His argument
is based upon the exhaustion of the human organism in mental la-
bor, and upon the agreement among all nations that intellectual
activity as well as the generation of mechanical energy is in-
volved in vjork. (5)
Concerning the nature of this psychic energy, Ostwald observes
that, "Whether psychical energy is to be regarded as a form of en-
ergy in and for itself, like heat or kinetic energy, or whether it
is only a particular of several combination energies as is known
to be the case with sound and probably so with light, must here re-
main undetermined." (4) In his Natural Philosophy he speaks as if
he considered spiritual energy to be a transformation of chemical
energy in the brain under determinate conditions, and as if it
might be changed back again; the energy of consciousness is the
highest and rarest form known to ue . W. P. Montague (5) "holds that
consciousness is identical with potential energy into which a por-
tion of the kinetic energy of the stimulus is transformed when ther
is a check in the motor discharge."
The striking feature of Ostwald' s article on "The Philosophica
Meaning of Energy" (6) is that he dodges the main issue: after sug-
gesting the hypothesis that psychic phenomena may be subordinated
to the concept of energy, he excludes the conscious ego from his
( 1 ) C . H . Judd, Genetic Psychology for Teachers, page 96.
(2) See above, pages 4, 170-1.
(5) International Quarterly, vol. VII, page 315.
(4) Ibid. , page 514.
(5) Essays in Honor of Ik, James, pages 1 0^-55 » quoted from
Miss M. F. Washburn, Movement and Mental Imagery, page 25.
(6) International Quarterly, vol. VII, pages 3OO-515.
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general explanation and relegates it to the class of special psy-
chological problems. He affirms that "If, then, consciousness is
not really a general property of psychical processes, the diffi-
culty of explaining the ego does not pertain to the question of a
general conception of psychical phenomena, but is irrespective of
the general conception and belongs within the especial domain of
psychology." (1) It is obvious that if he so defines mental or
psychic phenomena that they are not conscious, he simply avoids
the issue and does not touch the important fact of conscious ac-
tivities which challenges his theory. Further, if the monistic no-
tion of psychic energy is to be verified, certainly the conscious
ego ie one of the most significant realities which that hypothesis
must explain, and to avoid it is a confession of weakness. Here as
in many other expositions of the doctrine in question the exact
meaning of psychical is left in obscurity. We must consider, how-
ever, more positive objections to the hypothesis than this default
of Ostwald.
When the ambiguity in this flexible phrase, psychic or person-
al energy , is cleared up, the result is either an untenable mater-
ialism, --the usual result,—or a theory of mental activity in which
the idea of energy has lost its mechanical characteristics and its
scientific meaning. The first consequence may be passed by, and
some examples of the second may be noticed. R. MUller^concludes that
the psychic energy which is the "primary cause of all subjective ex-
istence" is an "imperishable essence, independent of time and space."
(2) F. Lieder (5) also maintains that "psychic energy" is something
sui generis
. This concept is so likely to lead to confusion and
misunderstanding that it should be banished speedily from the vocab-
ulary of philosophy.
The equivocation in the phrase and its position of unstable e-
quilibrium are further illustrated in J. Waldapfel's analysis of
personal energy. Near the end of an article on this subject (4) he
asserts that, "All kinds of personal energy fall apart into two
factors, of which the one has the nature of a mass or magnitude,
and the other of a strength. This terminology, so far as the under-
standing of personality is concerned, means replacing one obscure
term by two vaguer ones . What he means here by strength , and in
what sense mass can be applied to personal activity, is certainly
hard to understand. The confusion warns us that we are following a
fruitless tangent. The phrase, psychic energy , leads to the abuse
and twisting either of the meaning of psychic or of energy ; the
terminus of this line of thought tends to be either a psychic entity
which is not mechanical energy at all, or a mechanical energy that
lacks psychic characteristics.
(1) International Quarterly, vol. VII, page 515.
(2) Quoted in Revue Philosophique , 1900, Part II, pages 416 ff.,
from his work, Katurwissenschaftliche deelenforschung, vol. Ill,
pages 584-90.
(J) Die psychische Energie and ihr Umsatz: Bine Philosophic
des Seelenlebens
,
1910.
(4) Annalen der Naturphiloeophie , vol. V, page 319.
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The careful use of psychic energy requires that its meaning be
confined to the mechanical realm. Then, why not identify personal
activity with psychic energy when the latter is given a strictly
mechanistic interpretation? The objections are so well known that
only a brief summary of some of them that pertain to the view in
question need to be presented here. The general objections are
that: (a) this view gives a very incomplete account of personal ex-
perience, and (b) it contains several self-destructive presupposi-
tions. The specific reasons for these general conclusions are as
follows
:
The fundamental objection to the energetic theory of mental
activity is that it cannot account for those actions of intelligent
beings which result from the idea of a valued end, for in the me-
chanical conception of energy, it is essential that states should be
determined by antecedent factors, and not by conscious reference to
the future disired ends. The doctrine in question meets a formid-
able difficulty in providing for a state of mind which is in part a
function of a future or anticipated state. Any particular state of
an energetic mass is what it is because of a past of which it is
ignorant. The character of a person's activity, however, is regu-
larly determined in part by what he is about to experience, and cer-
tainly his actions would be very different if he did not expect
certain modifications of his life as a result of what he is about
to perform. The defenders of the doctrine of psychic energy, then,
either must admit that their category is inadequate for the explana-
tion of purposive mental activity, or they must nodify their defini-
tion of energy as applied to the mind so radically that that con-
cept would lose the significance which is ordinarily attached to it
in natural science; and the result of this modification could only
be confusion, as has been indicated already.
In other words, it is simply foreign to the concept of energy,
in scientific usage, to suppose that the energetic masses, whatever
they are, should ever sense the directions of their operations; they
neither recognize any useful work they may have done, nor approve
their own courses of action. If the work done by energy or by any
kind of a machine is useful, its value is appreciated only by an
intelligent and conscious being external to it, but human person-
alities may estimate their 07/n achievements. In short, the cate-
gory of purpose, used to designate the fact that one event occurs
in order that some subsequent event may occur, does not apply prop-
erly to energetic activity as described in natural science, and yet
this concept is necessary to explain much human behavior.
If energetic activity is incapable of self-realized action,
then the monistic system is a self-destructive one, for the psychic
energy which W. Ostwald, for example, describes in the pamphlet,
"Monism as the Goal of Civilization," (1) could not give rise to the
idea of "monism as the goal of civilization, 11 or to any other kind
of goal for itself or society. Trie monists seek a cosmic synthesis
under a concept which does not make possible such programs and plans
as they entertain for the future of educated men. The existence of
the theory under consideration depends upon certain interests and
purposes of human beings which have no consistent pluce in the sys-
(l) International Committee on Monism, Hamburg, 1912-
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tern proposed. In brief, the theory of psychic energy fails to ex-
plain those purposive and valuing functions which form so important
a part of our human experience.
An attempt to give a more concrete meaning to psychic energy
leads only to the acknowledgment that it is a purely abstract con-
cept which depends upon the actuality of certain human purposes and
volitions which the concept itself excludes. This abstract energy
is a part of a mechanistic conceptual system the existence of which
presupposes the interested and active work of a physicist aiming at
the realization, in his descriptions, of certain ideals of order
and universality. The attempted proof of this system with its
energy and atoms, its motion and mass, is a testimony to the inde-
fatigable work of a free intelligence who purposes to introduce or-
der into the chaos of sense perceptions
.
The attempt to extend the concept of energy so as to include
the mental functions above mentioned leads only to intellectual
confusion. Misunderstandings are inevitable when energy or activity
are used in the spiritual sciences in a different sense than in the
physical ones. The application of energy and motion should be re-
stricted to the physical or mechanical universe., while the concept
of activity should be excluded from it, and used only in the psychic
realm. G. S. Fullerton also believes that activity has no place in
the material world, (1) and thinks that activity is possible only
for minds, and not for physical things, where only causes and ef-
fects are. (2) The attempt to reduce complex personal activity to
the simpler form of mechanical energy results in the confusion of
both. The latter idea is too limited to include the rich life of
human persons
.
Probably the fundamental reason for this failure of the gener-
al principles of energetics to explain purpose and value is that
they cannot be applied to facts whose variations are purely quali-
tative, and which cannot, therefore, be measured. A. Aliotta points
out that "The world of mind, and, to a certain extent, that of life
as well, inasmuch as it is perennially evolved by the multiplication
of its qualities and forms, cannot be explained by the principles
of physical energy, which, when left to itself, should, in accord-
ance with the second principle of thermo-dynamics , sink towards a
greater uniformity." (5) 7/hat is there in the variation of the work
of energy or of physical things that could constitute an analogical
type from which to construe personality, with its striving to im-
prove its future existence, with its memory of its own past and its
hopes for the future, with its creation of rational systems, and
new worlds of experience, its love of beauty and its sense of re-
sponsibility? Our experiences may differ with respect to their sat-
isfying or annoying, their good or bad qualities, but never as to
their weight, size, or horse-power. The burden of personal quali-
ties and values is too great for the energetic conception to bear.
The uncritical character of the energetic view of mental ac-
tivity and the self is seen when one seeks to understand the gene-
sis of the concept of psychic energy. 1, Ostwald thinks that
(1) System of Metaphysics, page 255.
(2) Ibid., pages 545-6.
(5) Idealistic Reaction Against Science, page 567

198
5'
.
The con- energy is a fact given in sensation. This opinion shows how easily
cept of energy he passes from one abstraction to another. Both energy and sensa-
originates in tion are abstractions which depend upon the reality of active in-
personal ex- telligence. This assertion is confirmed by those thinkers who hold
periences which that the idea of energy, and also causality, stands in genetic de-
that concept pendence upon human volitional experience. Thus C. Renouvier asks
does not ex- 0)» "What is mechanism? That raises the question of the nature of
plain. force. That nature is undoubtedly in the internal feeling (senti-
ment) of the will on the one hand, and on the other, in the constant
experience of the efficacy of the will in bringing about the prod-
ucts of a movement in our bodies which we must claim as a psycholog-
ical fact—there is no other way to name it." He adds that (2),
"It is, then, under the aspect of personality that we ought ration-
ally to represent to ourselves the total synthesis of phenomena and
to define the real world, the living world.
"
Other thinkers hold a similar view of the origin of the idea
of energy. G. T. Ladd, for example, asserts that, "The beginning
of its (Force) solution, so far as it has a solution, is to be found
in the fact that every Self knows itself as a self-active will. As
self-active will, the rational personality has experience, in real-
ity, out of which his intellect evolves all the conceptions of
Force, Cause and Effect, Causation, and the so-called Law or Prin-
ciple of Universal Causality." (5) James ward is of the same opin-
ion for he declares that, "The history of the concept of physical
causation, from the cruder anthropomorphism of pre-scientific think-
ing down to its dynamical interpretation in the present day, shows
plainly that the notion of action was first imported into it from
the sphere of conscious life, and it has been gradually but at
length completely eliminated." (4)
6'
. The psy- The uncritical and abstract character of the doctrine of psy-
chic energy chic energy is seen also in the common oversight of the question as
doctrine can- to the nature and conditions of the time which is involved in all
not account for work that energy does and in all motion. The passage of time seems
the time re- to require a consciousness of succession which is foreign to the
quired in do- concept of psychic energy. The time span must be bridged by an in-
ing work. telligent experient whose constitution is something different from,
or atleast something in addition to, merely psychic energy. If one
should speak of motion in connection with psychic energy, some ac-
count would need to be given of the one for whom the motion existed.
Further, if psychic energy should do work, and "energy is
defined as the ability to perform work," (5) the estimate of the
value of the work must devolve somewhere upon a conscious being who
is capable of experiencing means in relation to ends . But we have
already pointed out the impossibility of psychic energy doing this.
It would seem rather that the experienced sequence, requisite for
the accomplishment of valued work, is possible only to an intelli-
gent being who is able to grasp successive phases of a system in
one embracing insight. If psychic energy is independent of time,
( 1 ) Le Personnalisne, etc., page III.
(2) Ibid. , page VII
.
(5) The Secret of Personality, pages 1 59-40.
(4) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N . 3., page 228
(5) B. Snow, Notes on Physics, page 8J.
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as Mtlller teaches, (1) then it is no longer energy that does work,
nor is it mental activity, which always has a historical aspect.
Since, then, the concept of psychic energy involves time, but ex-
cludes the consciousness of temporal flow which is present in per-
sonal experience, the energetic conception of personality must be
rejected
.
Another possible objection to regarding the soul as energy is
pointed out by H. Schwarz
. (2) He observes that if the soul were
a regular energy in the physical sense, it would grow weaker and
weaker because of the actions it performs, but the facts confirm
the opposite conclusion, namely, that the will intensifies itself
in action. Further, unlike natural energy, the will does not go
over into the action, but we say it produces action, and preserves
its capacity to produce .aore action. J. Waldapfel similarly de-
clares that "personal energy" is the capacity of the individual to
perform a work which maintains or increases the sum of personal en-
ergies. (?)
It is scarfccely necessary to point out the difficulty involved
in trying to explain the unity of the conscious life and purposive
activity in terms of psychic energy. How will psychic energy ac-
count for that synthetic gladness of a healthy boy as he romps amid
the flowers on a summer day, sensing at once the fragrance and col-
or of the blossoms and his own movements? Here is a qualitative
and unique coalescence or mental unity of which a mechanical concep-
tion of psychic energy can give no account. It is too complex in
character, too highly integrated, for energy to explain. B. P.
Bowne illustrated in a beautiful way how a musical symphony derives
its symmetry and unity, not from the succession of air vibrations,
but from the abiding and appreciating mind. (4) In the very attempt
to split up a conscious experience into parts, one acknowledges both
parts as being his own in an intimate and unique sense. What one
finds in active consciousness is not divisions or parts, nor con-
junction of energies, but aspects or distinctions within a single
whole
.
If the above criticism has done injustice to the concept of
psychic energy, a very probable reason is that its advocates have
failed to make themselves plain enough to give clearness and point
to the vital issues. It would seem that all attempts to conceive
personality in the mechanical terms of some peculiar energy break
down because the self exhibits certain conscious, qualitative, tem-
poral, unifying, purposive, valuing functions waicn the latter
lacks
. A negative answer must be given to the question (5) as to
whether one can adequately explain or describe personality from the
mechanical point of view. The persistence of the attempt to explain
personality in terms of some kind of energy can be regarded only as
the result of the enduring qualities of certain forms of super-
ficial metaphysics. Our fundamental objection to the theory of
psychic energy is that it cannot do justice to the fact of purposive
activity in personal experience. An intelligent man may not only do
(1) See above, page 195- (2) Die Seelenfrage, page 277.
(5) Annalen der Naturphilosophie , vol. V, page 310.
(4) PersonaliBm, page 112. For further discussion of the unity
of the mind, see Bowno, Metaphysics, part III, chapter I; H. L.otze,
Microcosmus, especially book II, chapter Zj W. McDougall, Body and Mini
(5) See above, page 12, a.
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work, but know what it is for, and value it. He may not only move
his body, but know where he is going, plan to make excursions, and
consider his progress.
The exponents of behavioristic psychology and new realism
sometimes advocate a different theory of mental activity, which may
be designated the behavioristic one. They maintain that it is to
be identified with the bodily behavior of a living organism. S-ome
examples of this view may be cited. R. B. Perry defines "mental ac-
tion
. .
in terms of the bodily action itself." (1) W. B. Pillsbury
declares that "'mental activity 1 is really bodily activity." (2)
W. E. Ritter asserts that, "The Self
. .
is literally the human or-
ganism according to my hypothesis," (5) and that, "personality is
indubitably objective both substantively and kinetically " (4)
William James believes that "so far as we are' persons' and con-
trasted and opposed to an 'environment,' movements in our body fig-
ure as our activities; and I am unable to find any other activities
that are ours in this strictly personal sense." (5)
Some of the important reasons for rejecting this behavioristic
conception of mental activity will now be set forth. (6) The ques-
tion before us is aot primarily, What is the relation of the self
to the body? but rather, Is mental activity bodily behavior or ac-
tivity?
Now, if the behavioristic conception of mental activity is to
be taken at its face value, it follows that all features of such
conative experiences belonging to the self as striving, intending,
seeking, etc., should be expressible in sensory or perceptive terms,
whether these refer to the external world (visual, tactual, spatial
perceptions, etc.) or to the internal sphere (kinaes thetic
,
organic
sensation* ) , the terms depending upon whether the observer be con-
sidering his own or another's activity. In other words, the advo-
cates of this hypothesis must find some region among the objective
processes (7) mentioned to include all such facts as emotions, de-
sires, and volitions, purposes, wishes, and values.
James apparently tries to meet this situation when he maintains
that one's affective and active life really consists in the sensory
awareness of his varying bodily behavior as it appears in what he
calls, from his introspective standpoint, "bodily feelings," or
"feelings of bodily processes." The term, feeling; , is very conven-
ient in this connection, if one wishes to slur over the distinction
between sensation and emotion. It ie precisely James' unjustified
confusion of organic sensations and bodily feelings with psychical
feelings or emotions which explains, according to J. Laird, his i-
(1) See above, pages 90-1, 100, 156-7.
(2) Attention, page 65.
(5) The Unity of the Organism, vol. II, page 506.
(4) Ibid., page 552.
(5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page 170, note. For state-
ment and criticism of James 1 view, see above, pages 55, 59-40, 49,
64-5, 80.
(6) Pages 80-1 and 11 5-6 above may be read in this connection,
where a number of objections to the theory in question are offered.
(7) W. P. Montague recognizes this need, and objects to it.
See, The New Realism, page 271.
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identification and confusion of psychical activity with bodily be-
havior. (1) James affirms that, "its breathing is my ' thinking,
'
its sensorial adjustments are my 'attention, 1 its kinaesthetic al-
terations are my 'efforts, 1 its visceral perturbations are my
' emotions . ' (2
)
2'. Why James Keeping in mind James' analysis of the spiritual self in his
fails in his Principles of Psychology and Essays in Radical Empiricism , we may
attempt to re- examine a simple instance of activity to ascertain whether this
solve the view is adequate for the description of the facts
.
Suppose that I
spiritual self sit down at a desk to carry out my intention of writing a letter
into bodily • of sympathy to a bereaved friend. It is granted that numerous
"feelings" or bodily motions and corresponding sensations are present; the ques-
sensations
. tion at issue is whether these exhaust the mental activity which
is admittedly present, whether they are the "storm-center" of the
self j or whether they are incidental or peripheral? In the con-
structive part of the present chapter, I shall defend the latter
alternative; here I shall offer some reasons for rejecting the for-
mer one.
a'
.
The sub- Suppose that I introspect, and carefully note my experiences
tie danger of at any state in the course of the letter-writing. Will I not find
overlooking the a variety of organic and kinaesthetic sensations? The answer is
main factor in certainly affirmative. To identify mental activity with bodily
introspecting activity means, for the observer himself, to identify it with mo-
mental activ- tor sensations, with sensations of strain, pressure, effort, or
ity or conation, tension. If I am interested in the behavioris tic theory of activ-
ity, I may discover these to be outstanding features iivthe field of
my observed conscious processes. Are these then to be regarded in
introspection as the central factors in that specific kind of men-
tal activity called writing a letter of consolation? Assuredly
not, for a simple reason which is often overlooked; that reason is
that, with the beginning of introspection, they are no longer ele-
ments or phases of that experiential system called letter-writing,
but of a quite different system, namely, a momentary psychological
introspection; for clearly when one is making psychological obser-
vations, one is not letter writing'. Carveth Read thus calls atten-
tion to this oversight: "If we try to bring forward a conation so
as to study it, it ceases to be the present conation; for that i8
now the effort to bring it forward; and this effort is marginal."
(5) What has become of the letter-writing activity in the instance
we are considering? It has disappeared, and if one neglects the
interest in scientific observation which has taken its place, one
may truly say that, under these circumstances, all that does re-
main of that activity is the group of sensations arising from
breathing and heart-beat and from the head and throat, but these
are also present in psychological observation. James concludes,
therefore, that these constitute the nucleus of mental activity,
of that active self which abides; and that they are the core of
the spiritual self, and the basis of personal identity. He has,
in fact, overlooked the main factor, and has fallen into the subtle
danger which is present in observing one's own mental activity,
(1) See his suggestive and interesting discussion of "The
Self and the Body," in chapter J, Problems of the Self; especially
page 65 ff
.
(2) Essays in Radical Empiricism, page
(5) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol
VIII, pages 256-7. Compare also !/. . F. Washburn, Movement and
Mental Imagery, page 162.
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namely, that the endeavor to introspect a present conation dis-
places it by a new conation, which, if neglected, iiay lead to the
mistake of supposing that the first consists only of the bodily
feelings which also may accompany the second.
b 1 . James neg- The incidental position of these bodily feelings or sensations
lects the pur- will appear from 3ome further considerations. 'He have here a clear
posive bond case of abstraction, for the interesting feature of the concrete
which condi- situation ia precisely what is neglected: that is, the psychological
tions and interest, or the interest in letter-writing, and the various uni-
binds together fied steps in the achievement of one or other of these ends- J.
the various Laird suggests that, "It is probably true that there is a contrac-
bodily feel- tion of the eyes and brows when we are annoyed, (1) and that we
ings present in feel something in the pharynx when momentarily embarrassed. But we
mental activity, are not usually aware of these facts until our attention is called
to them. They may conceivably be felt obscurely, but certainly not
acutely. At the same time the annoyance or the embarraosment is_
felt acutely." (2)
The trouble with the introspection of James in this case is
that he takes too close and narrow a view of the field of conscious-
ness, ^hat is required is that one take account of a series or
train of experiences, and not of one aspect alone of the action-
system. James takes an inclusive view more successfully in his chap-
ter on "The Experience of Activity." (5) And if one takes a larger
view, one discovers other factors in addition to the organic and
kinaesthetic sensations; one finds also an interest in comforting a
friend which leads to the performance of certain specific acts in
order to satisfy this interest; one finds an experience of progress
toward the goal and of performing various movements of the fingers
and arms as a more or less vaguely conscious part of the total a-
chievement. The purposive feature naturally disappears when one
suddenly tries to turn his introspective glance upon what he is
doing, for then another interest has been substituted; and when the
original one has disappeared, one cannot regard what i6 left as
the sole or even the fundamental feature of the original dynamic
whole. The analysis of James, therefore, represents an over-
simplification of the situation, in that he neglects that purposive
bond which connects the series of bodily sensations in such a way
that we say we act in a certain way. G. F. Stout declares that,
"The quickened beating of the heart and the increasing tension
of the muscles would not be acknowledged by the mail himself or
by others as being the man'e deeds." (4)
The funda- A feature of this activity-situation which is more fundamental
mental feature than the various sensations of movement which are present consists
of the activity- in that upon which they depend for their existence, namely, the in-
•ituation which tention of writing a letter. This progressively realized purpose
the behavioris- is the conscious thread upon which is strung the succession of
tic theory of bodily feelings which may be involved in its fulfilment. It is the
aental activity center of the developing system of action, for without it the sys-
doea not include tern itself would cease to be, except for the sensations of heartbeat
(1) See W. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, page 451.
(2) Problems of the Self, page 67.
5) Essays in Radical Empiricism, VI.
4) British Journal of Psychology, vol. II, part I, p. 1.
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and breathing which would be similar in the next action-system.
When, for example, one says that he has solved a complicated
mathematical problem in his head, or that he has composed a piece
of music which he has not yet written down, it is both difficult
and unnatural to suppose that the meaning of these mental activi-
ties, that the mental processes which occur in carrying out the
respective interests in these operations, could be exhausted in
terms of bodily feelings or behavior; and it is exceedingly hard to
understand in what sense the body is the center of reference. How
will that activity which arises in a response of a self to an ideal
situation be expressed in terms of bodily behavior? '.V. P. Mon-
tague, himself a new realist, points out in criticizing "the identi-
fication of consciousness with behavior , " that, "The square root of
minus one i3 not a bodily movement nor does it enter into such move-
ment in any intelligible sense. I cannot move towards it or away
from it. And the same is true of past events." (1)
The situation would be described more accurately by saying that
the phases of that behavior which are present are subordinate to the
interest or purpose which unifies them, which gives them point and
meaning, and upon which in many cases even their existence is con-
tingent. W. H. Winch observes that, "The motor sensations, which
are said to be what we mean by conation, themselves occur, like other
sensations, within the process wnich they are said to constitute." (2)
Some physical or other impediment to the free development of an
activity-train may throw the several accompanying organic and kin-
aesthetic processes into the focus of attention, but even in that
event they will not be focal on their own account. Vve would endeavor
to rid ourselves of them because they are signals of defeat; our real
interest undoubtedly would center in the contrivance of means for
overcoming the obstacles presented, in order that we might carry out
our purpose and complete the activity-system in spite of the obstruc-
tion, f. H. Winch suggests that, "V/e may compare also the speed of
effortless activity with activity under strain. In the one case we
feel we are getting on, in the other, whatever the result of the work
may be, we are slow and dispirited." (5) If a dominant interest or
purpose were not in the course of fulfilment, it is probable that
these bodily processes would not become more noticeable and central
in the face of difficulties, for the latter are significant only be-
cause of their bearing upon the realization of momentary interest.
The argument of the preceding paragraphs warrants the inference
that bodily feelings or sensations occupy a subordinate place in the
total activity-situation. (4) This conclusion is supported by an-
other series of facts. The muscular movements and straine with
which activity is sometimes identified are the expression and not
the conditions of mental activity. Bodily feelings are to be re-
garded as being, sometimes at least, subsequent, contingent, or con-
comitant phenomena, and not the core of activity. If this statement
is valid only for some bodily procosues, thut ie, if some of them at
least are products, collaterals, or consequents of that activity,
they cannot be identified with the activity itself. In the case of
vol
(1) The New Realism, pages 271-2.
(2) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method,
VI, page 515. (5) Ibid., page 511
.
(4) See below, pages 2^9-60.
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voluntary action at least movements exist which follow the voli-
tional act or decision. In abstract thinking bodily feelings may
sometimes be found to be present as accompaniments. S. Alexander,
for example, points out that, in his case, "Mental activity, espec-
ially in thinking, is accompanied by marked movements of the eyes,
which are apt to change their position with each change of the
thought." (1) J. Laird observes that, "We can choose to do and
strive to do things in which bodily movements have no place or, at
any rate, no conscious place. And if we reflect carefully we shall
find that the activity characteristics of choice or striving are
in no way affected thereby." (2)
The above argument is not intended to exclude the fact that
bodily actions may play some part, often a significant one, in the
development of mental activities and in the manifestation of per-
sonal experiences. The importance of these bodily aspects of per-
sonality is suggested by the popular tendency to find the peculiar-
ities of personality in winning manners, winsome smiles, stately or
impressive deportment, graceful movements, etc. G. T. Ladd goes so
far as to say that, "We may readily discover
. .
that it is im-
possible to conceive or a real person of the type afforded by human
beings, as existing or developing without a body." (5)
It seems, therefore, that it is not in bodily feelings, taken
by themselves, that we may expect to discover the key to the con-
sciousness of activity, but rather in some sort of experienced tran-
sition depending upon the presence of a goal which we are interested
in reaching. The organic processes may have a place in the concrete
whole, but they will not be "nuclear." The prospect is that we
shall find an important factor of personality in the kind of pur-
posive activity suggested in the above paragraphs
.
If the behavioristic view of mental activity is assumed to be
true, certain deductions may be made from it which are contrary to
fact. If, for example, James is right in finding the center of the
spiritual self in organic and motor sensations, we should expect
that our strivings usually would be directed to their production.
It is certainly possible, however, to enumerate many bodily feel-
ings which are not sought for their own sake, and many actions which
are not performed for the sake of getting such sensations or feel-
ings. .W. H. Winch offers some evidence which supports this state-
ment) 'He says that there are cases, such as the last stretch of a
crew race, where the persons concerned would gladly avoid the un-
pleasant feelings of fatigue connected with further exertion if
these feelings were the important factor in their interest. Since,
then, we do not always discontinue motor sensations when they are
painful, we may infer that in these cases something else is present
which makes for their continuance.
Further, if the self is bodily behavior, itB contents should
consist wholly in bodily states. The various aspects of the self
with its multiple interests and memories, its ambitions and regrets,
should be merely translations or equivalents of bodily qualities.
(1 ) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, I . S., vol. VIII,
page 216. (2) Problems of the Self, pa^e 11}.
(5) The Secret of Personality, page 21. Compare J. Laird,
Problems of the Self, page 79.
(4) See Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Jcientific Method,
vol. VI, page 512.
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However, there are numerous facts of our personal life, such as
those just referred to, which simply are not bodily qualities. (1)
W. P. Montague observes that. "I do not see in what sense my con-
sciousness of such things as the life of Julius Caesar can be i-
dentified with any specific behavior or movement of my body." (2)
Again, there is no constant ratio between intensity of cona-
tion and motor sensations. G. F. Stout suggests that if we iden-
tify conation with motor sensations, "the intensity of conation
would be simply identical with the amount of motor sensation con-
nected with it. But this is not so. Conation may be as strong in
giving the finishing touch to a house of cards as in lifting a
heavy weight." (5)
It may be noted, too, that mental activity may be very intense
while the subject's body is practically quiescent. V/e do not sup-
pose that a person 1 8 mental activity necessarily stops with the
cessation of bodily action, for he may be wrestling with fateful
problems of life while he is sitting in a restful position. The
intensity of cental effort does not vary in direct proportion to
the speed of bodily action. Intellectual activity may be at a min-
imum when one is running for exercise, while an exceedingly viva-
cious intellectual struggle may be accompanied by very slight bodi-
ly movements
.
Also, if I reduce my self to bodily sensations or behavior
which exist today, will the self wnich is equivalent to these pro-
cesses to-morrow be the same self as the one that exists today? If
it is, in terms of what bodily behavior will this awareness or this
identity be expressed? If it is expressed in a judgment of iden-
tity between two cases of "warmth and intimacy," or between two
similar bodily movements, then we ask, in terms of what bodily be-
havior will we describe this judgment? Somewhere in the process
an active subject different from the body is required to make the
judgment of identity, if there is to be any.
Further, from the pen of a new realist we have the confession
that the behavioriotic conception of consciousness does not account
for conscious contents which refer to the past or future; W. P.
Montague says, "Consciousness does at each moment of a train of
conscious behavior have for its contents past incidents of the be-
havior that are no longer and future incidents that arc not yet.
But it is obvious that with respect to the behavior itself all its
incidents are successive and so outside one another in time, tne
past and the future never being present together." (4)
Again, we learn in psychology that an organism in trying to
satisfy a particular need, may make many different reactions; (5)
a man may seek to satisfy a deeply felt want by a multitude of
means. The actions themselves may be very different, and yet we
have no hesitation in saying that they are unified by a single de-
sire. Does this purposive unity among distinct actions come from
the actions themselves? This is requiring too much of them. Vi'c
must postulate an abiding self of a quite different character than
(1) See below, page 211.
(2) The New Realism, page 272.
(5) British Journal of Psychology, July, 1906.
(4) The New Realism, oage 272.
(5) See above, pages 151-2, on the excoosi vonese of human
acti vi ties
.
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J. Laird gives reasons, from the introspective standpoint, for
thinking that "mo3t of us would agree that the self must be dis-
tinguished from the body." (1) He defends this distinction by a
description of the "internal sense," which he takes literally; its
"objects are certain real states of the body. The acts of sensing
these objects are parts of the self, but the objects themselves are
not." (2) One' 8 organic and kinaesthetic sensations are cognitive
acts which tell one something about the states of his body, but
these states are not to be identified with that self which is in-
terested in them, or which is said to possess them or have themj
although, as Laird points out, they have an "obvious subjectivity"
and certain characteristics like psychical feelings which make easy
the confusion of these two groups of facts j the latter alone belong
to the self . "The objects of the internal sense should not be con-
fused with the self. Although they differ in many respects from the
objects of the external senses, they are at one with these in being
the objects for the conscious self, not parts of it." (5)
The behavioristic and neo-realis tic advocates of the theory of
mente.1 activity which we are considering might object to the above
analysis because it is based upon introspection. Let us, then, con-
sider the hypothesis in question from the strictly behavioristic
point of view. From that standpoint, what would be the consistent
mode of procedure in the endeavor to describe bodily behavior, with
which mental activity is identified? One dislikes to make the ap-
propriate reply to this query, for it would be: study mechanics,
solid geometry, and the principles of curve-plotting. Develop a
kind of anthropological mechanics, with a view to formulating the
laws of human movements, just as the astronomer and physicist de-
scribe the movements of masses, and with a view to exhibiting the
daily orbits and perambulations of human bodies, just as H. S.
Jennings draws diagrams to illustrate the movements of the unicel-
lular Oxytricha. Human actions might be projected on a large
scale similar to Karl Pearson's description of the changes in posi-
tion of a button on the coat of a man who walks up a winding flight
of stairs. (4)
From one of the new realists themselves we have an indication
of the difficulties involved in the identification of consciousness
with behavior; W. P. Montague observes that, "All that is visible
or profitably observable as behavior relates to movements with which
it is physiologically impossible for consciousness to be identified
or even directly correlated. For physiology teaches us that con-
sciousness depends upon, or is immediately and directly bound up
with, neural currents which are always intra-organic , if not intra-
cortical. Now what we observe as behavior in a man, a bird, or a
rat, is never the flow of neural currents, but only the gross
(1) Problems of the Self, page 51 .
(2) Ibid., page 52.
(5) Ibid., page 57; see also, pages 17, 52, 55 56 » 67, in-
deed, all of chap. II.
(4) Grammar of Science, page 195*
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movements of the body and its members. These latter can by no
possibility be the physical correlates of the consciousness involved.
Still less can they be identical with it." (1)
W. P. Montague affirms also that, "Behavior is only one of
many purely objective processes. We can be conscious of behavior
as of anything else. But if behavior is itself consciousness, there
seems nothing left in terms of which we can define consciousness of
behavior. In short, we have here the same sort of difficulty that
confronts the crude materialist who would identify consciousness
with motion. Motion has an actual qualitative nature of its own,
which is obviously different from the nature of consciousness." (2)
There are various reasons why the thorough-going behaviorist
does not waste his time in the preposterous exercise of plotting the
movements of human bodies in their environment. He is inconsistent
and disloyal to his method in that he smuggles into his account of
mental activity principles of interpretation derived from the use
of a method of a different sort. He reads into bodily actions de-
sires and purposes , obtained from introspection, which make of the
former teleological groups, and which give them their real signifi-
cance. Again, the variations of human bodily movements are infinite-
ly complex; for instance, in writing and walking—but why not have
more descriptions of these physical movements? Exactly because they
are not the important features of mental activity in which the
psychologist and philosopher are primarily interested; after all,
the interesting thing about human activities is not usually their
spatial projections, but the values or ends which they subserve.
What the behaviorist actually does is to describe human be-
havior in terms of "organized habits" (5) and "dispositions" (4),
of "action-systems" and "units of behavior," where the individual
whole is determined by the apparent worth of the response. Cer-
tain bodily actions are regarded as "successful" or "satisfying"
responses; others, as "unsuccessful" or "annoying." If they ap-
pear to be of the latter kind, they are likely to be followed by
other trials, until a satisfying one is found. There are many
cases where the achievement of a satisfying response, or where the
conclusion of a series of movements, seems to be the reason for
their existence. (4) T/e have in this case what have been called
"anticipatory judgments."
Now an important question in the interpretation of these sys-
tems is whether the principle of unity in them is derived from a
strictly objective study, or whether it originates in introspec-
tion. A careful consideration of the facts seems to compel the
choice of the latter alternative. Perry thinks that a teleological
account of behavior is necessary in order to account for its value-
aspects, but in this account he is forced in the end to come back
to the purposive revelations of introspection, for the influence of
subsequent behavior upon present action is mediated, according to
him, by memory-images. (4) And in an action-system the various
(1) The New Realism, page 272.
(2) Ibid. , page 271
.
(5) J. 3. V/atson, Psychology, from the Standpoint of a Be-
haviorist, page 597.
(4) See Perry's teleological account of value, above, pages
94-7. Compare also his article, Docility and Purposiveness
,
Psychological Review, vol. XXV, pages 1-20.
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steps from the initial to the final situation are bound together,
not indeed by the successive spatial positions of the behaving
organism as presented to an outside observer, but by the presence
of a meaning or goal in the mind of the latter, nho regards the
end-3ituation as significant in the light of the initial one. But
this sense of teleological movement comes first from personal ex-
perience, after which it may be read with truth into the behavior
of those whom one studies, and in the light of which action- ays terns
may be constructed. Hence, while the behaviorist talks in terms of
acti'on-systems, the principle of unification for these systems is
derived from the introspection, present but unrecognized, of his
own purposive experiences, and of activities of a very different
kind than bodily movements. This introspective contribution is
suggested by the long list of questions which a prominent behavior-
ist proposes as a means of getting information in the study of the
behavior of a person. (1)
The fundamental and necessary defect, then, in the behavior-
istic method of studying mental action lies in its exclusion of
that inward experience of end-seeking and satisfying achievement
which alone gives action significance and offers a principle of
unification in classifying movements of the body. There is no con-
vincing evidence that these experiences are revealed by a study of
individual bodily movements, and yet without them the bodily behav-
ior of men would be trivial or meaningless. If we take literally
the method proposed by the thorough-going behaviorist, the bodily
actions of men would fall under the class of the mechanical move-
ments of physical masses, without inward meaning, and these move-
ments in themsel/es are too intricate and too insignificant to call
for careful or complete scientific description.
So far in our examination of the behavioris tic theory of mental
activity, we have found in it very serious defects, chiefly psycho-
logical. These are present whether activity be interpreted in terms
of the awareness of a certain class of physical, organic objects, or
in terms of sensory awareness of organic processes. We have found
that mental activity cannot be described adequately from the behav-
iori3tic standpoint alone. One must find the key to it in intro-
spection, but even the method of introspection must be used circum-
spectly if the real mental activity is not to be loBt among motor
and organic sensations. (2) We may agree with G. P. Adams when he
says that "no complex of found and describable elements will ever
be the equivalent of mental activity." (5)
In the consideration of the behavioristic theory it has been
assumed so far that such objective facts as bodily feelings and
visual perceptions of movement could exist without regard to the
subject who has them. But these feelings and perceptions themselves
are abstractions, when considered apart from the interested self who
experiences them. Their existence confirms rather than disproves
the operation of a subject or self different from bodily behavior.
In speaking of James, E. N. Merrington suggests that, "rfhut we want
is the Introspector , not the results of his analysis. Those re-
(1) J. B. Watson, Psychology, from the Standpoint of u
Behaviori3t, pages 598-405.
(2) See above, page 201.
(5) Philosophical Review, ./.ind as Form and as Activity,
vol. XXII, page 277.
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suits seen to me to concern a psychology of vital feeling . What
is described is the bodily background or object to the Subject in
its quiescent contemplation. The Self is the spiritual factor man-
ifested in our highest psychical experiences, where bodily terms
are absolutely unmeaning. As matter of fact
. . consciousness is
given as the presupposition and active participant in all exper-
ience. In comparison, judgment, selection love, aspiration, and
volition, the Subject preponderates over the field of objects,
waich do not seem to be given in that 'hyphenated 1 condition which
James represents ( 1 ) as being the characteristic of the field of
consciousness." (2)
In this argument a logical or epistemological reapn is met
for rejecting the behavioristic theory. The body is treated as the
center of activity because a subject or self very different from it
is interested in so regarding it; and if it be said, as Perry in-
clines to say, (5) that the body itself is the subject of mental ac-
tivity, let us consider whether this is the way in which normal per-
sons express themselves. When James, for example, says in his anal-
ysis, "I forsake general descriptions," he does not mean that his
legs carry him in a certain direction determined by the points of
the compass, but he means that he is substituting one point of view
or interest for another, and this supplanting takes place in a way
which does not at all resemble physical displacement or movement.
If the view in question is taken literally, I ought not to say that
I propose to write on personality, but that my body intends to do
so
.
a'. G. Kafka's Further, if the work of the self as a subject is required, as
criticism of it appears to be, as a necessary condition of the spatial and tem-
Schuppe's ob- poral representation of the body, apart from ?/hich such a repre-
jective theory sentation of the body is difficult to conceive, it is obviously
of the ego. fallacious to turn about and identify this self with the body which
it conditions. In criticizing W. Schuppe's view that the ego is
the total content of consciousness, G. Kafka offers an illustration
of this fallacy. He states that (4), "The attempt to place the
immediacy (5) in the sensation of the 'compact extensity 1 of the
eg° (6)> resting upon sensations of touch and pressure, appears to
be from the first a begging of the question. But even if the im-
mediacy of the bodily sensations is sought in their dependence upon
the will, still over against this spatially extended body as part
of the content of consciousness, there always stands the subject of
consciousness, repeatedly and expressly designated by Schuppe him-
self as non-spatial; (7) so that on this basis no identification
(1) The Principles of Psychology, pages 278 ff
.
(2) The Problem of Personality, pages 22-5
.
(5) See above, pages 99, 116.
(4) Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschau-
ungen tlber das Ichproblem, Archiv fur die gesamte Psychologie,
vol. XIX, 1910, page 216.
(5) Which is present when an object is immediately present to
the ego
.
(6) W. Schuppe, Grundriss der Erkenntnis theorie und Logik,
page 26.
(7) Ibid., page 24; also Erkenntnis tbeoretische Logik, page 75
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of the ego with the body can be asserted. . Further from the spa-
tiality of the immediate objects of the subject, the spatiality
of the subject itself does not at all follow." In J. Laird's ar-
gument it is just as essential to the sensations of the "internal
sense," for instance, organic and kinaesthetic sensations, to have
a subject for which they are, as it is essential to the objects of
the "external sense." (1) The need, in case of bodily feelings,
of a subject which feels them was indicated above. (2) These con-
siderations with reference to the need of a subject demolishes a
strictly phenomenal i 8 tic view, such as that of W. E. Ritter. (j)
F. H. Bradley objects to identifying the self with the body
because of the ambiguity in the term, body
. (4) He affirms that,
"Even 'my body' is ambiguous, for the body, which I imagine, may
have no spatial relation to the body which I perceive. And percep-
tion too can be illusive, for my own body in dreams is not the same
thing with my true 'real 'body, nor does it enter with it into any
one spatial arrangement. And what in the end I mean by my 'real 1
body, seems to be this. I make a spatial construction from my body,
as it comes to me when awake." (5)
This account is interesting because he refers to an "I," other
than the body, which is the source of that spatial construction of
the body with which a behaviorist might later identify his self.
But if my body is something which "I mean" when I am awake, I can-
not consistently turn about, and declare that my body is myself,
for in some of my speculations, my mind may be active for a conscious
period of time without my being aware at. all that I have a body; in
those cases my mind is directed in an entirely different direction
than toward cephalic or glottis movements.
In order to avoid confusion in examining the nature of activ-
ity, I propose that the latter term be reserved for exclusive use in
the mental realm where there is some measure of conscious reference
to a future state or experience as determined or determinable by
introspection. This usage is adopted only for the sake of clearness
in the following exposition, and does not imply that the meaning of
activity could not be extended after metaphysical criticism. Move-
'
ment or motion should be used exclusively for changes in the position
of inorganic beings or masses. Behavior would then refer to the
changes in the position of organic beings when considered in a pure-
ly objective way by an observer; it would not imply a conscious ref-
erence to ends upon the part of the . behaving organism itself, al-
though this reference might be made by the observer for the purposes
of describing or explaining the relevant facts. Action might very
well refer to a combination of activity and behavior as above de-
fined, that is to organic individuals possessing at once bodily be-
havior and mental activity in intimate union. Conduct , then, might
be used either as equivalent to action, or preferably, in a wider
ethical cense, so as to include the idea of a series of actions de-
liberately directed or regulated. In brief: the conduct of rational
508
(1) See above, page 207. (2) See above, page 62, bottom.
(5) See above, page 200, top.
(4) Appearance and Reality, page 77; also page 287.
(5) Ibid., page 287. For further criticisms, see Ibid., pages
S-9.
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persons includes a series of actions; an action involves both men-
tal activity and bodily behavior; the bodily behavior of an organism
involves physical movement; but the key to all these processes is
mental activity as we shall attempt to expound it.
The attempt to resolve the self and mental activity into bodily
behavior cannot be realized, and represents an unjustified mixing
of distinct categories. As J. Laird suggests, "The experience of
activity should not be confused with these accompanying states of
the body. Feelings of effort may be bodily, and so may feelings of
strain; but these are different from psychical endeavour. Congen-
ial work gives scope to much endeavour, but not necessarily to ap-
preciable effort or appreciable strain." (1) The behavioristic
theory makes for vagueness rather than clearness in thinking. If
its defenders are interested in studying bodily behavior, they may
do so, but they promote neither the study of mind nor of organic be-
havior by calling the latter also mental activity. It is simply an
inexcusable confusion in use of terms to say that the self, charac-
terized by the historical development of ends that are valued, should
be identified with an organism moving in space. The mental activi-
ties of striving, thinking, and aspiring, etc., call for different
descriptive categories than bodily behavior. L. T. Hobhouse well
observes that, "To say that mind is body is as much a confusion as
to say that a weight is an inference or that an acceleration is a
wish." (2) G. T. Ladd, too, asserts that "The person is something
more than animated body, no matter how well adapted and trained to
its control over its own domain. Plan's bodily self is more than
mere body. It is more than animated body; it is more than embodied
soul." (J)
We have considered in this section various reasons for refusing
to describe mental activity in terms of bodily behavior. (4) There
are numerous forms of personal experience, of mental activity or
conation, of hopes and regrets, of thoughts and memories, which can-
not be reduced to the dimension of bodily behavior without doing
violence to usage and to facts. "The fact is most of our notions
about bodily activities are due to the fact that we have overlooked
the inner activities." (5) The numerous bodily feelings or sensa-
tions by which we become aware of our bodily movements do not them-
selves contain any principle of teleological integration, which is
essential for the understanding of activity as well as for the pro-
duction of much of it. The purposive factor which seemB to be pres-
ent must be understood in other terms than any that can be derived
from the consciousness of bodily movements. In short, we do not
find the idea of bodily activity sufficiently rich in categories to
account for the wealth of human strivings and aspirations directed
to ideal ends
.
In addition to the energetic and behavioristic conceptions of
mental activity, there is a third one according to which mental ac-
tivity is explained in terms of some kind of vital process which
need not be conscious. This type of view might be called the vitul-
istic or Schopenhauerian theory. Space and time preclude a discus-
(1) Problems of the Self, page 7A.
(2) Development and Purpose, page 26.
(3) The Secret of Personality, page 77-
(4) These reasons supplement our criticism of Jamoe' view,
above, pages 60-5
.
(5) C. H. Judd, Genetic Psychology for Teachers, page 96.
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sion of it according to my original intention. In the classifica-
tion of theories in Part I above, several examples of this theory
were noted. (1) A. Drews is perhaps the most striking contemporary
representative of it. The promise that a criticism of this theory
would yield new principles, important for the progress of our argu-
ment, is very small, and
A
is, therefore, passed by.
The two theories of activity which have been examined both
fail to provide a place for that conscious, purposive trend which
is certainly characteristic of our personal experiences. That is,
an important reason for rejecting them is that they do not take ac-
count of all the facts which seem relevant. A second important
reason is that they all seem to evade the issue by talking about ac-
tivity in the object rather than in the subject of experience, and
so are not sufficiently concerned with the explanation of the inner
teleological unity which is present in some kinds of activity at
least
•
It is possible to bring a third charge against all three theo-
ries, namely, that physical movement, bodily behavior, or vital
process are not understood until we comprehend subjective or per-
sonal activity, and that the former types are grasped by a subtrac-
tion of attributes from the latter; while the latter, considered
from the genetic point of view, ia not built up by adding something
to the former types, as things first known, or as units of personal
life. This assertion must be passed by without evidence for lack
of time and space. Other objections that have been considered will
not be summarized here. Neither will an attempt be made to point
out in what ways a modified behaviorism may aid in the study of
personality. It is recognized that some of the above objections
cannot be directed against certain expositions of behaviorism which
are not exclusive or which recognize the value of other methods.
Having made these explanations, we shall turn at once to the import-
ant and positive endeavor to understand activity from the subjective
side of experience. Our primary interest will be in this activity,
even if it may be regularly connected with various objective proces-
ses
.
Y/e have now presented reasons for attacking the problem of per-
sonality from the standpoint of the concept of activity, and also
for rejecting two proposed definitions of that concept. The problem
which now lies before us is the presentation of a constructive ac-
count of it. Our method of procedure will be to set forth in order
the implications of any concrete experience of activity from which
we may start, and from which we should never wander far. Vve must
find the meaning of activity in every-day experience, if a study of
it is to be the foundation of every-day personality. We muat reject
from the first any suggestion that activity is something beyond or
anterior to experience which explains the latter. The execution of
our program will be systematic and progressive so far as possible,
and will conduct is, we believe, to the very heart of personality.
WTiile psychological evidence will be drawn upon freely in our
study of activity, (2) we shall put in a place of subordinate inter-
est such psychological questions aa: What are the actual experiences,
(1) See above, pages 4-5, 10.
(2) And James 1 account of the experience of activity will be
a useful mine. See above, pages 46-9, 57.
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if any, which are properly classed as activities? How may we de-
scribe them? and, What is the genesis of the concept of activity
in our individual history? etc. Our point of view is primarily
metaphysical, in that we are interested in the discovery and sys-
tematic organization of the principles involved in activity. We
shall ask such questions as: How is activity possible? What are its
conditions and implications? How do we know it? Are activity-ex-
periences themselves real, or are they appearances, perhaps decep-
tive, of something else? Above all, what exactly is the relation
of the concept of activity to personality?
The metaphysical category of activity is no doubt derived from
an original experience of activity which is to be found in general
in a felt tendency toward a goal that is valued. This experience
is one of the most complex that human beings have, and probably forms
the basis for the explanation of simpler kinds of activity, if they
exist. We do not demand a simple experience to start wita, for we
have already examined two failures resulting from the attempt to de-
scribe personal or mental activity in terms of concepts that are too
poor in implications. We shall not attempt, for example, to under-
stand personal activity by adding something to bodily behavior, for
activity is probably a unity in itself, and not composed of parts,
although it may be possible to understand the simpler bodily behav-
ior by subtracting from that complex process or fact which we call
activity of the personal kind. Its complexity is perhaps one reason
for the meager study of it, for it has been assumed sometimes that
activity could not be a real fact unless it were an elementary con-
tent of consciousness.
If, then, activity is a complex fact involving several implica-
tions, as we believe it is, its full meaning, and likewise the full
significance of personality, will appear only at the end of the log-
ical development of our argument. Consequently, the intermediate
steps sometimes will be unavoidably abstract. Our study of person-
ality will consist, then, in a progressive explication and synthesis
of factors involved in a typical activity. The epis temological
problem will receive brief consideration at the conclusion of our
exposition.
It is essential to the whole plan of the following argument to
maintain as close contact as possible with concrete cases of activ-
ity, even if the samples of it selected for study may be quite
commonplace. We have learned from James the importance of this em-
pirical attitude in the study of activity. (1) Let us make a rough,
preliminary analysis of such a sample; we cannot say that it is typ-
ical for we do not yet know what is typical. Suppose that I am
walking along a street and espy some apples in a shop window. Sup-
pose that, being somewhat hungry, I find myself wanting to purchuBe
some of them to eat. I recall that I possess the requisite money;
I decide to enter the store, and buy some of them; and I curry out
my decision.
Now, what are the outstanding features of thiB instance of ac-
tivity? (2) In general, this experience belongs under the conative
type of psychological facts. There is present a psycho-physical
(1) See above, pages 47-8. 86-7.
(2) Compare James' general description of activity, above,
page 49.
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situation which I set about to change as the result of a desire
appearing in my consciousness. Its appearance carries with it a
more or less clear sense of a proximate and very possible goal, and
my immediate problem is whether to consent to realize it promptly.
Having sized up the situation and resolved to satisfy my desire,
I find that the requisite movements of my body come about as a mat-
ter of habit so long as I meet no unusual problem.
The series of actions which leads to the achievement of this
purpose gains its significance, indeed its existence, from that in
which it culminates. That series possesses f»r me an intrinsic
sense of direction which, I believe, is the heart of the experience
of activity. That developing and teleological trend is the constant
or immanent principle around which the various phases of my behav-
ior are organized, and in that sense these phases are peripheral or
instrumental. My resolution to purchase the fruit brought into ex-
istence the actions constituting my excursion into the shop. The
central feature of this total train of experience seems to be a
unique trend conditioned by the maintenance within it of a conscious
goal. The whole situation is exceedingly complicated, for there is
present here (a) a transition (b) in a certain felt direction (c) in
the conscious life (d) of a concrete individual (e) which possesses
a measure of stability amid its developing experience, and (f ) which
guides its actions with some reference to its past. This summary
suggests some of the implications of activity to which we must now
turn our attention.
The immediate question which arises concerns what is the best
order of studying the numerous aspects and implications of activity.
The idea of change furnishes one possible avenue of approach, for
it is "evident" (1) that change is present in activity. F. H.
Bradley puts this implication first, for he says that, "in all ac-
tivity something clearly becomes something else." (2) And Stout ex-
plains that, "Throughout this work, whenever the word activity is
used, the reference is to a process in time, if and so far as the
process possesses a certain characteristic." (1) Following James %
we might define activity, in most general terms, as change: the
bare fact of something going on somewhere in consciousness or the
organism. (5) This usage, however, only makes for confusion and
redundancy, for change or process serve perfectly well to include
the facts in question, and there is no justification for multiply-
ing terms to name the same fact. For this simple reason, there-
fore, we cannot identify activity with mere change.
The objections to starting our study of activity from the con-
cept or implication of change are not at all serious, but there are
several minor ones which confirm the judgment trv-t there is a better
way. It may be true that all activity is a species of change, but
probably the converse is not true; so that, beginning wita change,
we should have to deal first with a general and abstract concept,
and then exhibit its relation to activity, a process which would in-
volve unnecessary metaphysical complications . It is probable that
change is to be understood as an idea derived by a subtraction from
( 1 ) G . F . Stout, Analytical Psychology, vol
(2) Appearance and Reality, page 65.
(5) See above, page 49-
I, page 144.
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or eimpli cation of mental activity, by a trimming down of the lat-
ter more concrete and complete fact. In view of this possibility,
I think there is a more profitable mode of attacking our problem.
We wish to find some marks of activity which will distinguish it
from mere process or change, from the aimless movements produced
by mechanical forces.
This better way is not the way of consciousness, although it
seems evident, in this case also, that mental activity involves
consciousness, and that the latter is one of the modes in which a
living individual, sensitive of its surroundings and aware of its
proper desires, manifests itself. But, the concept of consciousness
also involves well-known difficulties which need not be introduced
here
.
The first implication of mental and personal activity which
will be developed at length is that of purpose, for purpose is
"most unmistakably attached to the behavior of man." (1) All three
American philosophers whose theories have been reviewed assign the
idea of purpose to an important place in the concept of the self;
indeed, that idea has recurred frequently in our study of them. (2)
There is general agreement among those who discuss mental ac-
tivity to the effect that it is meaningless in concrete human ex-
perience without the presence of direction in some sense. Let us
note some examples of this opinion. S. Alexander affirms that,
"The consciousness of activity must be found in some change of di-
rection of the mental process itself." (5) For G. F. Stout the
crux of the concept of activity is an "experienced transition," (4)
and for W. H. Winch it is a "felt tendency." (5) G. A. Coe holds
a similar view: "Mental reaction is a response toward something as
well as to something, and this 'toward' reveals the nature of the
reactor." (6) P. Natorp, in his exposition of the will, thinks
that direction of some sort is present. (7) J. Laird asserts,
''Without the concept of direction, activity would be meaningless."
(8) R. B. Perry also points out that the differentia of life are
to be found "in its direction toward something: ." (9) Our first
task is to give a definite interpretation to the "direction" which
is so commonly regarded as present whenever an individual has the
experience of activity.
It may be thought that, by considering direction and purpose
first, we are beginning at the wrong end of our study. Why not
(1) R. B. Perry, Monist, vol. XXVII, page 571-
(2) See above: W. James, pages 52-54, 58, 65-66; R. B. Perry,
pages 94-97; B. P. Bowne, pages 155-157, 152; general, pages
171, bottom, 172.
(5) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol.
VIII, page 217.
(4) Analytic Psychology, vol. I, page 159. See also, Mind,
S., vol. X, 462.
(5) Jour, of Philos., Psych., and Scientific Meth., VI, 477.
(6) Psychology of Religion, page 29.
(7) Grundlinien einer Theorie der Wiilensbildung, Archiv ittr
Philos, Hefte 2 und J; reviewed in Psychological Review,
III, pages 460-2.
(6) Problems of the Self, page 106.
(9) Monist, vol. XXVII, pages 556-9.
N
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consider first the desiring actor who senses the direction and who
seeks ends? In reply one may say that (a) not only is purposive-
ness itself one of the chief factors both in activity and in per-
sonality, but alBO (b) that we come upon an important revelation of
the nature of the desirer himself in the course of our understanding
of the ends toward which his acts are directed. This is an assump-
tion of psychoanalysis , and it is valid in the examination of the
average person. But also, (c) the study of purpose before the im-
plication of an actor or agent will make our argument more progres-
sive, for the examination of the latter will bring us one step
nearer to the study of the reality of personality with which we
shall conclude our main discussion.
There is some disagreement with respect "to the precise meaning
of the direction present in the experience of activity. Two views
which appear to be mistaken may be briefly considered.
It is evident at once that the physicist cannot throw any
light upon the meaning of direction in mental activity. It is true
that in physical science both motion and force involve direction,
(1) but this physical conception obviously lacks some important
characteristics that mark direction in experienced activity. First,
mechanical direction is not sensed by the moving thing itself. Sec-
ondly, a physical motion has direction only as it is determined by
an observer with reference to its place in a relative system of
points which he constructs. In fact, the whole discussion of our
objections to the energetic view may be recalled here. (2) As J.
Ward points out, "We might as well say that the moon lights the sun
as suppose that physical action throws any new light on mental ac-
tivity." (5) The idea of physical direction offers nothing to il-
luminate our problem.
In spite of these condemning objections, S. Alexander makes
the direction of mental activity "definite and explicit" by refer-
ence to the brain. (4) He thinks that the best metaphorical term
by which to describe mental activity is movement
,
and that move-
ments differing in direction, are present in willing, inferring,
perceiving, etc. (5) "Always I am conscious of moving from one
point to another, which either may or may not be in the same direc-
tion." (5) He 3ays tnat he makes "clearer to myself" the idea of
mental activity "by locating it in time or apace in a picture of
my brain.
. . In all my thoughts ... I verify the description
that they strike along the brain." (6) Further, he affirms that,
"it is only as thus understood in connection with the bodily or-
ganism that I can say my mental activity is a movement with direc-
tion...My mental activity is always characterized by what, on the
analogy of local signs, I must call signs of direction." (6) "Now
what makes one thought-process different from another is, I find,
nothing but this difference of mental direction." (6) In the face
of criticism of his view, he tries to explain it more exuctly by
(1) Sec for example, B. Snow, Notes on Physics, pages 15, 62.
(2) See above, pages 194-9.
(2) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII,
page 228. (4) Ibid., page 220.
(5) Ibid., page 219. (6) Ibid., page 220.
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asserting, 1 When I say that I feel mental activity occurring in
connection with movement in my brain, I mean only that it occurs
in that portion of space, and is experienced by me as occurring in
my brain . " ( 1
)
b". Incon- Several fact3 may now be cited in support of the opinion that
sistencies Alexander's attempt to picture the direction of mental activity in
in his theory. terms of cerebral movement befogs rather than clarifies its meaning.
Hi3 view comes as a surprise after he has confessed tiat one "error"
which he had "learned to avoid" is that the bodily behavior which
may accompany thinking is mental activity itself. (2) His exposi-
tion is at once incomplete and confusing for the following reasons:
(a) The brain processes of which he speaks must be presenta-
tions, but he has admitted that it is "impossible" to find "activity
.... in changing presentations," and that it can be found only
in the transitions among them. (2) He thinks that this latter prin-
ciple condemns F. H. Bradley's view of activity as the expansion of
an idea against another idea. His argument is inconsistent, then,
for, while he asserts at first that activity cannot be found in a
series of presentations without an experience of transition among
them, he later seems to assert that it can be so presented.
(b) He states that the connection of mental activity with his
organism gives it direction, (5) and is thereby qualified by signs
of direction. But he adds (4) that when he is aware of activity,
this activity is consciousness. If he means the latter statement,
he should not say that he feels his thought occurring in his brain
or body. (5) Again, what these "signs of direction" are, and how
processes in the brain become cues to the directions of mental ac-
tivities, are questions which he leaves quite unanswered. Further,
these signs cannot be sensations, for they would be condemned by
point (a) above. But if they are "unique" transitions in con-
sciousness itself , the reference to the brain is superfluous and mis-
leading. When he says that mental activity "is a movement" oc-
curring in time and space, he has dropped his metaphorical language,
and direction has become literally spatial.
(c) He bases this cerebral reference upon the facts of exper-
ience. (5) He states that he experiences mental activity as occur-
ring in that portion of space which he has learned by reflection,
and not "direct inspection," to be his brain. In "locating my men-
tal activity in my brain, I am using my acquired knowledge of brain,
and not direct inspection." (6) Yet he declares that, "my mental
activity
. .
is experienced by me as occurring in my brain." (7)
These statements do not seem to be mutually consistent. If
direction is essential to mental activity, as we agree it is, and
if Alexander is right in thinking that reference to the brain is
essential in the determination of the meaning of direction, then,
according to his view that knowledge of the brain is acquired, men-
tal activity would be impossible until we had gained that knowledge.
It seems contrary to fact, however, to suppose that a child, for
example, can find no sense in the direction of his activities be-
(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, I. S., vol. VIII,
page 249. (2) Ibid., page 216.
(5) Ibid., page 220. Ik) Ibid., page 221.
(5) Ibid., pages 249-5°. (6) Ibid., page 25O.
(7) Ibid. , page 249.

218
b'
.
Adoption
of a teleolog-
ical interpre-
tation of di-
rection in
activity.
c
' . Two dan-
gers to be
avoided in this
exposition:
1". Spatial
metaphors
.
2". Intellec-
tual! sin.
fore he knows about his brain. I am unable to verify in my exper-
ience the hypothesis that I refer every transition in my thoughts
to cerebral movements or processes. On the contrary, I find that
I very rarely do so; and when I do, this reference is not made at
the time of the mental activity concerned, but at another time, and
as part of another activity whose direction is determined in a very
different way.
In Alexander's cerebral theory of mental direction we have be-
fore us another failure in elucidating it due to the misguided and
doomed endeavor to clarify mental activity by means of physical
analogies. Perhaps Alexander's method of directing his thoughts by
the aid of changes in the position of his eyes (1) is an individual
pecularity, acquired as a help in association or imagination.
I shall adopt and defend a teleological interpretation of the
"direction" of mental activity, because this interpretation seems
essential and necessary so far as personal experience is concerned.
This view may be stated briefly by saying that the direction of
mental activity is determined by its purposive reference, a refer-
ence which is more or less clearly present in consciousness, whether
as a goal of action or as an object of cognitive interest. If this
teleological reference turns out to be essential to mental activity,
then experienced transitions without a modicum of meaning cannot be
called active; they will have to be designated as bare change or
process. G. F. Stout accepts a teleological view of conation: "Any
specific activity must be thought of in relation to some result
which it either maintains in existence or tends to bring into ex-
istence. This result is called the end to v/hich it is directed."
(2) A careful examination of this purposive reference in activity
will bring before us one of the most important of the factors in the
concept of personality, namely, purposive activity. It is to be
regretted that the development of a genuinely functional psychology
as described by G. A. Coe (5) is not at hand to aid in the exposi-
tion of the purposive features of personality.
In this exposition two dangers need to be guarded against.
In the first place, we have found reason to believe that the endeav-
or to explain or express the purposive reference in activity in
spatial or physical metaphors would prove vain. The direction of
activity has no intelligible resemblance to the falling of a row of
dominoes or to the movement of a train or to the course of a ner-
vous impulse.
Secondly, if we distinguish clearly between the immediate ex-
perience of activity and the reflective knowledge of it, we shall
avoid the improper intellectualism of G . F. Stout's account of it
when he maintains that "sufficient" factors are present "to con-
stitute
. .
mental activity or conation" when "there is the knowl-
edge or thought of a certain actual situation, and of a pousible
alteration in it; and the alteration is not only thought of but al-
so wanted." (4) This account nurrows down conscious activity too
near to the point of identifying it with voluntary action, and
tends to exclude possible simpler types, where there is merely con-
(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII,
page 216.
(2) Analytical Psychology, vol. I, page 126.
(5) Psychology of Religion.
(4) British Journal of Psychology, vol. II-, Part I, page 1.
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scious wanting or striving, without a clear conception of the end
sought or without a reflective consideration of the stages of its
attainment. It should be noted, however, that the measure of
knowledge present is, of course, a question of definition and de-
gree. In the species of activity called personal, the intellec-
tive element probably cannot be entirely excluded at any time, al-
though its relative importance may vary greatly.
2'
. The dis- In the examination of the teleological factor in activity and
tinction between personality it is important, in the interests of clearness, to dis-
the objective tinguish several points of view from which it may be studied. It
and subjedtive is evident that at the moment when an action is performed, that
which is in prospect has a quite different appearance from the
standpoint of the actor himself than it has from the point of view
of the observer who is trying to describe it. "The vital processes
of the plant and the deliberate plans of man are alike purposive;
but in the former we have no evidence of the presence of an idea
guiding the series of movements which takes place, whereas, in our
own experience we have an immediate consciousness of such an idea."
(1) The first fundamental distinction to be noted is that between
what we may call the objective and the subjective standpoints, or,
as F. C. S. Schiller would say, between the point of view of the
"spectator" and of the "purposing agent."
points of view
in the study of
purpose
.
a'
.
Descrip-
tion and illus-
tration of pur-
pose from the
objective
standpoint.
1". Unconscious
purpose
.
From the objective point of view, the idea of purpose is "reg-
ulative," in the sense that it serves as a useful methodological
or metaphysical principle. To the seeker after knowledge it is of
instrumental value in the ordering of certain facts which come be-
fore him for synthesis. One simple type of this use is found in
the relation between means and end; as, for example, between the
falling of rain and a good harvest, between an axe and the prepara-
tion of lumber, and between the antlers of a stag and defense.
These forms of objective purpose, where we do not suppose there is
any foresight or conscious anticipation of the end upon the part
of the entities themselves, are familiar and common. From this
objective standpoint, a machine is purposive in the sense that it
is constructed for and serves some useful and practical end, but
the purpose lies outBide of the machine itself. In this type of
purpose the end is present only in the mind of the investigator,
and not in the subjects under investigation.
From the standpoint of these subjects, such purposes may be
said to be unconscious. Perhaps the only intelligible meaning of
unconscious purpose is to be found in purpose considered in this
objective way: methodological purpose is conscious as an explana-
tory category in the intellectual life of tne scientist, but it is
not consciously present in the processes to which he refers it in
a regulative way. The end which an individual's behavior sometimes
serves may be quite without meaning or significance in his own ex-
perience; as, for example, in the case of actions which are for the
good of the species alone. The latter type is illustrated Dy the
behavior of those salmon who kill themselves in leaping water-falls
under the impelling influence of instinctive tendencies which on
the whole are of benefit to their species. Wherever, then, the
behavior of an individual organism or the movements of a machine
are regarded by an observer as determining some valuable result,
(1) V/. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of Ood, pages
415-14.
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the result may be spoken of as an end or purpose in this objective
sense; for the purpose is purely methodological, and not immanent
or in any way anticipated or experienced by the individual being.
In our investigation of activity, we are primarily interested in
ends, considered from the subjective standpoint, which are con-
sciously sought.
The interpretation of "purpose as systematic unity" (l) would
belong in the objective type, if any one ever actually put it for-
ward. (2) From this point of view, purpose would be equivalent to
the Absolute Individual ae described by B. Bosanquet. (5) The lat-
ter, however, explicitly states that purpose can never be identified
with the whole of a world. (4) Although, therefore, Perry's criti-
cism is directed against an unreal opponent, his discussion illus-
trates another objective type of purpose, and also helps to clear
our way by warning us as to what purpose is not.
The usage referred to robs the term, purpose , of a significant
and necessary meaning, without bringing any logical gains. It at-
taches a static completeness to the meaning of the concept which is
foreign to its real nature. It is essential to the idea of pur-
pose that it be progressively realized or developed. It is pro-
perly applied to the historical and finite endeavors of human be-
ings, and not to the Absolute conceived as a perfected and system-
atic whole. Real purposes live where there are unfinished pro-
gressions, where time is required for their development, and where
change, improvement, realization, progress toward perfection, or
perhaps toward failure, may be present. An important source of the
value of absolute idealism to its exponent lies in tne fact that it
is the achievement of long intellectual strain and strife on hie
part, and its attainment well illustrates that most lofty of human
purposes, the quest for complete unification of experience. But to
extend the idea of purpose from finite strivings to the systematic
totality of things is unwarranted and confusing. In order to un-
derstand the human purposes just referred to the subjective stand-
point must be adopted.
From the objective standpoint purpose is primarily a methodo-
logical or epis temological principle of regulative value. ..hether
it is also "constitutive" does not concern us here. There is one
place, however, where it is undoubtedly constitutive, namely, in
human activity and personality. But to appreciate its meaning here
the subjective standpoint must be adopted. By the latter is meant
the standpoint of the one who himself is actively and consciously
seeking after ends. It means the point of view of the living, finite
individual who experiences in advance, to some extent, that pro-
gressive linkage of his o.,n experiences which leads to the achieve-
ment of an esteemed end.
(1) See article bearing this title by R. B. Perry, in
Monist, vol. XXVII, pages 552-575.
(2) An approximation to this view is found in the^article on
"Purpose" by R. Latta, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, N. S., vol. XVII, pages 17-55-
(5) See The Principle of Individuality and Value, Lecture II.
(4) Ibid., page 591
.
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The two points of view in teleology stand in notable contrast
to one another. From the objective or descriptive standpoint, pur-
pose is methodological, regulative, and static; from the subjective
or experiential standpoint, purpose is immanent, constitutive, and
dynamic. In the one case, purpose is a post mortem interpretation;
in the other, it is a prophetic insight. In the first case, the
end is unconscious in the sense mentioned above; in the other it is
foreseen, consciously anticipated in some measure, or vaguely sought.
\7e are interested now in considering only the latter kind of
purpose, and it is from this immanent and personal type that all
forms of objective purpose derive their meaning. This interest rep-
resents an attempt to explain experience and the movement of things
in terms of the conscious rather than the unconscious. F. C. S.
Schiller reminds us that, "It seems obvious to remark that unless
'you' were an actively purposing spirit, you could never regard any
connexion of things as teleologies! . " (1) Let us, then, turn to the
study of purpose from the subjective standpoint, with a view to
isolating those forms which are important in activity and personality
Although a description of immanent purpose must remain incom-
plete until we develop some other implications of activity, we may
note some of its chief marks. An experience or activity is not pur-
posive unless it is in some measure consciously forward-looking. An
experience is purposive from this point of view when its stages are
in part determined by a more or less clear awareness of what is
going to come out of it, when the end or direction of the experience-
trend is present with some degree of explicitness in the conscious-
ness of the actor* We have all had experiences of this kind,
—
of seeking, striving, undertaking, intending, endeavoring, giving
up, attending, persevering, trying, resolving, making an effort,
getting ready, attempting, starting to work, taking up a task, meet-
ing and overcoming obstacles, making progress in executing our
plans, solving problems, etc., etc. (2) In purposive activity the
end- situation, whether near or far in time, reacts upon the initial
situation, and upon the intermediate ones, if they are present. We
should not say that purpose is present in the sense we are consider-
ing if our satisfaction in a present state had come to pass without
our having sought it, or without our having any forebodings of its
coming. Such an experience would be one of the graces, one of the
benevolent surprises of our natural existence, and the processes
leading up to this enjoyable result could be regarded aB purposive
only in the objective sense. It is quite possible, therefore, for
an individual to make use of the objective standpoint in the order-
ing of his own past experiences, if he finds any occasion or value
in thi3 regulative exercise. Lovers adopt this point of view in
expressing the belief that they were made for each other, when they
have no evidence that they were preparing for their life together
before they met.
In addition to our earlier exposition of Perry's view of pur-
pose (5), we may note here his definition of it, for it is as good
as any: "I submitted a provisional definition in agreement with
(1) Studies in Humanism, page 2J1
.
(2) Compare James' account, above, page 49,
(5) See above pages 94-7.
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verbal usage, according to which purpose consists in the determina-
tion of an action by its agreement with the agent 1 3 expectation .
"
(1) He observes further, that if a dog hides when his master takes
down a whip, "he acts not because of what is or has been, but be-
cause of what may be by virtue of his action, or what would be
without his action." (2) Again, he says, "The differential factor
which constitutes a purposive aspect" is to be found in the fact
that "the act is construed by the agent in terms of something ul-
terior and non-existential." (2)
The consideration of purpose from the objective standpoint, as
a supplement to the subjective standpoint, is not at all rare within
the conscious life of an individual. What is rare is the objective
consideration of a purpose within human experience which has not
been preceded by an immediate and immanent experience of that pur-
pose itself . What is frequent in our experience is trie objective
consideration, in the light of memory, of various purposive cycles
or systems which are past. The subjective standpoint means the liv-
ing through of a purposive experience, while the objective refers
to its later interpretation. In the one case the purpose is actual;
in the other it is retrospective. When a purposive train of exper-
ience is a matter of anticipation or of future realization, we may
call it prospective; it would be a species of the objective type,
the meaning of which is always based, of course, upon the other type.
It is interesting to note that the objective end of a given
series of experiences may be different from the subjective one. For
example, the immanent or subjective goal of the experience of hunger
is securing food in order to eat and enjoy it, while it3 objective
end is the maintenance of physical life. Other instinctive exper-
iences could be used to illustrate this same point. On the other
hand, the same fact of purposive experience may be considered either
from the objective or from the subjective standpoint: namely, as it
has occurred or will occur, aa contrasted with its actual occurrence,
in the individual's experience.
As we shall see, it is in the objective criticism of our pur-
poses, in their conscious approval or disapproval, and in the control
of our subsequent actions in accordance with this criticism and this
approval, that personality manifests itself most clearly. This
passage from the subjective to the objective point of view is made
possible, in the first instance, by the originally dynamic and in-
telligent character of human mature experience; and it is in the re-
turn to the subjective realization of prospective purposes wnich we
have approved in objective criticism that we find personality in its
most perfect form, in the form of rational self-determination. In
the latter case that purpose of an individual wuich at first may be
merely regulative or prospective has become oonBtitutive of his
nature through his own choice and will.
The distinctions which have so far been made in the study of
teleo logical standpoints and kinds of purpose may be summarized in
the following table of classification:
(1) Philosophical Review, vol. XXVI, page 477. Sept., 1917-
(2) The Monist, vol. XXVII, page 56O.
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Standpoint
1 . Objective
:
a'
. Distinc-
tion between
implicit and
explicit pur-
pose.
Corresponding purpose
a. Methodological or regulative:
b. Prospective or possible:
2. Subjective: a. Actual or immanent in the
individual's consciousness
3. Objective-
subjecti ve
:
Examples
Means—end.
Systematic totality,
Wishes or hopes.
Buying of fruit ac-
cording to one's
intention. ( 1
)
a. Prospective become actual:
b. Actual become retrospective:
Realized wish.
Remembered
achievement.
Now it is important for the progress of our argument to compre-
hend purpose more fully from the subjective or experiential stand-
point, fro;a the standpoint of one's own purposive actions as he lives
them out in daily life. We shall need to be careful to exclude the
objective point of view only when precise distinctions are required.
The latter kind of purposes can do us no harm, now that we understand
their nature. The combination of both standpoints is sometimes use-
ful in discussion, as the above table indicates.
We may start from the fact, exhibited above (2), that human be-
ings are fundamentally active, they are gifted by nature with
most varied and abundant conative tendencies, notably the instincts.
From the objective standpoint all conative tendencies probably are
purposive. The question is whether they are also purposive from the
other point of view, that is whether the goal of any one of them, or
its progress towards some valued conclusion, is consciously present
in some measure to the owner. There is no doubt that tae end is
clearly present in that highly developed kind of human action called
volition. "We are accustomed to accept as the type of purposive ac-
tion our own most decidedly volitional efforts, in which we deliber-
ately choose, and self-consciously strive, to bring about some state
of affairs that we clearly foresee and desire." (3)
To restrict purposive activity to the volitional type, however,
is too narrow a usage, because there are other kinds of action where
purpose is present, although not so clearly, and also because we are
interested in establishing a continuity between the simpler and the
higher forms of purposive activity. There are lower forms of activ-
ity in which a full anticipation or conception of the end is not es-
sential. In order to avoid confusion, it is profitable to introduce
here the idea of grades of clearnejs with which the end of a given
action or a series of actions is foreseen at its initiation. Voli-
tional activity represents the type of greatest clearness. At the
opposite extreme would stand an activity where there is no conscious-
ness of the goal or aim, but only bare feeling of transition or ten-
dency, although this is certainly a very rare kind of experience for
us adult human beings. In order to describe this lower limit we
should have to adopt the objective standpoint, and call the purpose
in this case, whenever it is present at all, implicit. It would be
implicit in the sense that, from the objective standpoint, whether
of the experient himself or of an observer, tne facta of the ex-
(1) See above, page 213, bottom, and 214.
(2) See above, pages 168-193.
(3) W. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, page 356,
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perienced transition might be ordered under the concept of purpose,
or be regarded as contributing to some valuable end. (1)
Since our standpoint is primarily subjective, we are interested
much less in implicit purpose than in ends which are to some extent
explicit, in purpose which is immanent in experience, and not merely
methodological. Let us examine some of the varieties of explicit
purpose. Among them we may discover those purposes which especially
belong to personal activity.
Three stages or grades may be roughly distinguished in the ex-
plicitness of purposes: (a) vague or obscure purposes, (b) confused
purposes, or those possessing an intermediate degree of clearness,
and (c) clear purposes. The lowest stage of purpose in human ex-
perience must be described as a kind of restlessness in the presence
of an apprehended situation, an undefined craving for something dif-
ferent, an indefinite but nevertheless actual want to alter exper-
ience in some respect, where there is a very obscure anticipation of
some change in the given state of affairs. Provided we recognize
that the purpose is vague, it seems fair to say that it is present
in such experiences, even if there is no conceived course of action
present. It is well to remember that these obscure purposes are in
part the raw material out of which the intelligent self weaves for
itself an integrated personality, and also that these purposes may
be of great significance in effecting the course of experience, for,
as M. Maeterlinck observes, "It happily so comes to pass that the
more clear ideas we possess, the more do we learn to respect those
that a3 yet are still vague." (2)
Let us note some examples of obscure purposes. "To take a
trivial but instructive instance: you cough in order to clear your
throat; or, experiencing a slight irritation in your throat, you
puv out your hand, take up a glass of water, and drink, in order to
allay it. How very sketchy and ill-defined mwy be your thought of
the end of your action 1." (5) Another instance from developed exper-
ience where the end, though present, is obscure, is seen in the ef-
fort to recall a forgotten name. In that case, while one cannot
definitely say what one is seeking, yet one is able to reject wrong
goals when they present themselves--wrong in the sense of being un-
satisfying or annoying. Here the end is present in the form of a
vague or general feeling, not exant enough to permit a definition of
itself, but not so implicit or indefinite but what it can function
as a touchstone to eliminate false definitions. Sometimes, again,
after one has committed a sin of etiquette or morals, and tries to
go about his business, he experiences a lingering feeling of annoy-
ance, an uneasy sense of wanting a change in his experience. It is
perfectly possible, therefore, for general and obscure purposes to
be present in the emotional life of adult persons.
A vague or marginal awareness of end may be present often in
perfected habit, although the end may have been very clear at the
beginning of the learning process. The purposive history and char-
acter of habit is seen when its regular development fails to meet an
unusual situation. In this case one rediscovers that the habit is
(1) Compare I. H. finch, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,
and Scientific Method, vol. VI, page 477.
(2) Wisdom and Destiny, page 79.
(5) H. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, page 558.
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useful in serving a different purpose than the extraordinary need
which faces him. For example, if one discovers, after washing his
hands and face, that hi3 towel is out of its customary place, he
may find a train of thought interrupted in order that he may search
for a towel for necessary purposes. 7»rhen, then, a habitual action
meets obstacles, its general direction is brought into consciousness.
To what extent the end of a habit is ordinarily present in con-
sciousness must be left here undetermined. It seems certain, however,
that habitual actions are originally purposive, however vague their
ends may be when they are well established.
Purpose in im- The best examples of vague purposes may be found in the func-
pulsive and in- tionihg of instincts. Probably the beginning of purposive experience
stinctive is connected with the operation and development of instincts. f«
action. McDougall declares that, "The persistent striving towards its end,
v/hich characterises mental process and distinguishes instinctive be-
havior most clearly from mere reflex action, implies some such mode
of experience as we call conative." (1) "Awareness of the end towards
which it tends" is essential to an instinct, and even "in the case of
the higher animals some prevision of the immediate end, however
vague, probably accompanies an instinctive action that has often been
repeated." (2)
These vague purposes may turn out to have a significance which
one does not at first suspect. C. S. Peirce suggests that "a general
idea, living and conscious now is already determinative of acts in
the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious." Because
many of our original tendencies point to ends of which we only grad-
ually become clearly conscious, selection needs to be made, he says,
and thus there is room for self-determination. Sometimes we do not
discover clearly the purpose until the presence of a sense of fulfil-
ment or failure brings to light the end towards wnich we have been
more or less unconsciously tending. (5) h. T. Hobhouse describes
the situation well: "Where intelligence arises within the sphere of
instinct, it probably takes short views at the outset, and aims at
near results, which will relieve the tension and so satisfy. From
these it advances step by step till it grasps the end of the in-
stinct, which then becomes suffused with purpose." (4)
Between the vague purposes which have just been described and
illustrated, and the clear ends to be discussed in a moment, there
exists a motley group of confused purposes, or purposes possessing
intermediate grades of explicitness in intelligent consciousness.
The stages and varieties of these purposes in individual experience,
as contrasted with their extremes, will not be carefully delimited
or specified, because the notation of the fact of their existence is
sufficient for the present argument. A few examples, however, may
be mentioned.
A confused purpose is often present when one tries to relate a
general moral ideal to particular and momentary probleiao of life, or,
vice versa, when one seeks to understand the wider bearings of spe-
cific acts. The ends subserved by instinctive actions in their
(1) Introduction to Social Psychology, page 26.
(2) Ibid., page . (5) The Monist, vol. II, page 256.
(A) Development and Purpose, pages 57-6.
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early functioning, the uncertain goals which affect us in the midst
of conflicting desires, the first stages of our efforts at moral
self-criticism,—these and numerous other situations often generate
in consciousness purposes having many varieties of indefiniteness in
meaning.
Illustrations of confused goals are expecially abundant in the
development of our instinctive life. The end, however, is genuinely
present, for, as Perry suggests, we cannot explain fear or hope
"without admitting it to be the fear or the hope of something; , which
something is not upon the plane of past or present existence as or-
dinarily conceived." (1) There is a vast region of vague endeavor
"when we seek something less clearly defined or feel vourselves drawn
to a course of action whose value we recognise but dimly, looking to
future experience to reveal more fully both the way to the end and
the mode in which our nature will find satisfaction in it. These
vaguer impulses are not separated from conscious life, though con-
sciousness hardly penetrates to their further issues, but they may
function without a clear idea of the end they subserve, almost in
the way in which the instincts work which protect and preserve our
organ! c^ife . " (2) Evidently, then, purposes are present in our ac-
tivities with endless degrees of clearness.
The upper extreme of explicitness is illustrated by any volun-
tary action of a developed intelligent man. In thie type of activity
the end is clearly present in consciousness. In this case he has a
clear conception of some plan of action and of the means for its ful-
filment. An end which is vaguest present in one activity-series may
become, as a result of reflection, clearly present in a later repeti-
tion of that series when the latter has become better organized. An
important means of developing personality is this process of clari-
fying and controlling ends which are vaguely or confusedly present
to begin with.
A person develops In the' midst of the unfolding and fulfilment
of his purposes; unfolding purpose may be added as another species
of the explicit type. Within a complex activity-series all of the
above stages of clearness may be present; that is to say, the true
or satisfying end of a train of experience may become fully explicit
only at a relatively late stage or at the conclusion of a long ser-
ies of actions. (5) This conscious unfoldment corresponds to what
has been called the "progressive adjustment" of a growing^ organism.
The steps in such an activity-series are likely to be very loosely
bound together when considered as a whole, and the course of its
development may be very crooked. Toll unfolding type occupies, in
other words, comparatively long periods of human life; many men re-
quire a long time in order to discover their vocations.
The last paragraph suggests another distinction among human
purposes, namely, according to the time required for their realiza-
tion. Some ends are but a few seconds' distant from the present in-
stant; others may require hours or days for their achievement; and
still others, many years. Hence, there are proximate, intermediate,
and ulterior purposes, as determined by the time occupied in their
(1) The Monist, vol. XXVII, page J60.
(2) W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, page Ai.^.
(5) Compare, R. Latta, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
I . S., vol. VIII, pages 16-9.
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fulfilment. Let us note some examples of these.
One of the best-known cases of proximate purpose is to be found
in the "Aufgabe," "problem-idea," or purpose in the experiments of
H. J. Watt (1), and others, especially N. Ach (2). The latter
pointed out differences in reaction time according to whether the
subject's attention was fixed on the expected stimulus or on the in-
tended action. The idea of the anticipated result, which he found
to modify one's time of reaction, is an interesting and clear case
of proximate purpose.
Proximate purposes are the most common of all, for they are
constantly with us in our waking life. They are illustrated by the
multitude of "conscious attitudes" which have been brought to light
in recent psychology. These attitudes are interesting because they
are not only conscious, and involve the whole self, but they are def-
initely forward-looking, for in them one prepares himself for the
experience that is immediately to follow. A host of these attitudes
have been mentioned of late under various names: such as "conscious
attitudes," "Bewuss tseinlagen, " "marbs," "kulps," and "sets." In
"sets" there is said to be a kind of "preparatory adjuatient" for
changes shortly to come about; they are illustrated by readiness,
hesitancy, doubt, confusion, expectation, alertness, watchfulness,
etc
.
Probably the most common of all is the attentive attitude in
perception. The sensitive organism of a nan that is awake is con-
stantly keyed up in some degree in expectation of events about to
take place; he is ever ready for clear perceptions of surrounding
objects with reference to which he may be obliged to modify his ac-
tions. The mental activity present in particular cognitive acts is
an expression of the general interest in the multiplication of objects
of perception. (5)
Proximate purpose is not only present in the pulses of our per-
ceptive life, but in the activities of our thought life. It is il-
lustrated in the frequent experiences of intending to say something
before we say it, and of maintaining the advance guard of thought
when speaking. The thought comes first, and the words follow as an
expression of it. In thinking, too, the conclusion comes before
our evidence for it, and we are continually anticipating ourselves.
Then, there i3 a countless multitude of brief excursions in thought
and action designed to satisfy transient wants and relie/e vague or-
ganic pressures or impulses.
These numerous examples of proximate purpose have been ptesented
in order to indicate how thoroughly purposive our whole waking life
is. In the illustrations cited the time-span is very brief. It may
be so short that the activity is called a conscious attitude—a fac-
ing of the future, rather than an actual seeking after something ab-
sent that is ideally anticipated—a state of preparedness or readiness
for what may come. Theae instances also exhibit how thoroughly ac-
tive the human individual is, and hie activity io essentially pur-
posive. Starting with these proximate purposes, we may say that the
time required for the attainment of the experiences we seek varies
Within a period containing many scores of years.
( 1 ) Exper . BeitrHge zu einer Theorie d. Denkens, Archiv fUr
die gesamte Psychologie, vol. IV, 1^05.
(2) Uber die Will ens ttttigkeit and daa Denkon.
(5) See G . A. Coe, Psychology of Religion, page AO.
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b" . Intermed- Some ends require a few minutes or a few hours for their attain-
iate purposes. ment. These may be designated, intermediate purposes. The duty of
the day's work which lies before one each morning. is an example of
this type. Other examples of such familiar experiences need not be
mentioned
.
c"
.
Ulterior Finally, then, there are ulterior purposes which may require
purposes. long periods or a lifetime for achievement: e. g. , the acquisition
of an education or of professional skill, the execution of a literary
or commercial scheme, the multifarious kinds of human vocations, etc.
For the fulfilment of ulterior purposes, the realization of
proximate and intermediate stages is regularly presupposed. Here ap-
pears the idea of lesser purposes existing with a larger purpose,
6". Compound that is, of compound, in contrast with simple, purposes. If one
purposes; adopts a plan of life which requires many years for its completion,
he cannot realize it in general, but the intermediate step3 must be
composed of shorter cycles of activity. A compound plan may possess
varying degrees of organization or unity. Here we return to the idea
of purpose as a system, but the system here is a very different one
than the static and completed kind which was referred to above. (1)
They presup- The idea of compound purpose cannot be made plain without in-
pose the idea of troducing the concept of purposive or conative cycle, which will be
activity-cycles, expanded below. (2) It seems possible to fix the time limits of a
purposive activity within which the various experiences involved in
it are linked and unified by reason of the end to which they lead.
This wiiole may be called a conative or activi ty- cycle . It is a very
important conception which is too frequently overlooked in the dis-
cussion of personality and activity. In developed personality these
cycles are compounded in various ways by reference to more remote
purposes to which they lead; in other words, a person is able to di-
rect his activities in such a way that many of them will contribute
to the achievement of a common end, which, therefore, is at once ul-
terior and compound. These larger purposes of life will possess in-
trinsic value, while their elements will have instrumental value.
7". Personal- The opportunity for the development of personality appears when
ity in relation purposes gain in experience some measure of explicitness and when
to the several their achievement takes more than a moment of time. Ends that are
kinds of pur- sought with conscious intention by consciously devised means—here is
pose. the field where personality appears and unfolds, for it is the sphere
of evaluation and of self-determination in the light of evaluation.
One phase, then, in the development of personality lies in the clar-
ification of implicit, vague, and confused purposes, and in the adop-
tion of ends of an intermediate or remote kind, especially when these
have been carefully evaluated and approved, anterior to their real-
ization. In this realization a person himself, according to the idea
of unfolding purpose or "flying goal," may come better to define and
understand his own nature and deBtiny. Axiother phase in the develop-
ment of personality consists in the completion of well organized cy-
cles of purposive activity.
8"
. Summary The distinctions which have been made in the above discussion
classification of the varieties of explicit purposes, considered from the subjec-
of subjective tive point of view, may be summarized in the following table of
purposes. classifications made according to several principles or standpoints.
(1) See above, page 220.
(2) See below, pa^e 22o.
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Since these purposes are intimately associated witn conations and
values, and since the latter have not been systematically worked
out as yet in any degree, this classification is necessarily incom-
plete.
Classification of explicit purposes from the subjective standpoint .
A. According to the degree of conscious explicitness
:
1 . In a multiplicity of distinct activities:
a. Vague or obscure ; as in impulse.
b. Confused, i,. e
. ,
possessing an intermediate degree of
explicitness or clearness.
*c. Clear; as in voluntary action.
*2. Within a series of activities: the unfolding purpose or
"flying goal."
B. According to the temporal distance of the achievement of the end:
1. Proximate; e. g. , set, conscious attitudes.
*2. Intermediate; e. g. , a day's work, or task.
*5« Ulterior or remote; e. g. , a man's vocation.
C. According to the number of conative cycles present:
1. Simple; e. g. , a specific instinct, a so-called "impulsive"
action.
*2. Compound; e. g. , eating a meal, sight-seeing trip, getting
an education.
D. According to the character of the evaluation:
• 1 . Approved
.
2. Disapproved.
Those types above which are marked by an asterisk are the most im-
portant purposes which are characteristic of personal experience or
personality-activities. All the other kind3 of purpose, except the
last, are the materials out of which the self-conscious person works
out his own plan of life; the last is the refuse which accumulates
in the course of soul-making, and with which he refuses to identify
himself. The lower forms of purposive activity are important because
of the natural impelling force of many of them. The person makes
himself by taking hold of his elemental and original tendencies and
strivings, by criticizing and interpreting them, and finally by con-
trolling and utilizing them in self-approved plans of action, --in
short, by the definition and realization of ends.
4'. The direc- We have found good reasons, therefore, for interpreting the
tion of activ- direction of activity in terms of its purposive trend. Where this
ity is found in teleological factor is lacking in experience, we do not have activ-
ita purposive ity, but bare change or process. Whether simple or compound activ-
trend. ities come into question, each derives its trend and unity from the
end which is to be realized. (1)
a'. Time and The direction, then, of a typical activity does not admit of
purposive ac- spatial determination, nor can the concept of time alone suffice,
tivity. for the mere succession of experiences is not activity. In the
commonplace personal activity which we are studying, it is contrary
to fact to suppose that a person orders or unifies hia various activ-
ities by reference to the abstract idea of time; it ia always a con-
crete purpose which performs this function. The attempt to interpret
activity-direction in temporal terms alone means only a reatatoraent
of our problem in a more general form, for may it not be that the
concept of time itself originates in the aenae of incompleted pur-
( 1 ) Compare W. R. Sorley, Moral Valuea and the Idea of
God,
pages 444-5; 450.
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poses which is so universal in human experience? Is it not from
unrealized ends that the future gains its significance? We seem to
become most vividly conscious of the passage of time when our pur-
poses are thwarted, and when we are aware most clearly of the inter-
mediate steps which are required for their fulfilment. Miss M. W.
Calkins asserts that, "Every moment is what it is by virtue of its
relations to the irrevocable and the unattained. Thus the temporal
is essentially the incomplete." (1) In psychology it is well known
that we least notice the passage of time when all goes well and
when we are absorbed in the successful realization of our purposes.
Bowne's striking exposition of the relation of time to personality
may be recalled here. (2)
The question, How do we become aware of this direction? or
What are the "signs of direction?" cannot be much more fully an-
swered here than by saying that they consist in whatever marks for
us the fulfilment of or progress toward an end we are interested in.
These marks vary indefinitely according to the multiplicity of human
purposes, but most, if not all, of them may be subsumed under the
idea of the increasing satisfaction or value which appears as one
approaches a goal. This satisfaction is illustrated in the pragmat-
ic verification of ideas; (5) the latter, acting as leadings, are in
reality kinds of purposes. So far as I know no system of satisfac-
tions, taken as indications of the progress of purposive activity,
has been worked out, and it is certainly a very delicate and compre-
hensive problem, because of the variety and frequent indefini tenesc
of these satisfactions. Sometimes the real value which we attach to
the attainment of a purpose is shown most clearly in a negative way,
namely, by the kind of dissatisfaction present when our progress is
blocked in some way. Dissatisfactions are good indicators, when
translated into positive terms, of the directions of our mental ac-
tivities. (4)
It seems
,
then, that the direction of any mental activity is
determined by the anticipations of possible experiences of achieve-
ment, and that the line of its operation is marked by the variations
in one's satisfactions. If, for example, I set out to make a speech
and do it in a praiseworthy manner, I may say that I am elated; but
this does not mean primarily that I am high or low, east or west,
nor does it mean primarily that I have various organic aiu kines-
thetic sensations; but it does mean preeminently that I am satisfied
because I have attained that which I set out to get. In short, that
to which activity points, its direction, is found in the achievement
of its original and inner meaning. And for this determination we
need two points, and not three as in the determination of physical
motion. The point of origin is found in the presence of a purpose,
however vague or clear, and the point of conclusion is found in the
attainment of this purpose.
In discussions of personality, one often meets such phrases as
"the meaning of personal life." (5) The actual presence in one's
(1) Persistent Problems of Philsophy, 5rd edition, pages 440-1.
(2) See above, page 142. (5) See above, pages 15-16.
(4) See below, pages 255-55.
(5) See book with this title by N. Smyth.
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experience of the throbs of purposive activity or conative cycles
is life in the highest form which we human beings know. These ac-
tivities represent a more explicit, conscious, and full development
of that blind seeking of the sensitive organism v/hich is found in
lower forms of life, as well as of that behavior directed towards
the maintenance and development of the vital system, v/hich consti-
tutes the distinguishing mark of life from the biological stand-
point. "In conscious as in other vital activities", says W. R.
Sorley, "we must look to the end in order to understand them; and
in the organisms which are conscious, unlike other organisms, the
activity may be the realization of an idea or purpose which as a
mental fact preceded and anticipated the result." (1) So far, then,
as personal experience goes
v
life means precisely the purposive ac-
tivities which we are studying. But the term, activity . is adequate
to cover the facts in question; so that confusion may be avoided by
reserving the term, life
,
for use in connection with the biological
study of "living matter," or of organic processes. Beyond that lower
limit of conscious activities, where anticipation is no longer pres-
ent, we should not speak of activity, but of vital process or life;
for while purpose is present, it is probably of the objective type,
as defined above. (2) In the felt tendency towards a vaguely pres-
ent end the life process blossoms forth into conscious activity.
The meaning of consciousness, too, is to be found in purposive
activity. It is more proper to speak of conscious activity, or of
the conscious subject, than of the activity of consciousness, for
the latter phrase suggests that we have hypostatized consciousness
and assigned to it the rSle of an agent. Consciousness is one of
the characteristics of all activity; it is unique and strictly in-
definable. We may speak of it in terms of such synonyms as aware-
ness or sensitivity, but we cannot define it in a direct or logical
way. We all know, however, what it is, and we know what it means
to say that a man is unconscious. As Miss M. F. Washburn points
out, "Consciousness is that which is present when we are awake or
dreaming, and which is absent when we are dreamlessly asleep." (5)
She suggests that our inability to define consciousness should not.
trouble us, for behavior involves spatial movement, and we should
meet serious difficulties in defining space.
The meaning of consciousness, then, is to be found by refer-
ence to one of the familiar aspects of any one of our concrete ac-
tivities. Taken apart from the other aspects it is an abstraction.
(4) It may be regarded as an expression of a common property of
all our activities, but should not be taken as existing in and for
itself in some pure form, for that supposition would constitute a
fallacy of abstraction. And because activity has other distinguish-
able aspects than consciousness, the identification of it withmen-
tal activity (5) cannot be recommended . We cannot make conscious-
ness the distinguishing mark of activity, either, because there are
probably low forms of sensitive or conscious life which are not
(1) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 412.
(2) See above, pages 219-20.
(5) Movement and Mental Imagery, page 17.
(4) Compare J. Ward, Psychological Principles, page 22.
(5) As is done by S. Alexander, Proceedingo of the Aristotelian
Society, N. S., vol. VIII, page 221.
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properly called active, as we are defining that term. One may
heartily agree, however, with the suggestion that the "selective or
teleological character" of consciousness be adopted as "the funda-
mental and differentiating trait of conscious behavior." (1) J. E.
Creighton states that, "To live as conscious beings means to have
purposes, to will certain results, and employ ourselves in such a
way as to bring about their attainment." (2) Purposive activity is
the concrete fact of which consciousness is one property.
The discussion of purpose, the first implication of activity,
may now be summarily concluded. We assumed at the outset, upon the
basis of much definite evidence, that the human mind is fundamental-
ly and, we believe, constantly active. Whether there are experiences
of human beings which cannot be called active may be left open, for
if there are such, they are most likely not classifiable as personal,
and, therefore, do not concern us. We may express the conviction,
however, that there are none such. G. F. Stout has labored in his
Analytical Psychology to establish this view, and A. Aliotta main-
tains that, "undoubtedly the human mind is an activity in its every
moment." (5) J. Ward's definition of psychology supports the same
theory. (4)
But not only is all personal experience fundamentally active,
but it is also always purposive; and it is probable that all activity
is purposive. If satisfactions ever exist in human experience with-
out dependence upon any subjective purpose in the present or past
history of an individual, (5) they cannot be called personal, but
must either be assigned to a sub-per3onal stage of mental life, or
their concrete existence called in question. All personal experience
is active, and, by implication, purposive. ?.f.any advocates of this
view, that activity is alv/ays a tendency to an end, could be cited.
(6) L. T. Hobhouse puts the point most succinctly: "Rational pur-
pose is, and will always in the end be, recognised as the distinc-
tive feature of the activity of mind." (7) G. F. Stout asserts that,
"Our existence as conscious beings is essential Ly an activity, and
activity is a process which by its very nature is directed towards
an end, and can neither exist nor be conceived apart from thi3 end."
(8)
According to this view, pure activity in the sense of action
merely being or taking place, of action which has no meaning or tel-
eological reference, is not actual in human experience at the person-
al level. In concrete experience an individual subject is always
purposive at the same time that he is active; or, more exactly, a
real person acts purposively. (9)
(1) B. H. Bode, page 240 af his essay on "The Pragmatic At-
titude" in Creative Intelligence, edited by J. Dewey.
(2) Introductory Logic, page 404
(5) Idealistic Reaction against Science, paga I85.
(4) Psychological Principles, page 28. (5) Compars abovs, page 221
(6) For examples, see, G. A. Coe, Psychology of Religion, page
55; R. Latta, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc., N. S., vol. VIII,
page 20; E. Boutroux, Science and Religion, page 269l T. Loveday,
Mind, N. 3., vol. 10, page 469.
(7) Development and Purpose, page xxviii.
(8) International Journal of Ethics, Oct., 1694, page 119.
(9) Compare J. Ward, Psychological Principles, pages 266-7, not* t
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It is proposed, taen, that the term, activity , be restricted
to that circle of mental processes where purpose is present in the
subjective sense described above. (1) Accordingly, no experience
may be called active unless there is present to some conscious ex-
tent an anticipation of what is going to be, or of what is wanted.
The criterion of purpose is to be found in the presence or absence
of determination of an action by its "prospective sequel." Our
study of the first implication of activity warrants us in defining
activity as any experiential change or series of changes which is
consciously adapted to accomplishing some end, the end being pres-
ent to the actor or agent himself, and not merely to an observer.
Finally, then, so far as a person is fundamentally an active
being, we are warranted in asserting that he is also a fundamentally
purposive being. We have indicated already (2) the general nature
of the purposes which belong to the personal level of experience:
they must have, as a rule, a degree of clearness, of remoteness, of
approval, etc. The importance of their organization into compre-
hensive cycles or systems will be pointed out below. (5) Certainly
in a study of human purposes we find a marvelous revelation of hu-
man nature. As J. Laird says, "To strive persistently for an end,
with various modifications as circumstances dictate, is a funda-
mental characteristic of the self. We find ourselves in the ful-
filment of our aime." (4) The unique activity of human persons has
a colossal significance for the total spiritual life of man. The
first implication of concrete activity is purpose, and a primary
mark of personal experience is its purposiveness
.
The beginning of the third or constructive part of this inves-
tigation consisted in the presentation of evidence for the general
proposition that personality is in some sense dynamic or active, (5)
and it was proposed to study personality from the standpoint of ac-
tivity, and to develop the latter concept by setting forth its as-
pects or implications. We have found that, at the human and person-
al level, activity always implies some measure of purposiveness, but
if we stopped here, we should fall into the phenomenal is tic error of
supposing that activity is a presentation or phenomenon, and nothing
else. An exposition and defense of the second implication of activ-
ity, namely, agency, will save us from this mistake.
It is no doubt true that any particular activity has a phenomenal
or presentational aspect, (6) and it has proved easy to suppose that
this aspect exhausted its nature, as reference to a few great names
will indicate. J. F. Herbart attempted to explain activity in terms
of the combination of ideas, and David Hume had plenty of ideas in
succession, but no active principle of union. F. H. Bradley, too,
presents an incomplete view of activity when he defines it as the
expansion of an idea against a limit, and when he speaks of the will
as "the self-realization of an idea with which the self is identi-
fied." (7) In this interpretation the will and activity are loot in
(1) See above, page 220, bottom, and 221.
(2) See above, page 229. (?) 3ee below, pages 255-7 j J02-J;
Ik) Problems of the Self, page 242. (^^-16.)
(5) See above, pages 188-92. (6) See below, pages 256-9; 284-6.
(7) Mind, N. S., vol. XI, pages 457-69.
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abstraction, for an idea apart from a subject or active thinker
which posits it must be regarded as an abstraction. (1) Our criti-
cism of the endeavor to explain mental activity in terms of bodily
behavior (2) brought to light generally applicable objections to
regarding activity as phenomenal, at least in its actual entirety.
The aversion to the second implication of activity and the
desire for a purely objective or presentational explanation of it
are no doubt reasons for the backwardness and the "scandal" (5) in
the philosophy of activity. The phenomenalizing habit in dealing
with the subjective or agency-aspect of activity is illustrated
well by Miss M. F. Washburn's easy dismissal, as a peculiarity of
introspective interpretation, of N. Ach's finding that the exper-
ience of purpose contains, as one factor, a unique activity of the
self which cannot be resolved into the usual elements of the struc-
tural psychologist; her reason for rejecting this view is that he
offers "no suggestion as to the possible psychophysical basis of
this activity of the self." (4) Obviously it does not follow from
her reasoning that there is no self present in activity. She treats
E. Meumann's results in the same peremptory way.
If, however, purposive activity is not to be dissolved com-
pletely into a realm of abstractions or phenomena, it must have a
ground that is not identical with a succession of phenomena. To
make activity possible something relatively permanent is apparently
needed. When F. H. Bradley states that activity is "self-caused"
change, (5) the adjective he must use indicates the presence of
something more than bare change. To designate the ground of activ-
ity which we are seeking we shall use, for general reference, the
word, agency ; and, agent or actor in connection with individual ac-
tivities; the phrase, active subject , will be treated as synonomous
with agent
.
B. P. Bowne's discussion of agency (6) constitutes a
striking statement of some of the problems in question, and may be
recalled here as the starting point of the following exposition.
We shall offer first some reasons for supposing that agency is an
implication of activity, and then consider its meaning and function.
We began with the assumption that purposive activity is a fact
of human experience, and to explain this fact and make it possible,
it seems necessary to postulate an actor or agent. To find the ac-
tor in personal activity will be to come upon another central factor
in the concept of personality. The distinction between agent and
activity is an important one in the clarification and exposition of
the idea of personality, for it is likely that much of the confusion
in modern thought with regard to personality is due to the confusion
between these terms . In agency we cone upon an abiding factor which
is essential to personality.
A number of reasons will be presented now in answer to the
question, Why does activity require an actor? The first reason for
positing an agent as one of the fundamental conditions or implica-
tions of activity is to be found in the necessity of saving the fact
(1) As G. D. Hicks has shown; compare Proceedings of the Aria.
Soc., U. 3. vol. VIII, "Subject and Object," etc., pages 160-214.
(5) F. H. Eradley. (2) See above, pages 200-10.
(4) Movement and Mental Imagery, page 160.
(5) Appearance and Reality, page 64.
(6) See above, page 146, bottom, page 147, top.
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To save of activity from dissolution into a process of change that is bare
the dissolution and unperceived, for the proposition seems fairly well established
of activity that if change is to appear at all, it must do so in the experience
into mere change. of one who does not change in the same way or rate as that which he
experiences. Activity, however, is not thus dissolved away, but is
a fact of daily experience, and we may conclude that every activity
of adult human beings requires an agent. Although activity has
certain mutable aspects, (1) the existence of these depends upon an
agent which abides through them and sustains them,
b' . The fact In the second place, the fact of purpose requires a purposer.
of purpose re- Evidence has been presented (2) to show that human activities are
quires a pur- intrinsically purposive. But how does a future event, or "prospec-
poser. tive sequel," condition or effect a present action? The answer is,
Only upon the basis of an agent who, both in anticipation and in
realization, unites his present state with a future one, and who
knows the one as the initiatioi^and the other as the conclusion of an
activity which is unified by an identical purpose which he maintains
through the whole. That is, a genuine purpose does not subsist in
some transcendent world, but exists for some subject, however the
latter may be described. A desirer, a seeker after ends, one who
anticipates, is a necessary condition of the efficacy of purposes in
directing human actions. R. B. Perry recognizes this factor in pur-
posive activity when he defines purpose as "the determination of an
action by its agreement with the agent's expectation." (5) An abid-
ing agent is needjror the execution of Perry's program of analysis,
and also for the verification of ideas in the pragmatic sense. (4)
Pragmatic verification is impossible without an active and- interested
subject who carries through the "validating" process, and recognizes
the attainment of the truth-value he seeks
.
The necessity of an agent in purposing can be indicated in var-
ious other ways. The fact that many desires and plans can be real-
ized only in the course of days or months presupposes an agent who
continues to cherish them amid the vicissitudes of his life. A ver-
itable and fateful purpose simply would cease to exist if anywhere,
in the process of realization, a conscious subject should no longer
maintain an interest in it. Neither ends nor interests are actual,
save as they are live issues for real actors. "A transition that
begins with, and comes out of, the thing itself is the process,"
says F. H. Bradley (5), "where we feel that it is active." In other
words, if there are such experiences as conative cycles, unified by
purpose and leading to actual achievements, it is essential to postu-
late agents who "see them through."
The need of an actor is especially evident in the selection and
adjustment of means to ends. An agent is needed as the one who fore-
sees ends, who devises appropriate means for their realization, and
who beholds the achievement of the ends by the means adopted.
Again, it seems to be a plain matter of daily experience that
one is not lost in the manifold mental processes entailed in the
performance of his duties and the satisfaction of hie interests. A
(1) See above, pages 215-14. (2) See above, pages 220-2J5.
(5) 3ee above, pages 9^-6.
(4) See above, pages 15-16.
(5) Appearance and Reality, page 64.
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permanent and active subject is manifest whenever one can say, "I
have done what I intended, and am satisfied." By the postulation
of such an agent, interests , and mental processes in general, are
saved from being abstractions.
Finally, in the clearest cases of purposing or choosing ends,
there is present an element of assent or adoption, a kind of will-
ing or consenting to the projection of the plans in question. It
seems, therefore, that the achievement of ends as experienced by
human beings is meaningless apart from one who is conscious both
of their initiation and of their fulfilment. But here we come upon
an agent who is not merely a process, but who abides through a se?-
ries of changes; who, indeed, desires so to abide in order to be-
hold the conclusion of his esteemed work.
In the third place, an agent is required to explain the unity
found among the multifarious purposes and active tendencies of any
individual. To feel varying desires at different times is a famil-
iar experience, and at any time it is always possible for one to say
truly that he has them. Now, how account for the fact that they do
not exist separately, as independent conscious entities? Tais fact
of common ownership among the desires and purposes of a human in-
dividual can be explained only by supposing that an agent or active
subject possesses them, or acts in various ways in accordance with
them. His ends and wants may lack moral organization, but they do
not lack his ownership. The unity present may be imperfect, but
the ordinary unity of consciousness (1) points to a single subject
or actor.
When my native tendencies become organized, the presence of an
active subject becomes more evident. In cases of voluntary decision,
moral conduct, and deliberate action, an agent who shall make the
choice, feel the sense of duty, and assume responsibility for his
action, is requisite. A moral act clearly must be grounded in an
intelligent and responsible agent. This moral agent cannot be re-
garded as the organism for the same reasons that we cannot explain
mental activity in terms of bodily behavior. (2) A moral act is
more than bodily behavior, for it presupposes a conscious motive
and an approval upon the part of the actor. It may involve a ration-
al judgment, but this, apart from the agent, is an abstraction. Our
discussion of purpose a page or two back has prepared us for the
recognition that an agent is indispensable in moral conduct.
A very impressive reason for postulating an agent in human ac-
tivities is to be found in the efficacy of the latter. A familiar
maxim declares that, "Where there is a will, there is a way." It may
be said more truly that, where there is a way, there is a will; where
there are novelties and transformations v/hich disrupt the smooth
course of experience and which are not explicable in mechanical or
causal terms, there is an agent; there exists an interested subject
who, dissatisfied with his present experience, modifies it to suit
remote ends. In this argument we are carrying out Bowne'o uu gestion
that, "We may trace the deed to the doer." (5)
(1) See below, pages 510-12.
(2) See above, pages 200-11.
(5) Metaphysics, page 428. See above, page 146, bottom,
page 147, top.
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Summary
The creation of one world of experience after another, the construc-
tions of the hunian imagination, the rational systems and practical
schemes of human life confirm the postulate of an agent effectively
at work amid his developing experiences, transforming them so that
they may fit unexpected contingencies and contribute to long-range
goals. (1)
There is a large group of psychologists who believe that a sub-
ject of experience, especially of activity-experiences, is always
present. N. Ach, for example, thinks that one of the factors in the
adoption of a purpose is an immediate and irreducible activity of
the ego, which is accompanied by the consciousness (Bewusstheit) of
"I will" or "I really will." (2) E. Meumann asserts that in volun-
tary resolve, an inner assent to the end of the action must be pres-
ent; this assent, he thinks, is unique, and is sjcmptomatic of "an
elementary active reaction of the Ego." (5)
The views of the English thinkers, I. R. Sorley and J. Ward,
may be noted. The former asserts that, "None of the qualities,
ideas, or actions of the self have any real existence except as qual-
ities, ideas, or actions of the individual subject. It is the cen-
tre to which they are all related and without which they would not
be." (4) J. Ward defines psychology in terms of individual exper-
ience, in which attention or an active subject is always present; he
says that, "The subject is first and always that which lives, which
thinks and feels and acts, which attends, and is pleased or pained
by its sensations and movements." (5)
The American psychologist, Miss M. W. Calkins, advocates a self-
psychology which supports the metaphysical need of an agent in human
activity. She reiterated recently thu~t, "It has over and over again
been shown not only that all psychic phenomena may be described as
experiences of a self, but that many of them are inadequately and
equivocally described without this reference to conscious self or
selves." (6) In another place (7) she has pointed out how an Ich-
psychologie reveals an active and personal self standing in relation
to other selves.
These views of contemporary psychologists confirm the require-
ment of an agent or active subject in the activity-experiences of
human beings, who may be distinguished with profit from the meiital
processes or objective phenomena apprehended by him. In predomi-
nantly cognitive experiences this subject may be called the knower,
and in primarily conative experiences, the doer, but in both cases
the subject is intrinsically active, and is properly designated an
agent. The review of reasons for postulating an agent in activity
may be concluded by noting the following interesting confession of
(1) See James 1 description of how the self modifies experience,
page 72, top.
(2) From Messer's review in Kantotudien, vol. XV, pages 509 ff.,
of Ach's Uber den Willensakt und das Temperament, Leipzig, 1910.
(5) This summary is taken from 11, F. Washburn's review of
Meumann, Intelligenz und Wille, 2te Auf 1 . , Leipzig, 1915
-
(4) Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 459-40.
(5) Mr. F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind, Mind, 0. 3., vol.
XII, 1887, page 169. See also, Psychological Principles.
(6) Psychological Bulletin, vol. \6 t 1919, "The Self in Recent
Psychology," page 116.
(7) Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologic
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Carveth Read: "I should be glad to hear its (Aristotelian Society's)
opinions upon the good old-fashioned doctrine that all activity is
activity of the soul: a belief which, for my own part, I can neither
verify nor relinquish. 11 (1)
The agent, then, is the one who acts, who strives, who carries
out plans; he is the actor that is implied in all activity. He is
likewise the knower in cognition, and the one who is affected in
emotion. While in philosophical usage, the term, subject
,
has pri-
marily an epistemo logical and affective reference, no special pref-
erence need be expressed for either subject or agent
,
since in know-
ing there is always some activity, and therefore, agency; while in
the activity of the ordinary intelligent person, there is always an
intellectual factor. Both intellect and will, however, are only as-
pects of the unitary and individual activity which presupposes,
whenever it exists, an agent. What is important is to bear in mind
that the subject of activity, however one names it, is dynamic; this
character is emphasized by our term, agency , and by J. Ward's term,
"attention." The latter explains that, "instead of a congeries of
faculties, we have assumed a single subjective activity, and have
proposed to call this attention . . Attention . . has invariably an
active sense." (2) The so-called pure subject, then, is an abstrac-
tion which means simply the agent considered as a condition of an
act of knowing without regard to other mental factors present. J.
Ward also affirms that, "The so-called operations and states of con-
sciousness are not mere modes in vacuo: they imply an active and af-
fectible subject." (5)
We have seen, then, that demands press upon us from many sources
to the effect that we postulate "one who" acts, strives, thinks, pur-
poses, etc. The question now arises with regard to who or what this
one might be? If we are called upon to point him out so that he may
be seen and examined, we must reply that the agent cannot be directly
known, for the simple reason that he is the knower in any act of
knowing which is aimed at comprehending his nature. However, he may
be known indirectly, or, in other words, may be thought of or con-
ceived. This conceptual construction is based upon our knowledge of
what the agent does; we shall return to this point in a moment, (k)
At the outset of the discussion of the problem of knowing what
the agent is, it is important to understand what kind of an answer
is possible to such a question as was propounded at the beginning of
the last paragraph. When one says that the agent is the one who
acts
,
intends, perseveres, or resolves, it is clear that the agent
is a conception or abstraction which undoubtedly is formulated upon
the basis of many specific activity-experiences. But the agent, when
studied in connection with such experiences, is no more or lese ab-
stract than certain other implicated factors, such aa consciousness
,
change, or achievement.
In contrast to the conceptual agent, the real agent may be dis-
tinguished. The latter is the agent at work in any particular con-
crete activity; it is the active subject inextricably interwoven in
the living unity of the actual act which he is performing. But when
(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII,
page 24j.
(2) Psychological Principles, pages 60, 61. (3) Ibid., page 2k.
Ik) Compare S. Hodgson, Proceedings of the Ariototelion Society,
I . S., vol. I, page 220.
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we attempt to think of the agent, apart from his concrete activity,
as the one who acts or the one -.7ho experiences, we have set up an
abstraction, for the agent never exists, save as a concept, in such
a detached way. The demand that we present the agent as an object
for inspection apart from its acts is a reflection of a mistaken
common8ense or mechanical point of view, according to which one is
expected to be able to cut up a personal activity into parts for
exhibition, and still have living and real activity. The actual
fact is activity, which has several implications which may be con-
sidered in abstraction; one of these is agency.
But is not an abstract idea of the agent capable of leading us
right up to the real agent, so that we may view him as he is? This
is impossible in the nature of the case, for the agent with which I
may identify myself at this moment is not anything which can be ex-
hibited as a presentation or mental process, such as a group of
kinaesthetic sensations, for any of these would presuppoae for its
existence exactly the agent with which it is identified. In general,
then, it may be said that the threat of a vicious circle keeps us
from expecting to find the agent among objects the apprehension of
which at any moment depends upon his activities
.
A closer consideration of the relation bf the agent to exper-
ience will lead us to a better understanding of the sense in which
an agent may be known. It has become evident that the agent cannot
be regarded as a phenomenon, and nevertheless that he is more than a
conception. In general, the agent is not anything which can be ex-
perienced, where this passive phrase refers to any object appre-
hended by an experiencing subject. The reason for this assertion
follows immediately from the fact that the agent is precisely the ac-
tive subject who experiences, who is the unitary and dynamic center
of all such psychical matters of fact ( 1 ) as volitions, emotions,
decisions, perceptions, judgments, intentions, etc., (2) which fill
out for us human beings the universe of discourse called by the gen-
eral name of experience.
In our criticism of James 1 theory of the self we found pure ex-
perience to be a barren abstraction, and we also learned that actual
experience at the level of the human adult involves an active subject
or agent. (5) In short, the real meaning of activity can be found
neither in neutral experience without a subject nor in bare agency
apart from the concrete activities in which it is operative. It is
in the particular pulses of conscious life, in the specific acta of
human individuals, which constitute experience and which presuppose
a subject, that we shall find real agency.
How the experiences or conscious acts just referred to are com-
plex, and in each several aspects may be distinguished, among them
the subject or agent. In these experiences or Erlcbnisse. as the
Germans bo well call them (4), the agent is immanent. He can di-
rectly appreciate his real meaning only by the kind of intuition of
actual acting which was described above. (5) He can know himself
mediately, however, in memory, where he recalls how he acted in some
(1) Compare A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, page 2J.
(2) See others' above, page 221.
(5) See above, pages 66-72; compare E. N. Herring ton, The
Problem of Personality, Part IX, chapter I.
(4) Compare J. Laird, Problems of the Self, page 15.
(5) See above, pages 161-2.
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concrete way. Out of these intuitions and memories the active
subject may build a conception of himself as actor.
These speculative and epistemological difficulties with ref-
erence to agency are foreign to my ordinary experiences, where I
am at work, now in this direction and now in that, and where I am
continually demonstrating my capacity to do things. But my agency
is of such a unitary character that I am unable to get out of my-
self when I am doing one thing so as to do another thing at the
same time. But in doing any particular deed the fact that I am
doing it is a matter of immediate experience, which I do not doubt
at the moment, for its reality and living actuality are beyond
question. When I reflect upon this experience, my reflection is a
new activity, which again is so present and immediate to me that
it is meaningless to me to suggest its unreality. Activities, as
they are performed by the agent, are perfectly transparent to him,
for they are his very own. I am unable to improve upon my previous
description of thseu^imminence in or intuition of his own activities.
(D
The observations of F. C. S. Schiller may be noted here with
profit. He declares that (2), "A philosophy which refuses to enter
into the feelings of the agent must in the end pronounce the whole
conception of agency an unmeaning mystery. Now this external way
of conceiving agency from the standpoint of a bystander was Hume's
fundamental trick." Schiller recommends that we take the standpoint,
not of the spectator, but of the "purposing agent." He believes in
"our immediate experience of agency." To "enter into the feelings
of the agent," or more exactly, to have agency-feelings, means to
act as an agent, to do a deed, to achieve a purpose; for to have the
feelings of an agent or to perform activities is always a concrete
experience
.
Therefore, to one who would know what agency means, we can only
say, act, and having acted, stop to consider that your activity im-
plies, among other factors, an abiding agent. To such an enquirer
we would say, follow this simple formula: do something for a pur-
pose, and then recall how you felt in that particular activity.
Such concrete acts are real samples of personal life. In them the
agent is, not the end, not the presentations involved, not the ex-
perience as a whole, but the conscious subject who does the deed,
who entertains the end and sees it through, for whom the presenta-
tions occurring in its achievement exist. (5) It is the agent, too,
who, at the end of the individual activity, is interested in noting
the stages or aspects of it, and in doing so, institutes another
activity in which the same agent acts. He recognizes the fact of
his continuity or permanence in his very endeavor to understand a
previous activity of his own. After all there is no serious diffi-
culty or obstacle in the way of one's considering what his activi-
ties have meant to him as he realized them. One must remember,
however, that the agent which is referred to past activities is a
conceptual one, and that the real agent is always present and im-
manent in an experiential whole.
(1) See above, pages iei-2. (2) Humanism, page 2J0.
(5) See below, 2^2-J; 256-9, on the empirical phases of per-
sonality
.
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e'. Restate- The fundamental difficulty in knowing the agent may be re-
aent of the stated in the following form. In any particular case of a typical
fundamental activity an immanent agent is implied who is interested in a pur-
difficulty in- pose, for example, of taking a walk for exercise, and who carries
volved in at- out his intention. If, in the midst of the realization of this
tempting to particular purpoae, one should stop to ask concerning the nature
know the mean- of the agent that is carrying it out, would one learn what agency
ing of the agent.means? Yes, he would learn this much about it, namely, that he
is an agent interested in this practical goal of maintaining health
by exercise; but then his knowledge would be retrospective and con-
ceptual, for the real agent has stepped one step forward in order
to maintain and develop this new interest and new activity which is
directed to ascertaining the nature of agency by studying a partic-
ular activity.
In practice, however, one has no difficulty in identifying the
one who chooses to take a walk with the one who is interested in
studying the nature of agency. Perhaps the identity is not abso-
lute, but a recognized continuity is present. The demand for a
real and objective knowledge of the agent is based upon a condition
which would destroy agency itself as a unitary and continuous being,
for this demand means nothing else than that, the same agent act in
two different ways at the same time, which is impossible; for then
we should have two active subjects, and not one real agent become
known by another. The unity of the^gent must be maintained. (1)
In conception, however, we can refer not merely two acts, but
any number, to the same agent. But in this reference the agent is
an abstract one, for we do not suppose that the same human agent
can perform many acts at once. There is nothing in experience,
however, which prevents me from affirming that all of my past acts
were performed by the very agent which now makes this affirmation,
and I may notice tha-„ this affirmation is just another peculiar way
in which I act. The conclusion of the matter is that the agent in
a present activity-experience cannot be apprehended by itself, and
the demand that the possibility of such knowledge be explained would,
if satisfied, do violence to the individuality and lae internal con-
sistency of any agent or activity; for it i3 clear that if one acts
so as to gain one end, he is acting with reference to that end and
not to another. The adoption of another end, be it the endeavor to
understand agency, does not take him into tae nature of the agent
in the first activity, for that activity has been supplanted by the
second, unless it be possible for one to act in two ways at tae
same time, but this seems impossible for human beings, (2) J. <7ard
points out that, "Instead, therefore, of the position that feeling
and attention as such are known by being made objects of reflexion,
it would seem we can only maintain that in this way we know of them
by their effects, by certain changes i. e. wnich they bring about
in the character and succession of our presentations." He adds that
while we cannot say we know them, neitner can we say we are ignorant
of them. (5)
(1) See below, pages 244-5.
(2) Several reasons why this one limitation in our knowledge
does not trouble us, and further points bearing on the knowledge
of agency, will be presented below, pages
(5) Psychological Principles, page 56.
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Since the agent has, as we shall see below (l), A certain per-
manence in the midst of his activities, it will serve as the abiding
center of personal activity. Hence, what has been said about know-
ing an agent will apply to knowing a person, so far as a person is
an active subject of experience. But just as activity is more than
agency, so personality will probably turn out to be more than a
conscious subject. (2) Likewise, just as we distinguished between
the conceptual and the real agent, we must make a distinction be-
tween personality as a concept and personality as that which thinks
,
feels, and wills. Failure to take account of this difference has
not infrequently led to confusion in historical conceptions of per-
sonality. It might be possible to classify modern views of person-
ality according to whether their respective exponents suppose that
the 30ul, 3elf, or personality is something which we can know di-
rectly, or whether it is something we can know only indirectly by
studying and describing its activities. Personality, like agency,
is much more than a concept; this more is to be found in concrete
and purposive activities. These activities can be lived, and in
living them, one i£ a person. They can also be remembered and
thought about, and, as a result, may be built into a conception of
personality that is a matter of knowledge.
Only a brief exposition of the general nature of the agent is
needful here in addition to the incidental references to some of
his characters in the last main section, and in addition to the
fuller discussion below of the same points in connection with per-
sonality. The main characteristics to be noted are the permanence
and the unity of the agent.
Since the developing instinctive and habitual behavior of a
person undoubtedly exists in time, the question arises concerning
whether or not the personal agent or subject is in time. Constant
reference to some specific activities will help quickly to give an
answer to this question. In my childhood a variety of instincts
functioned in connection with what I have come to call my body, and
gradually I have formed habits of skill in play and work. Some day
I may notice the fact that I have responded in similar instinctive
ways on several occasions, for example, in fear and flight. I may
lack the philosophic interest in asserting that I was the actonin
the manifold activities of my life, although that statement would
be perfectly possible for me to make if my attention were called to
the mode of expression suggested. But I may remember on the occa-
sion of a fire that I was once before afraid of a fire. Or, my par-
ents may have induced me to take piano lensons, und I may remember
very well that I practiced or failed to practice on many dayB . I
who play the piano today played it yesterday and the day before; in-
deed, I may say that I have spent many years in learning to play it,
and it is I who can play the piano now as a result.
Now am I, the agent who play the piano today, the same or dif-
ferent than I who played the piano yesterduy? It ie clear that I
cannot assert that I who played yesterday is a thing of the past
for the evident reason that it is I who make the affirmation in the
present. I recall that I have acted in many ways by remembering the
effects or the feelings of my action and not by becoming another
agent
.
(1) See below, pages 242-4.
(2) Compare below, pages 264-6.
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My history or personal biography becomes possible if we may
conceive of a single agent acting in various ways or directions at
different times, but it is rendered impossible if we suppose that
a different agent is present in each activity. In this case there
would be lacking an inner connection or real ground, and a series
would become possible only if some other permanent agent connected
the activities in question into a history; but in that case per-
manent agency would be a fact just the same. If, therefore, there
are such things as biographies, there are permanent agents. We may
speak of them as permanent only from the standpoint of, or in con-
trast with, the temporal succession of the effects of their activ-
ities upon their own course of experience and upon that of others.
From the point of view of agency itself, it would be better to say
that agents are identical. The fact, however, is plain, however
it is labeled.
It is^not meaningless, then, to declare that I played the piano
yesterday
,
A ?ft*e same agent who acts in piano-playing may care also
for philosophy and history. I learn to construct a temporal system
in which I fix numerous historical facts. This system itself i3 a
product of my activity, and the same active subject which builds it
may be interested also in locating the remembered effects of his
multifarious activities in this system. I am in time only in this
restricted or borrowed sense, namely, that I experience various ob-
jects in a certain sequence, the object and not the agent being in
the sequence, for it is the agent which experiences the sequence,
and builds it upon the basi3 of his own identical or abiding ex-
istence
.
S. Alexander expresses the identitjjpf the agency by saying that
mental activities are single in source but difi'erent in direction.
"It is not the quality of consciousness that differs, but its coef-
ficient of direction'.' ( 1 )In commenting on this view, J. ,/ard says,
"I agree that the conscious or mental activity is in itself one and
the same, working only in different 'directions.' 1 ' (2)
The agent, then, is permanent, not as enduring in time, but as
acting now in this way and now in that. Since an individual agent
of the human sort seems able to act only in one direction "at a
time," the agent himself constructs the abstract concept of time so
as to correlate his various activities. To assert that the agent ie
permanent means to deny that he exists in some real time apart from
that which appears as a result of his activities. The term, identi-
cal, is preferable to the word, permanent , as applied to agency. I
may speak of the plurality if my activities, but this is a concep-
tual construction; for in fact they existed one by one. The same
agent, however, operated in all; so that I speak of the identity or
singleness of my agency.
If it should be asked whether activities are temporal, the re-
ply would be that they both are and are not according to whether one
considers the phenomenal or presentational effects of them in his
experience, or whether he considers the agency involved in them.
The agent strictly is not in time, although certain of his activi-
ties are; indeed, it may be that it is from these activities, with
(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol.
VIII, page 221.
(2) Ibid., page 226.
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their stress and strain, their sense of success and defeat, that
the idea of time originally is derived. I do not remember my agency
as something that was and now is not, for then memory itself would
be cut off j I remember myself by considering the Effects of my ac-
tivities; this recolleotion, however, would be impossible without
the presupposition of the identical agent. (1) Memories exist be-
cause the same agent reacts to different objects. We shall return
to the problems of memory (2) and of identity below. (3)
b 1 . The unity The problem of time would be set in a leza misleading context
of the agent. if one asked how the idea of succession in one's activities arises
instead of how one's activities aay be conne^ed, for the original
fact is a unitary activity, and not a series. The agent consti-
tutes this unity, and so we have to consider in what sense the agent
is u.iitary.
1". A unitary The necessity for what J. 'ward calls "the central unity of the
agent required subject," (4) has become evident from the discussion of the problem
to make activ- of knowing agency. Either the agent in any activity is single or it
ity possible. is not. We have no way of deciding this question 3ave by consulting
concrete experiences or activities. Now in them the assertion that
the subject performs the whole of an activity is perfectly intellig-
ible. But how an activity is possible save as one agent "sees it
through" is quite unintelligible, for we have no experience in nor-
mal life of the active subject or agent transferring its burden of
work either within one activity cycle or within a series. In short,
activity as actually present in human experience is impossible with-
out a unitary agent which grounds it. The impossibility of splitting
the agent in the endeavor to know it has been suggested. (5) We in-
fer, too, that the active subject is unitary because it is the or-
ganizer of a unitary experience. Those who deny this unitary char-
acter of the agent in human activity must present some evidence from
experience which has not yet turned up.
2"
.
Non-spatial Those who speak of the agent as complex introduce into their
or simple char- discussion, usually, spatial metaphors which are not permissible,
acter of the save as they are recognized as such. Instead of declaring that the
agent. agent possesses various powers of acting, we may avoid spatial fig-
ures by affirming that one and the same agent acts now in one way
and now in another, the mode being determined by the concrete sit-
uation, especially by the teleological factor present. But, as
Bowne very well suggests, we know of no way of tracing these differ-
ent forms of activity into the subject so as to discover its inner
constitution; we can only lay down the laws of the subject s activ-
ities. (6) The demand that we thus trace the deeds into the doer
arises from the inveterate habit, of many thinkers, of expecting
and insisting upon spatial representations of their conceptions.
The ultimate agent, so far as we human beings are doncerned, is that
subjective aspect of any concrete activity which we have tried to
(1) Bowne 's illuminating discussion of the temporal status of
personality ought to be recalled here; see above, pages 141-J.
(2) See below, pages 262-71. (5) See below, pages J20-29.
(4) Psychological Principles, page 72.
(5) See above, page 241. (6) See above, pages 146-7-
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describe on the preceding pages
. This aspect is to be understood in
terms of generalizations based upon the observation of many specific
activities, and not by setting up some substance behind or below the
agent which supports it, for the agent is himself the doer so far as
we can know. The conceptual generalization may take the form of
statement, that the agent has the power to act in numerous ways, but
this assertion must not be taken to mean anything else than an ex-
pression of the fact that the agent in question has historically
acted in various ways and knows it, and also of the fact taat the
agent knows no reason why he may not continue to act in definite
ways in order to carry out the desires of which he becomes aware from
time to time
.
The simplicity If we wish to emphasize the point of the last paragraph, namely,
of the agent. that the agent cannot be explained by or thought of as being com-
posed of parts or elements, we may speak of the simplicity of the
agent. This characteristic will not add anything to our positive de-
scription of him, but will merely indicate the denial that the agent
is composed of elements or parts of any kind. (1) It will serve to
emphasize in another way that the agent in any activity is single
and unitary. We speak of the agent acting upon his environment and
not of moving among the objects of his experience.
c
1
.
Agency and Bowne declared that, "The soul is a proper agent acting out of
personality. itself." (2) This statement may be expanded so as to epitomize the
results that we have obtained thus far: a person is a proper agent
who acts purposively out of himself. When a person comes to himself,
he is already a purposive actor, being one of the original facts of
reality. This definition of personality, the quality of being a
person, is not sufficient, of course, to cover the facts, but it is
fundamental. In the expression of purpose and agency we have made
important forward steps in our problem of gradually constructing a
conception of personality by setting forth the implications of ac-
tivity.
d. THE THIRD We have found that the abstract character of the agent and his
IMPLICATION OF central position in any cognitive act prevent U8 f rom knowing him in
ACTIVITY: the ordinary way of knowing objects of perception. One may say that
INDIVIDUALITY. the agent is "that which" acts in this way or tnat, meaning thereby
himself taken in general as the active subject of his particular ac-
V. The con- tivities, but, apart from such concrete activities, "that which acts,"
cept of in- or the agent, is clearly an abstraction. (5) It has been indicated
dividuality ap- already (4), however, that the agent may be suffused with all the
plied to an ac- warmth of reality and of the affective life if he is considered in
Uvity empha- the act of actually doing something definite. While, therefore, the
•ize8 its con- agent is an abstraction in himself, he may understand nimuelf in his
creteness. real efficacy in realizing or experiencing the effects achieved in
his concrete activities. This distinction between the conceptual
. Heed of a and the acting agent is easily made and grasped, and it is to the
concrete study latter that we now turn,— to the agent at work in a specific constel-
of activity. lation of exoerience. Since the idea of concrete activity hue provod
to be so important in the understanding of personality, we must ex-
amine its significance more carefully. We shall do bo by ••tting
(1) See, B. P. Bowne, above, page 144.
(2) Metaphysics, page JOO. See above, page 146, middle.
(5) See above, page 2J8. (4) See above, pagee 2J9-40.
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forth the meaning of the individuality of activity. This concep-
tion is the third implication of activity which will be expounded.
And in the study of the concrete workings of the agent, we shall
learn more about his meaning, for after all it is in his acts that
we find what he is
.
By the individuality of activity is meant the concrete unity
of an actual act or activity-experience as determined by the par-
ticular constellation of mental facts present in the realization of
a definite purpose. One's biography is a long succession of such
individual acts, grounded upon an identical and unitary agent, and
involving all manner of combinations of conscious processes. Out
of these individual acts, too, one builds the general concept of ac-
tivity which gives his life significance beyond that single act to
which one is confined in the present moment. This idea of individ-
uality is intended to prevent actual activities, which we shall call
act3, from losing their essentially systematic and unified character
by being reduced to some kind of phenomenal or other series or com-
pound. This idea, also, will serve as a constant 7/arning against
falling into too abstract an account of activity, and will emphasize
the concrete and purposive character of activity. In the elucidation
of this concept we shall be examining the person at his real work in
the world.
Now the individuality of an act brings out the fact that it is
at once a complexity and a wholeness. These points will be consider-
ed in order. The complexity of acts which the idea of individuality
implies is manifested in a very great variety of ways. G. F. Stout,
in his psychological analysis of conation, emphasizes the fact that
this experience is complex. He himself thinks, indeed, that there i3
an original conative element which can be distinguished from the
other features of the complex; this unique element he calls "felt
tendency." He poi-ts out, however, that it does not exist apart from
other processes. It exists as a part of a little system of exper-
ience of varying comprehensiveness. Such a system we have designated
the individuality of activity. The agent and trie purpose are pre-
supposed; their relations will be more clearly seen from a study of
individuality. We can distinguish in an activity, the agent or that
which act3, the end for which the agent acta, and finally the per-
formance of the act itself, and it is in tae latter individual aBpect
that we have before us activity in its concreteness and actuality.
It goes without saying that amid the exigencies of daily life, there
are all degrees of perfection with which the individuality of an act
is realized.
The statement that activity is complex rests upon the results of
analysis. This analysis needs to be supplemented by a synthesis.
The latter will be an interpretation or recognition of the concrete
wholeness of certain typical or fully developed acts. This recogni-
tion is of gteat importance in the understanding of personality. The
purposive activities of the human individual are not merely complex-
ities, but usually they are complexities that are in a measure order-
ly. They have individualities of their own. T. Loveday observes
that, "Every conation involves some progression of feelings and
ideas; it cannot therefore be any one of them," but must be token
as a whole. (1) It is probable that this active Individuality is
a key to the understanding of individuality in general or as used in
(1) Mind, N. S., vol. X, page 461
.
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other connections. (1) Just as the biologist speaks of the parts
of the organism cooperating in the interest of the organism as a
whole, we may expect to find that various mental processes develop
themselves in the interest of a conscious and teleological whole.
It is seldom in psychological literature that this idea of
the individuality of acts has received recognition; indeed, only
occasionally does one meet a hint that its existence is suspected.
There is a fairly clear recognition of the concept in Miss M. F.
Washburn 1 8 book on Movement and ..lental Imagery and in R. B. Perry's
article on "Docility and Purposiveness') (2 )The idea in question cer-
tainly needs to be worked out more carefully.
The neglect of it is to be explained in part by the preoccu-
pation of psychologists ./ith the elements of consciousness, or the
units of behavior, without regard to their actual and conscious
wholeness. This oversight is due to what <7
.
E. Ritter calls the
" elemental is
t
1
s" fallacy, namely, the mistake of losing the whole
of a fact by preoccupation with its parts or phases, Thi3 fallacy
is illustrated in biology by the attempt to get a real live organism
out of a combination of cellular elements. It is the fallacy of the
structuralists in psychology, when they attempt to explain various
complex phases of the mental life in terms of the composition of so-
called mental elements. Until one has found the idea of active in-
dividuality, the idea of a mental series unified by a purposive bond,
he will not have found the key to the unders tanding of personal life,
nor, indeed, of mental life in general. It is to be hoped that tne
development of a functional psychology as outlined by G. A. Coe (3)
will overcome this deficiency by providing those definite teleologi-
cal principles which give concrete personal acts and series of acts
their intimate unity. If one is really to understand a personal act,
he must not stop to introspect at any point he pleases in the midst
of its development, for in that case he is likely to lose the sig-
nificance of the act as a whole, and may find only bodily sensations,
as James did. (4) One need not deny the existence of the bodily
feelings which he finds, but one should point out that the activity
which James sought has vanished, andunother which he does not suspect
has taken its place, namely, the psychological interest which leads
him to introspect.
The striking feature of human activity, however, is the peculiar
order of its development. Whatever elements the analytical psychol-
ogist may find in the complex activity-situation, such as motor sen-
sations, desire, ideas, feelings, visual sensations, etc.,—and
usually most of these are present,— the significant thing about it
is its "constellation," a useful phrase borrowed from the biological
writings of f. E. Ritter. An actual uct is characterized by a com-
bination of factors or features which is so intimate that we seem
justified in applying to it the term, individuality. If the con-
stellation is overlooked in the process of analysis, the most im^rt-
ant part of the experience has been lost. James loses it when he
turns quickly upon himself and finds only bodily feelings; his psy-
(1) See below, pages J09-10; J18.
(2) Psychological Review, vol. XXV, pa/eo 1-20.
(5) Psychology of Religion.
(4) See above, pages 201-2.
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etiological vision is too short-sighted in this case.
A simple method of demonstrating the unity of an act consists
in considering the experiences of the agent when he meets obstacles
in the achievement or realization of an act other than the easy-
going hindrance introduced by a subject interested in psychological
observation. The fact that various factors belong together in an
activity-whole or chain is seen in the violent remonstrances that
are frequently offered when a particular activity- cycle is hindered
in its progress. The displeasure of the agent indicates by contrast
the worth he attaches to the individuality and integrity of the act
in question. The strong feelings which are sometimes aroused when
an act is obstructed would not appear if the end sought did not have
an immanent and inherent connection with the stages already passed
through. The reasons for suicide sometimes illustrate the fact that
the suiciding person would rather not possess a part of a series of
activities if he cannot have the whole. The inhibition of a purpose
in the midst of its realization exhibits the value which is attached
to it, and shows also how intimately the parts of the whole are
bound together.
The thesis, now, may be laid down that personal life in the
concrete consists of a continuous development of one individual act
after another, of one active or conative cycle after another. These
individual acts or cycles exhibit, of course, the most varying de-
grees of completeness, and blend or overlap in varying measures, but
all alike, in any particular person's life, are grounded in a perman-
ent or identical agent. The thesis means to emphasize the view that
these individual cycles make up the totality of personal experience.
Some of them are short, and some are very long, but the latter are
constituted of many shorter ones. Here we meet the idea of compound
cycles of activity. These correspond exactly with the idea of com-
pound purpose elaborated above. (1) The determination of an indiv-
idual act must be teleological . Hence, the complexity of the mental
factors involved in it will vary greatly according to the character
of the purpose present. -Some act3 will be very simple, aa in per-
ception; others will be very complex. Only the general principles
involved in the individuality of activity can be considered here;
the details must be left to the functional psychologist.
Let us turn, then, to a general description or exposition of
this concept. In general, it means the unique way in which mental
processes are actually bound together for the sake of an end which
they subserve. The mo3t perfect and unambiguous example of such an
individual act is found in a typical voluntary action. Description
is difficult, although identification ia comparatively easy. It
might be said that the individuality of an act consists in ita pe-
culiar form, but tiia term has the value only of metaphorical sug-
gestion; it is a synonym for individuality that ia somewhat of an
aid in undera tanding the latter. The intellectual phasea of active
individuality have been worked out to some extent by G. F. Stout in
his Analytical Psychol or;/ under the heading of "Noetic Synthesis."
He makes valuable and suggestive use of the idea of form. He be-
lieves that the form of a mental whole, a melody, for example, or
any typical whole of conacious otatea ia relatively independent of
ita constituents. In case of an act, we may aay that ita form ia
(1) See above, page 223.
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more fundamental or important than the particular contents in-
volved in it. That which constitutes conation, says J. Royce (1),
is a "significant series of states in their wholeness
. .
.
in so
far as these embody the fulfilment of aims."
An act, especially of the unambiguous volitional kind, is
properly described as individual because its various aspects or
phases get their significance from the purposive whole. It pos-
sesses a peculiar unity in the midst of its complexity. The system
may be very poor in content and of short duration, and yet it is a
system to some extent. J. Dewey pointed out many years ago that
stimulus and response in a reflex arc are teleological distinctions
.
(2)
He observed that, "The fact is that stimulus and response are not
distinctions of existence, but teleological distinctions, that is,
distinctions of function or part played, with reference to reaching
or maintaining an end." (5) "It is only the assumed common reference
to an inclusive end which marks each member aff as stimulus and re-
sponse" and "apart from such reference we have only antecedent and
consequent." (4) If the phases of a reflex action thus form an ob-
jective teleological unity, how much more unified may we expect to
find those activities of the adult person where the end is in some
measure consciously anticipated?
The voluntary act best exhibits the individuality of activity.
Consider, for example, ./. Wundt' s description of it: "At the moment
when the volitional act begins, the feelings of resolution give
place to the specific feeling of activity , which ha3 its sensation
substratum, in the case of external volitional acts, in the sensa-
tions of tension accompanying the movement. . . As a total feeling,
this feeling of activity is a rising and falling temporal process
extending through the whole act and finally passing into the widely
differing feelings, such as those of fulfilment, satisfaction, or
disappointment, or into the feelings and emotions connected with
the special result of the act." (5) L. T. Hobhouae thus concludes
his excellent description of the purposive individuality of activity:
"in the purpose it is an organization of elements of thought and
feeling, of physical acts and of external things that constitutes
the efficacy of the action." (6)
Miss Washburn makes wide use of the idea of "movement- systems"
in her study of behavior. She says, "Let us use the term movement
system to indicate a combination of movements 00 linked tor.e ther
that the stimulus furnished by_ the actual performance of certain
movements i_3 required to briiy, about other .lovements . " (7) The
writing of a word is an example of an irreversible aovement-system
of this sort. To this account we should have to add that the writ-
ing of a word at all is due to some interest of the moment which
sustains the behavior by reason of a ki.id of general influence run-
ning through the whole. The interesting feature about "problem-
(1) Mind, N . S., vol. VI, page 594.
(2) Psychological Review, vol. Ill, 1696, pages 557-70.
(5) Ibid., page 565. (4) Ibid., page 566.
(5) Outlines of Psychology, 1902, P»g« 210.
(6) Development and Purpose, page 520.
(7) Movement and Mental Imagery, page 10.
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ideas" or purposes i3 that they bring together movements, feelings,
perceptions, etc., which are not habitually connected, and which,
sometimes, have no other connection than the purposive trend that
conditions them.
The conative cycle which we are considering
,
primarily from
the introspective standpoint, is well described, in its more objec-
tive features, by H. Driesch (1), under the heading of " the second
criterion of acting: individuality of correspondence. Action always
is a reaction corresponding to an individualised etimulus. I need
only remind you that the sight of a specific person or a specific
house may influence your behavior in a specific manner." (2) "It is
the totality in its specificity
,
both of the stimulus and of the ef-
fect, that comes into account in acting, and nothing else. But what
is the meaning of this totality? The totalities of stimulus and ef-
fect have a 'meaning.'" (5) Since there is nothing like this mean-
ing in inorganic nature, he concludes that it constitutes a new and
independent proof of the autonomy of vital phenomena. He illustrates
(4) what he means by a totality "built up of singularities;" he saya,
"The artist, a painter, for example, bears within himself the com-
plete totality of what he is to perform, and what afterwards is to
be carried out by single acts of movement of his hand. In the same
way the single phrases of a conversation, in spite of their consist-
ing of single elements, form a totality that 'means' something."
What Driesch emphasizes here is the peculiar way in which the intel-
ligent human being can bring about a combination of bodily reactions
to varying and contingent features in the environment in order that
he may attain some goal, and the stages in its achievement possess an
individuality determined at once by the nature of the goal and the
contingencies of experience which arise in its attainment.
Personal life is a series of acts each of which possesses some
individuality. Because of the contingencies of mental existence this
individuality i3 not always easily determined, but in the typical act
of the normal adult human person, several stages in the whole may be
distinguished. These are variously described, but the essential ones
seem to be the following:
(a) The initial or optative period, the stage of desiring, purposing,
etc. This stage has been appropriately called "preparatory set."
(5) In this period the actor prepares to seek for or accept some
imminent change in his experience. (6)
(b) The intermediate or realizing period, in which the consciousness
of the end or change sought sinks into the background, and atten-
tion is directed to the means, and to the sensory or affective
marks, of its attainment. (7)
(c) The final or concluding period, tae period of achievement, or of
disappointment, marked by tiie presence of satisfaction or dissatis-
faction. (6)
(1) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, vol. I, page 66 ff,
(2) Ibid., page 66. (5) Ibid., page 71
.
(4) Ibid., page 72, note 1.
(5) M. A. May, The Mechanism of Controlled Association.
(6) See below, pages 251-2.
(7) See below, pages 252-5.
(3) See below, pages 255-5.
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The expansion of a present experience into a fuller and more
concrete meaning is essential to the typical conative cycle or in-
dividual act. The expansion is not merely of an idea, as F. H.
Bradley suggests, but of the active self, in search of some end.
A series of such acts, each with these states, is well illustrated
by one's efforts to solve a mechanical puzzle. All but the last
ends with a sense of failure cf the attempt made.
Perry on the Several other endeavors to describe the stages of a typical
stages of a act may be compared with the above. Perry mentions four which will
complete action, be seen to be readily reducible to the three mentioned. He says that
the following "different phases" are "involved in complete action. .
(a) The phase of desire, a felt lack, the sting of present dissatis-
faction.
. .
(b) The vision of the ideal.
. .
(c) The outcome of ac-
tion, the satisfaction, the achievement, the thing done.
. .
(d) This
fourth factor is movement from desire to attainment, the effort, the
change, the deed, the performing of the act." (1)
Stout on the One of the most comprehensive endeavors to describe the stages
stages of men- of the average mental activity has been made by G . F. Stout. In his
tal activity. Analytical Psychology (2) he says, "Our whole mental existence, from
its earliest and simplest beginning to its most complex maturity,
depends upon a perpetual cycle of changes involving (a) mental change
(b) innervation of muscles; (c) muscular contraction and bodily move-
ment; consequent mental change. This process, In so far as it has
its starting point and terminal point in the current of consciousness
is mental activity.
. .
In its most complex development, it takes the
form of self-conscious and deliberate volition, in which the starting
point is the idea of an end to be attained, and the desire to attain
it; and the goal is the realization of this by the production of a
long series of changes in the external world. In its earliest and
simplest form it consists of those simple reactions which, without
being determined by any definite idea of an end to be realized, tend
on the whole to the maintenance of immediate pleasure and the avoid-
ance of immediate pain." J. Royce thus summarizes Stout's view:
"'Activity,' empirically speaking, does normally pass through stages,
very much such as our author so well defines—stages of vagueness, of
growing differentiation, of a more definite apperception of our sys-
tems of means and ends, and, finally, of the dying away of each par-
ticular striving in the attainment of its ends." (5)
2". The ini- In each one of the stages of an activity wnichj.8 complete and
tial or optative quite complex a different factor is important, but that which gives
stage. the whole its unity is the teleological factor which marks the ini-
tial or optative stage. "The end is the realisation of something
a". The pur- somehow present from the beginning." (A) This influence of a general
pose posited in purpose upon an act needs to be more strongly accentuated than it
this stage gives is in the psychology of activity.
unity to the in- R. B. Perry speaks clearly of "the dominance of the general
dividual act. motor set over the subordinate reflexes which are assimilated to it,"
and explains further the importance of this initial attitude in de-
1*. Perry on termining the total action. He offers several illuu trutiona of how
the dominant a dominant propensity effects the course of a complex act or action-
propensity of aeries. "It ia essential that the action should be thus determined
an action.
(1) The Present Conflict of Ideals, page 5J2 . (2) Page* 152-5-
(5) Mind, N. S., vol. VI, page 595-
(4) W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of Qod, pa^e 415.
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by its relation of prospective congruence with a controlling pro-
pensity which is both prior and more general;" ( 1 ) he adds, "that
the higher propensity should be alive, or actually at work in the
organism." (2) That which above all gives individuality to behavior
or activity is the presence of an inner teleological trend or refer-
ence, which marks and characterizes the first stage of a typical and
complete activity.
Miss M. F. Washburn calls attention to the persistence of the
influence of purpose in her attempt to give a physiological explana-
tion of the idea of purpose or "problem-idea." (5) A good illustra-
tion of such persistence is seen when one adds a column of figures.
The achievement of this task cannot be explained by habit, she says,
but only by the influence of the resolution to add which was formed
at the outset. (4) But whatever the physiological explanation may
be, it seems fair to say that a psychical influence persists through
an individual act and gives meaning and unity to the complex whole.
(5)
"The nature of preparatory set," which marks the first stage
of an activity, has been well described, from the introspective stand-
point, by M. A. May, who says that, "Most of the subjects described
or referred to two general processes in the fore-period: (a) A pro-
cess of understanding the task, or of knowing what to doj (b) A pro-
cess of getting set or ready to do it. The first of these processes
corresponds roughly to Ach's 'idea of end 1 (Zielvorstellung) , and
the second to his 'determining tendencies. 1 " (6)
Such diversified experiences may enter into the attainment of
our purposes that a general description of the intermediate stage of
activity is very difficult to carry out. for it really would involve
writing a treatise on psychology. This stage consists of a varying
group of presentations and representations, and of a constant and
ever shifting interplay of mental processes. The character of their
blending varies indefinitely (7), but regularly gives quality and
color to the whole. (8) Among these processes a-vear notably the
various bodily feelings which mark the progress or efficacy of ac-
tivity which involves bodily behavior. Since the attainment of most
ends does involve actions, the kinaesthetic and otner "internal"
sensations, such as the "resident" and "remote" sensations, may play
a very intimate and important part in the de/elopnent of our activ-
ities. But this importance should not be so exaggerated as to blind
us to the fact that, after all, these various kinaesthetic sensations
are subordinate to the general trend of the whole act as determined
(1 ) Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 12. (2) Ibid., pa e 1J.
(5) Movement and Mefctal Imagery, pagee 15J-5-
(4) Ibid. In this connection see also: Ladd and Woodworth,
Elements of Physiological Psychology, page 55 1 ; J. Peterson, Com-
pleteness of Response, Psychological Review, vol. XXIII.
(5) An excellent discussion of the conscious phases of an indiv-
idual system may be found in R. Latta's article on "Purpose", Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII, pagss 27-J5.
(6) The Mechanism of Controlled Association, page J2| see also,
pages 2, 25, etc.
(7) See F. Paulhan, L'activiti mentale et les elements de
l'esprit.
(8) See, for example, discussion of value below, pages 2^6-9.
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by its teleological factor. They may constitute an important means,
but seldom do they constitute the end, of our activities. They are
so frequently and regularly present, however, that they have been
mistaken for the activities themselves.
So far as our mental activities involve bodily behavior, and,
therefore, adjustments to our environment, perceptions occasioned
by the latter may also play a significant, although usually a sub-
ordinate part in the intermediate stage of an act. This importance
is due to the fact that our interests are intimately concerned with
a physical world. In the realization of most of our purposes, indeed,
contact with the order of physical nature is present, and in conse-
quence the development of an act will bring "external" perceptions in
its train. But in other cases, such as the effort to recall a for-
gotten name, various reenforcing processes of consciousness may make
up the intermediate stage, and mark the direction and progress of the
activity. (1) In cases where an activity involves the devising of
means, the end in view may sink quite into the background.
The progress of an activity may itself sometimes seriously af-
fect the purpose of the whole, or may bring about the abandonment of
it. A very common result of the evolution of a series of activities
is the 'clarification of the end sought. The purposive system of hu-
man acts is not always, nor, indeed, often, fixed from the beginning,
but depends in part upon the contingencies ofAits realization. In
this respect human, activity stands in contrast to the reflexes of
certain animals where fractional behavior appears to be impossible,
as, for example, in the case of an ant-eater who cannot consime^Sftxll
he has scratched in the dirt. But even such series illustrate in a
striking way the individual and teleological character or internal
linkage of the whole. (2)
One of the most interesting phases of the activity cycle is to
be found in the conscious marks which attend its culmination, whether
or not the latter be satisfying. It is characteristic of an activity
experience to be efficacious In bringing about the end wnich unifies
the activity. G . F. Stout describes this efficacy as follows: "If
the change which is wanted takes place in consequence of its being
wanted, the activity is so far successful; otherwise it is unsuccess-
ful.
. .
Plainly no finite process can claim to be called an activity
unless it counts as a factor in determining other processes; and yet
I have asserted that there may be mental activity which fails in at-
taining its end." Such activities "are not absolutely inefficient
but only unsuccessful. A conative process wnich is unsuccessful is
inefficient in producing that particular result which we call its
fulfilment. But it is not absolutely inefficient; it counts in some
way as a factor in determining the course of events. . . Its specific
character in this respect is marked by the distinction between success
and failure. This distinction applies only to conative process; and
it presupposes what we cannot describe otherwise than as a tendency
towards the production of a certain result. The tendency may be pres-
ent both when the result is actually produced and when it is not. It
is equally involved in success and failure; it is presupposed in the
(1) See, e. £. . 3. Alexander, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 1.8. , vol. VIII, page 218.
(2) See, T. G. Brown, "On the Question of Fractional Activity,
Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series B, 1915. voL - 6 7. P*£e»
152-144.
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possibility of distinguishing between success and failute." (1)
In typical acta at the personal level of human experience the
efficacy just referred to is a function of the activity cycle itself,
however many results it may entail in the brain and the rest of the
universe. Sometimes this efficacy is the function of a judgment, but
usually it is marked by certain affective factors, which may be called,
in general, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. These will be considered
briefly
.
The satisfactions which mark successful activities are so multi-
form that no attempt can be made here to classify then. A few exam-
ples of them may be mentioned. If I stop at a store to buy some ap-
ples, the end of the conative cycle is marked by the more or less
faint feelings of possession which go with the perceptions connected
with my reception of the bag of fruit from the dealer. If one is
seeking to remember a name, the mark of success is found in the feel-
ing of familiarity and of attainment which accompanies its clear ap-
pearance in consciousness. In the mechanical puzzle, the satisfac-
tion at the end is based upon the presence of certain visual percep-
tions of form which indicate the particular physical combinations one
has sought, and a peculiar feeling of triumph characterizes those
perceptions
.
The attempt to act often results in the encountering of obstacles
and the sense of failure. But we must avoid supposing that unsuccess-
ful activity is not activity at all. On the contrary, as l-liss M. F.
Washburn points out, "The 'feeling of effort, 1 the form in which the
activity attitude reveals itself most clearly to introspection, is
connected, not with smooth and easy thinking, but witn interruptions
and obstacles to the course of thought." (2)
We have proposed already (5) that, as a matter of fact, the very
intense feelings which are present in an unsuccessful or obstructed
activity often reveal most clearly the end sought and its value. In
other words, our feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction con-
stitute important negative evidence bearing on the character of the
ends we seek. The amount of the displeasure accompanying the obstruc-
tion of an activity shows by contrast the value of the cycle itaelf
if it could be perfected. The experience of activity ap ears moat
vividly in consciousness when, amid embarrassments and difficulties,
I have to devise means for achieving the end for waich so far I have
striven unsuccessfully, or when I havo to enter into intimate cooper-
ation with a natural world which is not at once tractable to my
wishes. This vividness and intensity is a revelation of ttie wortu
which I attach to the goal I seek. The direction of mental activity
is felt when an obstacle is raised against its advance. In short, it
is when something inhibits what we desire, that we feel moat active.
We cannot present here a detailed description of the various
kinds of dissatisfaction, of disappointments and annoyances, of fail-
ures and pains which characterize "unsuccessful" activities. Since
the obstacles to the attainment of one's purposes may appear at any
stage in the development of an activity, we find in fact activities
of all degrees of completeness. An incomplete act often means the
inauguration of another one, with different means, for the attainment
(1) British Journal of Psychology, vol. II, part I. pageo 1-}.
(2) Movement and Cental Imagery, pages 161-2.
(5) See above, page 248.
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of the purpose of the original one. But an activity may end with
the recognition of its faliure.
In the examination of the various stages of an act we have
found everywhere the importance of the teleological principle which
unifies the whole. While the purpose gives unity to it, other fac-
tors may contribute very much to the individual quality or form of
it, especially the mode of satisfaction which marks the final stage.
When one finds himself in a state of unrest with no clear idea of
what he wants, he may act with a view to defining what he wants,
and this act may be followed by another one in which he seeks that
which he has defined.
But this is only one of the countless ways in which individual
acts are correlated into larger units which may be called, for con-
venience of reference, compound cycles. Not only the various stages
of individual acts, but also these acts themselves blend and overlap
in a countless variety of ways and .vith all degrees of complexity.
The difficulty of defining the delicate variations in the phases and
correlations of the pulses of our active life has been a reason, no
doubt, for the neglect and oversight of that important implication
of an activity which we have called its individuality. James, in
many eloquent paragraphs, has called attention to our tendency to
fix upon the "substantive" parts of the stream of consciousness, and
to pass by the "transitive ones," largely, perhaps, because we lack
names for the latter. (1)
The attainment of our more remote ends may involve a multitude
of intermediate or subsidiary purposes. It is seldom that the real-
ization of a great purpose consists solely in one uDmentary and mo-
mentous act. Its attainment usually results from many contributory
or subordinate acts which point in the general direction of the end.
Indeed, the consummation itself may be only one of these subordinate
acts, as, i'or example, writing the last sentence in a book. Further,
our personal life is characterized by the periodic recurrence of
larger cycles or series o£ac ti vi ties . Problems or trains of thought
involving many acts may be alternately taken up ai.d laid down, and
may be resumed several times before they are finally completed. In
the intervals, other cycles of acts which belong together may be
performed. Thus, individual acts form in actual life all maimer of
unions for a purpose.
The idea of activities being compounded into cycles dominated
by a general end may be illustrated by the attempt to solve a me-
chanical puzzle for the purpose of studying the psychological laws
of learning. The main cycle begins with stating the problem, namely,
of understanding learning, and ends either with an inference or con-
clusion which is satisfactory, or with a reaesertion of the problem.
The intermediate stages of the series or compound arr filled out by
many individual acts which are subordinate to the end of solving the
puzzle. These acts consist of the control of manual .r.ovements so as
to meet the contingencies which develop ae the subject tries to find
the solution. Each of the attempts, save the last, ends with dissat-
isfaction, and leads to renewed effort. The finally successful act
is another individual one which may bring to conBciouaness the pur-
pose of the whole experiment. This purpose, after its conception,
(1) See, for example, The Principles of Psychology, vol. I,
pages 245-4.
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may have remained in the margin of consciousness, or may have been
suppressed momentarily by monor purposes subordinate to it. Then,
by a review of his trials and errors and final success, the inves-
tigator draws a conclusion which is satisfying, and the whole com-
pound cycle comes to an end. Now if one should stop to introspect
at any particular stage in the experiment, he might find, indeed,
only kinaesthetic sensations; but he would lose the meaning of the
whole if he did not look beyond them, for certainly the significance
of the total cycle could not be found in any number of bodily sensa-
tions
.
In the case of the solution of the mechanical puzzle, there is
present the general problem of solving it for a certain purpose.
Now psychologists have been so engrossed in the study of structural
elements of consciousness, or of phases of bodily behavior, that
they have generally neglected this striking way in which a long
series of acts in our human personal experience may come into exist-
ence for the sake of a general goal which, most of the time, hovers
dimly in the background and the real meaning of which cannot be found
in any one of the acts in the series, taken by itself. The physical
counterpart of this process may be found probably in the progressive
integration of the nervous system in learning, but the mental side
needs to be more generally recognized and emphasized.
In these cycles the fundamentally purpoaiv- character of the
activities involved comes out with new clearness. The begiiining is
for the sake of an end, and the beginning, once initiated, may bring
in its train many experiences which gain taeir significance, and
usually their existence, from their part in the larger cycle to which
they belong. It is in these cycles, especially of the longer types,
that the activity of persons manifests itself most clearly. But in
every case, these large cycles seem to be composed of simpler ones,
of particular acts which in themselves possess some measure of in-
dividuality.
Difficulties of description are met when one attempts to mark
the transitions from one act to another, and to delimit one act from
its temporal neighbors. The most obvious way to mark off conative
systems would seem, at first thought, to be to arrange the cognitive
objects and the various sensations connected with them. This method
proves futile, however, because it misses the teleological factors
which distinguish and correlate activities.
A special difficulty lies in describing the transition from one
activity- cycle to another. J. Ward observes that, "Attention does
not move by hops from one definite spot to anotner, but aa Wundt
himself allows, by alternate diffusion and concentration, like the
foot of a snail, which never leaves the surface it is traversing."
(1) But however psychologists may come to describe the unnamed in-
tervals in the progression of purposes and meanings in the life of
a human individual, the abiding and active subject grounds them all.
We are so absorbed in the world of objects which are involved in our
human interests that it is hard to become introspective enough to
note the rise and fall, the expansions and transitions , the delicate
differences of satisfaction and disappointment, which after all are
such important marks of personal progress and of biograpnical unique-
ness. It is not essential to the course of our argument to undertake
(1) Psychological Principles,
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a description of these "transitive" states to which attention has
been called, but whatever may be their nature, they will be very
subordinate to the pulses of individual acts in the life of a per-
son.
Various reasons have been presented for asserting that the
typical act of a person possesses the individuality defined above.
(1) This concept calls attention to the unity of the purposive act,
and reminds us that a personal act cannot be understood as any com-
position of mental elements; but is, in varying degrees, a system:
a self-realizing, purposive, efficacious whole. Its efficacy is a
function of itself, and is determined by the fact that the initial
stage of the act brings changes in the experience of the subject
which are either satisfying or dissatisfying. The wholeness of the
act is due to the fact that the changes brought about are wanted,
or, in the case of the highest mental development, are deliberately
approved at some time or other. The concept of individuality, as
applied to acts, also emphasizes their uniqueness, namely, the fact
that each may play a part in the development of a personal biography
which no other act can play. In this way the idea of active indiv-
iduality helps us to avoid the dangers of an abstract description of
activity. After all, however, the most important feature of the
individuality of an act consists, in the unity which it possesses and
which is derived from the end sought. And it is of such ultimate
units of human experience as individual acts, thus described, that
personal life is made up.
Further, the concept of individuality, as applied to personal
activities, calls attention to the infinite peculiarities wuich acts
may have by reason of the countless combination of mental processes
which they may contain. It also enables us to understand the devel-
opment of personal experience as a series of acts which may be tel-
eologically organized into compound cycles of varying length, and,
perhaps also, of periodic recurrence. The concept of compound cycles
of individual acts is fundamental to the under standi. ig of the real-
ization of those larger or .uore remote purposes which are present in
personal experience. Indeed, personal life is constituted, on the
whole, of many of these compound and frequently periodic cycles of.
activities. Sometimes our acts come and go with little reference to
each other, but, as a rule, the individual acts of a person have
reference to a general purpose beyond the momentary ends of each,
and this common reference serves to combine them into a significant
series
.
The study of the individuality of acts has brought out the
driving or pulling force which belongs to^purpose. The idea of an
end, when qualified by affective worth, (2) becomes a powerful fac-
tor in determining action, but this manner of speaking must not be
taken too abstractly. R. B. Perry points out that, "In the case of
one's o.,n agency, the prospective sequel does account for the act,"
and hence we call the act purposive, "ft are forced to recognise
the essentially dynamic character of purpose." (5)
(1) See above, page 246.
(2) See below, pages 298-9.
(5) The Ironist, vol. XXVII, page J6i
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c'. Corollar- Our study of the individuality of activity enables us to set
iess forth several corollaries which throw light upon a number of import-
ant problems connected with the nature of personal activity. In the
1". Recon- first place, in the concrete or whole act, to which this idea calls
ciliation of attention, we find the possibility of a reconciliation of the con-
activity and cepts of activity and passivity. F. H. Bradley maintains that ac-
passivity. tivity is a contradiction because we can never have activity without
passivity, and yet, to have them together, is inconsistent. (1)
On the contrary, the fact seems to be that each of these terms
calls attention to factors which exist in harmonious union in the
individual act of finite persons. Both seem to be present in all of
our ordinary acts. In the case of live and conscious human beings,
absolute passivity, if it ever is present, is certainly exceedingly
rare. G. F. Stout labors at length to prove that we are never en-
tirely passive in our experience. (2) He holds that it is an empty
concept that can never be applied without remainder to any of our
psychoses. He thinks that to be mentally alive and to be awake is
to be mentally active. Even in the case of reverie, there is not
complete inactivity, and between the most^ntense activity and that
which appears to be most obviously passive, as recovery from swoon-
ing, there is, he says, no apparent break.
But in all ordinary experience I am both passive and active.
Even in the midst of acting I am passive in the sense that the con-
tent and the order of many of the elements which enter into the men-
tal constellation of the individual act are determined for me by the
nature of the world in which I exist. Or, as Stout expresses the
idea, we are passive when we are externally determined. (j) To as-
sert that I am passive means that I am constantly in intercourse
with a world which I accept for what it is and do not create entire-
ly out of myself. As Stout says, "We can in every case distinguish
between determination from within anddetermination from without."
(5) If I perform the act, for example, of going into a shop and
buying a book, I find that its consummation, although a free choice
of my own, yet brings into my experience various factors, such as
kinaesthetic sensations, which are not present as conscious elements
in my initial purpose, and I explain their presence by reference to
a world which cooperates with me in attaining my ends, but which I
discover rather than create. My passivity, then, is an expression
of my limitations as a finite being in a vast universe which has
structure of its own and of which I must take recognizance in the
realization of my interests and the control of my activities. With-
out the recognition of this meaning of passivity my finite existence
would beco.ae ^intelligible to me.
There are, then, certain aspects of an individual act,— these
are to be found most often in its intermediate stage .--which are de-
termined for me and which I must accept. In that sense I am passive
with reference to them. However, I am only relatively passive, and
never entirely so, for I would ..ot respond at all to the stimuli
presented by my environment if I were not to some extent awake.
These facts suggest that perhaps passivity gets its significance from
(1 ) Appearance and Reality, page 65.
(2) Analytical Psychology, pages 147 ff» ( 1 70 ft,, etc.
(5) Ibid., page 147.
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activity. It is unnecessary to point out that I cannot become en-
tirely passive by any effort on my part, for that effort itself is
a testimony to ray essentially active nature. Without this active
and responsive nature, my environment would not effect me as it
does; so that my relative passivity is itself dependent upon my ac-
tivity.
2". Subordinate In the second place, the conception of the individuality of
place of bodily activity, according to which personal activity enters in the devel-
feelings. opment of a conscious purpose, implies that bodily feelings occupy
a subordinate place in the activity-series. The active subject, and
the purposes he seeks to realize, must be thought of as constituting
the points of reference in the activity- system at the personal level
of experience. The subordinate and peripheral position of bodily
feelings
>
results from the fact not only that they are phenomenal,
but also that they gain their value from the part they play in the
development of the agent's desires. H. ... Carr asserts that, "The
purpose i3 what it is by reason of its connection with the train of
thought pure and simple, however the existence of that train of
thougnt may be imagined to be conditioned by a series of nerve
changes," (1) and, we may add, however much the purpose may involve
bodily feeliggs . In other words, these bodily facts are neither
independently conditioned nor independently valuable, but the sig-
nificant part they may play in any activity is determined or condi-
tioned by the purposing and active subject.
This corollary is confirmed by K. Ach's penetrating analysis
of the act of will and his conclusion (2) th&tiff&nSations nor feel-
ings constitute the peculiar and essential characteristic of the
act of will. (5) An illustration of the subordinate place of bodily
feelings in personal activity is suggested by Perry (4) ..here he re-
fers to Socrates' distinction, recorded in Plato's Phaedo, between
being in prison because of his bones and muscles and because of his
purpose of "enduring any punishment which the law inflicts;" the
latter, and not the former, being the real reason for his acting as
he did. Further, there are rather common experiences, such as in
mathematical calculation, literary composition, or philosophical re-
flection, where the dominating purposes of the subjects have no refer-
ence to their bodily conditions, and where the quantity of their bodi-
ly behavior is quite insignificant and out of proportion to the in-
tensity of their mental activity. If this corollary is correct, then
the attempt to explain "the feeling of activity" as nothing "but a
complex of sensations coming from the muscles" (5) seems very uncriti-
cal and incomplete indeed. According to the definition of an act
put forward by J. M. Baldwin and G. F. Stout (6) kinaestuetic sensa-
tions are not essential to an act, for they say that "an act is a
deed performed with some foresight and deliberation, whether carried
out in muscular movement or not."
Although bodily states or feelings are either subordinate or
(1) Proceedings of trie Aristotelian 3ociety, I.'. 3. vol. I. p. W.
(2) Meeser's review of N. Ach's Uber den Wiliensakt und das
Temperament, in Kantstudien, vol. XV. pages pOQ t
(5) On reasons for not identifying mental activity with bodily
behavior, see above, page3 200-211.
(h) Moixist, vol. XICVII, pa^e YjC.
(5) 71. B. Pillsbury, Attention, page 59.
(6) Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psycholo^r, article,
-
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non-essential in the structure of personal activity, they often and
usually do play a part that is not unimportant, ffe have been inter-
ested only in rejecting the view that would make bodily behavior the
essence of personal activity; and we have sought to defend its psy-
chical character. Even if the hypothesis of Miss M. P. Washburn,
that movements always accompany consciousness, were proved, it would
not follow that kinaesthetic sensations are necessarily the central
feature of mental activity.
The bodily states do perform a significant service in those
cases where the agent interacts with the physical universe, for it
is only through his body that this interaction can be achieved. My
bodily feelings do belong, as S. Alexander suggests, "to a spatially
preferred external thing." They have a consistent and useful place
in the activity- system which has buen set forth. The progress and
culmination of an activity-cycle or series often are marked by the
appearance of various bodily sensations. Sometimes we are so ab-
sorbed in the presentations which result from our bodily movements
that the end of our activity sinks into the background. Frequently
we are not satisfied that we have attained our purposes until we
have experienced various kinaesthetic sensations, which mean for ue
a successful adjustment to our environment. But even in this case
the meaning and the success is something in addition to the sensa-
tions involved. But while the act cannot be constituted of bodily
feelings, the latter may frequently help us to complete it and to
enter into its total individuality. If we wish to distinguish be-
tween our interests and the objects to which they refer, we shall
have no difficulty in distinguishing between our acts and the bodily
and other phenomena which may be involved in them. On the other
hand, if our bodily states are regarded as constituting an essential
part of our interests, then the way is opened to including, as con-
stituents of our interests, many other physical things, to which
there is no definite limit. A very satisfactory meaning of the rela-
tion of the body and the self seems to be found in the teleological
system of an individual act, where experienced bodily movements and
other perceptions of the physical world, are organized by the active
self according to its spiritual ends.
Our study of the agent and the activity-cycle also points to tne
conclusion that activity in and for itself, bare or pure activity,
is a fiction. To deny that there is pure activity means the refusal
to believe that activity, except in abstraction, has existence apart
from a concrete or individual waole of experience, in which there
are other phases than those commonly called will. The real fact is
that there are agents who act in definite ways and with reference to
specific ends, and in consequence experience certain constellations
of mental processes. Even if structural psychologists find a dis-
tinct and primitive feeling of activity, tendency, or traix^i tion, it
would be an abstraction, of the same kind as sensation or idea, apart
from an individual and active whole including other elements. Such
an abstraction, however, may be very useful, of course, lor purposes
of scientific analysis and description.
What really exist, then, are individual and concrete activi-
ties; each is a variety in unity, and among its aspects one may find,
perhaps, an elemental will-element. E. P. Buchner holds this view,
for he thinks that volition must be appraised among primitive pro-
cesses, although it is never given as a pure process, but always ex-
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ists in constant relation with other contents of consciousness. (1)
James Ward asserts that empirical psychology "will have to recognize
that unanalyzable element I mean by attention or psychical activi-
ty." (2) J. Royce, too, defends the unique character of activity:
"By the term' activity' I regard our ethical common sense as meaning
precisely the very fact that our present will, as the will of an
individual, is unique. By our activity, then, I mean just the
unique significance of the present expression of our will." (5)
The complete acti vity- cycle , as it has been described, involves
a temporal process, the transitions of which must be experienced as
a condition of there being a series with direction at all, aa T. H.
Green long ago pointed out. This need, together with the fact that
we do experience transitions or feel tendencies, confirms the ex-
istence of the agent which we considered aa the 8econd implication
of activity. (4) The conative cycle could not be made intelligible
apart from the experient who seea through to the end its various
phases, and finds in the final phase that which he sought in the
initial one. It is the active subject v/hich realizes the transitions
in the activity-experience without itself being a mere transition,
or without disappearing in any step of the process. Besides, the
agent is required to select that prospective direction which gives
promise of being most "successful" in meeting his enduring or devel-
oping preferences. Underlying and supporting the individual activ-
ity as a whole is the subject which acts. But since the agent is
the condition for the succession which is present in the development
of an individual act of a complete type, the agent cannot itself be
a member of the series, but must itself be permanent and an abiding
ground of each act and series of acts. The meaning of this perman-
ence will come before our attention below. (5)
The study of the individuality of activity suggests several-
methods of classifying activity: for example, (a) according to the
peculiar conreries of orocesses which constitute the whole of indiv-
idual acts. It might be possible ^o define various V/pes of activ-
ities in terms of the variations in their affective and 3ensory ac-
companiments. There might be two main groups of form-qualities de-
termined by the affective marks of successful or unsuccessful con-
clusions
.
(b) If one activity were carried out for the sake of a larger
whole or a remote purpose, the former would have instrumental and
the latter intrinsic value; and we might classify activities accord-
ing to this principle, which arises in the compounding of activities
with reference to distant ends.
(6) An imperfect and overlapping mode of classification might
be based upon the distinction between relative passivity and unre-
(T) Volition as a Scientific Datum. Psychological Review,
vol. VII, pages 494-507.
(2) Mind, 0. S., vol. XII, page 570; see also Ibid., page
569; Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., vol. VIII,
page 227; H. Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organ-
ism, vol. I, page 65.
(5) The World and the Individual vol. I, page 466.
(4) See above, pages 255-45.
(5) See below, pages 520-9, especially 528-9.

262
6". The indiv-
iduality of ac-
tivity presup-
poses some or-
der in the
universe
.
7". Activity
involves
change, but is
more than
change
.
8". Other
problems sug-
gested
.
ft. THE FOURTH
IMPLICATION OF
ACTIVITY:
MEMORY
(and disposi-
tion)
.
served activity; that is, according to whether activities were de-
termined primarily from within or from without the agent himself.
J. Laird' 3 proposal for the classification of mental processes
may be recalled here. (1) He suggests two main classes of mental
facts: (a') the dynamic, including conation or endeavor, and (b 1 )
the adynamic, which has two subdivisions: (a") feeling, which is
essentially passive, and (b") cognition, in which the subject is
affected by the object. It is certain that we are active in a
less degree in those experiences in which knowing or feeling pre-
dominate than in those in which volition predominates.
The realization of such individual acts as have been described
presupposes and requires a certain amount of order in the universe
as well as within an individual act itself. It will be important
to consider this phase of a personal act below in connection with
the relation of intelligence to personality. (2)
It has become evident, too, that activity involves change, but
that it is more than change. Indeed, change, apart from such con-
crete pulses of activity as have been reviewed, is apparently an
abstraction obtained by subtracting certain elements, such as pur-
pose, affection, etc., from an individual act, and leaving only the
bare principle of their successive connection without regard to the
conditioning agent. Change can be understood if one starts from a
concrete personal act, but the concept of change itself throws no
light whatever upon the act. It is in the cycles of personal activ-
ity that we learn the meaning^f the abstract idea of change.
In addition to the above corollaries, several other phases of
personal activity have come to light in the study of its individual!
ty which need careful consideration. The bearing of the latter con-
cept upon the problem of personality has been indicated already. (5)
The place of intelligence in personal activity has been mentioned
also. Another factor to be noted is that various native disposi-
tions and learned tendencies usually enter into our activities; we
shall include both of these under memory, taken in a wide sense, as
the fourth implication of activity, which we shall examine next.
After this examination we shall summarize our study of activity, and
indicate its relation to the problem of personality. There will re-
main for separate discussion an important phase of activity, namely,
its value aspect.
So far as an activity-system involves complicated bodily behav-
ior, it is well known that the latter is made possible by a long
history of learning and practice during which numerous reflexes and
habits have been coordinated. From the physiological standpoint,
therefore, "the individual history is one of the most important
features concerned in the characteristics of acting," according to
H. Driesch, (4) In fact for him, "the historical basis of react-
ing," is "the first criterion of acting." (4) Speaking of the or-
ganism, he says further, "The specificity of every one of its ac-
tions depends on the specificity of all stimuli relating to sensa-
tion and movement which have encountered it in the past and on all
the specific effects of those stimuli." (5) The organism is quite
(1) Problems of the Self, chapter II, especially page 35.
(2) See below, pages 278-94. (5) See above, page 257.
(4) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, vol. I, :>age 5^
(5) Ibid. , page 60.

26?
1
1
.
Import-
ance of the
"historical
basis" of be-
havior in
biological
science, (dis-
position),
and in
conscious life,
(memory)
.
2 1
.
Why memory
is important in
activity and in
personality.
a
1
.
Import-
ance of memory
in an individ-
ual act;
unlike a machine in that it has the ability of "changing the form
of its combined specificities" by profiting from its past; so that
the behavior of any animal depends not omy upon the particular
stimuli which are presented, but also upon the effects of its past
stimuli and actions. (1) The sensitive and living organism profits
by "experience." "That which acts in action is, as we know, deter-
mined in its potential specificity by its individual history." (2)
When it is asserted that "memory is found in all organic life," (j)
the meaning ie that living raatter is so changed by any process which
goes on in it that a repetition is either facilitated or inhibited
according to circumstances.
So far as consciousness and personality depend for their ex-
pression upon bodily behavior, this historical, physiological basis
holds good for human action. The effects of past behavior and ac-
tivity hpon human beings are reflected in consciousness in another
form which is of great importance for personality
,
nanely, memory.
Memory plays its important part not only in the development of a
purpose through an individual cycle, but especially through com-
pound cycles of activity; our plans and wishes of the moment are dye
in large part to past plan3 and wishes that we have entertained and
developed. We must now consider, in some detail, these and other
points in connection with memory. The "historical basis of action,"
which is so important from the biological and psychological stand-
point, becomes, in the form of memory-consciousness, an important
factor in the concept of personality, considered from the metaphysi"
cal point of view.
Since one cannot be aware, in any one moment of consciousness,
of all of the effects of his past experiences, we must distinguish
two ways in which the past effects the present, namely, through
character or disposition and through memory. The word, disposition ,
will represent those effects of our past experience which are not
consciously present, but which, nevertheless, are influential in our
present conduct. We shall consider memory and character or disposi-
tion in this order.
There are several reasons for assigning an important place to
memory-consciousness in the concept of activity, as well as of per-
sonality, and also for regarding memory as one of the implications
or conditions of a personal activity. In the first place, the
achievement of a purpose is an achievement because of the memory
factor. This statement need not be taken to mean, Ln the strict
psychological sense, th^t an act of recognition follows every other
act, but^it does emphasize the fact that in an individual act the
end is present from the beginning with varying degrees of conscious-
ness or influence, and that without this continuity the unity of the
act would disappear. Triat which is a purpose at the initiation of
an act becomes a memory at its conclusion. These are two phases of
a concrete whole, and it is essential that we do not separate memory
from the individual activity as some kind of independent faculty.
The memory factor is especially likely to appear when one's activity
is obstructed, and one has to take a new attitude or devise new means
to carry out hie original plan, which he remembers.
(1) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pages Jk, 60.
,
page 72.
twald, Individuality and Immortality, ^a ( o 10.
(2) Ibid.,
(5) f. Oc
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b'. and espec- The most important part that memory plays is seen in the cor-
ially in com- relation of acts, that is, in the constitution of compound cycles
pound cycles of of activity. In adult experience, that which we seek at any moment
activity. is, in considerable measure, an outgrowth of previous desires which
we have sought, and which we continue consciously to pursue with a
measure of perseverance. By acts of memory we learn what purposes
already have proved successful, and, in the light of these, we make
further plans for the future. This reference to the past is essen-
tial in all enlightened self-determination. By recalling how our
activities turned out in the past, and having learned from this
retrospection what our real purposes are, we are prepared more in-
telligently to foresee the future and to construct our plans. The
following proportion is probably true on the whole: the more clear-
ly we understand our past acts, the more definitely we foresee and
control our future activities. From a review of our historical ac-
tivities we learn to distinguish between good and evil, and thus
are better able to posit purposes which will turn out happily.
And when, finally, we reach the ends we sought, their signifi-
cance depends, in large part, upon that act of recognition by which
we see ourselves as either successful or failing in the light of our
remembrance of what we set out to seek. Many of our activities are
regarded as valuable, not because of their intrinsic qualities, but
because we acknowledge them as fulfilments of remote past ends. It
should be noted especially that in those compound activity-cycles
which are so important in personal life, the individual acts which
enter into the whole must be attached to it by frequent recall of
the larger goal to which each contributes its small share. In
other words, when one achieves a proximate and instrumental purpose,,
its meaning becomes clear when he connects its conclusion with that
anterior purpose for the attainment of which it was initiated.
Hence, it is in those compound cycles of activities ..hich are
so common in personal life, that memory is a function of fundamental
importance in their coordination and teleological continuity. Cer-
tainly long-maturing plans could not be carried out without memory,
and it is just such plans which enrich and distinguish personal
life. As W. Ostwald states, "the essential difference between men
and animals is the difference in their memory development; man's
culture is higher because of hie memory." (1) The interpretation
of one '8 past enters especially into taose transitional acts in
which one attempts to understand the teleological connection between
two compound cycles, one just finished, and another about to being.
Memory thus enters into both the original formulation and into the
development and achievement of the purposes of a person.
G. T. Ladd declares that, without the memory of a self, how-
ever incomplete and imperfect it may be, that is, without the recog-
nition that I have a past, there could not be any "unity either to
thought or action which is worthy of being considered of the personal
type." (2) Further, he states that, "Memory that is capable of being
explained by the passive processes of association, however elaborate,
can never give to^conscious life the unity characteristic of a Self.
For such an achievement recognition and self-appropriation are essen-
tial." (2) James, in his appropriative theory of personal identity,
(1) Individuality and Immortality , pagee 7-8.
(2) The Secret of Personality, page 56.
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has expressed, in a striking way, the need of recognizing the
practically universal presence of a general or specific memory-
factor in personal experience, (l) So important does Richet think
that memory is for personality that he really identifies the two.
(2)
So far as we attempt to organize our purposes and interests,
it is clear that memory is a very important factor. It makes pos-
sible a common wealth of interests apart from which the life of the
self is very poor indeed, as J. Royce eloquently points out. (5) He
suggests that memory gives to the self a solidarity, just as a long
history gives a community a certain stability and coherence.
The value of the memory-function in the organization and clar-
ification of our purposes cannot easily be over-estimated. The
memory-synthesis of a person's interests becomes the center of opera-
tions for his future activities. The part of memory is clearly seen,
too, in very important decisions, in sudden conversions of purpose, and
in the conscious r.irth of new moral ideals which stand out in con-
trast to the imperfect ones that are being abandoned. Such exper-
iences do not weaken, but, by contrast, strengthen the sense of the
historical continuity of our personal lives. For example, our sins
are awful, just because they are our sins, and in any effort to con-
demn them, we acknowledge them as our very own. These acts, then,
called recollective or memory acts, are of fundamental importance,
both in the fulfilment of our purposes, and in their unification.
The significant part played by forgetting in the development
of personality is too often overlooked. Mucfi is said of memory in
that connection, but quite too little, of forgetting. The latter
permits of the concentration of our attention upon the acnievement
of specific purposes, and thus gives point to our unfolding exper-
ience. The very narrowness oi our span of memory oiten requires ua,
in tne progress or our activities, to recall the various interests
which are invoived in them and which are momentarily forgotten, and
thu3 forgetting aids negatively in the development of a historical
unity in our experience.
Since we forget easily, ana therefore learn that permanent
knowledge can be gained only in the course of time, the fact of for-
getting forces us to choose wisely that to which we shall devote
our energy, lest we waste it, and thus makes for a more careful se-
lection oi vaiues, especially of the cognitive type. Again, the
rapidity with which we forget is a kind of negative condition for
the constant alertness of the intelligent man in his attention to
perceived objects in the interest of maintaining or regaining the
immediate clearness which retrospection cannot furnish and irhioh
may be necessary for successful adjustment to his surroundings.
Further, our inability to recall, all at once, our multiform
interests, instincts, and desires, gives occasion, to the intelligent
person, for deliberation, and for a comparison of his interests. A
chief reason for the impulsive character of the actions of primitive
men is to be found in the absence of deliberation in the light of
memory. It is interesting to note the findings of experimental psy-
chologists, that, after a score or more of trials, a normal man re-
quires a longer time to get out of a maze than a rat, the former be-
( 1 ) See above, pages J6-7, also 57-6* compare Bowne s view of
memory and personality, above, page 140. (2) See above, page 6.
(5) See below, page 266.
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ing delayed by his reflections upon the situation.
A striking statement of the contrasting importance of memory
and forgetting for personality i3 found in an article by L. Dugas
in which he says: "Memory exprebses an organization, forgetting a
disorganization of the self. Memory moves itself as a single mass;
it is the personality, rich at once in all its treasures, as for-
getting is the personality cut up and ruined.
. . Never does memory
resolve itself into atomic dust; it is always as a synthetic char-
acter. Memory and forgetting are always together symptomatic of
the entire self, or at least of one of the aspects of the self; that
is wby personality alone explains the particularities of memory and
of forgetting. Memory is in a sense personality: forgetting is the
loss of personality; and the study of memory and fogetting, there-
fore, is important in studying the evolution of personality. (1)
e
1
.
Royce on One of the most eloquent accounts of the place of memory in
the place of personality is the following one by J. Royce: (2) "Each one of us
memory in per- knows that he just now, at this instant, cannot find more than a
sonality. mere fragment of himself present. The self comes down to us from
its own past. It needs and is a history. Each of us can see that
his own idea of himself as this person is inseparably bound up with
his view of his own former life, of the plans that he formed, of
the fortunes that fashioned him, and of the accomplishments which
in turn he has fashioned for himself. A self is, by its very es-
sence, a being with a past. . .
"But nevertheless, if considered simply in this passing moment
of my life, I am hardly a self at all. I am just a flash of con-
sciousness,—the mere gesticulation of a self,—not a coherent per-
sonality. Yet memory links me with my own past,— and not, in the
same way, with the past of any one else. This joining of the pres-
ent to the past reveals a more or less steady tendency,—a sense
about the whole process of my remembered life. . . My individual
life, my own more or les3 well-sundered stream of tendency, not only
is shut off at each present moment by various barriers from the
lives of other selves,—but also constitutes an intelligible sequence
in itself, so that, as I look back, I can say: 'What I yesterday in-
tended to pursue, that I am to-day still pursuing. 1 'My present car-
ries farther the plan of my past.' Thus, then, I am one more or less
coherent plan expressed in a life. 'The child is father to the mail.'
My days are 'bound each to each by mutual piety.'
"Since I am this self, not only by reason of what now sunders me
from the inner lives of other selves, but by reason of what links me,
in significant fashion, to the remembered experiences, deeds, plane,
and interests of my former conscious life, I need a somewhat extended
and remembered past to furnish the opportunity for my self to find,
when it looks back, a long process that possesses sense and coher-
ence. In brief, my idea of myself is an interpretation of my past,--
linked also with an interpretation of my hopes and intentions as to
my future."
5'. The prob- It is well known that when a human self comes to self-conscious-
lem of disposi- ness, he finds himself to be the possessor of varied emotions, de-
Uons. sires, and tendencies to action, which he calls original or innate
because he cannot explain their total characters by any acts of hio
(1) Revue Philosophique, vol. IX, pages
(2) The Problem of Christianity, vol. II, pages 40-42.
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own. He regards them as gifts of nature, and calls them his native
dispositions, temperament , or talents. Then, too, in the course of
experience he develops certain tendencies to act which are relative-
ly permanent, and this group he calls his character. Since all these
facts are the result of either individual or racial history, we might
call them all memory, used in a wide sense; or if the latter is used
in a narrow sense, as is preferable, we may apply the term, disposi -
tion, to the general class of facts which, though a part of one's
history, and effective in his present acting, are not a part of uis
conscious memory. We have noted above (1) how Perry makes the con-
cept of disposition a corner-stone in his view of personality,
a'. The kind The main problem suggested by this preliminary characterization
of knowledge we concerns what kind of knov/ledge we may expect- to obtain regarding
can expect to our dispositions. In the first place, since, by hypothesis, we have
have regarding no knowledge of them until they begin to operate in or to influence
them. our activities, we must conclude that, in the nature of the case, any
knowledge we have of them before that time is indirect, and cannot be
based upon individual memory. This indirect knowledge must be based
upon the experience and study of those aspects of our own activities
which we do not regard as due to our own choice, or it must be based
upon what additional information we can gain from the observation of
the behavior of other men and of animals
.
In other words, what we call dispositions will be inferred from
an examination of our activities at a stage of self-consciousness,
namely, when we discover that we are naturally active beings and are
endowed with tendencies to act in various ways, and when, also, we
acknowledge that we are not responsible for these tendencies, however
great may be our duty to control them in the light of accepted ends
.
This discovery rests upon our recollection that, as a matter of his-
tory, we have been able to perform a variety of acts; it is confirmed
by the belief, based also upon recollection, that there is nothing
in our present nature which will prevent our acting in certain ways
in the future under appropriate circumstances,
b'. Definition The contemplated acts in the latter case joist be called merely
of disposition, possibilities, so far as present experience or achievement goes.
Disposition, then, is an inclusive name for those activities which,
by virtue of our intelligent and imaginative natures, we may expect
ourselves to perform in the future in view of what we have already
done. In order to express the fact of this belief in what we might
do under the proper historical conditions, we say that, at the pres-
ent time, we have various capacities or dispositions. Such an ex-
pression is a corollary of the fact that our finite activities must
take the form of a consecutive series of single acts, or, in other
words, of the fact that we can act inpnly one way at a time. F. H.
Bradley describes disposition in the following terms: "The soul at
present is such that it is part of those co:iditions, which, given
the rest, would produce certain psychical events. And hence the
soul is the real possibility of these events, just as objects in the
dark are the possibility of color." (2) He adds that a disposition
means "the probable course of psychical events." (5)
(1) See above, pages 92-4
,
(2) Appearance and Reality, page 512.
(5) Ibid., page 515.
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The latter statement is a cautious one, for naturally we should
like to know about the ground of this possibility. But at this point
the ways divide in personality- theory . One road that has been trav-
eled frequently is to trace the possibilities of future activity in-
to various qualities in a substantial soul,
—
perhaps by the route of
subconsciousness, regarded as the margin of consciousness,—and the
result is the well-known doctrine of soul-facuities , wuich H. Lotze
well called a tautology. (1) Since this subterraneous soul is not
conscious—for it must explain that which is not momentarily con-
scious—we find that we have upon our hands, besides the conscious
self, another self which must be described as a non-conscious some-
thing, usually a substance of some sort. To speak of it as conscious
contradicts the hypothesis in question, and robs the soul -substance
of the function which it is supposed to perform. It might be de-
scribed as material without such a contradiction. The real problem,
however, which it presents is not to name it, but to give it consist-
ent and intelligible meaning.
Only a few critical objections need be raised here against this
antiquated view of soul-subs tance , in addition to those that James
and Bowne put forward. (2) First, this substance, as conceived with
a view to explaining active dispositions, is inferential; its mediate
or indirect derivation needs to be noted. It is an hypothesis re-
sulting from the felt necessity of explaining certain tendencies to
action which we cannot refer to our own choice of the moment. The
obvious difficulty with the hypothesis is that we have no way of veri-
fying it except by a study of the various activities of our exper-
ience. In these experiences we can distinguish the subject from the
objective phases of the activity. That subject is the agent which
acts, and which is one aspect of our immediate experience. If this
unconscious soul is identical with this agent, we have gained nothing
in explanation. It cannot be thus identical, however, for it is
not conscious by assumption, while the agent is the subject of con-
scious experience. The soul, as interpreted here, doec not, there-
fore, explain why the agent io such as it is. Consequently it must
be something different from the agent, and then the question is, How
relate the agent to it? This can be done only by another interpre-
tation of the agent.
In this interpretation insurmountable obstacles present them-
selves; especially this obstacle: that if those activities, of a so-
called original or dispositional sort which a particular agent now
carries out in the course of his experience, arc to be explained by
potentialities lying in some kind of soul-substratum which, uy hy-
pothesis, is not a part of this agent's experience, then somev.here
and somehow this soul must be identified with or made a part of the
agent himself. In other words, if this type of hypothesis is to ex-
plain what it is intended to explain, the agent must be able to get
out of himself and tell of his origin. But in the human and sane
world the active subject of experience does not and cannot etep
outside of his exoerience and become the subject of some other ex-
perience, and certainly no subject of an unconscious something is
better prepared to perform this impossible function. The demand
(1) Medic inische Psychologie, section
(2) See above, pages k0-k2; 124, 1}*.
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cannot, in the nature of the case, be carried out; further reasons
for this statement were suggested above in the discussion of the
problem of knowing the agent. (1) The subject of experience may
distinguish himself from the objects with which he deals, and in con-
ception he may simplify his knov/ledge of his own functions, but deny
himself he cannot, for in the very effort to do so, he reaffirms
himself. In elaborating such an hypothesis as the one in question,
the subject is demonstrating, as in other cases of thinking, his
self-identical egency.
H. Lotze has some interesting words of advice to those who per-
sist in positing a real kernel of being back of the mind: "One will
never get behind being or existence to find out how they are made;
but this question would have weight for us only if our problem of
knowledge consisted in creating the world. But what we have to un-
derstand is only the present, and there at any rate we recognize
that all being is a marvel whose eternal and existential operation
we must presuppose, whose origin, on the contrary, can be recognized
indeed as a fact, but never can the riddle of the manner of its pro-
ceeding be dissolved." (2)
He declares again: "What we are we know well, and of the quali-
tative character of our spiritual existence nothing escapes us as
entirely incomprehensible; but how, in general, all this can be,
—
this foundation of our own existence,—is inscrutable to us, as is.
also every other case of being. But if we seek to lead back the
.-.hole content of our developed soul-life to a primitive quality in
which the reality of the soul consists, before it began its develop-
ment by taking its first step in interaction with the outside world,
then, of course, this original nature lies outside of all possible
self-knowledge." (5)
In contemporary psychology and philosophy of mind there is a
general tendency to try to explain those actions which show the ef-
fect of heredity or learning by reference to structures or modifica-
tions in the nervous system. Upon this hypothesis, mental activi-
ties modify nervous structure in some way ao as to effect the course
of future mental processes, and in this way the character of the ner-
vous system is said to be an important condition for many activities,
if not for all. One must be careful not to assert that dispositions
exist as changes in nervous structure, for obviously changes do not
have the requisite persistence.
This theory is very different from the one examined a page back.
*t does not necessarily require us to identify mental activity with
nervous process, but may mean that nervous processes bring changes
in mental activities, and vice versa. From this standpoint, then,
a disposition would mean so..ie structure or functioning of the ner-
vous system which had been found to effect the course of mental ac-
tivity, the assumption being that this structure owed its peculiar
character to previous behavior or activity upon the part of the in-
dividual or of his ancestors. So long as the mental sucject io not
identified with the nervous structures themselves, nor with bodily
behavior, and also so long as the mode of knowing nervous structures
is set in a critical context, this view of disposition has promise
(1) See above, pages 2^c-k2.
(2) l/.edicinische Psychologie, section
(5) Ibid., paction

270
e'. Useful
meanings of
dispositions
V. Import-
ance of memory
uet not be
exaggerated,
but may be
summarized
.
of helping us to understand the development and conditions of men-
tal life. The effects of historical action, then, according to this
theory, are retained, not entirely as facts of memory, but as modifi-
cations in the structure of the nervous system.
The danger in the use of this hypothesis is that one will over-
look the activity of the self in deriving the knowledge of the ner-
vous system and that one will be^empted to identify mental process
with nervous process. But the theory need not mean such identifica-
tion, and if the proper existence of the active self be explicitly
recognized, the doctrine in question may be, indeed, a valuable con-
tribution to our knowledge of how a self acts upon the physical uni-
verse. The theory emphasizes the probability that the spontaneous
centers of experience called human persons have a ground in the uni-
verse, but is in no way an explanation of their origin. It merely
helps us to understand how, once they are given, they may interact
with the world.
There are, then, two useful meanings of the term, disposition ,
(a) In the first place, it may be the name for those nervous struc-
tures which an active agent learns, as the result of painstaking in-
vestigation, to regard as standing in a constant relation to himself
so far as he endeavors to act upon the world.
(b) Secondly, the more accurate meaning of disposition , and
also the more important one, is that it sumaarizes the ways in which
we expect^o act in the future. This summary is based upon our
knowledge that, first, we have historically acted in certain ways,
and, secondly, tha^nMfng in our own nature that will hinder us
from acting in similar ways in the future under appropriate condi-
tions. The idea of disposition expresses the fact that at present
these conditions are not actual.
But the content of these dispositions, the kinds of acts to
which they refer, are derived in every case from a consideration of
actual and concrete activities that have been matters of experience.
Hence, the conceptual effort which has gone into their formulation
is a strong testimony to the work of memory in understanding our-
selves. The idea of disposition is useful in making it easy for us,
when we are considering our plans for the future, to summarize how
we have actually acted in the past. Characte r commonly stands for
tendencies to action which have been apquired in the course of ex-
perience, and may be briefly defined as one' 3 "habitual attitude
toward the values of life." (1)
Although memory, including disposition, is a chief implication
of activity, its importance must not be exaggerated. The outstand-
ing characteristic of activity is its forward look rather than its
backward look. Human activities are primarily prospective in direc-
tion, and only secondarily retrospective. Memories are important
and indispensable aids in the determination of our future activities
and in marking the results of our activities. Memory plays in fact
a function analogous to the rudder on a ship: it is a means of guid-
ing and stabilizing actions. Because it is concerned with activities
that have been tried out, it enables us better to predict and plan
for imminent ones. It helps us to define and organize our purposes.
As a matter of fact we do not often make absolutely new beginnings,
but we are constantly developing and enlarging the purposes and de-
( 1 ) G . A . Wilson.
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sires which, by past experience, we have found feasible and satis-
fying. It enables one to retain the various steps in a very com-
pound activity-cycle. Memory serves, then, as both a steadying and
an illuminating factor in personal life. Sometimes it is the name
for the persistence of our purposes, and sometimes it is itself a
genuine act by which one defines the relation of himself to his
past activities. The fertility of human association immensely en-
larges the field within which persons conduct themselves, but their
conduct is ever directed to what is to be.
The study of memory concludes our examination of the implica-
tions of activity. Not all of them have been set forth. The con-
cepts of value and of intelligence might be included as aspects of
purpose, but these and other factors important in personality will
be discussed below. It is time to summarize our exposition of ac-
tivity, and indicate its relation, so far as its meaning has been
developed, to the concept of personality.
The term activity is applied in general to any experience or
system of experiences which is individualized by the fact that in
it a conscious agent seeks to realize some more or less clear pur-
pose which has grown out of his past experience. The four chief im-
plications of this conception of activity are: purpose, agency, in-
dividuality in form or occurrence, and memory. Any such particular
system may be called an act, or an activity. We shall see that two
further specifications are required: the purpose always has value
for the subject, and activity in its personal form always contains
a- rational or intelligent factor. These specifications are, however,
involved in the implication of purpose v/hich we have included in our
definition. Activity is a conccete fact or actuality whenever one
can say that in hie conscious and individual life, he experiences a
transition in a certain felt and valuable direction, at the aarie
time that he maintains, by reason of his history and memory, a meas-
ure of stability amid his developing experiences. In other words,
activity is present whenever an agent or subject with a memory at-
tempts to realize, through changes in his experience, some end which
he esteems, and anticipates more or less clearly.
A particular and complete act of a human person has the follow-
ing four distinguishable aspects: (a) It is marked by the positing
of an end that is to be sought. This may be called, in ethical
language, the motive, for it represents that for which the agent
seeks because of its value to himself. But this end may be much
more indefinite than is required for an ethical act. The word, pur -
pose
.
is a more exact term. The starting point of an act, then, is
a being, conscious and alive, who is prepared for some imminent
change in his experience.
(b) In the endeavor to realize the end or purpose, the moat
varied mental processes may occur, notably the feeling of transi-
tion, but also other feelings, sensations, strains, etc. They all
get their meaning, and often their existence, from that in prospect
to which they point. I have called this experience- train, unified
by its prospective goal, and possessed of the most varied form-quali-
ties, the individuality of activity. It is in this phase that pre-
sentations, for example, bodily feelings, may play "an important part.
It is recognized, of course, that changes or consequences in the en-
vironment are usually essentinl conditions for the achievement of the
end, but do not constitute the principle of the activity itself, and
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arc not necessary to its existence.
(c) Finally, there is the achievement with its various signs
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The marks of achievement,
whether or success or failure, are not to be found in consequences
in the environment, although they may be involved, but in the feel-
ing of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Memory plays an especially
important part in determining what an achievement is, and also in
linking up acts in series by reference to a common purpose which
persists through them.
(d) None of these aspects are intelligible without the agent
which is the abiding ground of the act as a whole. He is the funda-
mental condition and the unifying principle.
Imperfect There are, of course, countless imperfect acts where one or
forms of ac- more of the phases mentioned is either in the margin of conscious-
tivity. ness or absent altogether, but it is often absent because it has once
been there. There are acts where one phase is more important than
another; in moral resolution, for example, the purpose stands out
clearly. Then there are activities where the beginning and end are
unimportant as compared with the intermediate stage where the devis-
ing of means occupies attention. Then, again, memory may be funda-
mental or predominant, as where a man discovers that he has loved a
girl only when she accepts a rival suitor.
4. The concept Now, the activity which has been expounded exhibits the concrete
of activity as person at work, for the person is the agent who acts in countless
related to that ways and according to certain purposes. If words are used carefully,
of personali ty . as we shall try to use them, personality should mean the general or
conceptual qualities that pertain to being a person, while a person
a. Use of is an individual example of personality. In contemporary usage,
terms : person- however, personality is also used in the latter concrete sense, and
ality and per- this usage is accepted here with reluctance. When, then, reference
eon
. is made to the general character or a concrete person or a personal-
ity the phrase, concept of personality , or personality without an
article, may be used sometimes. The above study of activity has
brought forth some of the fundamental factors in the concept of per-
sonality, although several others have still to be examined. The
features thus far developed may now be brought together before we
proceed to the exposition of the remaining ones.
b. Summary In activity in its more developed or typical forms we have seen
description of the person at work in the concrete. A person is from the first an
the factors in actor. Agency is the central feature in the concept of personality,
the concept of ,e have explained at length the meaning of agency. (1) We have seen,
personality bo among other things, J&ie agent is an abstraction apart from the con-
far developed
. crete activity-experience, but so aleo is personality.
In view of the relation of the agent to his acts, it seems im-
1! Agency. possible to ascribe activity to the pure subject, if the latter is
thought of as existing apart from concrete acta, for in a particular
activity there are Various objective and phenomenal factors present,
as I have tried to show in the study of the individuality of activi-
ty. (2) These objective factors consist of all that goes to make
up what has been called the empirical or psychological self, namely,
that totality of interests, desires, cognitions, volitions, etc.,
(1) See above, pages 2^5-245.
(2) See above, especially pages 256-9.
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which one regards aa intimately his own, though distinguishable
from the subject for whom they are. (1)
According to our view, then, concrete activity has both a
subjective and objective phase or aspect, and it is the latter, in-
cluding such facts as were mentioned in the last paragraph, which
comes into consideration in what is called self-consciousness. We
may study these objective phases of activity for themselves, in
which case they will be as abstract as the active subject, but in
our study we may note that they are dependent upon our subjective
selves . As H. V/. Carr observes, "I may attribute activity to the
self-conscious subject of experience, the psychological subject,
and in the sense that all experience, and activity as experience,
is the experience of a self-conscious subject, I mu3t do so." (2)
The relation between the subject and the empirical self represents
what J. Ward would call a duality in unity, or "unity in duality."
The distinction between the two aspects of the unitary person, in-
cluding at once active subject and empirical self, is made, however,
only in epistemo logical criticism, although it is perfectly intel-
ligible in every-day experience apart from tiiis criticism.
The real person, then, is not a bare agent or subject which
exists apart from his concrete acts. The true meaning of personality
ia to be found in the latter: in his individual acts and their cor-
2'. Purpo- relations. In these individual activities, agency is indissolubly
siveness. wedded to purpose, for as Perry points out, "Persons do things for
reasons . " (5) J. Y/ard well says that, "Persons literally work or
strive ( o perari ) , things are only metaphorically said to do so; per-
sons are not inert, merely passive or indifferent; they are active,
interested, and directive." (4) It is only in the interest oi meta-
physical analysis that we distinguish the agent rroia the other im-
plications of concrete activity; and Having done so, we must regard
him as the fundamental or grounding feature in the concept of per-
sonality
.
It is clear, too, tnat there must be included in the concept of
personality not only agency, but purposi veness . This, like agency,
is an abstraction apart from the individual and particular act. But
here again such abstractions are legitimate in a philosophical analy-
sis of the concept of personality, provided we recognize their ab-
stract character. A person ever acts with reference to what will be
in his experience. Very far-reaching consequences in the universe
may proceed from the individual act of a person, but these are not
constituents of it unless they are conscious or meaningful aspects
of the experiential whole of the act, and even in that case the per-
sonal feature of them i3 not their content, but the meaning or the
valuing itself considered from the point of view of the acting sub-
ject.
We have considered already at length in whut precise ways pur-
pose is a fundamental feature of personality. (5) The importance
(1) The question concerning the relations of the objective and
subjective phases of personality will recur below; see pages 265-9.
(2) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, H. 3. voi. I, p. 194.
(5) See his exposition of personal idealism, The Present Conflict
of Ideal*, page 207. W Psychological Principles, p. k06.
(5) See especially above, pages 215-255-
ii
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of purpose in personal activities is exceedingly great. In a gen-
uine sense, a person is what he seeks or what he wants to be. (1)
His purposes, his desires, his interests, considered as distinct
from the external objects connected with them, are an important
factor in the concept of his nature. C. S. Peirce declares that,
"This reference to the future is an essential element of personal-
ity." (2)
J
1
.
Memory. A person develops with the increase in the articulateness both
of the purposive aspect of hi3 activities, and also of his evalua-
tion of them, (j) This articulateness increases only in the light
of his personal history. It takes time for one to learn what his
wants are, and to properly evaluate them. In other words, wherever
purposive activity has attained some measure of intelligible clear-
ness and intelligent correlation, we must introduce the idea of mem-
ory, or, more generally, of "historical basis," to account for these
factors. Memory is another important implication of activity, and
factor in personality. Whether a man's life as a whole is a success
or failure, his consciousness of this fact requires a large and
significant memory-factor, by which he is reminded of what he is as
compared with what he intended to become, but even such a judgment
of a man's success or failure is not without reference to his future.
It should^pe especially noted, however, that memory does not explain
the fact of agency but presupposes it, and is a name for the fact
that the agent in his activities may take account of his own past.
H. Bergson declares: "To touch the reality of spirit we must
place ourselves at the point where an individual consciousness, con-
tinuing and retaining a past in a present enriched by it, thus es-
capes the law of necessity, the law which ordains that the past shall
ever follow itself in a present which merely repeats it in another
form, and that all things shall ever be flowing away. When we pass
from pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for
spirit." (4) We have explained carefully how large a part memory
plays in the activities and development of a person. (5)
V. Indiv- In order to connect the positing and the achievement of a par -
iduality. ticular purpose, the further concept of individuality is required.
This concept is the principle of order in the complex phases of ac-
tivity, and calls attention to the fact that although there may be
countless forms or qualities in the activity-cycles of a person,
each activity is, nevertheless, a unity of meaning. (6) When v/e
speak of the individuality of personality something quite different
is usually meant, as explained below (7), but the more complex con-
cept of individuality as applied to a person as a whole finds its
prototype in the concrete act.
a 1
. Personal- We have seen that bodily feelings and sensations may play a
ity and body. part in determining the individuality of an activity. (8) Bodily
factors have an important but subordinate place in our description
of activity in so far as bodily situations are regarded as essential
for the attainment of certain of our t>ur ;J03es or ends, but in ex-
plaining the achievement of some of or ends, ho bodily sensations
are essential. In any case, however, the subject of the experiences,
(1) See further below, page J08.
(2) Monist, vol. II, page 526. (5) See below, pages }Q'*i-5+ JOC.
Ik) Matter and Memory, page 515. (5) See above, pages 262-271.
(6) Gee the whole account of active individuality above,
pages 245-262. (7) See below, pages } 17-20.
(8) See above, page 259.
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the positor and maintainer of the purpose, is judge of the achieve-
ment, and the one who attains cannot be identified in any way with
corporeal features, as we have tried to show. (1) Even where we
seek bodily satisfactions, much more is presupposed and involved
than the body, both in the seeking and in the satisfaction, however
much bodily feelings may be involved. The latter are always sub-
servient to the active and conscious agent, with his interests,
purposes, and memories. The central and determining dimension of
personal experience is to be found, then, in subjective activity,
to which all other factors in the experience are subordinate.
It should be noted, however, that while every person is an
actor, not all acts are personal. While the actual person is an
immediate experience of the kind of concrete activity, yet not all
activities are to be referred to agents that are personal, unless
we introduce the concept of degrees of personality suggested by
E. S. Brightman, and made use of by Miss M. W. Calkins in her "per-
sonalistic conception of nature." (2) The chief difficulty in work-
ing with this idea lies in so determining or defining the lower lim-
it of personal activity that one does not lose the significance of
the latter concept. That Miss Calkins cornea near to doing this in
her attempt to extend the idea of person to the inorganic world
shows that the difficulty referred to is a real one. The problem
of determining various degrees of personal activities would admit
of easier solution, for certainly such activities may differ in the
clearness with which the agents grasp their purposes, and in the
intensity with which they work them out.
In those low forms of activity, however, where the goals have
never been other than very proximate and vague, or have never been
intelligently approved and compared with other possibilities, the
activities may fairly be said to be below the level of personal ac-
tivity. Personal activity is present only when a measure of clear-
ness, of approval, and of organization among our purposes has been
developed. The two latter points will be expanded more fully below
under the headings of value and unity in connection with personality.
(5) So far as purpose alone goes, the criterion of personal pur-
poses must be found in the presence or absence of at least an inter-
mediate degree of clearness and of a period of realization which is
sometimes at least of intermediate length. A corollary of this cri-
terion is the requirement that a personal activity shall involve a
degree of conscious memory.
Before the stages referred to in this criterion are reached,
there may be vague and proximate purposes wiiich presuppose an agent,
but this agent cannot properly be regarded as a personal one. The
various activity-experiences at this low level may be correlated
under the concept of self, but not of personality. A person is a
self which has reached a certain meaeure of development as determined
by the purposive criterion just mentioned, and by other criteria to
be developed below. (5) Not all selves then are persons, while all
persons are selves. A person is a developed self, and a self is the
promise of a personality. "The task of man is to become a person-
( 1 ) See above, pages 200-211.
(2) Philosophical Review, 1919, vol. XXVIII; see especially pages
159 ff., where she speaks of selves of different levels.
(5) See below, especially pages 29J-4j J00; ^1>1o; ^6;
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ality." (1)
The actual person is primarily a purposive actor, and his
concrete significance can be grasped only by those who have had the
experience. Since the person himself, however, possesses memory and
rational capacities, we must go beyond the actual person and form a
concept of personality, according to which a person is to be defined
in part as a being capable of many purposive activities, or, in other
words, which is prepared by its history and intelligent self-con-
sciousness to act in the future with reference to a diverse system
of ends. Our study. of the activity-system has proved to be the key
to the understanding of personality, and that is a sufficient justifi
cation for its lengthy examination. In a particular activity-system,
possessed of a unique individuality, performed by a conscious agent
in the light of his own past and his contemplated future, in the
light of memory and valued ends,—in such an individual system we
have personality at work in the concrete, and those who have such
experiences appreciate the meaning of personal activity, which is the
basic feature of personality.
If we take the point of view of being in the midst of one of the
active cycles of personal experience, then for the agent himself,
part of the cycle will be past and part of it will be future; the
first will be a matter of memory, and the second, of anticipation.
As the cycle completes itself memory more and more takes the place
of anticipation, and the achievement makes the whole a matter of his-
tory. Personal experience seems to be constituted of such individual
cycles of activity; some brief and imperfect, some long; some success
ful and some failing; some clearly outlined, others vaguely defined.
In some, attention is fixed constantly on the goal; in some, on the
means, and in some, on the past. These cycles succeed or overlap
one another, blend and are compounded, in all manner of ways. Never-
theless, the isolation of individual acts in the stream of experience
appears to be the most concrete and fruitful method of ordering ex-
perience if one is seeking to understand the personal aspect of it as
distinguished from the apprehended environmental objects.
In the outstanding features of developed individual activity as
described above there is present what may be called, in metaphorical
language, the fundamental triadic movement within personality or per-
sonal experience, namely, the achievement of ends that are remember-
ed (initially purposed), the whole cycle being grounded in the abid-
ing agent, apart from which it i3 unintelligible. Here is the es-
sence of personality: a conscious being which acts with reference to
remembered or persistent ends; an agent which conceives purposes,
works them out in the course of experience, and does so in the light
of his own past. Here is permanence amid progression, development
out of what has been, and yet an ever-present forward-look.
This is the great triad of personal experience: purpose, activ-
ity, memory. These are not parts of a compound, but are intimately
unified aspects of a single significant whole of experience In which
a conscious subject seeks an end and knows when he has achieved it
because he remembers that it was he who sought it or its kind at the
beginning. Since we have used activity to include all those aspects,
it is more in keeping with our usage to refer to the basic dialectic
of personal activity as purpose, realization, and memory. In the
repetition and blending of such cycles, involving phenomenal contents
having infinitely varied qualities, with purposes and memories reach-
(1) H. Dreyer, Personalismus und Realis-uue, page 71.
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s ing far into the future arid the past, consists the development
of personality in the concrete. When tais movement, rich as it is
already in the light of previous analysis, is thought of as further
illuminated by intelligence, permeated with the values of feeling,
and determined out of its own free nature, it will represent still
more perfectly personality in its most typical and highly developed
forms. To some of these supplementary concepts we must turn pres-
ently before attacking the problem of the reality of personality.
a 1 . Examples This triadic movement may be otherwise named the dialectic of
of personalist- personal activity, or personalistic dialectic. It3 clearest ex-
ic dialectic. amples exi3t in those moral experiences where a person suddenly be-
comes aware of his obligation to perform a particular act and re-
solves at once to do it and carries out his resolution, and in the
end he has a satisfying consciousness of having done his duty. It
is illustrated in religious conversion, where one is presented with
a new ideal of life, accepts it, meets difficulties in its fulfil-
ment, but overcomes, and in the end has an experience of elation and
triumph which is in part derived from his remembrance of his origin-
al resolution and his previous sinful behavior. The dialectic may
be illustrated in simple perception: for example, I want to know the
time of day; I look at the clock:, rind out what I desire, and then
resume ray work. Here is an original sense of incompleteness and a
direction of experience looking to its removal, simple bodily be-
havior, and the appearance of a satisfaction with the conclusion of
it. Again, I cannot see an object plainly; I move and strain my
eyes; finally it becomes clear, and I am satisfied. But it is un-
necessary to multiply examples of man's most familiar type of ex-
perience.
b'. Com- In some such personal movement as has just been described the
pared with dialectical movement of Hegel must be expressed apparently if it is
Hegelian to have concrete meaning for us human beings. Unlike the conceptual
dialectic. and universal dialectic of the latter, the personalistic dialectic
is confined within a whole of finite activity-experience, which is so
different from Hegel's representation of the development of concepts
in the world at large that a comparison is likely to result in deep-
ening difficulties rather than in deepened insights. However, if
one does not pre^s the comparison too far, he may get perhaps a new
view of the fundamentally important triadic movement within personal
experience by making a brief and superficial comparison of the two
doctrines
.
In every case of a highly developed and complete activity at
the personal level of experience, the active and conscious subject
which originally exists ( thesis :agent) begins with some sense of in-
completeness (negation), and accordingly posit3 a goal (antitaesis:
purpose) which promises to remove it; he may end either with an ex-
perience of satisi action or completeness ( syntuesis : achievement)
,
and the positing of a new purpose, or witn a feeling of dissatisfac-
tion and the consequence of eitiier aoandoning or reasserting his
original goal. The achievement of a compound purpose sometimes re-
presents a very comprehensive synthesis in the sense that many sub-
ordinate or instrumental ends have had to be realized before its
full and ideal meaning could become reality in the experience of
the agent who first posited it.
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In the per8onali8tic development which we have been describing
it is the presence of a purpose—namely, of an experience which an
agent wants but which at the same time the agent does not have
—
which explains that inner and ideal disagreement or incompleteness
v;hich is so regularly present in personal activities. Such incom-
pleteness—not properly called a contradiction—is required as an
essential factor of a complex typical activity because of the pur-
posive character of the latter, and thiB incompleteness, arising from
the presence of purpose, alone makes intelligible the historical and
self-perfecting activities of human persons. The overcoming of
deficiencies in experience by acts of self-determination—the tem-
poral development of purposive activities—an agent's expectation of
being something in a moment which he is not now— the making real of
that which at first is only ideal—these are the most real and funda-
mental facts in personal experience.
C. PERSONALITY AND INTELLIGENCE.
1 . Transi -
tional remarks
and introduc-
tion .
a. Import-
ance of recog-
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implications
of purpose.
The results of our study of personalistic dialectic have forced
upon us the consideration, next, of the rational or intelligent fac-
tor in the concept of personality. The approach to this concept by
way of an examination of concrete activity has been an aid in freeing
us from the perils of intellectualism, although at the beginning of
that study we recognized that much abstraction was inevitable . in the
course of a logical treatment, one by one, of the implications of
so complex a fact as personal activity. This abstractness has been
overcome in part by maintaining the standpoint of particular acts,
and in part also by the summary of the preceding pages; it may be
overcome further, and we may reach a still more concrete view of
personality, by the consideration of several other aspects of the
complex activity-experience. So far as possible our intention has
been to begin with personal experience in the concrete and to pro-
ceed by setting forth its implications rather than by analyzing it
into parts. That is, we started with the original whole, and then
tried to exhibit its various aspects. This method of procedure has
involved some repetition because the whole concept of personality
must reappear again and again, but this method has the great advan-
tage of warding off much abstraction, and of preventing us from sup-
posing that personality is some kind of composition, for example,
of intellect, feeling, and will. It kee^s before our minds, too,
the original unity of personal experience. But since our primary
aim is to understand personality in its chief aspects, we have no
objection to the use of abstract terms and argument, after we have
sufficiently recognized the fact of this use.
For this understanding further specifications and distinctions
are needed. The program immediately ahead of us may be understood
by considering what the fact of purpose involves when it is present
as a dynamic factor in a concrete activity. Such a purpose may be
abstracted from its active whole and be properly designated an idea,
but it is actually more than an idea in the usual logical sense, for
it is something which, as we may say, appeals to the subject as a
significant end, and because of this significance, he may choose to
realize it in action.
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In other words, the purpose present in personal activity seems
inseparably linked with what have been called rational, emotional,
and volitional phases of mind. These various concepts need now to
be considered in connection with personal activity and the concept
of personality, and we shall do so under the following headings:
Personality and Intelligence; Personality and Value; Personality
and Self-determination. The conclusion of these discussions will
find us ready to examine the meaning of the identity and unity of
personality, before taking up the question of its reality.
From the days of Plato reason has been put forward as the
chief and divinest aspect of the soul. (1) Such assertions should
be made with circumspection lest one imply by them that the concrete
person has been dissected into parts and that one of these has been
made the ri ler over a little colony of faculties, as a charioteer
may drive his horses. (2) A person is from the first a unity in
which various aspects may be distinguished but from which they can-
not be separated, save as concepts. Now when Bowne asserts that
personality is intelligence (j), this statement is not inconsistent
with the affirmation that personality is also will, for each asser-
tion is meant to emphasize one important aspect of personal exper-
ience and not to exhaust the latter. We shall consider briefly now
the intelligence-phase of personality.
By intelligence will be meant, in general, the "power to know"
or to introduce order into experience; the power to discriminate, to
perceive details, to relate, to build concepts. It includes the
cognitive character of consciousness to which James refers. (4)
These capacities are plainly discernible in a typical activity-cycle,
and are very intimately involved in the purposive and individual as-
pects of personal activity. The latter ideas will furnish a start-
ing point for the study of the intelligent or rational factor in the
concept of personality.
In the first place, it should be noted that intelligence is one
of the fundamental implications or conditions of purposive activity,
for if a purpose is to mean anything more than a vague or undefined
craving, and if it is to refer to a time more distant than the next
moment of experience, free ideas are required for the forming of the
purpose, discrimination for its realization, and rational ordering
for its comparison and organization with others . It is characteristic
of the rational phase of mind to deal symbolically with absent things
and to differentiate meanings and to correlate objective facts. Hence
when activity comes to be self-directed with reference to ends remote
from the momentary impulse, the work of intelligence becomes manifest.
L. T. Hobhouse points out that, "With the formation of Purpose we
cross the bridge which leads from the action of blind (though felt
and conscious) impulse and enter the kingdom of Intelligence proper,
and though the basis of the feeling which underlies the Purpose may
be wholly instinctive, yet the purposive act will be justly ascribed
to the conscious intelligence of the individual." (5)
(1) For examples of intellectualis tic views of the soul, see
page 6 above, in the classification of theories.
(2) Plato. (5) See above, pages 1J2, top,
(4) See above, pages 25, 57.
(5) Development and Purpose, pages 175-4.
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. > In other words, in order to make clear plans for the future
.
and in order to provide .neans that are efficacious, in an orderly
universe, for their realization, what is called intelligence is
indispensable. H. Bergson. has made familiar the idea of intellect
being the instrument of action; it is an instrument in the sense,
not of being something apart from action, but of being an integral
and essential aspect of all phases of personal activity. .7. Cald-
well states that, "It is equally certain that there is thought in
action—so long, that is to say, as action is regarded as action
and not as impulse." (1) The two most important forms which in-
telligence takes in our personal activities are (a) apprehension
and definition of ends that are valuable, and (b) discrimination
in the means of their attainment upon the basis of our understanding
of ourselves and the universe. Let us consider more fully these two
forms of intelligence. The functions of intelligence are so well
known that it is difficult to avoid trite remarks,
a. The func- When we consider the work of intelligence in the definition of
tion of intel- our ends, we note that, as our individual experience develops, the
ligence in the original unrest and unguided behavior witn its near-lying ODjects
definition of give way to a more and more explicit plurality of purposes that are
ends. more and more distant so far as their realization is concerned, so
that tne present situation comes to be distinguished clearly from
the future or ideal one. Our first criterion of personality was
the guidance of conduct by ends that are not at all times momentary.
The definition of these more remote ends is one of the important
offices of intelligence in the economy of personal life, and with
it is intimately associated the imaginative function. Indeed, we
may say that personality is first present in a genuine form when we
endeavor to define, to order, and to evaluate our desires and pur-
poses, but these processes require some measure of judgment, idea-
tion, deliberation, synthesis, and other intellective factors.
It is in those acts which are directed to the definition or
clarification of our purposes that the intelligent aspect of person-
ality is seen in one important form. These acts themselves must, of
course, be included in the general class of personal activities, al-
though they are of a different species than those acts which, for
example, are directed to the means of realizing a purpose that is .
already clearly apprehended. When a man pursues knowledge for its
own sake, we do not come upon a kind of personal life that cannot be
included under the form of persona, activity, but we have only a
difference in the content of the purpose. The attainment of such
knowledge, however, depends upon very intense activities and inter-
ests. Definition of human values may become one of the driving mo-
tives of a person's activities, but under these circumstances he
does not cease to be active; he has become active only with refer-
ence to a different end. Intelligence, then, is a necessary condi-
tion for the definition of a man's goal whether he aims to write
books on science or to sell merchandise or to raise corn. The work
of intelligence in this connection is so obvious as to need little
comment.
In the elaboration and coordination of our moral, religious,
aesthetical, and philosophical ideals the work of active intelligence
or of intelligent personality is manifested in its highest forms.
(1) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 96.
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The various conative tendencies of the human individual need to be
organized with reference to one another and to their total signifi-
cance, as well as with reference to the demands of society. That
is,, intelligence must cooperate if our native tendencies to action
are to be fruitful in attaining ends that are likely to be genuine-
ly satisfying. The ideas, ideals, or rules of conduct which arise
from the criticism of ourselves in the light of social demands be-
come the permanent points of reference for the determination of our
life as a whole, "it is characteristic of human conduct that it i_s
guided by 'ideas . ' " ( 1
)
R. B. Perry gives an excellent description (2) of the intelli-
gent factor in the determination of conduct. He thinks that a dis-
position is not sufficient to explain the moral activity of Socrates.
"What is necessary is that Socrates should mean to submit to law, or
that he should think his act to be a case of submitting to the law.
The link between the rule and the disposition is an act of interpre-
tation or judgment. In other words, one is said to be governed by a
purpose' M, when M is some generalized form of action, and when one is
disposed consistently to perform what one believes. . . to be a case
of M. Thi3 then appears to be what is meant by purpose when pur-
posivenesn is i lputed to the rational or reflective procedure of man."
The function of intelligence is also very important in the
realization of our purposes, for this depends upon acquaintance with
the natural and social world in which we act, and it is the special
business of intelligence to differentiate and coordinate the objects
of our experience as we encounter them in our individual activities.
"All experience," says B. H. Bode, "is a kind of intelligence, a
control of present behavior with reference to future adjustment." (5)
And since we finite beings stand in inevitable interaction with the
universe in which we find ourselves, the work of intelligence in
understanding these interrelations is obviously an important condi-
tion for the successful attainment of all those of our ends which
depend upon coordination of objective things.
In other words, it is in the achievement of a person's ends in
an orderly universe that the need clearly appears of ordering in-
telligently the steps in his cycles of activity and also the objects
involved in them. This work of discovering the systematic relations
of things is the outstanding characteristic of those personal acts
which are primarily of the intelligent type, as contrasted, for ex-
ample, with the aesthetic type. The greater our knowledge of things,
the greater becomes the universe of which we may take account in our
activities and in the attainment of the ends we esteem. Our person-
alities grow with the increase of our intelligent understanding of
the nature of our interaction with the world. This understanding
makes possible growing wisdom in the^election of the ends which will
prove to be practicable in realization, for selection really presup-
poses 3ystem in things, and intelligence takes account of this sys-
tem in constructing designs or plans of action.
If certain principles of order and free ideas are in/olved in
the positing and the realization of human purposes, and if purpo-
siveness is a mark of all personal activity, it follows that all pcr-
(1) R. B. Perry, Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 17.
(2) Monist, vol. XXVII, page ?57-
(5) J. Dewey, editor, Creative Intelligence, page 249.
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sonal activities are intelligent. But intelligence must not be
thought of as some kind of condition or faculty external or anter-
ior to personal activity. Apart from its immanent existence in
particular activities, it is an abstraction; its real meaning is
to be grasped only in the concrete experience of personal acts.
Although all such acts are intelligent, the amount of orderliness
involved in them varies much, but even where it is greatest, name-
ly, in those acts which may be called predominantly acts of intel-
ligence or of knowledge, the latter conform to the type of activity
already described. Intellect does not exist apart from personal
acts. (1) An intelligent act would be distinguished from a volun-
tary one, not absolutely, but only relatively; the difference would
be merely one of emphasis among factors, and not one of fundamental
difference of factors.
We may say that intelligence is especially emphatic and domin-
ant in those acts where our interest is directed to the differentia-
tion and the ordering of the phases of our experience, intelligence
being the concept to cover particular acts of this sort, which have
also the other aspects of activity. It might be more exact to say
that intelligence is an abstract term used to refer to all modes of
ordering present in individual acts. It is notably manifest in
those activities which are directed at the analysis and synthesis
of facts or purposes. But all personal activities are intelligent
in the sense that clear ideas are required in some measure both for
the positing and the realization in an orderly way of their purposes
In short, so far as a particular act, by reason of its purposive,
individuality, or memory aspects, has clear outlines and represents
a system of distinguishable and orderly phases, it is intelligent.
Since thought itself must be regarded as a kind of activity, we may
say that there is a special group of human purposes which are di-
rected to the understanding of reality. It seems certain that all
thinking is a form of activity, but it is doubtful whether, as the
pragmatists hold, it is also a form of action. "Theory does indeed
belong to practice," says B. Bosanquet. "it is a form ozonation .
"
(2)
e The ideality of one's future plans presupposes a subject which
is a thinking or intelligent one, but it should be noted that this
subject is not different from the agent or active subject which we
have already examined. Acts of knowing are as concrete as other
kinds of activity, and have similar implications. If one wishes,
for epistemological purposes, to neglect these implications, he may
call the agent which in general conditions acts of knowing the t ure
ego or epistemological subject, but he has not brought to light any
new factor in personal activity; he has only described the agent
in a more abstract way. He has considered the agent as merely the
subject for whom objects of knowledge are, without regard to the
factors of attending, purposing, valuing, and the like, which are
usually present in the concrete act in which the agent is actually
operative. In short, the pure ego of epistemology is the active
subject treated abstractly as a condition of knowledge. The ab-
straction itself is an interesting variety of activity of the pre-
dominantly intelligent type. In the history of any intelligent
(1) See below, pages 289-91; 557-8.
(2) Page 9 of his Inaugural Lecture at Saint Andrews upon the
Practical Value of Moral Philosophy, quoted by f. Caldwell, Prag-
matism and Idealism, page 96, note 1.
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person, then, it is the same subject which is active, whether his
activities are directed to the attainment of knowledge or to the
production of practical values.
The formal ego regarded as "the logical unity of conscious-
ness" gets its original meaning from the active unity of personal
experience. Until this ego has been reclothed with the concrete
factors of interest, etc., of which the epistemolo gists have strip-
ped it, it can under no circumstances be identified with personali-
ty. (1) It is altogether too empty and abstract for such purposes.
(2) But the subject in the theory of knowledge may be identified
with the agent which acts in various human experiences, and thus be
brought back to the realm of concrete personality and real existence.
J. Lindsay has written an article to show that the formal ego has no
"place in actual experience where form and content are indissolubly
united." (5)
Y/hen it is said that the real person cannot be identified with
the pure subject or formal ego of epis temology , because the lattec
is an abstraction, it should be noted that the object is also an
abstraction. How objects may be thought of as existing does not
concern us here, but if it is true tnat both subject and object are
abstractions and not ontological distinctions, then we have to ask
concerning the relation of personality to its objects of cognition.
(4) W. Mitchell says, "To have an object-experience is also to
have a subject-experience; it is this which differentiates the ob-
ject as we think it from our thinking it, our interest in it, and
our dealing with it. These are our subject-experience." (5) Hence,
we should try to understand the relation of the subject-experience
to its objects, and we may expect to find this meaning in concrete
experience where a particular active subject is acting in an envir"
onment of particular objects.
But if the active subject does not exist apart from an object,
the question clearly arises as to whether or not we should include
in the active person the objects which he knows or is interested in?
We make a negative answer, with the qualifications to be noted in a
moment, and avoid reducing personality to mere subjectivity by mak-
ing an important distinction between two meanings of the very ambig-
uous term, object . This view of the self will be seen to stand in
contrast with that which issues from R. B. Perry's epis temological
monism, for according to tne latter, personality tends to be dis-
solved into the same "stuff as things." (6)
Now, the word, object , may refer, on the one hand, to the
physical things or to the logical and mathematical entities which we
know, but there are good reasons for refusing to assert that the self
is to be understood either as a physical thing (7), or as a logical
entity. (6) On the other hand, mental processes may also become
( 1 ) See references to transcendental theories of personality,
above pages 7-8, in the classification of views.
(2) Compare James' objections to the emptiness of the tran-
scendental ego, above pages 42-5.
f5) The Formal Ego, Philosophical Review, vol. XXVIII, page 72.
(4) Compare Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Part I,
chapter III: How Does the uind Get ObjecU?
(5) Structure and Growth of Mind, page 58.
(6) See our criticism of his immanent conception of conscious-
ness, above pages 110, 116-119, 89 ff.
(7) See above, energetic view or activity, pages 194-199.
(6) Compare criticism of Perry, above pagee 87-8, 10^-7,
116-19.
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objects of knowledge, and it is these waicn may become aspects of
the self or personality. The most general and satisfactory way of
making these distinctions clear is to adopt the general points made
by K. Dunlap. In every experience we can distinguish, he says
,
Uiree aspect,*.: besides the subject of experience, there is the ex-
periencing, and also that which is experienced. (1) The two latter
aspects we regard as objective, though both are not objects of an
attentive subject at the same time, but may be so only successively.
Hence, in retrospection, the phases of an individual act, except
the agent, may become objects of knowledge
. There are, then, two
great classes of objects: psychical facts, and the objects with ref-
erence to which an agent acts, notably physical and logical enti-
ties. Hereafter, wnen line distinctions are required, the word,
object, will be used in tne latter sense; and confusion woula oe
avoided if the term, contents ox consciousnes s , were also restricted
to tne latter signii ication. The two sorts or objects may oe called
respectively internal objects and external oojects.
The concrete person does not include the ooject in the latter
sense, but is an act which is constituted by an active agent plus
the mental processes involved in this act. In most general iterms,
then, a person is the subject of experience having certain exper-
iences, exclusive of objects in the physical or logical sense. The
process of experience is always one aspect merely of a concrete ac-
tivity which involves an agent; so that the two fundamental phases
of human experiences are personal acts and that objective world to
which these acts are related.
D. H. Parker (2) suggests that the self is "in contact with
content," and both together he proposes to call aind or conscious -
ness . Contact is a valuable term if it is not taken to imply a
realistic sense, for it is as a result of my active contact with a
world which I do not entirely create, however much its order in my
knowledge and its value are determined by me, that leads me to make
the distinction between my activities and the objects upon which I
act, but with which I do not identify myself in reflection. If the
above conception of a personal act is correct, then psychology
deals with abstractions when it is concerned with mental processes
alone, for the unifying and active agent, which together with them
constitutes the real person, has been overlooked. This fact fur-
nishes a solid foundation for the development of a self-psychology
like that of Miss M. W. Calkins (3) and of a functional psychology-
such as is advocated by G. A. Coe. (4)
The totality of mental processes which one experiences has
been called the empirical ego. It is frequently unclear, however,
whether or not this term includes both the active subject of ex-
periences and his proper psychical processes, such as feelings,
interests, cognitive acts, volitions, etc., all of which we have
called his internal objects, and which constitute the phenomena
studied by the introspective psychologist. We shall adopt reluc-
tantly the usage which, on the v/hole, prevails, and take the empir -
(1) Psychological Review, vol. XXI, pages 62-69.
(2) Self and Nature, page 2^.
(5) Compare her First Book in Psychology.
(4) Compare the first part of his Psychology of Religion.
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ical ego to mean all of the abstract psychical processes owned by a
particular active subject. It is recognized that this use of empir -
ical ic inexact and misleading, for it is uncertain whether or not
the agent is to be regarded as an aspect of personal experience, an
uncertainty which is probably due to the common neglect of the ac-
tive subject of experience. From tiiis customary terminology it fol-
lows that the empirical ego and the subject of experience are alike
abstractions, and that it is in their unity that personal life con-
sists. James called the empirical ego the "Me," (1) but this is not
the concrete person, and is an abstraction. In order to recognize
the abstract character of the empirical ego, v;e may spealc of the ex-
periential unity, in the concrete acts of human persons, of this
agent and the empirical ego as above described.
It was precisely the empirical ego,—the mental processes,
functions, or phenomena that belong to any subject,—which we tried,
in our account of the individuality of activity, to set forth in a
general way as an important aspect of a concrete act. We thus avoid
the fallacy of abstraction which arises from attempting to identify
the self either with the bare subject of experience or with the em-
pirical ego considered apart from such subject. From this point of
view, the person is the active subject plu3 his experiencings
.
It is, however, only in rare moments of introspection that the
experiential person as thus described is not acting with reference
to external objects, of physical or logical kinds, with a view to
knowing them or to adjusting his actions to them. But when a person
comes to define carefully his selfaood, he ought not to include in
it the external objects which he knows by means of his intelligent
acts
.
2'. The sub- In this way we avoid two abstractions, the pure subject of ex-
ject and the perience, and the empirical ego considered without reference to the
empirical ego former. These two extremes have been well distinguished by E. C.
are alike 7/ilm: "There is the empirical self, the content or object side of
abstractions. consciousness, composed of so-called states or processes of con-
sciousness, like perceptions, memories, emotions, and conative ex-
periences, and the subject, the transcendental self in the Kantian
tenainology , aware of these experiences, to whom these experiences
in some sense belong." (2) From the standpoint of this investiga-
tion the genuine person consists neither in the subject-self nor in
the empirical self, but in the indissoluble unity of these two in
concrete activity. In such active cycles as described in the last
main chapter all of the processes mentioned by E. C. '.Yilm may have
a place on occasion, but in addition to them there is the a^ent or
active subject which is the indispensable ground of them all.
a 1
. Note on The peculiar difficulty in knowing the agent which already has
Kant's Pa- been pointed out (j) explains perhaps why some thinkers, especially
ralcgisms. psychologists, treat the self as purely phenomenal or empirical, in
the sense just designated. In this treatment they seem to have the
support of Kant, for in his "paralogisms" (4) he points out that the
jsaye in Honor of
(1) See above, pages JJ-jC.
(2) Article, "Selfhood," in, Philosophical Est
J. E. Creighton, page 279.
(5) See above, pages 258-42; compare below also, pp. 525-257.
(4) Critique of Pure Reason, (MUller translation) pages 278-527.
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self is known only as an object of thought, and declares that when
one tries to apprehend it directly as it is in itself, he falls into
a fallacy. This mistake arises from the demand of reason to know
what the empirical self, which is manifest in internal sense and which
grows in the course of experience, is in its completed form. To sup-
pose that such knowledge is possible is to commit a fallacy, accord-
ing to Kant, for this completed self is a thing-in-itself , and is not
experienced; a paralogism arises from drawing a conclusion concerning
the noumenal self upon the basis of what one knows of the self as
experienced. If, however, we maintain the point of view of the in-
dividual act, where the active subject and the empirical ego are only
distinguishable phases of an experiential whole, we shall not only
avoid both the abstractions of a transcendental ego and of a phenome-
nal self without any abiding ground, but also we shall be using ex -
perience in a definite snese. Without the empirical ego the agent
would be empty, and without the agent the empirical ego would be
groundless. To the one is to be referred the unity and permanence
of concrete acts, and to the other their empirical and qualitative
richness.
A more complete discussion of the relation between the empirical
and the subjective egos will be presented below under the topic of
the unity of personality (1), but in connection with the intelligent
feature of personality it should be noted that the person, in his
thinking and practice, may deal with many varied phases of the uni-
verse, both near and remote, without identifying himself with them.
V/hen Jaraes speaks of extending the empirical self so as to include
friends, country, bank account, etc., (2) he is certainly using terms
in a very loose way, for such an unbridled extension is possible v/hen
the distinction between the two kinds of objects to which reference
has been made is overlooked. Personality is no doubt successively
in "contact" or interaction with a vast world of objects, but it i3
not characteristic of the average person to identify himself with
them, however much he may be interested in them.
In other words, a person may always be in contact with objects,
including his own body, without feeling the necessity of identifying
his activities with these objects. Perry recognizes the distinction
between the contents of consciousness and action in the beginning of
his exposition of consciousness. (5) James declares that the most
fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology" is the belief in the
distinction of "the mental state as an inward activity or passion,
from all the objects with which it may cognitively deal. (4) The
meaning of personality is to be found in activities and not in the
objects, although it is no doubt perfectly true that both exist in a
common world of experience. When one does riot distinguish his per-
sonal activities from the world of objects which he experiences, this
means that he is living in a world of primitive experience which has
not yet become articulate. When the distinction in question arises,
the only legitimate meaning of pure activity will be personal activ-
ity, and this poi..t indicates that tnis activity is inseparably con-
nected witn various objects of experience. D. H. Pr.rker says that
(1) See below, page ^17.
(2) See The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, 291-5.
(5) See above, pages 09-90.
(4) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 185; «»©e above,
page 28, bottom.

2'. Parker s
account of the
relation of
Hie self to
the content t>r
objects of
experience.
y. Further
examples of the
distinction be-
tween the per-
son and hi
8
objects
.
287
he has always meant to himself "certain instincts, purposes, choices;
certain satisfactions and dissatisfactions; and certain opinions,
thoughts, memories. Let us call all these activities." (1) These ac-
tivities he considers to be the essential part of the self; the self
or person in this sense is a narrower term than mind, which includes
at once the active self and the contents or objects of its experience.
This use of terms certainly gives promise of making for clearness in
our thinking about personality.
Parker has some further striking and succinct remarks on the rela-
tion of a self to his object, which we may summarize as follows: (2)
The self is in constant contact with things which are no part of it;
our activities never exist apart from these things. With them the self
makes a whole from which are excluded all things it cannot at the mo-
ment find. This whole I call the mind or consciousness. It is made up
of content and myself. The self is only a part of this whole, and it
is improper to say it is the whole. Everything in this whole which is
not self is content. This distinction is not always recognized because
I never find myself without some contact with content, that is, because
of the close connection between the two parts of the mind. I never
find any content separate from the self. These are illuminating sug-
gestions
.
There are numerous cognitive experiences in which the distinction
we are trying to make is easily slurred over. D. H. Parker points out
further that images, for example, often seem to be myself. They are in
such inseparable connection with oneself and his activities that they
are often identified with them, although in careful reflection, one can
easily distinguish himself and his interests even from the imaginative
worlds which he may create. Then, too, thoughts and memories are inter-
woven with the pictures of their objects; pleasures and pain are pene-
trated with organic pressures and changes. Strivings are always in-
wrought with strains, and desires often go with images of objects in-
volved in their satisfaction. Other things often associated with the
self are articular and muscular strains, beatings of the heart, ten-
sions in the forehead and throat, etc. (j) The self, however, is not
content, but is the active agent which interacts with objects. Most of
the examples in this paragraph are taken from Parker's first chapter.
It hardly seems necessary to insist at such length upon the im-
portance of distinguishing the person as an experiencing agent from the
objects which he may know or with which he may interact or waich may be
involved in the realization of his purposes. I may experience blue ob-
jects, but I never say that I myself am blue or yellow or black, ex-
cept in a figurative sense. G . Kafka asserts that, "The content of
sensations and ideas can never form a predicate of the ego; the ego,
therefore, is not red, sharp, hard, sweet, or square, but it is, cheer-
ful, satisfied, strained, and the like, and, above all, it wills." (4)
I may wish for a lot of money, but the money is not a part of myself,
but only the wishing for it. I may propose to take a sight-seeing
tour, but I do not identify myself with the objects in which I become
interested in fulfilling my purpose, however important a part they may
play in bringing me the satisfaction I seek. That satisfaction may be
(1) Self and Nature, page 51. (2) Ibid., pages 4-5.
(5) Compare, for example, James
1 description of the spiritual
self, above page 55-
(4) Archiv ftirdie gesamte Psychologie, vol. XIX, 1910, page 110.
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distinguished from the objects with which it is concerned if I
make any distinctions in my experience at all. In thinking I may
distinguish the aspects, "it is 1 who think" and "I am thinking ,
"
from "I think some thin^, . " The two former are essential to my per-
sonal activity. The perceiver and the perceiving, not the perceived,
belong to the personal act. The actor and the acting, not the objects
effected, constitute personality. The latter are experienced. The
acting is the process of experiencing. The agent is neither a process
nor an object of apprehension, but is the immanent subject of exper-
ience, abstract enough indeed taken by itself, yet essential to all
experience on the personal level.
Now most of our activities involve relations to the sensory
world. It has been said that in sensation the self is passive. Sen-
sations are identified with impressions which we receive. Shall we
then say that in sensation personality is passive? .;e hold that per-
sonality is throughout active in some measure, end that in the case of
sensation the supposed passivity is fictitious, and the reasons for
this affirmation are as follows:
(a) First, since we have long ago abandoned physical or spatial
metaphors, we cannot think of sensations in the old-fashioned way as
impressions in any physical sense. Sensations appear in experience
because there is something to react to the objects presented and to
receive the impressions. As J. Ward observes, the subject must have
a degree of activity in order to be "active enough at least to 're-
ceive impressions.'" (1) The conscious and waking person is constant-
ly and actively ready to take cognizance of objects acting upon him,
and without ais active cooperation these objects would mean nothing
to him.
(b) But the doctrine that the mind is passive in sensation rests
upon the assumption that sensations themselves occur in a pure state,
which as a matter of fact is a dangerous abstraction. They never so
occur in normal adult experience. They are always aspects of an ac-
tive experience; indeed, declares S. Alexander, (2) "it is not
strained to speak of a sensory action or an act of sensation." Again
he says, "I find in a sensation nothing but mental activity directed
upon what is called the content of the sensation, which content is
nowhere found except in the external object." (5)
D. C. Macintosh asserts that, "What we are concerned to maintain
here is that in sensation, as truly as in memory, there is a creative
activity of spirit— or of whatever we may choose to call the psychical
subject. Upon occasion of certain stimulations, sense-qualities—par-
ticular colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and the like—are creatively
produced by each psychical subject for itself, and in many cases lo-
cated with more or less accuracy in or upon the very object in the
environment from which the stimulation proceeded." (4) He concludes
that, "What we here suggest is that it is possible to interpret con-
sciousness, in sensation everywhere and always, as well as in its
other forms, as being a productive activity , and that of a unique
—
but not indefinable—sort." (5) He also points out that sensing is
(1) Psychological Principles., page 49.
(2) Proceedings of the Aris. Society, H . 3., vol. VIII, page 213.
(5) Ibid., page 221. An excellent destructive criticism of the
doctrine of pure sensations is found at the beginning of Coe's Psychology
of Religion. (4) The Problem of Knowledge, page J1J.
(5) Prob. of Knowl., page J15; for a long defense of the active
nature of sensation, as well as of consciousness as a whole, see Ibid.,
pages J12-19.
I
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R. B. Perry gives an excellent account of a simple cognitive
experience which fits in very well with our present conception of
the mental subject as fundamentally active. He explains: "To make
the matter clearer it is necessary to introduce the case of simple
awareness or cognitive response. In this case the endeavor is that
the stimulus should more effectively stimulate. The organism re-
sponds by a better adjustment to the action of the stimulus, by turn-
ing the head, focusing, cutting off inhibiting or disturbing stimuli;
in short, by looking, listening, touching, sniffing and the like.
This attentive set is like any other except in that it usually accom-
panies the others and facilitates them. But it is quite capable of
absorbing the energies of the organism for a time. Then when it comes
to rest, one can be said to have one's curiosity satisfied, and to
have learned how to 'see' what one was trying to see. The attentive
act is an anticipation of future stimulation, and whatever excites it
is object of consciousness in the sense just described." (2)
G. A. Coe also suggests that the desire to multiply objects is
one of the general purposes of the human mind. (5) 'K Caldwell, too,
maintains that, "There is certainly purpose in the attention that is
involved even in the simplest piece of perception, the selection of
what interests and affects us out of the total field of vision or ex-
perience." (4) The perceptual world, he says, is not given, but
"constructed by our activity." B. P. Bowne holds also to the view
that the mind is fundamentally active in all knowing. (5)
The interest which accompanies perception is one phase of that
general interest which we have in adjusting ourselves to the universe
by means of understanding its nature. When we pass from the guidance
of activity by perception to its guidance by ideation, the intelligent
phase of personality becomes still more important.
Hence, even in cognitive experience which appears to be passive,
it turns out that we are passive only in a very relative sense, and
that fundamentally we are active in them all. We may agree with G. F.
Stout that a purely passive consciousness does not exist. (6) Even
reverie, he thinks, involves an active element (7)j we are active in
the sense that we "hug our present enjoyment," and resist interrup-
tions. It is by means of his own activities that the individual per-
son comes to know his world, and in this endeavor his activities are
predominantly intelligent.
In view of these observations it appears that the whole question
of whether the will or the intellect is primary in personality is a
wholly mistaken one. J. Laird (8) has demonstrated at length the mu-
tual irreducibility of will, feeling, and reason. He maintains that
there is no primacy of practical or speculative reason, and that the
whole terminology in this controversy is misleading. There is a de-
(1) The Problem of Knowledge, page J19.
(2) Psychological Review, vol. XXV, page 17.
(5) Psychology of Religion, page 40.
(4) Pragmatism and Idealism, pages 95- 6«
(5) See especially Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pages 50-57.
(6) Analytical Psychology, vol. I, page 168. (7) Ibid., p. 170 ff.
(8) Problems of the Self.
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aire to do what we believe to be. right, and this is operative in mor-
al choice; and there is a desire to believe only what is seen to be
coherent, and this is operative in speculation; but in both cases the
ultimate fact is a personal activity ..hich involves at once an intel-
ligent and a volitional phase. To separate them would mean to irrep-
araDly split personality. W. Caldv/ell maintains that, "It is the
fact of action that unites or brings together what we call 'desire'
and what we call 'thought.'
. .
It is in conscious action that our de-
sires and our thoughts do come together." (1)
a. Usefulness It undoubtedly is true that the ideas of intellect, will, and
of intellect, feeling also, are valuable principles for purposes of psychological
will, and feel- classification or description, but one approaches the problem of per-
ing in psycho- sonality in a mistaken and unprofitable way if he attempts, first, to
logical de- prove that one of these is a fundamental principle or essence of which
ecription, but the others are species or .:ianifes tations , and then, to show that his
personality - favorite principle is identical with personality. This identification
cannot be would rest upon the hypos tatization of a psychological class, and one
identified with should scarcely expect to grasp the meaning of real personality with
any one. such an hypostatized abstraction. This i3 a common mistake into
which defenders of objectivis tic or phenomenal is tic theories fall. (2)
J. Ward points out that "intellect without synthetic activity is
a nonentity." (5) G . Kafka, in criticizing H. Mttnsterberg' s attempt
to identify the ego with the will, maintains that the will-experiences
cannot be so distinguished from other kinds of psychic phenomena that
we are warranted in making them the subject over against which the
other psychical phenomena may be set, for these so-called will-exper-
iences have the same relation to the ego as the others, although their
special characteristics as a class of facts may be granted. He says
that, "it is one and the same ego which experiences sensations and
ideas, and their relations, on the one hand, and the feelings and
will-acts on the other." (4)
b. Will, in- In other words, will, intellect, and feeling are alike abstract
tellect, and qualities or aspects of the concrete personal act. The living person-
feeling are ality is wider than intellect, as H. Bergson has so strongly empha-
abetract as- sized, and it is also wider than either will or feeling. Jamea sug-
pecta of con- gests that, "if we postulate the fact of thinking at all, I believe
crete personal that we must postulate its dynamic power as well." (5) In another
activity, place (6) he says that knowing is a function of^pur active life.
In other words, if we begin with personal activity as we know it in
every-day life, we find that we can distinguish in it an intellectual
or intelligent aspect, and perhaps also a will and a feeling aspect;
these are not parts, however, but aspects of a single living and
progressive whole. They are abstractions when taken apart from this
concrete whole.
It is true, however, that in any particular activity one of these
aspects may play a more important part than another. H . W. Carr sug-
gests that, A train of thought is the evolution of a meaning or
(1) Pragmatism and Idealism, page 100.
(2) See above, pages 6-7.
(5) Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II, page 242.
(4) Archiv fUr die geaamte Paychologie, vol. XIX, pagefl 10^-10.
(5) The Principlea of Psychology, vol. II, page 571.
(6) E8aays in Radical Empiricism, page 75.
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gut in any purpose according as the emphasis is laid on intellect or will." (1)
individual act In our scientific or philosophical endeavors, the rational aspect of
one may be personality predominates, but these endeavors are nevertheless essen-
more important tially active and interested. In the performance of various daily
than the duties there are cases where the Till aspect predominates, but in
others. these cases the intellective factor is never absent. In great joy
and sorrow and In intense aesthetic delights feeling may be the rul-
ing factor, but these experiences probably would not exist apart from
the presence of some thought and will.
In short, in any individual life or act, the knower who knows is
identical with the agent who acts, and these are one with the subject
who feels. The most fruitful line of division in the study of person-
ality lies between the active subject and his various experiences,
rather than among cognition, volition, and affection. If these rea-
sonings are valid, it is as mistaken to say that personality is intel-
lect merely, as it is to assert that it is only will or feeling, for
I am unable to find that in human experience at the personal level
these ever occur singly.
Upon the basis of a careful psychological description of will,
intellect, and feeling, one might, with some profit perhaps, classify
personal activities according to the predominance of one of these fac-
tors over the others in individual acts. After such a classification
had been carried out, one might infer that one group of personal ac-
tivities is more important than another, but such an inference would
be of value only if it rested upon"- (a) a complete classification;
(b) a recognition of the abstract character of the division; and (c)
the discovery of an explicit definition of importance or standpoint
adopted which (d) would be applicable to all classes.
7. Personality Will, intellect, and feeling are useful categories or principles
in relation to for the ordering of our knowledge of the empirical ego, but call for
. the categories circumspection when used as metaphysical principles. These distinc-
or explanatory tion3 and their coordination are the work of the thinking and active
principles of person himself. No doubt he may learn about his own nature by the
knowledge
. consideration of the ways in which he acts, but his activities, as
matters of immediate experience, contain within themselves the cate-
a. The origin gories which he must employ if he is to reach a conceptual formula-
,
tad meaning of tion of his own nature. The point that needs to be emphasized here
categories is that it is in one's personal activity that he finds the real mean-
used in ex- ing of those principles which he may be interested in abstracting
plaining per- from them for the purposes of a systematic and comprehensive under
-
eonality are standing of himself, and it is probable that this idea applies also
found. in con- to most if not all of the fundamental categories with which he inter-
crete personal prets the physical world. The various epis temological categories are
acts. an expression of the cognitive interests of human beings and are them-
selves achievements resulting from intelligent acts; they are derived
by the agent himself working intelligently upon his own activities in
the endeavor to understand their immanent principles. (2)
1'. Why they We are obliged to conclude that the principles present in par-
cannot be found ticular acts are the only available keys to personality, and some of
elsewhere. the reasons, in summary, are as follows: In the first place, any
( 1 ) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, I. 3., vol. I,
page 19fi.
(2) See further discussion of these points in connection with
personalistic method, above, pages 1 76-78; and below in connection
with the reality of personality, pages J41-50.
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principles of order present in the knowledge of the world of nature,
sucft as time, identity, energy, continuity, causality, or purpose,
which may be useful in understanding personality, derive their only
intelligible meaning from personal activity itself from which they
have been abstracted. Secondly, anything else except a person him-
self lacks a sufficiently ricn individuality so as to be aole to
furnish enough principles of interpretation, in an intimate and
unique correlation, for personal activity. G. T. Ladd explains this
point by asserting that "everything is known by the Self, only a3
having some of the qualities in lower degree which every Self knows
itself to have." ( 1
)
The work of intelligence in the interpretation of personal ac-
tivity does not consist, therefore, in introducing principles from
without, save those derived from social intercourse, but in the en-
deavor to develop more clearly and explicitly the principles which
are already present in it in an implicit way. This work and this de-
velopment will not lead to something different from activity, but
only to higher forms of activity. These acts of the developed intel-
ligent person will be higher in the sense of representing a clearer
integration of individual acts and of compound cycles. That is, the
agent will comprehend what he does more clearly, and will be able to
achieve more significant and remote ends because of his wider and
more explicit knowledge of his own past, of the world in which he
lives, and of his purposes for the future. Memory will come to play
a larger part; his activities will form themselves into larger and
better organized systems, and the rational connections of the various
stages in the realization of his ends will be more intimately and
consciously bound together. And this whole intelligent development
of self-consciousness proceeds from within. As B. H. Bode says, "The
process of intelligence is something that goes on, not in our minds,
but in thinking: It is not photographic but creative." (2) In short,
out of his own activity-experiences, the agent develops various forms
of rational interpretation of himself which add significance to his
own life.
It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to consider the deduction
or evolution of the categories of philosophical explanation from per-
sonal activity. One of the most important functions of personal ac-
tivity, as indicated above (=5), is its work of understanding its
world, of developing systematic conceptions of it. The human person
is notably an organizer of experience, who, by his activity, develops
a comprehension of the relation of things, and of his place in the .
world
.
From the study above (3) of the relation of intelligence to pur-
pose in personal activity, it is clear that the function of intelli-
gence in the development of personal consciousness is very great. G.
T. Ladd maintains that "it would seem that in order to be Anybody, --
in other words, any sort of a Person, --so much development of the
knowledge of things and of the knowledge of oneself, as has been de-
scribed^in the preceding chapters, is a minimum requirement. The hu-
(1) Some evidence in support of these propositions was offered in
the criticism of the energeti" and behavioristic theories of activity;
see above, especially pages 81-2, 19^— 197, 204-212.
(2) J. Dewey, editor, Creative Intelligence, page 255.
(5) See above, pages 279-81.
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man being who would lay reasonable claim to personality, even of the
meanest grade, must know, with an indubitable conviction of its cer-
tainty, something of himself, something of other selves, and much
that concerns his own physical constitution and its physical environ-
ment. He must know himself as an intelligent will, capable of produc-
ing changes, but only within certain limits, and compelled to suffer
changes in his states of feeling and thought by external influences
that are not subject to nis will.
. . The development of personality,
then, as involving growth in trie knowledge of Self is the achievement
of intellect as a capacity and activity of the personal type." (1)
Attainment of knowledge may become an end of human endeavor for
its own sake, but more commonly among men its value lies in the fact
that we can more perfectly realize our ends the more perfectly we un-
derstand ourselves and the universe in which we live. The pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake represents one of the highest stages of
intelligent activity, which, because of its importance in philosophi-
cal speculations, explains, perhaps, why intellect or reason is fre-
quently regarded aa the essence of personality. <J . H. Fichte main-
tained that the ego must build a world as a theater for the realiza-
tion of his purposes; the spirit of this doctrine is illuminating,
wb,en it is understood to mean that we must, by our own efiorts, under-
stand the world and ourselves before v/e can fulfil our highest pur-
poses and supreme duties
.
The humanistic disciplines deal with the contents of knowledge
which, in general, are of prime importance as a basis for the develop-
ment of personality and self-consciousness. (2) Any knowledge derived
from the sciences of psychology, sociology, ethics, history, religion,
or any other sources, which throws light upon the nature and ideals
of human beings will be of great value to anyone seeking to become as
rich a personality as is possible. The reason why this knowledge is
of such worth ought to be evident now in view of the significant func-
tion of intelligence in the definition and realization of human pur-
poses. Of secondary importance to the humanistic kind of knowledge
will be that concerning the world in which men live. "We would know
what we want, and we would want and desire what we know we can get
—
the complete development of our personality
.
11 (5) We have found as
yet no obstacle to the human individual gaining knowledge of his own
activities, (4) altnough, of course, it should be recognized that the
knowledge of any activity is an aduition to the activity itself.
Personality, then, is rational. All personal acts have an in-
tellective phase; they are intelligent and intelligible. Those activ-
ities, if they exist, which are without an intelligent aspect should
not be called personal. The idealizing or thinking capacity of the
human person is so lively and productive that we must regard it as a
very important phase of personality. A person is intelligent so far
as his activities involve an orderly understanding of himself and his
not-self. But everywhere we must avoid speaking of intelligence as
(1) The Secret of Personality, pages 114-5.
(2) Compare H. '.7. Wright, Self-Realization, etc., Part II,
chapter VI, The Condi tionsof Self-Realization in Human Life. See
also, G. S. Shaw, The Ground and Goal of Human Life.
(5) W. Caldwell, Pragmatism and Idealism, pi^e 101.
(4) On problem of self-knowledge, see below, pages 551-6.
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if it were an independent entity; it is one aspect of our personal
activity, and does not exhaust its meaning, unless we give a very
wide interpretation to it, as Bowne sometimes does. (1)
b. Intellec- The claims of intellectualism and voluntarism (2) are equally
tualiem and ' untenable, for both views rest upon an abstraction which caimot be
voluntarism. regarded as representing the real personality. Voluntarism is the
product of personal activities involving highly developed rational
principles, and intellectualism is a product of personal activities
involving volitional phases. The intellectualis t is right in think-
ing that purposive reflection is a mark of genuine personality, but
wrong in supposing that it is the only mark. The vol\urtarist is
correct in emphasizing the fact that reflection itself is an act of a
mature will, but mistaken in trying to exhaustively express the in-
telligence-functions of personal activities in terms of will.
c. Importance The intelligence-aspects of personal activity, then, are very
of intelligence- important ones, but not the only ones. Even in the act of knowing
aspects of per- itself something else is present beside principles of order: there is
sonal activity, always interest of some sort, and an original spontaneity. Intelli-
gent acts are distinguished from other types, for example, practical
ones, by a difference in emphasis or degree of orderliness present,
and not in fundamental nature. The intelligence-aspect of personal-
ity is very important, as we have seen, first, because it is essen-
tial in the definition and the achievement of long-term purposes
which are characteristic of personality. It is important, too, be-
cause it is by acts of the intelligent type that we relate other kinds
of activity to tae universe as a whole, and to the development of the
selr in the light of its purposes and nature. But until we decide
upon some commonly applicable criterion or standard or rererence, it
is incorrect to assert that eitaer intellect or will is primary in
personality. They are so inextricably interwoven in our activities
that we should not have personality without the presence of both.
d. The systems In the systems of kno?/ledge which human personalities have con-
of human knowl- structed we find a wonderful revelation of their essential interests,
edge reflect and of their creative power
.
C. C. J. Webb declares that, "'.Ve have
personal inter- no conception of knowledge except as a personal activity. . . In at-
e8te. tempting to explore the nature of knowledge we are confronted by the
fact of personality as the presupposition of that w.iich we are explor-
ing. So . . . progress of knowledge itself must sooner or later bring
us face to face with this same fact of personality as the highest form
of life." (5)
D. PERSONALITY AND VALUE.
The above study of the concept of personality has indicated that
a person is primarily an intelligent agent or actor, with all that
this implies. In the definition of the meaning of personal intelli-
gence it was difficult to omit the concept of value, for intelligence
is especially manifest in the apprehension and multiplication of
values. (4) This difficulty was avoided temporarily by describing
( 1 ) For an excellent discussion of the place of intelligence in
personality, see Bowne, above, pages 1J2-2.
(2) See further below, pages 500-1; 557-6.
(5) God and Personality, page 24.
(4) Compare L. T. Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, pa e 174.
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intelligence, in part, by exhibiting its relation to the purposive
aspect of personal activity which had been explained before. Now,
however, we must consider for itself the idea of value in its rela-
tion to personality. In this study attention will be given to the
s concept of feeling, which occasionally is made the essence of per-
/
sonality (1), and which includes an important group of psychological
facts belonging to the empirical ego.
It has been indicated that the concept of purpose as applied in
an activity-cycle of some duration requires free ideas or an intelli-
gent aspect, but it implies more, namely, value, for ends ar^sought
because of their worth. This vaiue or axiological aspect has been
referred to already in connection with the several kinds of satisfac-
tion connected with the achievement of ends. (2) The purposes in-
volved in activity-cycles have value in the sense that they give
promise of satisfaction. This promise is based, in large part at
least, upon the facts, reflected in memory, of valuable past exper-
iences. In other words, the ends sought would not be regarded as
valuable unless the success which they promise is related to certain
previous experiences of value in connection with situations similar
to those which are expected to develop.
Whatever, therefore, the character of the satisfaction or value
which is present in a personal experience, it seems to be intimately
bound up with the teleological aspect of that experience. Tnis con-**
nection is plain in those activities which are directed to relieving
a present sense of incompleteness or annoyance. But it is also pres-
ent "In satisfying activities, for, in that case, we desire to continue
the enjoyable state of mind, provided it does not conflict with higher
values which we seek. The close connection of value with purposive
activities was suggested also by the importance of conative satisfac-
tions in the pragmatic theory of truth. (3) Certainly tnis teleologi-
cal reference in a present feeling of satisfaction would be manifested
if something should interfere with its smooth continuance. (4) If I
desire to substitute some higher value for a present one, the teleo-
logical element ia obvious. In general, then, as A. E. Taylor s^ys,
"Only a being whose behaviour is consciously or unconsciously deter-
mined by ends or purposes seems capable of finding existence, accord-
ing as those purposes are advanced or hindered, pleasant or painful,
glad or wretched, good or bad." (5) These facts confirm the view
that ,ve may find our way into the problem of value from the standpoint
of purpose in activity,
a. Personal Those purposes are of value, of course, v/hich are actually realiz-
activity the able in concrete activities, and which do not remain always merely
clue to value. ideas entertained; so that it is in the study of individual and per-
sonal activities that we shall expect to understand the real meaning
of value. We shall suppose that value is dependent for its existence
and meaning upon the personal activity processes with their implica-
tions, a3 already set forth. Activities are quests for ends that are
valuable when realized. It is in personality, therefore, that we
(1) See the emo tionali6 tic type of theory in the classifica-
tion of views in Part I, above, pages 6-7.
(2) Gee above, page 2^0. (?) See above, page 16.
(4) See above, pages 20J, 246.
(5) Elements of Metaphysics, page 56.
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expect to discover the key to the problem of value, and not vice
versa. By adopting this point of approach we run no risk of ending
with a one-sided emotional is tic or phenomenal is tic theory of person-
ality. (1) Bowne has pointed out that the value of most feelings
depends upon the element of personality in then. (2) This does not
mean, of course, as James has suggested, that we are animated in
seeking values by any love of a pure ego. (5) In a word, value has
to be defined with reference to the concrete activities of a self.
Now it is probable that the value of a mental activity lies
primarily in the feeling or affective aspect which is present in it
or which develops in it in the course of its fulfilment. There are
many theorists of value who find its ground in feeling. This view
has been elaborated thoroughly by J. C. Xreibig, among others. (4)
If we analyze anything, he says, which signifies worth to us, we
shall find that its affective operation (GefUhlsvirkung) is the fun-
damental and distinctive element. That is, "Value in general is a
feeling (geftthlsm&saige) significance. Feeling is the V/'ertfundament-
al," and feeling here includes for him actual pleasure (Lust) as well
as the accompanying affective disposition whose presence influences
the will. (5) Everything felt is value and everything valued is felt.
(6) Further, he maintains the important point that the primary sub-
ject of value is the individual self which experiences the value-feel-
ings; (7) certain phenomena are preferred or disregarded by the feel-
ing subject, and between these two poles there stands a scale of value.
(8) He defends in this sense the subjective character of value.
Kreibig also points out (9) that values show a many-sided devel-
opment. One method of treating this development is the temporal one.
(a) There are, first, those values which come with the accidental re-
action to given contents. These must be regarded as founded in human
nature itself. W. K. bright (10) believes in the "evolution of values
from instincts," and maintains that "the great sources of all impulses
and desires in man, and hence the roots of value, are to be found in
the primary instincts and other innate emotional tendencies." (11)
(b) At the stage of reflection, we come to consider values which are
connected with our experience of objects which have spatial or tem-
poral distance; and finally, (c) there is the stage of acquired dis-
positions to unified ways of ordering our activities. (12)
C. von Ehrenfels (15) is not opposed to the feeling theory of
value, for he locates it in desire. He maintains that, "Value is a
relation between an object and a subject in which the subject either
really desires the object or would desire it if he were convinced of
its existence." (14) The value of a thing is its "desirousness , " and
"the amount of value is proportional to the strength of the desire. "(15)
(1) Compare classification of theories, above page 6.
(2) See above, pages 155-^4. (5) See above, pages 55-6.
(4) Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der V/ert-theorie, 1902.
(5) Ibid., pages 5-4; 15. (6) Ibid., page 27.
(7) Ibid., page 5. (8) Ibid., page 5.
(9) Ibid. , page 2J.
(10) Philosophical Review, vol. XXIV, pages 1 65-85.
11 Ibid., pages 166-7.
12; Psychologische Grundlegung, etc., page 28.
(15) System der Werttheorie, 1697.
(14) Ibid., page 65. (15) Ibid., page 65.
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W. 14. Urban, too, regards both feeling and conation as the psycho-
logical equivalents of value, but these two factors are not to be
treated as separate in reality. (1)
'b. Value- The particular aspect of Kreibig's theory which fits in with
feeling is only our systematic development of the concept of personality is that the
one aspect of feeling element in which he finds the criterion of value is not some-
the concrete thing which is found as a separate phase of consciousness, for he
whole of per- says that in any fully developed mental experience, the four funda-
eonal activity, mental psychical elements nre present: presentation, thought, feel-
ing, and will. In some mental experiences perception is so predom-
inant in consciousness that we are inclined to call it pure. Again,
the feeling element may preponderate over all others— in which case
it may be designated pure feeling. But all four elements in a more
or less determinate way are found in all purely psychical phenomena."
(2) His general conclusion is that there is "no feeling of value
without perception and thought-content, and no perception or thought-
content without a feeling of value." This conclusion, he believes,
saves his theory from leading to hedonism. (5) Putting the above
facta together, he gives his general definition of value: "By value
in general we understand the significance which a perceptual or
thought- content, with an immediate or associative, an actual or a
dispositional feeling, can have for a subject." (4)
1'. Perry s Perry puts forward the view (5) that value is the fulfilment
theory of value: of an interest, where interest includes both liking and disliking,
and indicates the consummation of either. Interest may be present
either as the feeling factor marking the present possession of ob-
jects, or aa the desire which characterizes prospective possession.
In other words, we may be interested in prolonging the present joy,
or in seeking to possess the desired object; and so, he thinks, we
may classify values according to whether action is directed tov/ards
prolongation or achievement. (6) He suggests, also, that "interest
cannot be at the same time cognitive and constitutive of value," but
at a later time cognition^f values is possible by tne observation,
comparison, and systematic description of our interests. (7) Orig-
inally, however, it is true that "any interest whatsoever in an ob-
ject is constitutive of value;" (8) in other words, "value is pos-
sessed intrinsically by the thought complex object-in-relation-to-
interest." (9)
Value is the This view may be restated in classical terminology by saying
interest pres- that there is present, in any value experience as described by Perry,
ent in a con- a cognitive, an affective, and an active element, for we must remem-
crete activity, ber that interest is always marked by the presence of behavior of
some sort. This behavior, according to Perry, is, as we have already
(1) Valuation; Its Nature and Laws.
(2) Psychologische Grundlegung, etc., pages 27, 4j.
(5) Ibid., page iii. (4) Ibid., page 12.
(5) Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method,
vol. XI, oages 141-62. (O Ibid., page 151 .
(7) Ibid., page 172. (8) Ibid., page 154.
(9) Ibid., page 155. 3ee also a further account of hie view
above in connection with his theory of the self as "an entity
capable of desire," pages 92-95-
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explained, (1) teleological j interest has a prospective reference;
interested behavior is a function of its sequel as well as of the
present environment of the individual. Thus the value-situation
which he describes greatly resembles the activity-situation which we
have described, but emphasizes the fact that the value of the whole
lies primarily and distinctively in an emotional or affective factor.
Contemporary theory ->f value, therefore, seems to warrant us in
concluding that it is the affective aspect of airy individual activity
which gives it value. There are, of course, other thinkers than
those referred to, who find the criterion of value in the life of
feeling. We have noted, for example, how James refers all religious,
and probably also all personal values to emotions. (2) The men men-
tioned, however, are sufficient to indicate a prevailing tendency in
value-theo ry
.
Since the purpose of this discussion is not to present a sys-
tematic theory of value, we shall be content with only an indication
of the general meaning of value. It has been suggested already that
in whatever affective or conative terms one may define value, they will
always represent phases of individual acts. (5) It will be pointed
out in a moment (4) that feeling, for adult human beings, is probably
an abstraction apart from experiential and active wholes. (5) Con-
sequently, value must be described from the point of view of such con-
crete activities as make up the life of a real self or person. (6)
Anything which contributes to the satisfaction of a self or person
is a value in tae positive sense in which the term is commonly used;
while that which brings dissatisfaction is a negative value. In other
words, a value is anything which meets or hinders a felt need of a
self or person.
Several of the main factors implied in this general definition
of value may be pointed out, especially so that its relation to our
exposition of activity will be clear, (a) In the first place, it
represents an explicit attachment of the idea of value to those ex-
periences of satisfaction and dissatisfaction which have been noted
as marking the final stage in a complete and typical individual act.
(7)
(b) Values are essentially teleological. Since it was seen
that satisfactions and dissatisfactions are function of the purposes
unifying individual activities, it is evident that a teleological
factor, °and, therefore, a factor of intelligence, is always an intimate
phase of a value-experience. The relation between the value- and the
purpose-aspects varies because sometimes a purpose represents an
ideal value which one desires to actualize, and sometimes it represents
a demand that an actual value be preserved. Upon the basis of these
distinctions we might classify activities, as Perry suggests, (8)
(1) See above, pages 92-95*
(2) See above, pages 55, JQ.
(5) See above, page 297.
(4) See next section below, subdivision 4.
(5) Compare criticism of F. H. Bradley's view that immediate
feeling is a sample of reality, below,
(6) On the distinction between self and person, see above,
pages 275, bottom, 276.
(7) Bee above, pages 25J-257.
(6) See above, page 297.
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The teleological aspect of value may be indicated in another way
by saying that, while the idea of felt need which was included in our
definition of value may take the form of a very vague desire or goal,
yet, whatever its degree of conscious explici tness , it represents that
incompleteness which was noted, in the discussion of personalis tic
dialectic, (1) as a negative sign of the presence of purpose. In
short, a purposive factor is always present in a value-experience,
whether the former consists in a desire to prolong an actual satisfy-
ing experience, to get rid of a dissatisfying one, or to gain a satis-
fying one that is not present.
(c) In the third place, so far as any phase of an iiidividual
act can be abstracted and made the distinguishing mark of the pres-
ence of value, it is the affective or feeling tone of the whole. This
affective character probably originates in the emotions associated
with many instinctive and native tendencies. (2) Values, however,
need not remain attached to these tendencies, but may be developed
and transferred to activities that do not directly satisfy inherited
cravings; some of the higher forns of religious and aesthetic exper-
iences illustrate this development. (5)
(d) Finally, the presence of an agent is clearly manifest in
value-experiences, for he is required as the subject which is affected
and as the one who seeks to conserve or attain values. Indeed, value
in its most unambiguous form is fundamentally an activity in which a
subject either likes or dislikes, approves or disapproves.
Our attempts to define value have shown the need of doing so
from the point of view of the individual act as it has been described
already. Indeed, our study of value so far has been little more than
a review of several phases of personal activity from the point of
view of the satisfaction present; we have merely isolated one aspect
of an activity which was noted in that intimate blend of aspects
called the individuality of an act. So closely connected are the
axiological and the teleological aspects of an individual activity
that it is hard to separate them, and one may say either that the
purpose is sought because it is valued by the subject, (4) or that
the agent seeks purposes because he experiences value, or has ex-
perienced value, in their realization.
It is probable that every personal activity possesses, as one
of its intrinsic features, the quality of value in the sense that
has been described, and that this value is felt by the agent in the
presence of those ends which he seeks. H. Bergson has presented a
description of how any specific feeling "reflects the whole of a
personality." (5) Value may be a negligible element in some activi-
ties because it, like purpose, has been pushed into the background of
consciousness or has been submerged entirely as a result of the forma-
(1) See above, pages 277-276.
(2) Compare W. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology,
pages 2£-29; see whole of chapters II-VI.
(5) See W. K. Wright's article, The Evolution of Values from
Instincts, Philosophical Review, XXIV, pages 165-18J.
(4) As H. H'rfffding does, Philosophy of Religion, pa e 1J.
(5) Introduction to Metaphysics, page 25.
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In view of the concrete standpoint adopted throughout this in-
vestigation, it is unnecessary to offer much evidence for condemning
the assertion, sometimes made, that feeling has a primacy in the ex-
perience of personality. (2) This hypothesis is due to a failure
both in recognizing the abstract character of feeling and in defin-
ing the respect in which feeling is primary. The same arguments
which above were directed against the supposed primacy of intellect
will apply here. (5)
Feeling itself is an abstraction, as has been said. As a mat-
ter of actual experience, it exists along with other mental factors,
and its real meaning is to be found in an activity-cycle where a
person dislikes his present state and seeks to transform it into one
that he likes or it is seen in that individual act where he strives
to preserve a satisfactory experience already possessed. In such
experiences one learns the concrete meaning of feelings, which the
psychologist may abstract for purposes of scientific classification.
Feeling is no doubt a useful concept as a principle for psychologi-
cal classification, but this class of mental facts cannot be mistak-
en for the real person without an inexcusable fallacy of abstrac-
tion.
Intellect, feeling, and will are actually integral phases of an
active whole of experience. Any one of them evidently has a primacy
only from some definite point of view, and the question concerning
their order is unanswerable until one defines the standard or cri-
terion of primacy. If personality consists chiefly in orderly self-
adjustment to a universe, intellect night be said to be primary. If
personality consists fundamentally of preferences and satisfactions,
then feeling might be basic. If personality consists essentially in
the achievement of ends through conduct, then will would be primary.
But if feeling, intellect, and will are each fundamental in a dif-
ferent sense, we lack a common criterion by which to compare them
and to assert that any one is more primary than another.
Consequently, we cannot expect to find the meaning of personality
in any one of these three concepts, for each of them is an abstraction
from, or a particular aspect of the concrete personal act. Not any
one of them can be reduced to the others, but all of them exist to-
gether and are unified in individual activity. C. A. Ellv/cod asserts,
"Every complete mental process has three side3 or aspects, the voli-
tional, the affective, &nd the cognitive. In other words, thinking,
feeling, and willing are not separate divisions of the mind, but are
simply different aspects of its activity." (4) f. Richmond, too,
points out that, "The different phases or forms of the personal life
are not as a matter of fact separate from one another, like the
limbs of a body. They are rather aspects or forme of personal life,
the activit^of each of which involves the activity of all the others.
They are thus, so to say, internal to one another." (5) He main-
tains, also, that, "Feeling is the background of personality, the
element of 'consciousness' that interpenetrates and accompanies all
( 1 ) Compare Kreibig's view that there are value-dispositions,
above, page 296.
(2) Compare emo tionalistic theories of personality, above, page 6.
(5) See above, pages 269-90) compare also the discussion of the
primacy of will, below, pages 55°; 557-8.
(4) Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, page 109.
(5) An Essay on Personality as a Philosophic Principle, page 44.
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the different forms of 1 self-conscious 1 life."
1'. The ques- This finding of the meaning of feeling in the concrete whole of
tion, Does personal activity solves by shelving the problem of whether or not
feeling refer feeling always or ever has an object. When it is said that * feeling
to an object? does not refer to an object (1), feeling is taken in abstraction,
is a mistaken It is true, indeed, that if one considers the concept of feeling by
itself, reference to an object is not essential, but actually feel-
ing, on the level of personal life, always exists as an integral
phase of a mental whole in waich there is a reference to an object.
J. Ward points out (2) that, "Affection and conation, though dis-
tinguishable, are not actually separable; this I admit." Conse-
quently, we do not say that feeling knows an object, any more than
we say that intellect feels, or will knows. These statements are
all alike abstractions, for the fact is that it is the active sub-
ject who feels, knows, and wills.
a
1
.
Feelings The real meaning of denying the objective reference of feeling
are essentially is seen in J. Royce's statement that, "it is an important feature of
subjective. the feelings that, when we have once developed our notion of the dif-
ference between the self and the world, we refer feelings especially
to the self rather than to the world without the self . " (J) In other
words, feelings are an important part of that empirical self, and the
latter together with the active subject constitute the concrete per-
son.
5. Various In the examination of the relation of value to personality , it
stages of value . is essential to distinguish various points o: view or stages in its
development. In this study the introspective standpoint may well be
adopted because of its greater directness and freedom from ambiguity,
although we recognize the worth of observing the behavior of others
when we wish to le-rn of their interests.
a. First (a) In the first place, the experience of value in concrete ac-
stage: the ex- tivities precedes the cognition of or reflection about value. The
perience of latter processes are conditioned by an original feeling of value,
value. B. Bosanquet asserts that, "The fundamental fact is that I care for
some sort of thing; then you may argue upon the consequences in which
that fact involves me. But you cannot by argument undo my first
sense of value, nor could you impart it if I did not possess it. If
there was no feeling there could be no value." (4) "it is true that
before arguing upon questions of value, we muot have immediate exper-
ience of what is meant by caring for something." (5) He explains
carefully, however, that arguments may modify our experience of value.
In the first stage of value we have conscious value or value in con-
sciousness, but we do not yet have consciousness of value, thut is,
a consciousness of the objects and activities with which values are
associated
.
b. Second (b) In the first stage of the development of values there are
stage of value: conscious values, and positive values are matters of satisfying ex-
cognitive or perience; in the second stage there is consciousness . of or thou at
reflective about values, and this thought is a kind of sctivity in which either
(1) T. Lo veday, Theories
MIPSi«MiiVi^.d , I. . 3., vol. X, p. 460,
(2) Proceedings of the Aris. Soc, I. S., vol. VIII, p. 227, note.
(5) Outlines of Psychology, page 167.
(4) The Principle of Individuality and Value, page 2^4.
(5) Ibid., page 296.
ralues
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memory or expectation is predominant j for when we think about the
meaning of values, the values thought about are either memories or
prospects, and not actual. In this thought-activity, value is no
doubt actually present, but the actual value is not thought about
in the same activity-cycle in which it occurs. The effects which
mark its presence may be thought about only in a subsequent act,
however soon that may occur. (1) In the second stage, then, we be-
gin to reason about the means of realizing values, to estimate our
responsibility in their production, and to judge what it is that
is worthful to us.
The occasion for the first reflection upon cur desires and val-
ues in all probability arises when conflicts are present among them,
and when there is a felt need of selecting one among several possible
activities, all of which have prospective value. The conflict is
most likely to arise between one older, biological, egoistic instinct
and a newer, social, and more altruistic one. The existence of two
such main classes of instinctive tendencies has been elaborated in an
interesting way by J. Lippert (2), and it accounts for the severe
struggles and relative dualism in our human strivings. Further,
there is a great prodigality of interests and conative tendencies
which cannot all be satisfied at once, and which, therefore, call for
selection. It is in the attempt to harmonize and organize these in-
terests that moral values are born, and the "moral economy" consists
in this process of organization.
At the second level of the development of values, the meaning of
values is clarified because there is a comparison of ends, and a de-
mand for the explicit evaluation and selection of our purposes, so as
to remove conflicts among them. The stages of y/orth are not, of
course, clearly marked off from each other, but, on the whole, the
ends which are Bought in what we may call the second stage possess
values that are more or less transient or momentary, because the pur-
poses with which they are associated are proximate or short-range
purposes
.
However, it is in the reflection and comparison of values
of short duration that personal values make their appearance.
(c) In the second stage the valuable purposes with reference to
which the subject acts are determined by momentary preferences. When
these preferences result from approval, based upon consideration of
more remote ends or upon a system or scale of such ends, then we
reach what may be called the third stage of evaluation, the personal
stage. The latter represents an extension of the second stage, in
which reflection begins, and may be considered from several stand- .
points
.
In the first place, tne stage of personal evaluation is marked
by the presence of instrumental as distinguished from intrinsic val-
ues; that is, various activities Which in themselves may be either
pleasant or unpleasant are approved 1'or the sake of more remote ends
which they serve, and the values connected with tne latter may be
called intrinsic.
Such preference of remote ends presupposes a system or several
systems of ends possessing varying worth. An important characteristic
of personal activities is that they depend, in varying degree, upon
(1) Compare ¥. R. Sorley, iloral Values and the Idea of God,
pages 166-67.
(2) Kulturgeschichte, see especially pages 1-26.
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the choice of ends which are regarded as valuable because of intel-
ligent comparison of them. These value-judgments themselves are,
of course, to be regarded as a peculiar species of personal activi-
ty. The systems of ends or sentiments upon which these judgments
are based vary in wide limits with respect to their completeness of
organization and inclusiveness
. Tiiis topic will recur below in con-
nection with the unity of personality. (1) Trie important point to
be noted here is that personality involves not only ends that are
remote, but ends which are chosen because of taeir comparatively
greater value.
W. R. Sorley points out that, "Each moment even may have its
own value. And yet that value is never altogether independent; one
moment is not a mere means to the next, but it3 value is connected
systematically or organically with that of other moments in the in-
dividual life.
. . But xt is only a fragmentary value that is real-
ised at any moment; its meaning and worth depend upon the purpose
of the individual life to which it belongs." (2) "In a character
completely in accordance with the ideal of goodness the whole life
would be regulated in this way—unified by the moral ideal to which
each particular action would be contributory." (5)
Thus, while intellectual judgment does not create value feeling,
it may condemn or approve it in the light of certain esteemed pur-
poses, and in this way greatly modify its significance by setting it
in a system of values. The life of a person is characterized by con-
scious thought, directed to the correlation of his values and to the
control of his activities by reference to his own system or systems
of values. A complete theory of personality requires a comprehen-
sive ethics and systematization of values, which, if attained, would
include, in an orderly way, all of the higher values of human person-
ality, such as are found especially in the experiences of truth,
goodness, and beauty. (4) H. Stuart has considered some of the rela-
tions of personality to art. (5) An illuminating discussion of per-
sonality in relation to religious value may be found in G. Berguer's
La Notion de Valeur ; he defends the hypothesis that a third series
of value-facts must be put alongside of the psychological and the
physical series. In a second volume of his Phttnomenolo;;ie des Ichs
K. Oesterreich promises to discuss "the problem of value and its rela-
tion to the problem of the ego."
The system of ends with reference to which a person acts develops
under the presence of social influences. The measure of harmony which
exists in the social group or groups of which I find myself a member
depends upon a community of purpose, and the development of my mental
life ordinarily proceeds in intimate connection with the purposes and
ideals of my social group or groups. We must view "the self in its
essential basis of moral solidarity with the natural and social world,
(1) See below, pages 515-16.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 128.
(5) Ibid., page 44?. See page 94 above for Perry's account of
how personal values arise in the organization of human interests.
(4) J. A. Leighton, International Journal of Ethics, vol. XXI,
pages 25-56, "Personality and a Metaphysics of Value," presents a
classification of the most important human values.
(5) Art and Personality in Personal Idealis.-i.
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and in the special relations with others which forbid its isola-
tion.*1 (1) That system of ends which I consciously value is a prod-
uct of my interaction with the coiamunity even more than it is a re-
sult of my reflection upon my own instinctive tendencies and wants.
/ So far aa my personal activities depend upon a system of ends of
social origin, my personality is a social experience. H. R. Sorley
declares that, "Personality has been held to be the bearer of value;
but personality itself is a social category: it indicates not mere-
ly the individual unity of life and consciousness, but also the so-
cial place and function which be.long to the person and without which
he could not be what he is." (2) 7.re may recall here how James in-
cluded a social self in his list of empirical ones. (;5)
a
1
.
"Capacity The importance of the social conditions of the development of
for social fel- personality is matter of such familiar emphasis in many contemporary
lowship" a mark works in sociology, well an in philosophy, t'.v-.t only a brief ref-
of personality, erence to the fact is necessary. C.H. Cooley, for example, maintains
that self and society are "twin-born." (4) W. Richmond, in his Essay
on Personality as a 'hilosophic Principle , carries the social na-
ture to such extravagant limits that the individual person becomes
an abstraction, which he himself maintains is the fact. He believes
that the "true definition of personality" consists in saying that
"personality in the individual i3 the capacity for society, fellow-
ship, communion," (5) and he asserts that "the actual personal life
is the social life." (6) He overdoes a good point, however, when he
asserts that "the individual person is an abstraction, not a reality,"
and that the community is the primary reality. (7) Since this ex-
treme view does not fit in with his total exposition, it may be that
this particular statement is exaggerated for the sake of making his
point concerning the importance of the social relations of a person in
determining what he is.
b 1
.
Relation There is no doubt about the fact that personal development pro-
of individual ceeds in a social atmosphere, but this development presupposes a con-
and social crete reality such as has been expounded at length, in which sympathy,
mind. charity, benevolence, obedience, and the other social virtues center
and have their ultimate ground. W. R. Sorley 's statement of the case
is most acceptable: "The community has not a feeling or apprehension
of this value over and above the feelings and apprehension of it
which belong to its members. . . The social mind is realised and real
in individual minds and nowhere else. But this is only one side of
the truth. If society is unreal apart from the individual, it is
also the case that each individual mind is dependent upon the minds
of others. It is impossible to point to any fragment of the indiv-
idual's mental content which does not imply, or which is independent
of, the intercourse of mind with mind." (6)
I
1
. Modifies- The contact of a person with others and with social institutions
fan of indiv- is a powerful factor in his development, expecially because it helps
idual desires him to define and organize the ends he seeks. In contact with others
through social
influence. (1)3. Eosar.quet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page 1J0.
(5) See above, page J4. (4) Social Organization.
(5) Essay on Personality as a Philosophic Brinciple, page 21.
(6) Ibid., page 15. (7) Ibid., page 14.
(8) Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 129-JO.
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one learns better what he himself wants. The result of social in-
fluences is frequently that our natural instincts and emotions are
suppressed or are harnessed up to the quest for ends which are so-
cially valuable. Our original desires may be greatly modified so
-
.
as to bring harmony with those of our neighbors, or to attain ends
which the tradition of the community sanctions. It is in the fur-
nace Of this self-criticism, carried on in the light of social de-
mands and of our fundamental and remote life interests, that person-
al value is forged and shaped. It is this reference to remote and
enduring ends which makes our purposes personal.
V. Not all Personal value is an aspect of intelligent activity; it is the
Talues are per- mode of satisfaction which characterizes an activity which is not
eonal . random or impulsive, but which follows from a more or less critical
comparison of ends and their relative significance as well as from
a study of the means of attaining them. From this description of
personal value it is evident that not all values need be personal,
for we should not say that personal value is present in the lower
forms of feeling life of infants or animals, although value, regard-
ed as being primarily feeling, may be present in imperfect and frag-
mentary forms
.
d. Fourth (d) Perhaps the highest stage ir. the development of personality
stage of value: exists where all our activities are directed by reference to their
where values significance for the personality as a whole in its self-conscious re-
are self-con" lation to the universe. Here personality comes to be an end in it-
aciously refer- self, as Kant said it ought to be. Probably there is no higher stage
red to a uni- in the development of the human experience of value than the one just
lied personal- suggested, except where the individual person regards the universe it
ity . self as an expression of an infinite value-creating Personality with
whom he^stands in intimate cooperation.
It should be noted, however, that just as value may be exper-
ienced without reflection on its nature, so personal values may ex-
ist without the conscious and explicit reference of all the higher
values to personality as its source. Ju3t as the act of knowing
value is subsequent to the existing value itself, so this highest
stage in the development of evaluation, which consists in referring
value to personality, is subsequent to the experience of personal val
ue. In other words, while all value may presuppose personality, not
all value does so in a self-conscious way.
W. K. Wright (1) points out that the experience of personal val-
ues grows out of the instixicts of self-abasement and self-assertion
with their corresponding emotions of subjection and elation. (2)
Wright says "About these as a nucleus, develops in man the self-re-
garding sentiment and later a fully organized moral self or personal-
ity.
. .
After the self or personality has developed,. . the individ-
ual comes to recognize the value of this acquisition and to interpret
the significance of all external values as well as the virtues in the
light of their significance for the self as a whole." Since person-
ality itself is the source of the chief values of man, it is easy to
understand why men may come to regard per tonality itself as the su-
preme value to be maintained and preserved in the universe.
B. P. Bowne explains how many, but not all, our values conscious
(1) Philosophical Review, vol. XXIV, page 177.
(2) See Wm. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology,
chapter VII.
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ly refer to personality. He observes that "l.Iout of our plans and
aims also have their value, not in their inherent power to please
ue, but in the fact that they are ours. Few of our experiences have
value in themselves, as passive gratification of our sensibilities;
their value lies rather in the element of personality which we have
put into them.
. .
The same reference to self underlies a great
variety of feelings of a less exalted kind. Apart from this self-
conaciousness, the pains of poverty, of social slights, etc., would
be a vanishing quantity. On the other hand, the^atisfactions of
pride, vanity, and ambition would be nothing with^the same refer-
ence. (1)
e If the existence of. valuea in a limited measure is a fact of
human experience, the demand naturally arises for their increase and
completion. If one. has a valuable experience, it is essential to
that experience itself that one desires its continuance so long as
it maintains its value, but if it is inadequate, or if one Delieves
that greater values are possible for him, he naturally and consist
tently demands a new experience of value. But since values are
facts of human experience, and have been so for a very long time, we
should expect to find generally in human nature a tendency to self-
betterment which will manifest itself in the endeavor to multiply
personal values. Tais logical deduction with reference to the pro-
motion of value is based upon the fact that personality is at once
a seeker after ends and the possessor of values. On the whole, there
are reasons for postulating that it is a common characteristic of hu-
man personality to 3eek to multiply its own peculiar values.
This general tendency to seek the better or the good has not
been sufficiently emphasized nor studiea in psychology. However, its
existence is admitted as a psychological fact, which conforms the
postulate proposed above. For example, E. L. Thorndike maintains
that, "There is but one thing in original human nature that is un-
reservedly good, and that is the power to make it oetter. Man is
thus eternally altering himself to suit himself. His nature is not
right in his own eyes.
. .
This power, the power or learning or
modification in favor of trie satisfying, the capacity represented by
the lav/ of effects, ic trie essential principle or reason and right
in the world." (2) Instincts represent, in the words of . E. Hock-
ing, a "kind or judgment of value; a force of estimate." Animals
are impelled to valuaole ends without conscious roresight, but man
has a more or less clear knowledge of the ends he seeks, and a capa-
city to criticize and- transform them.
The idea suggested by c. i». Thorndike is very similar to a doc-
trine of which Thomas Aquinas made much. He teaches that it is char-
acteristic of human beings to control their actions with reierence to
ends that are good, (5) and which, being good, "cannot be without
concomitant delight." (4) Now according to Thomas' doctrine of ayn-
deresis, man has an haoitual tendency to seek the good. His exposi-
(1) Introduction to Psychological Theory, pages 1$>4 ?%
(2) Educational Psychology, vol. Ill, pages 281-2.
(5) bumma Theologia, i'art II, First Number, Question 1, First
Article.
(4) Icid., Question IV, First Article.
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tlon of tais concept is worthy of careful note. (1) Synderesis is
a "special natural habit" which belongs to the class of practical
principles bestowed on man by nature, and its special function is
that "synderesis always incites to good" and "murmurs at evil."
"Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles con-
cerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to
a power and to synderesis as a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally
both by our reason and by synderesis
.
.
" Conscience also is a prac-
tical principle or act and is closely allied to synderesis. "Prop-
erly speaking conscience dominates an act. But since habit is a
principle of action, sometimes the name conscience is given to the
first natural habit—namely, synderesis, as Jerome calls synderesi3
conscience.
. .
Now all the habits by which conscience is formed,
although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from our first
habit, the habit of first principles, which is called synderesis."
In a lecture on the philosophy of religion (2) W. E. Hocking
presented an excellent exposition of this doctrine: "Synderesis is
not reason, but it is a habit within reason. It is a tendency. It
is a sort of foretaste of happiness and an inkling of what happiness
is like. Thoraas use3 phrases indicating anticipatory images of hap-
piness. Synderesis—this preperception not only of what is good but
of what it is to be in possession of the good—is present to us all
the time, and might be defined as a sense of one's destiny which is
the source of laws and rules. Its presence constitutes obligation.
It gives the first principles of morality. It tells us that we
should like according to nature. It tells us blessedness ought to
be sought. We ought to seek the good and avoid the evil. Conscience
is a contact between the synderesis of man and a single act of will,
or a proposed act of will. Whenever this continually present judg-
ment of our destiny meets a particular proposition, then there is a
judgment of harmony or disharmony that passes between them, and that
judgment is conscience."
At the personal level of activity, ends are chosen by the sub-
ject witn a measure ox self-conscious and deliberate selection. They
are selected because the subject expects to secure an increase in
value in the course of their realization. For him the value of the
ends lies in their possibility or power of satisfying him, the possi-
bilities being serious ones which bear upon his fate. As such, they
are more than mere ideas, but purposes in which various feelings or
sentiments center. (5) The full significance of these values, how-
ever, will appear only in an activity-cycle in which satisfying prog-
ress tov/ard or achievement of these treasured goals is made. The at-
tainment of a remote and significant personal purpose may call for
the cooperation of a large part of the physical, historical, and so-
cial realm, but its real value is to be found in the experience of
the person who seeks it.
(1) See Summa Theologia, Part I, Third Number: Treatise on ton,
Question LXXIX: Of the Intellectual Powers; 12th Article: Whether
Synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from others? and
15th Article: Whether conscience be a power?
(2) Dec. IJth, 1915.
(5) W. I/lcDougall
.
L
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It is probable that with the exception of a few doubtful cases,
all personal activities have a value that is grounded in an affective
aspect or feeling tone. This tone is present with all degrees of in-
tensity. It is at a minimum in those acts of a person which are pri-
marily habitual; its intensity is perhaps at a maximum when our in-
stincts most directly function. Also, there is frequently a high de-
gree of intensity present in cases of clearly moral or conscientious
acts. W. G. Everett believes that, "The motive of conscious choice
properly includes both the idea of an end and the accompanying emo-
tions which are sometimes said to be the real motive or 'moving' ele-
ment, in conduct. The separation of the two factors, however, is the
result of a false abstraction. The ideational and affective elements
vary in prominence; now one and now the other occupies the foremost
place, but both are always present in the moral act. Even 'blind'
passion is never completely blind; it6 expression follows the path to
some perceived end. And, on the other hand, the 'coldest' idea that
we entertain kindles feeling enough to secure for it some measure of
interest and attention." (1)
If we ask at what point a self first becomes a person, the reply
is that he becomes a person the moment he approves or disapproves of
one of his acts. G. A. Coe declares that, "A person is any reactor
that approves or disapproves of his own reactions, or that realizes
consequences as successes or failures of his ov:n." (2) The concrete
person at work is clearly manifested in those of his acts in' which he
strives to realize ends which he has chosen as a result of careful
and self-conscious evaluation. The most important condition for the
development of personal life, says G. T. Ladd, is "growth in the
knowledge and appreciation of the ideas and sentiments of what has
value,— truth, happiness, beauty, and goodness; and all given reality
by being expressed in conduct, and by the formation of a character
corresponding to these ideas and sentiments of value." (5)
What one's personality means to himself, therefore, he may find
in those purposes which he consciously makes his own. Its meaning
for him will be found in what he esteems most highly. Since there
are countless ends and combinations of ends which a man may appro-
priate, it is not surprising that the individual qualities of personal
life differ so greatly, nor that there is so great a variety of theo-
ries as to the nature of personality. In other words, if I wish to
know what is my neighbor's personality or my own, I aust determine
what he or I most dearly esteems. To know what one's personality is,
one must know the ends which one values, and according to which one
acts
.
(1) Moral Values, page 546.
(2) The Psychology of Religion, page 50.
(5) The Secret of Personality, pages 9*-5-
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In spite of a certain multiplicity in the phases of the exper-
ience of a person, one of his distinctive features is unity. Sever-
al kinds of unity which have already occurred in our investigation
need to be brought together now in a more orderly way, and exhibited
in relation to the concept of personality. The demand that con-
flicting desires aua tendencies in our conscious life be Harmonized
is so insistent thao it looks as if one of the original tendencies
of human nature were a desire for unity, consistency, or agreement
of an unspecified kind among the various aspects or our mental life.
We must distinguish several senses in whica personal experience is a
unity.
A fundamental and typical kind of unity was found in the fully
developed act of a human being. This unity is a teleological one.
It is of a more integrated sort than what is called "unity of con-
sciousness," (1) for in the individual activity, the whole is unified
by the purpose to the realization of which the act is directed. It
is the unity which makes the individuality of an activity all that it
is. (2) This type of unity is concrete, and is easily verifiable in
experience. One finds himself desiring something and sets about to
get it, and the gaining of his end completes a series of experiences
which are rationally organized around the goal he sought. The at-
tainment of the end may involve several subordinate activities, but
then these activities are interwoven by the significance which they
derive from their reference to an end, and, besides, each cf them
has its own individuality and teleological unity. The unity of a
purposive activity which is smoothly achieved stands in contrast to
those experiences which are marked by conflicting impulses and un-
certain ends
.
Not until cne purpose dominates others arid gets the
right of way is the teleological active unity in question present in
typical form. This unity of the individual activity may be called
conative unity, to disting ish it from other varieties that will be
discussed
.
Now, it is probable that the unity which belongs to an individ-
ual act is the most typical and original kind which we experience.
Other forms derive their meaning from this concrete prototype of all
forme of unity. These derivations are made by a process either of
simplification of, or abstraction from, conative unity, or of expan-
sion of it. Within conative unity itself at the personal level there
are, as we shall see in a moment, two other kinds of unity; and by
the combination of individual activities into larger systems, another
more comprehensive kind of unity is reached. Several possible mean-
ings of unity in personal life were described briefly above (5) in
the effort to understand in what sense a new realist of Perry's type
is warranted in speaking of the unity of the self.
Why there should be any such conative unity as exists we do not
know. It has to be taken as a fact of experience as we find it. It
is a part of the mystery of reality. But while we are unable to tell
( 1 ) See below, pages 51J-16.
(2) See the discussion of the individuality of activity,
above pages 245-262.
(5) See above, pages 109-112.
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of individual
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ponderates .
5. The uni ty
of conscious -
ness , or psy-
chological
unity
.
a. Descrip-
tion of it.
v/hy it should be at all, we can study it and understand it, and
interpret other kinds of unity in terras of it. B. P. Bowne has
strongly emphasized the original, experiential,
-aiid necessary unity
of the mental life. (1) "it is only by means of subjective synthe-
sis, and the conative activity by which it is prompted and sustained,
that experience can advance and unfold."
J. Laird points out that several kinds of unity may be derived
from this original conative unity by reason of the differences of
emphasis among the factors present in the complex 7/hole. "The life
of the self is a unity of cognition, feeling, and endeavour. These
elements are continuously present; they must exist whenever a self
exists; they develop together, and decline together.
. .
While it is
true that the three principal modes of consciousness develop together,
and that they imply an inter conr.ecHed development, it is false that
the development of the three is parallel in every respect. . . But
just as, at any given moment, one of these elements may preponderate
over the other two, so it may show a relatively permanent predomin-
ance in a given person." (2) There are, he says, the emotional or
mystic types of unity, as well as the intellectual and the energetic
ones. That is to say, we might describe the unity of personality in
different terms according as we found predominant in a particular
activity its affective, its volitional, or its intellectual phase.
In the first case, one possibility of unity would be that of love,
such as is expressed in the "first commandment 11 of Jesus of Nazareth.
Other possibilities would be the unity of will as expounded by H.
Mttnsterberg (5), or the unity of meaning set forth by J. Royce. (4)
D. H. Parker holds a view of the original unity of the self
which resembles that of J. Laird as well as the one mentioned a
page back. He believes that, "The unity we find is an interweaving
of the activities. It is nothing besides them; it is a growing to-
gether of them, an interpenetration of them. Just as color and shape
are grown together in a flower, so thought and feeling and striving
are grown together in the self. And this interweaving of activities
is
. . .
different from their ideal unity in the direction of them to
the same end. The ideal unity is correlated with a real unity, but
does not suffice to create it." (5)
If we abstract the teleological principle and any other kind of
rational organization which may be present in a moment of personal
activity, there is left what ha3 been called the unity of conscious-
ness. It is an abstract unity, it should be noted, for it consists
in the property of consciousness which belongs to the whole. It is
the "subjective synthesis" whic'ry.8 involved in the existence of a
group of mental processes in a single center of sensitive life or
awareness. Whether or not there is any kind of rational unity ex-
isting in the total experience belonging to a subject at a particular
time,°there is present a unity based upon the fact that all the as-
pects of that experience have in common a quality of awareness or
consciousness. "At any moment we have a total mental state possess-
ing the characteristic unity of consciousness." (6)
(1) See above, pages 144-5.
(2) Problems of the Self, pages 215-6.
(5) Eternal Values.
(4) The World and the Individual, e. g. , vol. II, pages J00 ff.
(5) Self and Nature, page 26.
(6) J. Royce, Outlines of Psychology, page 100.

511
b. It is
present irre-
spective of
moral or logi-
cal conflicts
in one
1
s
experience
.
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e. L'Unstcr-
berg's account
of this unity.
This psychological unity is present irrespective of the pres-
ence or absence of moral or logical conflicts in one's experience.
However much the mental processes of a conscious subject may conflict
with one another, they are all his because he is aware of them, and
this fact is sufficient to constitute the psychological type of uni-
ty. Indeed, the very presence of warring ins tine ts^and ideals in
one's life confirms the fact that they are all his very own. The
conflict is conditioned by and emphasizes a community of awareness
to which the warring parts belong, for the sense of logical contra-
diction, of moral antagonism, or of musical discord is possible only
as the striving elements exist within a common conscious life. Mor-
al, aesthetic, or rational unity may be absent, but not the unity of
consciousness
.
This unity is difficult to describe in other terms than those
already employed. It may be proper, however, to say that the various
distinguishable phases of a momentary conscious activity are inter-
dependent. This interdependence is not to be thought of in any me-
chanical way, but must be understood by reference to one's own exper-
ience, where the various aspects of the whole fit togetaer in such a
way that a modification of one would bring a modification of the whole.
This conscious unity is a kind of "mutual penetration." It emphasizes
the fact that psychical events do not occur in isolated or detached
ways, but occur together in certain groups called individual centers
of experience. Unless our various activities, knowing, judging, per-
ceiving, etc., possessed this common property of consciousness, this
intrinsic quality of awareness, they would have no meaning for us; in
short, they would be outside of our conscious life. This common qual-
ity of consciousness gives to our momentary experiences this very gen-
eral, obvious, and inferior kind of unity which may be called psycho-
logical unity. A personal act has this kind in addition to others.
Thi s unity of consciousness is of such a low variety that it is
probably present in infants and animals. Hence, the presence of con-
sciousness or awareness in itself is no mark of personality, for the
conscious unity must be developed into a teleological one before per-
sonality can be said to be present. This is possible because in a
oersona1 activity-experience there are other features present beside
the quality of consciousness, however much that permeates the whole,
for, as J. Ward declares, "The proximate fact for the psychological
observer is ... a unity that is differentiated. But though differ-
entiated, it is not disintegrated. On the contrary, the further the
differentiation proceeds, the more apparent becomes the solidarity
and consentience, the work of synthesis within the whole ." (1)
One or two other excellent accounts of this familiar kind of
unity may be noted. H. Mttne torberg defines it thus: "By unity of
consciousness we understand only that we possess no content of con-
sciousness which does not belong to its, to our consciousness. (2)
"Neither can the consciousness-subject in temporal unity split
another consciousness off from itself, nor car. the conscious subject
exchange itself for another at any time." (5) James' statement that
"every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness, (A)
(1) Psychological Principles, page 410. Compare V/. R. Sorley,
Moral Values and the Idea of Gdd, page 1J0.
(2) GrundzUge der Psychologie, page 210. (j) Ibid., page 211.
(4) The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, page 225.
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is well known.
One of the most excellent studies in the unity of mind has been
made by F. Brentano. (1) His general position is that "simultaneous
psychical activities belong completely to a real unity," (2) as when
the fragrance of a rose and the beauty of its color are recognized
by the psychologist as distinct sensations and yet as being present
at once to the observer. We think these sensations are unlike and
discern their difference because they are bound together in a uni-
tary consciousness. He says: ">.e not only represent the bare like-
ness between different objects, but we bring them to our thoughts in
manifold relations. We order means to 3nds , and work out complex
plans. These orderings and combinations are dissolved into multi-
plicity, or rather into nothing, when we distribute the members of
our thoughts to a number of things. Does not the desire for the
means include also the longing for the end and vice versa? All this
is so clear that it seems superfluous to speak of it." (2) "The re-
sult of our investigation," he concludes, "is that the totality of
our psychical states, however complicated they may be, always forme a
real unity. This is the well-known fact of the unity of conscious-
ness, which should be designated as one of the .^ost important points
in psychology . " (4)
When one tries to explain this unity of consciousness, one has
to introduce the idea of a subject or agent. F. Brentano tries to
give an account of what he means by the real identity that is present
in simultaneous psychical processes, (5) but does not go further
than to affirm that, "All psychical phenomena which are found in us
at any time belong entirely to a unitary reality." (4) From our
metaphysical standpoint, we may, indeed, we must take the next step,
the inevitable step, of postulating the agent or subject as* the real
principle of unity in our experiences.
If we not only abstract the teleological principle from the unity
of activity, but from the latter abstract also the various conscious
processes that are present as phenomena, there is left the subject
for whom these phenomena or processes exist at any moment and to whom
belongs a unity which may be called the unity of the agent, or the
subjective unity of personality. That is, in each center of hman
experience, there i3 one and only one subject, for we know of no way
in which a person may split himself into" two subjects or agents each
having the same mental phenomena. We have had occasion already to
describe and defend briefly the unity of the agent. (6) This sub-
jective unity is that which results from the subjective reference or
oossession of all modifications in an individual field of conscious-
ness. This unity seems to rest upon the fact that the subject ac-
tually does something in the total experience so as to modify it,
which warrants us in referring all processes to him. Brentano sug-
gests (7) that we can imagine the perception of color uniting
itself
with a perception of tone as little aa we can imagine a blind man
and a deaf man comparing colors and tones with one another. Again,
the judgment of comparison must be an act of a subject which is one
because, otherwise, there would be no comparison.
(1) In his Psychologie.M Ibid., page 210.
(5) Ibid., page 211.
(7) Psychologie, page 209.
(2) Ibid., pages 206-1"$.
(4) Ibid., page 214.
(6) See above, pages 244-5,
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Since the agent himself, apart from his activities, is an ab-
straction, the unity which he possesses is likewise an abstraction.
It is one aspect of the conative unity of the moment, and it is the
presence of a single agent in various conscious processes which ex-
plains psychological or conscious unity. H. Lotze says, (1) "And
so our whole inner world of thoughts is built up, not as a mere
collection of manifold ideas existing with or after one another, but
as a world in which the individual members are held together and ar-
ranged by the relating activity of this single pervading; principle .
This, then, is what we mean by the unity of consciousness, and it is
this that we regard as the sufficient ground for assuming the indi-
visible soul .
"
3. P. Bowne's conclusion is that "a rational life by its very
nature demands a unitary consciousness and a unitary subject." (2)
However diverse one's mental content, the subject amid this diversity
is a unity, a unity in the midst of multiplicity. H. C. Sheldon
agrees, too, that, "Real knowledge presupposes a real subject, a psy-
chical agent, unitary and persisting, capable of reacting against
impressions and interpreting them." (5)
Thus we return to that activity from which we started, and in
which the agent manifests his reality by his acts. And this active,
unitary agent is the ground both of conscious unity and conative uni-
ty; he is at once the conscious and active subject in every personal
act. He is in the midst of matters of experience which he may be
said to have; conscious processes exist only as belonging to him; and
it is from him that activity emanates. The true ground, then, for
the unity of the mental life is to be found in the active subject or
agent who unifies the fleeting events of time and the scattered ob-
jects of space. (4) The unity of the agent, therefore, means the
singleness of subjective reference within a particular group of con-
scious processes. The latter are kept from falling apart, indeed,
from falling out of existence altogether, by the immanent agency of
a single subject. This conception enables us to overcome the dif-
ficulties of objectivistic or empirical views of the self, (?) and to
show how impossible are the collectional theories (6) of personality,
such as that of Hume.
The variety in personal experience is not to be referred to
variety within the agent, for that is a mistaken and abstract way of
speaking, but may be found in the empirical self, in the phenomenal
phases of individual activities with their multiform cognitive and
emotional peculiarities. It is found in the individuality which is
the last kind of unity to be described below (7): Each agent is the
possessor of or lives himself out within a multitude of experiences,
especially such as are called interests, desires, and activities.
He acts in numerous purposeful ways, and in so acting, he produces a
multiplicity all his own. Just as there is unity within the diver-
sity of an individual act, so there is in the total personality, but
to understand this wider unity, we must consider a different kind
(1) Quoted by I. McDougall, Body and Mind, page 264.
(2) Introduction to Psychological Theory, page 27.
(5) System of Christian Doctrine, page 4.
(4) Compare J. Ward, Psychological Principle**, page JO.
(5) Compare above, pages 6-7.
(6) Compare our classification above, page 7.
(7) See below, pages 517-20.
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than we have so far noticed.
We may consider the unity of personality also from the stand-
point of an expansion of the original type of conative unity, or
unity of the individual act, so that the latter comes to occupy a
significant place in a larger system of activities. We may call
this the moral unity of personality. In most cases this form of
unity ia less intimate in its internal integration than the unity
of the individual act, but it is marked by a much greater comprehen-
siveness. This unity, which consists of the system of ends, ideals,
or rules according to which one regulates his activities, especially
compound cycles of his acts, is also of a teleological kind, where
the purpose is of the intermediate or remote type.
On various occasions we have come upon the fact and need of
this moral unity of personality . V/e noted (1) that a person is
marked by activities directed to ends which are not momentary, but
which involve a series of acts and subordinate ends, so that he de-
velops as a result of criticism and interpretation of his purposes.
Without some moral organization of our purposes, we should not be
genuine persona, for we should act upon proximate purposes without
ulterior connection; and as a result our lives would be made up of
sporadic, detached, and* impulsive acts. Personality is a stage in
the development of the self when he begins to recognize some respon-
sibility for acting with reference to ends that are in a measure re-
mote and that are sanctioned by society. A person, then, is one who
can act according to a purpose which belongs to a system of purposes,
however small it may be, and which may involve for its realization a
cycle of activities. As a result of interpretation of his active
tendencies, one learns not to yield to every momentary^desire, to
choose among several possibilities involving future realization, and
thus to postpone the attainment of values in order to increase their
totality. In the organization of our purposes and the criticism of
our native desires the need for their organization appears, and moral
unity is born of this criticism.
If we consider, not merely ideal purposes, but actual activi-
ties, we see moral unity manifested in what we have celled compound
cycles of activities, each of which is unified by a single purpose.
According to this conception, we saw how a great number of individ-
ual acts°may be integrated in, and become significant by becoming
parts of a series offsets directed to a common general purpose to
which they all contribute. Out of such cycles is built personal bi-
ography. The conception of activity-cycles keeps tie in touch with
the concrete progress of men's lives by preventing us from resolving
a man's history into a disconnected series of acts such as the psy-
chologist might study, and also by preventing us from losing the ac-
tual empirical fulness of a man's living by considering only his pur-
poses as a group of ideal ends constituting a more or leas logical
system. It°is in the actual development of activity-cycles such as
we have described (2) that we see moral unity in practice or in the
concrete, and that we see personality achieving a character for it-
self.
:Ie have also seen (5) that in fact the organization of our pur-
(1^ See above, pages 228, 255.
(2) See above, especially pages 226-255.
(5) See above, pages 5°2-5.
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The con- poses means equally the organization of our personal values. It is
lltruction of a a mark of the moral man to direct his actions to- prospective values
system of per- -vhich are sought as a result of comparison and voluntary adoption.
80iial values This moral unity was described above in the discussion of personal
il another as- values (1), where it was seen that the latter depend upon an approval
pect of moral and a choice based upon the consideration of a group of various
unity. possible values. The more moral among us proceed by holding our i-
deals before us in an objective way, and criticizing and comparing
them, and selecting those which give proaise of bringing the greatest
values in the light of our whole life and its relation to others.
W. G. Everett describes this construction of a system of personal
values so well that his remarks deserve- extended quotation: "From the
dictation of uncriticized desires we must appeal to a more inclusive
purpose, to an. ideal of spiritual wholeness .vhich comprehends and
dominates all the interests of life. To suc;i a unifying principle we
must cling in spite of the fact that its very comprehensiveness baf-
fles a too exact formulation. All critics of human conduct have re-
cognized that the demand for detailed principles of organization can-
not be pressed beyond a certain point.
. .
The organized scheme of
family and social life provides tais guidance for a time, but only for
a time. Then each is set at the task for himself, a.d bidden to strug-
gle forward even at the price of mistakes or failure. Every individ-
ual is called upon to effect a unique but harmonious organization of
values in a personal life—a creation which partakes of the nature of
a work of art. Yet as a work of art, although a free creation, is not
lawless but governed in every part by principles of unity and order,
so in life the choice of values must be dictated by the meaning of the
whole." (2)
Few attain a complete harmonization of all their interests in a
supreme conception of what their good is to which all particular ac-
tivities ought to be subordinated, but multitudes get part way
—
get
far enough to be called persons. . They live now within one partial or
incomplete system of ends and now within another. These have not
attained the complete moral unity which dominates the activities of
a great personality. That there are countless varieties and degrees
with which moral unity is attained goes without saying,
c. Meaning of Tne practical fact is that few men prooaDly develop a single
a plurality or moral purpose which dominates all aspects or their lives. What is
selves witain most common is for the activities of a man to be directed witti ref-
one
:
;eruonanty. erence to several systems of purposes, each more or less consistent
within itself . iror example, a professional man will organize one
group of his activities about the duties of ais profeusion; another,
about the interests of his family; another about his recreations; and
others about their relations to persons of various positions and char-
acters. The unity in each case is teleological : that is, his activi-
ties are fitted to meet the contingencies of the several groups of
objects and persons wita waom he deals.
\ The same agent obviously is presupposed in each system of nis
activities, but the purposes involved in his several systems may oe
very loosely connected, and sometimes even morally antagonistic.
Since a person consists in his various purposive activities, it is
clear t&at tie will be relatively different according as he acts with
M) See above, pages 505-6.
(2) Moral values, page 220.
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reference now to one, and new to another group of his interests.
His activities and attitude in his professional office may be dif-
ferent than they are at the theater or in the family circle.
This variation in one's personal attitudes as determined by the
> • partial systems of purposes which guide his conduct froffl time to
time is another way of expressing the fact that each man possesses
various selves, as James pointed out. (1) Thut is to say, the idea
of teleological unity within various systems of interests and activ-
ity-cycles which a man may possess furnishes a clear method for dis-
tinguishing several relatively different selves within a single per-
sonal life which has not attained a complete moral unity. It is
more accurate, however, to say that the same person acts with refer-
ence to several systems of purposes and dispositions than it is to
say he has different selves. This idea of a plurality of selves
within a single personality warns us against overdoing the idea- of
the moral unity of personality. The unity in moat of us is, from
the ideal standpoint, relatively incomplete, and is in the process
of constant transformation.
6. The devel - The transition from the original unity of consciousness to the
opnent of uni ty consummate moral unity ox a higftiy developed personality in wmch ail
in personality . acts are determined Dy rreeiy approved and adopted ends forming a
systematic whole is a very long and difficult one. "The sporadic,
excursive, vague, and jerky strivings of the youth develop into the
organized passion of the man," (2) only as a result of much effort
and training. It is, however, beyond the scope of this investiga-
tion to set forth this development towards complete moral unity; it
is important here merely to point it out.
Until such a system as referred to is systematically presented,
it is almost impossible to say just how much moral unity is required
to constitute a person. That a self is present in the unity of con-
sciousness seems certain, but until this unity comes to be rationally
and purposively determined to some extent, a personality is not pres-
ent. The primitive self of the conscious life becomes a personality
when a measure of moral unity has been attained— this is the most
definite statement that can be made here, --that is, when the self
acts with reference to ends which are approved in the course of an
interpretative comparison v/ith others. When personality appears be-
ll cause of moral unity, the conscious unity originally present does
not disappear, but merely wins a greater internal organization. A
person has psychological unity as much as the poorest self, but the
moral unity which we cannot describe at length is an achievement of
persistent and free activities. It is not a gift of nature, but it
is in part a gift of society and in part an achievement of one's own.
We shall returii to tuis work of self-c.reation in another chapter
dealing with the question of self-determination. (J) The full mean-
ing of unity cannot be understood until we shall have considered
botn identity and self-determin- tion. But it is in the differentia-
tion and integration of our purposes and dispositions that the line
of personal development lies.
When one speaks of tne unity of personality without qualifica-
(1) See above, pages 35- 5^-
(g) W. H. Winch, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Sci-
entific Method, vol. VI, pages 479-80.
(5) See below, pages 229-356.
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tion, what is usually intended is this highest kind of moral unity,
of which there are many grades between the feeble beginning of the
moral life and the more or less completely organized ethical person-
ality. This type of unity is a teleological one, and it reflects or
is an extension of the original unity of a personal or individual act.
It appear 8, therefore, that there are, as a matter of fact, several
kinds of unity in a personality, and we cannot say what is meant by
the unity of personality until we specify our point of view.
There is, first, the active or real unity of a personal act, in
which a personality is actual or existent by reason of his acting.
This unity is also a purposive one. Within this active unity two
other more abstract kinds have been distinguished. The first of
these is the conscious or psychological unity, which is the name for
the fact that each conscious life represents, a unique, existing, and
distinct whole which is characterized by the common property of aware-
ness which belongs to all the factors present in a finite center of
experience. Next, there is the formal or subjective unity, the unity
of the agent in his activity. This unity not only refers to the fact
that the same agent grounds all phases of an individua^act, but also
means the common reference of all mental processes present in a par-
ticular field of consciousness to a single subject. Then, there is
the moral unity which grows out of the teleological organization of
one's ideal activity, and which is a product at once of social in-
fluence and self-determination.
Beside all these, which have been described, there is the unity
of individuality in a wider sense which we have still to explain.
Further, when the subjective unity is considered as persisting through
a series of activities, we come upon a distinct kind of personal unity,
a kind of unity in succession, which is more properly called the iden-
tity of personality, and which will be considered soon under that
heading. (1) To however large a system a personal act may belong, it
never loses its original unity as an individual act which contains
within itself those more abstract forms of unity which we have called
the unity of consciousness and the unity of the agent.
Let us consider now the individuality of a developed or moral
personality as contrasted with the far less comprehensive individual-
ity of a personal act. Individuality is a much more inclusive term
than personality , for it applies to many other entities than persons.
It means that which distinguishes one person or thing from another.
Individuality and personality are both alike general terms of which
there are many instances, but individuality as applied to a person re-
fers to those unique qualities or activities of his which cannot be
referred to any other person. One has individuality in the sense that
the content of his personal history is nowhere duplicated. It is a
"differential" principle among persons; "it is something which specif-
ically characterizes each self. . . Individuality expresses what one
uniquely is; personality expresses what one has, a property that one
may acquire." (2)
Miss M. f. Calkins includes uniqueness or ii.communicability
among the fundamental characters of the self. " Uniqueness is the
character by virtue of which the oelf is 'this' or 'that' and not
any one of a group—a reality which cannot be replaced by another how-
(1) See below, pages
(2) J. Dewey, Article, Personality, Cyclopedia of Education.
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t ever like it or qualitatively identical with it." ( 1 ) Uniqueness
I does not mean merely that each person exists in a different his-
' torical situation, amid more or less variant social surroundings,
! etc., and not only that each person involves an agent which is on-
I Z tologically distinct from every other agent, but it means also that
f his moral unity, his set or purposes, his historical activity and
disposition to action are altogether peculiar to him, so that there
J
is nothing else in the known universe which is identical with or
even entirely similar to his particular combination of activities.
I It means, also, that his personality cannot be classified except by
I omitting essential features, and could be set forth most adequately
I only in a complete biography.
c. Description We have spoken of the importance of moral unity in the develop-
f of individuali- merit of personality. This unity depends at once upon a system of
ty in terms of purposes and of corresponding preferences and dispositions. That
activity. is, individuality is expressed in a system of moral activity, but
each personality-system represents a combination of ends, of memories,
of historical activities, of thoughts and feelings, which it seems
safe to say cannot be duplicated among all other persons. Individu-
ality represents a more or less ordered whole of ideal purposes and
active dispositions which in its particular combination and organiza-
tion is different from any other that is known. This fact of indiv-
iduality does not prevent us from describing a person in the general
terms of purposive activity-cycles, but it does prevent. us from as-
serting, without good warrant, that two personal cycles are similar.
Thus we see that the principle of individuality also finds its ex-
planation in the conception of purposive activity which we adopted as
our standpoint for the exposition of personality. 'Ay individuality
consists in the fact that I have acted, do act, and intend to act in
my own peculiar way.
Individuality, then, is to be found in the specific combination
of desires and dispositions which are involved in the multiple activ-
ities of a single person. Each man as a person possesses a wondrous
variety of conative capacities and desires that are assembled in that
conception which we call his individual personality. For some
studies suggesting the countless modes in which the qualities of men
may be combined, one may turn with profit and delight to J. Jastrow's
Character and Temperament . The fact of individuality i3 30 well
known and so easily verified that no further exposition of it is
called for
.
d. Individu- The individuality of a person may represent, in spite of its
ality is a kind peculiarity, indeed, because of it, such a more or less organized
of unity. group of ends that we are justified in saying that his life is on the
I whole a consistent one, and we may properly speak of the individual
I unity of his life. In that case we should have added another type of
I unity to those already discussed. Since such an individuality as has
I been described can belong only to a being who is a person, we may call
I it personal individuality. It is distinguished from the individuality
' of lower 'organisms and inanimate things by moral and religious factors,
e. Sources of There are probably three chief general sources (2) of difference
^Ividuality. or individuality among persons, (a) First may be mentioned the in-
I herited differences of temperament and talent, (b) Then there are
I (1) Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 3rd edition, page 406.
Wt (2) See G. T. Ladd, The Secret of Personality, page 92.
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the tendencies and characteristics that are acquired as a result of
the historical and social conditions of experience. The activities
of one person vary largely from those of another because of differ-
ence in environment and history, (c) Finally, there are those pur-
poses and systems of ends which are intelligently adoped and ap-
proved as one's own. To these should be added one's own self-iden-
tification and self-differentiation from other persons. One resents
being identified with or mistaken for another person; one wants to
be his own self. The normal person would not surrender his essen-
tial personality if he could, but he cannot surrender the peculiar
combination of activities which makes up his biography. Many of his
particular acts may be similar to those of others, but never the to-
tal historical combination of them. One would lose his sanity, not
his individuality or his personality, if he tried to identify himself
entirely wi th ano ther
.
The various sources of individuality referred to result in the
fact that each person finds a different content in his empirical self,
and never ir? tempted to confuse or confound his empirical self with
that of another; the reason for this is to be found not merely in the
difference of mental content in each empirical self, but in the dif-
ference in the immediacy with which his own empirical self and that
of another is present to him. In this personal individuality we have
an individuality of development, character, and history, which is
contrasted with the individuality of a single act, an^also with the
ontological separateness which belongs to the agent as the subject of
his mental life.
A peculiar combination, then, of activity cycles and dispositions
constitutes the individuality of a person. This description includes
the emotional phases of consciousness which are sometimes said to be
the chief basis of individuality, as contrasted with thinking, which
is said to be more public and universal. The reason for tae import-
ance of the emotional aspect of our activities in determining our in-
dividuality may lie in this, that since affections are the foundation
of my values (1), I find in them that which makes me an individual
of independent worth. Some of the objects I love are not esteemed in
the same intense way by any one else 01 wnom i icnow. My system of
values distinguishes me from other persons who claim different sys-
tems of values
.
The individuality of personality has been found in other groups
of mental processes than the affective one. Perry inclines to find it
in the intellectual life, for he declares taat, "The true individual-
ism is this intellectual self-sufficiency, this capacity to do one's
own thinking. Its substance is originality. . . This is essentially
an individual and not social attribute, \7here passion may be social,
only an individual can think." (2) On the other hand, .Miss Calkins
speaks or "the true insight that the ..ill is the principle of indiv-
iduality, uniqueness." (J) These three different views show clearly
the dangers of inconsistency when one talks In terms of one abstract
aspect of personality. As a matter of fact all three views probably
have a measure of truth in them, for thought, feeling, and will are
all aspects of the concrete personal activities which make me what I am
(1) See above, pages 296-99.
(2) The Free Man and the Soldier, page 160.
(5) The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, Jd edition, page
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R. Tagore describes in a masterful way the meaning to him of
personal individuality: "i am absolutely unique, I am I, I am incom-
parable. The whole weight of the universe cannot crush out this in-
dividuality of mine. I maintain it in spite of the tremendous gravi-
tation of all things. It is small in appearance but great in reali-
ty. For it holds its own againBt the forces that would rob it of its
distinction and make it one with the dust." Loss of it means that
'the creative joy which was crystallized therein is gone." This in-
dividuality "is most valuable because it is not universal.
. .
The
universal is ever seeking its consummation in the unique. And the
desire we have to keep our uniqueness intact is really the desire of
the universe acting in us. It is our joy of the infinite in us that
gives us our joy in ourselves. This separateness of self is consid-
ered by man as his most precious possession. It is a constant striv-
ing and suffering for us to maintain the separateness of this self of
ours. And in fact it is this suffering which measures its value." (1)
F. THE IDENTITY OF PERSONALITY.
Besides the ideal unity of the moral life and the concrete, si-
multaneous unity of the conscious, momentary act, a person possesses
another kind of unity of a remarkable character w.ich is commonly
called the identity of personality in the midst of its developing cy-
cles of activity. The significance of an act which is not rationally
or purposively linked with other acts of the same individual may be
very slight indeed. The value of particular acts, whatever their in-
trinsic importance, is greatly increased by their organization into
orderly systems or series which converge in important and distant ends.
Indeed, the realization of the higher types of personal purpose re-
quires a continuity in the raids t of their realization without which
the latter could not be attained. Without this continuity, personal-
ity would not exist, and the human being would consist of one isolated
and transitory act after another. In order to explain actual person-
alities as we have found them to exist, we must accept some degree of
permanence in the midst of their conative cycles, and need now to try
to understand the meaning of this permanence.
Perhaps the real source of our demand for identity lies in our
appreciation of the need of it as a condition for the realization of
ends v.-hich we value and for the preservation of values already at-
tained. The fact of this felt need of time for the fulfilment of our
purposes has not been sufficiently recognized alongside of the fact of
memory as a confirmation of our personal identity. If we should en-
tertain purposes and some one else reap the enjoyments of their real-
ization without our consent, those purposes would have little or no
value for us. We consider those purposes to have veritable worth
which we expect to realize in the course of our individual history,
or which we do or have realized. V/e require a continuity between the
inception and the fulfilment of a given plan of activity. This con-
tinuity or identity is a condition of such fulfilment and is mani-
fested in it. But this identity must be more than merely logical.
It must have the hardness of life and activity Btretcning through it.
Here again the concept of purposive activity ub to un-
derstand the source of the demand for identity. Our interact in the
(1) Sadhana, pages 69-70.
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future attainment of our ends leads us to consider our identity as
much as does the desire to connect our present act with past ones.
The relative importance of purposing and remembering in confirming
the fact of personal identity varies, of course, according to the age
of the person concerned. Those who desire immortality usually wish
for a personal iromor tality
,
namely, one in which their future life
will be rationally and teleological Ly connected with their present
life. V/e want personal identity, then, because it means the develop-
ment and attainment of those values which we seek, of those purposes
which we hold dear. The conception of personal identity, therefore,
haa great pragmatic value.
Now that some of the reasons why we want personal identity when
we stop to think about the matter have been presented, we may turn to
the conscious assertion of it as a fact in our experience. In the
light of the activities which we have already carried out we have no
hesitation in asserting, in the course of rerlection upon our nature,
that identity or continuity is a fact of personal life, whatever may
be our specific definition of it. The demand or need of identity is
met by the fact of identity as demonstrated by our own conscious
histories and memories. I, therefore, may assert that I am one in
the midst of the successive activities which I, as their subject,
perform... The reality of the self-assertion of identity in the course
of experience is one of the cardinal components or James' doctrine of
the passing thought. (1) Bovme, too, emphasizes repeatedly the ac-
tuality and the great importance of permanence as a feature of person-
ality. (2)
My identity then may be a matter of my self-consciousness, but
my self-conscious assertion that I an one in the midst of my active
cycles does not create that identity as a fact; it only brings before
my reflective attention that which was there all along in an unrecog-
nized way, for my very assertion presupposes the identity to which it
refers. My identity, therefore, is merely an explication of an orig-
inal aspect of my activities w lich is not a matter of my creation,
but which is a presupposition of my developed activity- experiences
which I may bring to light when I think about ray nature and its impli-
cations. In other words, personal identity may be a principle immanent
in my personal activities which makes them possible without my con-
scious recognition of it as such. From this it follows that identity
is not a principle derived from outside of what I call my personality,
but is one of the categories which are immanent in my personal exper-
ience. As a result of reflection I may become conscious of it, and I
may extend it to other facts than personal ones.
It should be noted, however, that I do not often stop to say that
I am identical in my various activities. This point was stressed when
we gave reasons for denying James' view that every passing thought ac-
tually and consciously appropriates its whole past, (j) The demand
for an assertion of my personal identity may arise only on some excep-
tional occasion, such as philosophical criticism, or in acting as a
witness in a judicial proceeding where I am asked to testify whether
I saw a certain event or not. The common fact is that I want some-
thing now, and later I want it still, and finally I get what I want
(1) See above, pages J6-7; criticism of his appropriative hy-
pothesis, above pages 7^-6.
(2) See above, pages 159-^'i nee s1b0 ?aoe 172.
(5) See above, pages 76-8.

522
View of
D. H. Parker
c. Inadequacy
of the inter-
pretation of
personal iden-
tity as logical
meaning
.
and I am satisfied, for, I say, I have what I wanted. It is easy to
pass from this original experience to the statement that I who have
what I want am the same one who once wanted what I have, save that I
am now satisfied when I was not before. In other words, the exper-
ience of personal continuity precedes the conceptual formulation of
it, anc^Ls to be distinguished from it. James includes sensible con-
tinuity among the characters of the stream of consciousness. (1)
This distinction is clearly made by D. H. Parker in the second
chapter of his book on The Self and Nature . He asserts that, "Per-
sonal identity i3, however, nr. more identical with self-identifica-
tion than blue is with the concept of blue. The most ordinary exper-
iences give e^ridence of this, 'when we waken in the morning we feel
ourselves to be the same without any overt assimilation of the new
experience to the idea of ourselves; the idea may not arise at all.
There are times
. . .
when the idea of self is in abeyance, as when
we work quietly; yet there is a sense of familiarity which pervades
all experience, and is the abiding identity within it. Yet when the
idea of self is in mind, we cannot apply it to another self; for its
root and substance is just oneself and no other. One's sense or feel-
ing of identity with one's past is thus no illusion or empty boast)
for it is the having in mind of the real identity, however small, be-
tween one's present and one's past.
. .
According to the view of this
chapter,
. .
the judgment which the self makes about itself is a true
judgment." (2), "The abstract concept of identity, like all concepts,
is the reflex or representative in the mind of something real in that
Which the mind knows or reflects upon." (5)
These points bring; to light the important distinction between ac-
tual identity and conceptual identity, between the fact or experience
of identity and the idea of identity which one forms by reflection
upon the experience. Only the former is essential to personality, al-
though the latter may mark an important step forward in the develop-
ment of self-consciousness.
From this distinction it follows that the concept of identity
does not exhaust the meaning of personal identity. It is only half
true to say that the continuity in personal activities is a logical
meaning which results from thinking. In making the latter statement,
one must carefully avoid the assumption that ideas or logical mean-
ings somehow hang detached from personal acts of intelligence. The
assertion that an identical purpose abides through an activity-series
is itself a personal act presupposing a unitary agent. There may be
a logical or rational continuity in a compound cycle of activities by
reason of the presence of a single purpose; this continuity, however,
does not make, but depends upon and presupposes a permanent agent who
maintains an interest in the purpose, and this agent cannot be reduced
to the ideal or logical meaning which he thinks and according to which
he acts fro;;: moment to moment. The conceptual identity of a person
rests upon, and is an expression of his experience of. seeking an end
and seeing it through until he realizes it; and to the completed whole
he may add the assertion, This is my work which I have done.
So far we have discovered several points of view from which per-
sonal identity may be considered. There is, first, the original exper-
(1) See above, page 24.
(2) The Self and Nature, pages 51-2,
(5) Ibid. , page 41
.
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ience of carrying an end to its consummation, where one attains
the values which one is aware of having sought at the beginning of
the cycle of activities; this is factual or actual identity. Then,
by reason of ray interest in the permanence of my personal values,
or for other reasons, I may come to reflect on my continuity, and
one day assert that I abide and that I know I have experienced be-
fore the very purpose which I now seek, and which I expect to con-
tinue to seek. I may perform, thus, an act of self-identification
in which I judge that I who now perform this act am the very one
who has performed many and varied acts in the past. This latter
kind of identity is conceptual identity, a conscious and reflective
expression of the first and original kind.
This account of personal identity would seem to be perfectly
intelligible an! relatively complete, and yet it is commonly supposed
that the meaning of personal identity is very difficult to understand.
The source of this over-estimated difficulty may be explained by
several mistaken expectations connected with the idea of personal
identity. One of these is that one will find in the study of personal
identity some kind of agent which exists apart from or outside of
concrete activities, and which perhaps exists through 6ome kind of
real time. This is one of the prejudices which casts unnecessary dif-
ficulty over the problem in question. In answer it is sufficient to
point out, first, that the agent, apart from the individual acts which
he performs, is a concept or abstraction, and we should have no more
interest in the permanence of meaning attached to this than to any
other important concept in our system of knowledge . In the second
place, it should be noted that the acting agent himself is the ground
of time, the support of the temporal series, and cannot, therefore,
be regarded as an entity which this series in some way carries along
upon its back. T.:ese erroneous notions of the relation of the agent
to his acts and to the temporal series are common reasons for many of
the mistaken questions and hypotheses about personal identity. The
uselessness, for purposes of explanation, of a substantial substratum
of the active subject may be regarded as generally recognized.
Again, it may be said that one does not understand personal iden-
tity because one does not know why agents abide. This attitude rep-
resents a confusion of two problems: namely, of the understanding of
the facts of our personal life, and of the comprehension of the crea-
tion of agents . We have no compunction against admitting that the
positing of agents and the creation of souls is not our business.
There is no o ejection to trying to find out how these things come to
be, but failure in t is attempt should not blind us to the actual
continuity which we experience in our activities. If we begin with
our personal experiences, and do not pretend to ^.^eyond them, we
find that abiding agents are facts, and that they ^essential to the ex-
planation of our activities.
Sometimes thinkers are dissatisfied with the answer they get to
the problem of personal identity because they expect the answer to be
given in some sort of spatial or mechanical metaphors which will en-
able them to imagine how personal agents continue to act as they do.
All one can say to this view is that it is a mistaken conception.
There is no sense in saying that an active suDject or agent exists in
space, for space itself is a concept which presupposes the organizing
work of the subject himself. One may as well expect to find how
agents exist in a physical world aa to find how a stone seeks after
ends which it values.
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It is scarcely necessary to add that tne body cannot be regarded
as constitutive of personal identity, for the assertion of its perman-
ence presupposes just the fact of identity in a thinking subject which
we are in part trying to explain. ',Ve can go back further in our search
for principles tlian the body. In solving, for example, a mathematical
problem I may maintain my identity in the various steps or tne solu-
tion without any reference whatever to my body, and it is not at all
evident how tne body helps me to assert at the end of the problem tnat
I have solved that which was proposed 1'or solution.
D. H. Parker presents various reasons for not finding personal
identity in tne brain (1), one or wnich is that "the experience of an
individual is not His brain. If the brain has a continuous existence
and experience only a fleeting and interrupted one, they cannot be
identical." If it is said that identity is not to be round in exper-
ience, but in some thing, such as the oody, the reply is simply that,
"we know nothing of things except as they are given to us in our ex-
perience. Hence, if experience is naturally transient, things must
be transient also; if there is no identity and permanence in the one,
there is none in the other." (2)
We shall attempt now to present more fully the concrete or ac-
tual meaning of the concept of persona] identity wnich is expressed
in my self-conscious assertion that I who now act am the same agent
who acted yesterday. The identity in this statement is clearly a con-
ceptual or abstract one, for it applies to the connection between many
activities which are not now actual, and cannot be, ir it be true that
a human person can act in only one way at a time. In the affirmation
just mentioned I take advantage of my capacity for conceptual con-
struction, and remind myself that I have been present in all the acts
I have performed. This construction is frequently of great signifi-
cance in binding together long-term purposes and compound conative cy-
cles and memories of acts already performed. The identity, then, be-
tween the group of my historical acts as I now experience it is con-
ceptual, and to assert it3 existence in this conceptual way is the
special function of a memory-act.
If we turn from a series of activities to an individual act, can
we say that there is identity present in that? Strictly speaking, we
should not refer to the identity of an individual act, but of the
unity of it, especially of the unitary agency which it implied. The
identity of an individual act is only another name for its unitary
agency. We have explained already that an individual act centers in
a single agent who initiates, grounds, and achieves it. (5) H« E.
Moore points out that, "The first meaning, then, which we can give to
an assertion of Identity, is that the assertion that a thing is^den-
tical with itself is equivalent to the assertion that it is a subject.
Identity is not here a relation between two things, nor does it imply
any difference." (4) Without a conscious subject which holds to-
gether the several aspects of an individual act, it would :.ot occur,
or its phases would be only an aggregation of separate events or
things. A subjective unity rather than strict identity character-
izes an individual act of short duration.
(1) The Self and Nature, pages 2G-9
(2) Ibid. , page $6.
ff) See above, pages 232-45.
(4) Mind, N. S., vol. I, page 121.
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It is when acts begin to blend into one another and to form more
or leas complex cycles that the problem of personal identity appears
in its simplest form. But "the normal human mind," as J. R. Angell
points out, "is never a mere string of states of consciousness. It
is always a unitary affair in which the past, the present, and even
the future are felt to hang together in an intimate personal way." (1)
Let us consider a particular case to see how mental states are linked
together
.
Suppose I perform some complex action, 3uch as throwing a bowling
ball. I prepare for the throw by taking in the whole situation in
which I find myself; I graap the ball, adjust my fingers, and feel -its
weight. I aim carefully, and hurl it with the best of my ability; I
watch it roll down the alley and knock down several pins; and I re-
joice at my success. Here is a short-term act with all its character-
istic ac companiment8
.
Now, the question which is often asked in the discussion of per-
sonal identity is, what connects the beginning with the end of the ac-
tion? or whr.t binds together the different minor acts within the whole?
What joins the picking up of the ball with the resulting satisfaction?
This putting of the question tends to warp the issue from the begin-
ning. The more obvious question, from the point of view of the ordi-
nary acting person would be, what separates the activities? or what
distinguishes them, since they form an intimate purposive unitty? Cer-
tainly the actor at the time of performing the action is unaware of
any difficulty in getting from one part of the activity- cycle to
another. He has no experience of needing to bridge some chasm in the
series of his activities. He may have some uncertainty in deciding
what purpose will guide him in his next act, but having adopted a par-
ticular purpose, he has no problem of getting out of a present act
into a new one. He just does the deed that he wants to do. The ques-
tion, then, of what connects the beginning and the end in acting is
asked from the standpoint of the observer and not of the actor himself.
Now, if one should analyze out all the sensations of strain and
effort in the whole series of movements , .o.ie would no doubt miss the
connecting link. Some psychologists go astray by looking too closely
at these incidental factors. (2) The clue is to be found in the main-
tenance of a purposive attitude. The total action gets its tone and
its significance from the intention to do one's best, in this case, in
knocking down pins. No succession of kinaesthetic sensations can pro-
vide this necessary bond of teleological unity. That is, as one pro-
ceeds to roll a couple of balls down a bowling alley, his various bodi-
ly movements are unified by the single aim of doing his best in knock-
ing down pins. This aim possesses a logical or rational meaning which
abides through the whole act. Numerous sensations may function in the
fulfilment of the aim but they are too transitory to constitute the
abiding or identical factor. But the aim itself presupposes always
the interested agent who maintains his attitude of concern with its
attainment. We should remember, however, that the purpose itself is
only one aspect of a concrete activity from which it can be distin-
guished only in abstraction. This activity gets its unity from the
general purpose which dominates it and not from any sensory phases.
The one who starts to perform a task is the one who executes it, if it
(1) Psychology, 1904, pa-e 582.
(2) Compare our criticism of James
1 view of the spiritual self,
above, pages 201-204.
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is executed, for the whole meaning of the act would disappear with-
out this presupposition of an abiding and interested agent. The one
who proposes tb play the game is the one who plays it,°and notes his
success or failure in doing so.
Identity in this particular case is the name for the fact that
one agent has a variety of specific experiences, such as attitude of
playing the game, preparing by picking up a ball, aiming and throwing
it at a definite time, feeling various stresses and strains in doing
so, and finally having a satisfaction in the result of hie total ac-
tion, fe may say with J. Ward that "The first and most fundamental
fact yielded by the analysis of this experience we have found to be
its reference to a subject or self that has it." (1) There could not
be a development of such specific experiences toward a definite end
without a single agent who possessed them all.
The identity of this subject means simply that he does as a mat-
ter of fact perform various activities wnicn have for him a meaningful
connection or development. In the first instance this bond of connec-
tion is immediately experienced without reflection upon it. (2) One
may say that the subject is permanent amid these mental processes if
he speaks with circumspection, but it is easy to turn the activity
situation inside out and lose its meaning by looking at it solely from
the standpoint of an external observer. To refer to the subject as
permanent is a reflection of the objective point of view. It is to
apply a category to the agent himself which he applies to certain of
his ideas. We may speak, however, of the permanence of the agent, if
this is not taken to imply that he exists tbrougfa some real time, and
if it is merely an attempt to indicate that the agent is one and the
same amid his varying experiences. D. H. Parker points out that, "A
difference in moment does not involve a difference in existence; for
the same thing may exist anew at separate moments of time. 11 (5) In
short, if the series of mental phenomena present in a cycle of activi-
ties ia to be known as such at ail, the knowing subject cannot itself
be a part of a series.
Identity, then, in connection with a series of particular person-
al acts possessing a teleological unity, means, from the standpoint or
the actor himself, that he consciously performs these acts, one and
all, that he finds some satisfaction which he seeks, or perhaps un-
expected dissatisfaction. This persisLence in the pursuit of purposes
upon the part of a conscious subject who values them is tHe real and
original meaning of identity. The only mystery about it is trie mys-
tery of the existence of tne agent at all. Ttiis luentity of the ac-
tive suoject in the midst oi a aeries of activities Having a common
signil'icance is sometmng waica any one can verily in nis daily life.
Another concept in connection -ici ..^ruoi^ity a~o uutu illuminated,
perhaps, by a study of concrete activity.
J. Laird states that "Our argument a^u rex rrcu ouly to the iden-
tity of that self which can be discovered oy introspection. This
self, it is plain, consists of experiences, and its identity is of the
experiences. We can recognize the identity in one way only, tnat is
to say, by a judgment of comparison. It is necessary to compare the
self at some time in the past with the sell' as it is in the present,
(1) Psychological Principles, page 5^1.
(2) Compare our discussion of actuul or experiential identity,
above, page 521.
(5) The Self and Nature, pages 4^-4 1
.
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and then we can tell whether and in what respects it is identical.
Thus personal identity does not involve any peculiar logical diffi-
culty. We must be identical if we can recognise our identity in
judging. He require memory in order to make the comparison implied
in any judgment of identity; but memory does not make ue identical.
It merely supplies part of the evidence for recognising tae fact. le
muut remember the selx' of the past in order to compare it with the
sell' of the present. Perhaps there is no personality which is incap-
able of recognising itself in this way." (1)
Any one who might be interested in making tnis comparison could
do so only because he had reached a developed stage of intelligence,
which fact explains why it is customary to speak of identity with
reference to remembered activities involving a long period of time.
In tais case identity is no longer an aspect or implication of a
short-term series of activities, but a general term applying to a
great many past and complex cycles. i»evertneless
, the basic nature
of identity is the same, namely, the judgment of the agent that he
has performed these many acts which, he rememoers. Since he may recall
these numerous previous activities as his own, without reflecting upon
the nature of his identity, we may distinguish this historical identity
also from reflective or conceptual identity. Historical identity dif-
fers from actual identity because it refers to more distant activi-
ties, and it differs from conceptual identity in not being strictly
self-conscious. For oovious psychological reasons one's historical
identity is likely to have much greater unity and order than his actual
life contained. Since one is most likely to remember those activities
which most affected his development of value, forgetting and remem-
brance aid in the development of a system of values.
One of the characteristics of a person is that his activities may
be modified a6 the result of past experience. Some of these efrects
may be consciously present and influential as he goes about performing
an act in the present. Most of them, however, are not thus present,
and yet we know, on pragmatic grounds, that he is capable of acting
with reference to various purposes wnicn conditions in the near future
may bring to his consciousness.
When we attempt to define these capacities, or tne ground of our
possibility of acting, we m_et serious difficulties whicn involve the
whole problem of the relation or mind and uody, which cannot be fur-
ther introduced. The question is sometimes restated without solution
by saying that each person has a particular disposition, temperament,
and character. There is no general term to cover these three factors.
Their meaning is well summarized by V/. JcDougall : "Temperament must
be carefully distinguished from disposition and from character. . .
The disposition of a person is the sum of all the innate dispositions
or instincts with their specific impulses or tendencies of the kind
discussed in Chapter II. . . Character, on the otner nand, is the sum
of acquired tendencies built up on the native basis of dispositions
and temperament; it includes our sentiments and our habits in the
widest sense of the term." (2) Temperament is one's native suscepti-
bility to emotional experiences. We can do no more here thau to re-
call the discussion of disposition above (5) and point out the worth
(1) Problems of the Self, pages 24,-6.
(2) Introduction to Social Psychology, page 120.
(5) See above, pages 266-70.
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of reserving the term, dispositional identity , for whatever explana-
tion may be found for those permanent factors outside our conscious
life which exercise the most persistent influence upon our activi-
ties This identity, however, in no sense supersedes the original
identity of the conscious active person, and its meaning as a prin-
ciple of explanation will rest upon the kind of identity wnich we
actually experience.
A useful distinction may be made between the application of
identity and of permanence to a personality. Identity refers to the
subjective or agent aspect of a person. Relative permanence, but
not identity, may be applied to the phenomenal stages of a person's
activities, that is, to his empirical self. While some of the inter-
ests of every person are probably short-lived and temporary, he has
others which are only slowly modified and developed in the course of
his experiences. If his life-activities are thoroughly correlated
by reference to well selected and remote purposes, the latter will be
tokens of permanent interests, the value of which he repeatedly rati-
fies. In this sense personality is permanent: namely, in the frequent
reaffirmation of certain valuable ends, as well as in the frequent ex-
perience of similar values.
There is, therefore, no contradiction in affirming that a person-
ality is both identical and permanent, for these terms refer to differ-
ent aspects of his nature. The former concerns the subject or agent,
and the latter, the values which he cherishes and the interests which
he repeatedly experiences. His total personality does .,ot remain un-
changed from day to day. There are frequent and often radical changes
in that aspect of a personal life which we have called the empirical
self, (1) but on the whole there is a relative permanence of inter-
ests, desires, etc. There is identity on the subjective side of per-
sonality. The distinctions which we have made in the concrete person-
al act enable us to assert without contradiction that personality is
an identity in the midst of change. (2) Permanence in personality
means that the agent acts in ways that are relatively constant, but
identity in personality means that the same agent acts in all his ac-
tivities
.
The development of one's interests and the coordination of his
activities ordinarily take place gradually. A personality is a slow-
ly developing organization of activities, or a progressive, ,-urposive
growth -from within. The person remembers hi8 past, makes plans for
the future, and gradually alters and correlates his activities so as
best to promote what he finds most valuable in the course of his ex-
periences. For this reason the subjective identity of the person is
intimately bound up with the development and continuity of nis empir-
ical phases, and both a3pects need to be studied together.
The importance of the fact of development in personal life
warns us againBt over-estimating the permanence of personality
.
There are distinct limits to the permanence of many or our interests
and tendencies. Moral crises, religious conversion, moral negligence,
social calamity, and other exp.riences may greatly modify the pur-
poses which form so determining a part of our personal lives. Tuen,
(1) See above, pages 264-5.
(2) Compare our criticism, above, pages 150-1, that Bowne does
not reconcile permanence with activity in his concept oi
ty.
tro< Ll<

w 529
too, we should note the vague purposes and conflicts in human inter-
eats, and the frequent uncertainties concerning what we really want.
This limited permanence in personal lire does not in any way under-
mine the fact of personal identity, for even the memory of the pur-
v poses which we have abandoned, or of the false ideals which have
tempted us only confirms the certainty that these once appealed to
our very selves.
D. H. Parker expresses well this fact of identity amid change
which characterizes personal experiences: "Permanence and change,
adventurous seeking for the new, and the tragic holding on to the
old or effort to escape the old; self-making and self-mending—such
is the life of the mind. Throughout there is a thread of identity;
the old man remains in 3ome respects the same as the child. Yet the
amount of this identity varies on different occasions . It is great
when a man puts all his emotional energy into some task which re-
quires the use of his whole past experience, the total resources of
his memory and learning; then as we say he is most himself; it is
little when in a light moment of gaiety he forgets himself feeding
on new impressions.' 1 (1)
8. Summary of Shall I then say that I am always the same? If I refer to the
personal iden- active subject in my experience, I may reply in the affirmative. If
tity . I refer to the marvelous wealth of experiences which come to me in
the progressive realization and transformation of my personal inter-
ests, I must reply in the negative. One cannot say that personality
is either changing or permanent until one defines the aspect of the
concrete person about which he is thinking. A person is different
on successive occasions in the sense that he actually acta in differ-
ent ways, but he is the same in the sense that one agent performs all
the acts. Since it is inevitaole that we must include the most vary-
ing interests and purposes in a single personal history, clearly we
cannot assert th t a person is always the same, if we consider him as
a whole. It is the personal agent wno is identical, and this iden-
tity is an original fact or his experience. When he becoaies self-
conscious, he may be interested in a reflective assertion of his
identity, but thia conceptual identity will be merely an expression
of his original and actual identity, then the latter experiential
form of identity is referred, in memory and reflection, bo many past
acts of a person, we have what we have called historical identity.
G. PERSONALITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION.
The discussion of the relation of the idea of seli-determination
to the concept of personality has been postponed longjpecauae it is
complex and involves many other factors waich needed consideration
first, and also because the idea is closely connected with the problem
of the reality of personality xx x&xxaxxxxxx which we shall consider
next. ..
.
G. Everett points out that, "The development of reflection
and self-criticism, of self-direction and moral efiort on the part of
the sell', are essential conditions of human freedom, ireedom in and
through determination by ratioiuil insight." (2) With the exception of
self-criticism or self-conociouuness (5), the conditiona to wuich he
refers have been net. The concept of personal individual uctivity
1 . Jiode of ap-
proach to the
problem of
Beli'-determina-
tion
.
a. Transi-
tional /emurKS.
(1) The Self and Mature, p-a^e 50.
(2) Lioral Values, page 550. (?) ^« oelow, pages
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rill enable us briefly to state t.ic place of self-determination in
tae concept of personality.
In the study of self-determination tae volitional side of cer-
tain human activities comes into the foreground of attention. The
intelligent phases ofjpersonality have been treated in connection
with the purposive and orderly character of human activity. (1)
Tae affective factor in personality has been considered in connec-
tion with the values which are characteristic of personal activity.
(2) A consistent place in the concept of personality must now be
found for the volitional fact3 of psychology.
We started out constructive study by pointing out the variabil-
ity and excessiveness which is manifested in trie activities of human
beings. "When the self first comes to consciousness, it is a bundle
of activities moving swiftly along a definite track." (5) In the
course of time, perhaps, the activities of a self become sufficiently
organized around various ideals so that he may be called a personal-
ity. At this level of development intelligence has already become a
dominant factor in activity, and makes possiole the choice of one out
of several^ore or less distant purposes. The value attached to
these ends^as a pulling power upon the individual subject, and thus
they become "efficient causes" of activity. In tais way, as W. G.
Everett points out, a union of the final and efficient causes is
operative in moral acts, and, we may say, formal teleology becomes
dynamic teleology. "Such determination by the attraction of ideas
of value which challenge interest and claim obedience, is the one
point in the universe where we are able to see clearly the identity
of final and efficient causation. >Ve are, then, capable of deter-
mination by the ideas of ends which are, at the same time, the driv-
ing motives for their own realization. Ideas are efficient forces.
In this fact is to be found the true source of our freedom. Intelli-
gence thus contains a genuine element of transcendence, by which we
are delivered from subjection to tae moment " (4)
A profitable approach to the meaning of self-determination may
be found in the need of controlling the abundant and conflicting ten-
dencies and interests of original human nature. If man were prepared
by nature to act unequivocally under all circumstances, the need for
speaking of freedom and self-determination would ue very auch less.
But his desires and tendencies are often mutually antagonistic, and
consequently one tendency must gain right of way before action can
follow. In a man's first activities conative unity undoubtedly ex-
ists, but not moral unity, for a comprehensive harmony in active ten-
dencies is an achievement which a human being must win gradually.
The freedom of man might mean the fact of divergence and lack of
moral organization among hi3 inherited interests and conations, a
fact w.dch gives him the opportunity, indeed the duty or taking hold
of his endowment with a view to unifying and moralizing it. The va-
riability and excessiveness of man's native activities ^ive need and
opportunity for control and self-direction.
In what sense, then, is self-determination said to be present
in a personal activity? We' may answer by asking another question:
Why are these two words combined in this way? In the first place,
(1) See above, pages 276-282, 2^2-3.
(2) See above, pages 2<^k-^0&.
(5) V. a. Everett, Moral Values page 549. (4) Ibid., page 551
.
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the self in this phrase is equivalent to the subject or agent in
our concept of personal activity, and the meaning of this agency
can be expressed only in general or synonomous terms, namely, as
the one who acts in any finite field of experience.
Secondly, the real problem of interpretation arises from the
ambiguous meani'ng of determination
.
It can be understood from va-
rious standpoints. In the first place, it may refer to the orderly
arid uniformly conditioned stages in any activity when it becomes a
matter of knowledge on the part of an observing scientist or philos-
opher. From such a point of view any intelligent goal in which
one's behavior may culminate may represent only an apparent, regula-
tive, or objective purpose, (1) and one might infer from this inter-
pretation that the activity is due to causes in the strictly scien-
tific or mechanical sen3e.
Such a deterministic interpretation, however, is inconsistent
wita our conception of personal activity as a function of the "pro-
spective sequel. In general, the defect in this doctrine is that
it over-simplifies the facts in the interest of logical order; it
has no place for the retroactive influence of purposes. It actually
results in a static conception of human activity, and thereby ex-
cludes the Very important dynamic agency which is a characteristic
of personality. It represents the standpoint of an observer who,
from an external point of view, is interested in setting forth in a
logical order the changing experiences of someone else, and this
point of view is very different from that of the actor himself, who,
from the inside, may intelligently and purposively alter the course
of his experience with reference to tne "prospective sequel." (2)
If we take the standpoint of the actor himself, self-determina-
tion will be a very different process than that of an orderly de-
scription of phenomena; it will mean for him tue purposive initiation
of activity, (j) Hence, a satisfactory meaning of self-determination
may be said to be that the agent acts intelligently with reference to
prospective /alues or ends which he approves, and in auca activity ex
presses his own nature, i:. the sense of making manifest to himself
and others what he seeks. Self-determination means, Ln other words,
a conscious and deliberate guidance of the successive stages of one's
activities so as to attain the mo3t satisfying results in view of the
whole situation, past, present, and future, in which one finds him-
self. Just as spontaneous and impulsive action is characteristic or
original human nature, intelligent and controlled activity is a mark
of human nature that has become personal. The motive of a personal
act has its origin and residence within the conscious self, so that
when a person acts according to a motive, his activity is an express-
ion of himself. (4)
A self-determined or free act ia neitner foreordained nor for-
(1) See above, pages 219-20.
(2) See .Y . Fite, "The Agent and the Observer," Philosophical
Review, vol. XVII, .-ages 46V-506, for an excellent account of tne die
tinction between the two points of view in question.
(5) Compare here James
1 excellent description of causation and
free will, above, pages 50-2.
(A) See above, pages 1^4-6, v/here the important connection of
self-determination with purpose in Bowne'j tkMTJ of tan aelf is
explained.
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Neither is it causally determined in the scientific sense,
for the totality of antecedent processes considered in scientific
causation does not include the teleological factor which is charac-
teristic of the personal act and apart front which it would be unin-
s telligible. That "final cause" which is the reason for acting in the
case of normal persons cannot be overlooked if one desires a complete
understanding of them.
J. tfard points out that, "If we ask a man v/hy in a new and strange
situation he acts as he does, it will hardly occur to him to explain
his conduct by describing to us the immediately preceding situation.
The answer he is likely to give, and that we naturally expect, will
consist rather in describing the end at which he aims and the value
that it has for him, as the reason for his determination." (1 ) He de-
clares further that, "Efficiency and spontaneity, purpose and worth,
these ontological and teleological categories . . . are the categories
that in the main define what we mean by an individual or a person." (2)
Yflien the intelligent and conscious subject finds himself in a
given situation calling for action, his resulting activity is not a
function merely of the present situation, but also of an absent or fu-
ture one which he expects to develop. He will choose that line of ac-
tion which gives the promise of bringing greatest satisfaction.' His
choice of ends and means is a real one, and he exerts genuine control
over tne ensuing activity. The sell is not carried along upon a stream
of impulses ana tendencies which are separate from it, but so far aa
these tendencies are operative, tney are aspects of a conscious and
concrete activity which centers, in experience at the personal level,
in an agent who is in control of the course of his actions. The person,
by selecting the ends according to Which he will act, determines in
large part his own history. J. Ward says, in a fine way that, "A man
is internally free whenever the ends he pursues have his whole-hearted
approval." (5)
c. Self-deter- The teleological seir-determination which has been described does
mination and not exclude, but rather usually includes a measure of causal determina-
uniformity. tion in the natural-science sense of uniformity of occurrence, for, in
the completion of an activity-cycle, various factors, including mental
processes and perhaps also physical phenomena, may occur in a regular
order as features of the total situation . This factor of order was
explicitly incorporated, as a feature of activity, in our discussion
of its individuality (4), and it was also definitely recognized in our
exposition of the meaning of intelligence in personal activities. (5)
Indeed, most of our personal purposes could not be realized without
our depending upon some uniformity in the occurrence of mental and
physical phenomena concerned, but it by no means follows that our per-
sonal activities are exhaustively reducible to these univormities
.
In other words, our activities are at once determined by the val-
uable ends to which they lead and conditioned by the orderly character
'
. of the universe in which they are realized. Without the first deter-
mination, our actions would be either mechanical or accidental; and
without the second condition, their attainment would be entirely prob-
lematic and chance. In an experience which is at once orderly and
(1) The Realm of Ends, page 278. (2) Ibid., page 262.
(5) Psychological Principles, page 405.
(4) See above, especially pages 2^2-J, 250-9.
(5) See above, pages 279-82.
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teleological
,
personal activity becomes a possibility and a fact.
The working out of the relation between these two aspects of purpos-
ivenees and uniformity in personal activity would constitute the phi-
losophical side of " teleomechanics," with which I. Stern concludes
his system of "critical personalis^. " (1) Bowne has also described
in an excellent way how freedom and order are blended in personal ex-
perience. (2)
\*. Conserva- The idea of the conservation of energy represents a scientific
fcion of energy uniformity which has sometimes been used in an attempt to disprove the
ad the in- fact of creative self-determination which appears to be a matter of
Tease of personal experience. We have said that self-determination means the
ralue. intelligent maintenance and increase of personal values. The active
personality is a source of many significant values, but we should
speak of personality as a "storehouse" of values, not of energy. (5)
Since mechanical or energetic categories simply do not apply in any
intelligible sense, to these valuable personal activities (4), the
question of the conservation of energy does not enter at all. Not on-
ly the conservation but the production of values is characteristic of
the self-determining act of the human person. (5) But since the con-
scious activities of personality are not physical energies, however
much they may involve the expenditure of physical energy in their per-
formance, the principle of the conservation of energy is neither af-
firmed nor denied, for it is irrelevant. There is no objection to ap-
plying the law of the conservation of energy to the bodily expression
which may form a part of an individual act, but the latter In its es-
sential constitution simply belongs to a different order of facts than
the former
.
a'. Differ- The assertion that the conservation of energy is i^I'Pligg^gg^
.•nces between personal activity is confirmed by J. Ward's eloquent dis tine tioiumo-
wtives and tives and forces. The characteristic of motives "is not, that like
orces. external forces they move or tend to move the subject, but that they
are themselves the subject moving or tending to move, or more accur-
ately, acting or tending to act. We say indeed that hunger makes a
man eat, but we do not interpret this statement as we should the
statement that heat makes a glass crack. In both cases we have a cer-
tain situation, but in the one case the active subject changes the
situation; in the other the situation changes the passive object.
"Forces, though distinct, combineAtheir effects only because they
converge on one body: motives, though distinct, conflict only because
they diverge, so to say, from one subject. The forces, that is, are
applied to the body, the motives spring from the subject. The body
moves in the one path which the forces collectively determine, the
subject moves in the one path which it selectively determines. The
(1) See- his Person und Sache. (2) See above, page 155.
(5) In writing the first draft of this paragraph as it remains
here, I had forgotten entirely that H. HtJffding has suggested the anal-
ogy between the persistence of energy and the conservation of value;
see his Philosophy of Religion, pages 216 ff
.
(4) See above, pages 194-9. .
(5) H. Httffding makes the "axiom of the conservation of value,
^ described from the point of view of its psychological basis, a central
i feature of his philosophy of religion; see especially, Philosopiry of
Religion, pages 215 ff -
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magnitude of a force io referred to an objective standard, the
strength of a motive depends o.i its subjective worth: the sufficient
reason i3 in the one case mechanical, in the other it is teleologi-
cal." (1)
From the discussion of the relation of self-determination to
uniformity it follows that a self, in determining or controlling his
activities, must take account of his ov/n nature and the structure of
the world in which he acts. Hie self-determination is not absolute,
but relative. W. R. Sorley. expresses this idea in his inimitable way
as follows: "The self is thrown into an environment in which it can
live and act only in conformity with natural law. It brings with it
mental dispositions and it developes a character which tend to give
it a stability of its own. Thus its freedom is limited in two ways.
In the first place, it is limited by the physical conditions in the
midst of which it is set.
. . As mind acts through body, it is in all
its activity limited by the laws to which body is suoject.
. .
Nor,
in the second place, is freedom in human nature divorced from its own
past. It is the means by which character is established, and in
which we look to the future to fulfil the promise and correct the er-
rors of the time that has gone before.
. .
Actions are systematized
into the growing character of the self, and thus contribute to the
determination of the acts which follow. At the same time the succeed-
ing acts proceed always from the self, not from the particular features
which we distinguish as making up its character, nor even from all
these features taken together.
. . When, if ever, this character is
firmly established, the need for repeated conflict in order that the
good may be chosen disappears.
. .
The free man may achieve uniformity
through his freedom; upon the unfree man it would have to be imposed."
(2) The self selects his own past freely, even when the variety of
competing ways is diminished.
Thus, between the immature self, struggling amid the warring im-
pulses of his nature in an effort to win moral victories, and the or-
ganized personality whose activities are freely directed with irefer-
ence to a single good, there are many degrees of self-determination,
and beyond the moot perfect human self-determination we may think of
the complete self-determination of the Infinite. The degree of self-
determination which a person possesses cannot be regarded as a con-
stant function of the intensity of the conflict from which an ethical
act emerges, but rathor is estim ted by reference to the completeness
with which the act expresses the organized approval of the agent as
he considers it in the Light of hiB whole life. It may be also esti-
mated with rererence to the completeness with which a single clear
purpose is organized in character as tne result of many previous
self-determined acts. One's character is an expression of«hli own
past self-determinations and an incarnation of his proper evaluations.
It is sometimes said that free will is an import nt, indeed, a
primary mark of personality. Thifl is a misleading statement, i'or, in
the first place, will is an abstraction. It is one aspect of the con-
crete person-in-activity . It may be conceptually distinguished from
other aspects of that person, but apart fro... them it seems to be non-
existent. Hence, we should rot say that the will, but tuat the per-
son wills
.
(1) The Realm of Ends, pages 264-5.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, pages 449-52.
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The objections to the doctrine of the primacy of will are simi-
lar to those offered above in criticism of the primacy of intellect
and feeling. (1) To affirm that will is more primary, for exaaple,
than intellect, assumes that intellect and will can be ordered with
respect to the same criterion of value or the same function in per-
sonal life, which plainly is not the case. One cannot say, eitner,
that intellect is more primary than feeling, for feeling does not
know, nor does intellect feel. In other words, there is lacking a
common basis of comparison which is requisite to determine the 4ues-
tion concerning the relative worth of these factors in personal ac-
tivi ties
.
It follows that the assertion of the primacy of the will is mis-
leading and not well founded, fill is an important feature of per-
sonality, bjtt not a primary one, for there is nothing else secondary
which can be compared with it. The will is the "whole person active;"
the intellect is the whole person knowing; feeling is the whole per-
son evaluating. A. Aliotta believes that, "Concrete thought is an in-
tuitive life at once volition and feeling, and in its full concrete-
nes3 is no other than the v/hole mind in action." (2) Only a confusion
would result from identifying the meanings of wi 1
1
and activity as we
have defined the latter.
The so-called "freedom"of personality is only another way of re-
ferring to some of the aspects of personality to which we have already
given consideration. Freedom is essentially a negative concept, but
even as such it may have some value as indicating that personal activ-
ity cannot be reduced to he chai-ical terms, and that this activity is
not a movement due to compulsion of a spatially external sort. Free-
dom, on its negative side, may mean also that the self is not a slave
to its lower impulses and desires. D. C. Macintosh expresses this
idea by saying that, "What is meant by the assertion of freedom or
free agency is that the agent is not necessarily at the mercy abso-
lutely of what was his character at the moment immediately preceding
the moment of his activity." '3) The terms, freedom and inde termini am .
refer to what the person does not do; but it is in that which he ac-
tually does that his fundamental nature is revealed.
The positive significance of the term, freedom , has already been
wholly included in the idea of the self-determination, on the part of
a person, with reference to ends that are a proved by him. Freedom,
from this standpoint, means the agent 1 a capacity to act according to
purposes which he intelligently chooses and approves. When a thinker
makes freedom one of the chief marks of a person, he usually has in
mind this intelligent initiative in personal activity. Self-deter -
mination
,
however, is a more accurate and positive term than free will
to designate that fundamental feature of personality waich is before
us, for the former indicates the fact that personality consists in ac-
tual purposive activities executed with a measure of self-control.
The person and not the will is free. Self-determination is the self-
direction of activities; in it the true meaning of the phrase, 8elf-
activity
.
is to be found, for, in the words of R. Tagore, "we gain
our freedom when we attain our truest nature." (A) Tois meaning of
(1) See above, pages 289-91, and JOO-JO!
.
(2) Idealistic Reaction against Science, page 411.
(j) Theology as Empirical Science, page 68.
(4) Sadhana, page 74.
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self-determination "recognises," as B. Bosanquet says, "the self as
operative in its own nature, as creative and originative according
to its own law— the only law of creativeness which prevails in the
universe. It recognises a necessary act—an act which must be what
it is—but not a necessary agent, because nothing but the agent de-
termines the act, and there is no meaning in applying to him any
•must' or 'cannot help it' except in the sense that everything is
what it is ." ( 1
)
7. Self-deter - The explication of the idea of self-determination requires one
mination and to take account of all the other aspects of personality which have
personality . been discussed. This overlapping character of the concept was a good
reason for the postponement of its consideration. In this conception
and its implications we are approaching still nearer the completion
of our description of personality-. Activity . which has attained the
level of self-determination is the .^ost important characteristic of
personality. It may be taken without qualification as a criterion of
personality.
This criterion is a very ancient one. Thomas Aquinas, for ex-
ample, adopted it; he asserts that, "Those actions alone are properly
called human of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions
through his reason and will.
. .
Therefore those actions are properly
called human which proceed from a deliberate will." (2) When we have
a deliberating, evaluating intelligence who determines his activities
with reference to approved ends, we have personality in its highest
form. Self-determination is the "secret of personality" according to
G. T. Ladd: "It is the power of self-control, however, in which re-
sides the citadel of personal life and personal development; and it is
the doctrine of self-control which furnishes, so far as its possession
is possible by finite intellects, the secret of personality." (5)
H. SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY AS SO FAR DEVELOPED.
1. Use of So far in this investigation we have developed, one at a time,
terms . the main features of personality. Now these may be brought together
profitably in a summary form. The concept of personality which we are
endeavoring to understand mean3 generally the quality or state of be-
ing an individual person, and our problem has been to define what this
state or property is. It is clear that a person is an individual ex-
ample of personality, although, in contemporary usage, a personality
and person often are used as equivalents. The ontological status of
personalities and the m3thod of knowing them are the problems which re-
main for consideration. in two concluding chapters. A personality is
a moral achievement of a self, the self bei..g the wider term.
2. Our start- We did not attempt to build the concept of personality out of
Ing point was ,r.rts, but we began with the concrete act, in its wholeness, of a nor-
ths concrete mal adult human being, and asked, first, that are its implications?
act ; the person- and, next, How should it be developed from within so as to b< ,
in-activitv
. merely an act, but >< 1 act? We found that pical h ac-
tivity is an individualized whole, the existence of which involves
Pp- several distinguishable, but not separable aspects. We discovered
(1) The Principle of Individuality and Vulue, pa^es 55^-5.
(2) Summa Theologia, Part II, First Number, Question 1, First
Article.B (5) The Secret of Personality, page

557
jH| that activity is consciously unified by a permeating purpose, and
^f that the latter is sustained by an agent or subject. Ke noted aleo
that when the agent in his acting is satisfied with having attained
the value sought, memory becomes an explicit and important phase of
4K 1. . activity. Such a complete and concrete act represents the real per-
son at work.
v The triad!
c
In the consummation of such an individual pulse of personal
^^Knt in per - life, we have before us a spiriti 1 ..d triadic cycle or movement
sonal expcr - which may be regarded as the fundamental mode in which a personality
[ence § exists. A person exists when a conscious subject or agent acts so
JF^ as to gain an end which, when attained, is remembered; purpose, ac-
^R. tive realization, memory--all grounded in a unique and unitary agent--
HL is the typical logic of personal development and experience. Our con-
7* crete etandpoint exhibited the intimate unity of purpose, activity,
flf and memory, and saved us from regarding them as parts or faculties of
which personality might be composed.
k. Intelli - But the discovery of this dialectic of personal activity did not
gence. exhaust the significance of the personal act; it rather involved
other features which needed explication. It became evident that the
'4k presence of a purpose with some degree of clearness, which marked a
personal activity as distinguished from lower forms of self-experience,
implies two other important features of personality, intelligence and
value. The positing of a purpose requires not only free ideas and
some discrimination, but a measure of knowledge of the total situation
to be met and of the means to be adopted. Further, the individual act
as a whole, including its phenomenal phases, presents an orderliness
of an essentially intelligible sort. In order to explain how the act
is possible, we are obliged to assign intelligent capacities to per-
sonality, and to regard the act itself as thoroughly intelligible.
5. Value . But, further, in order to understand why persons seek ends with
such universal solicitude as they do, we have had to infer that the
ends, when attained, are believed to bring satisfaction or to poajess
value. This value we have referred to the presence in the individual
act of those mental processes which the psychologist isolates and de-
scribes as affection or feeling. So general is the human tendency to
seek to multiply values, or the good in some form or another, that it
must be regarded as an essential mark of personality. A fundamental
feature of personality consists in activity which is of value to the
actor himself.
6. Self-deter- We have noticed also, that when a person acts with reference to
aination
.
an end which he fully and freely approves, we can apply the term,
self-determination , to this kind of achievement. This concept em-
phasizes still more clearly the importance of Intelli ;ence and pur-
pose and also brings before our attention two further aspects of the
personal act, namely, will and self-consciousness. The latter con-
cept has not been expounded, but will be treated below (1) in connec-
tion with the problem of self-knowledge.
7. Intellect , <Ie have laid tress in several places upon the
view that it is a
and feel - mistake to suppose that either intellect will, or feel
a a pri-
5T aiacy in personal ife, because these are distinctions, made from dif-
ferent standpoints, within an individual whole. To
aaaert, for ex-
ample, that personality is will is to elur over the
all-important fac-
tor of intelligence, and yet progress in clear thinking
it in no way
m advanced by identifying will with intelligence. The pereon la an
[Tj See below, pages 551 -5
.
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agent who wills, thinks, and feels, not successively, but all at
once, although at any particular itage of activity, one of these mo-
ments may preponderate. But in every personal act these three fac-
tors mutually penetrate or blend together in varying degrees. If we
s wish to retain the old terminology, we may say that in an act intel-
lect guides, will executes, and feelin^ evaluates, but this is so
abstract and misleading a mode of expression that it should be used
only with the greatest precautions.
The three moments mentioned in the preceding paragraph might be
brought together in a less objectionable form in the statement that
personality consists in the intelligent acts of an interested a^ent.
This serves very well as a concise definition of the meaning of per-
sonality which includes the main conceptual factors. If one realizes
how great are the verbal difficulties involved in stating, in a sin-
gle and well-balanced sentence, those various phases of a person
which we have studied in a successive, and, therefore, a relatively
abstract way, he will not expect too much of one summary statement
of the meaning of personality.
8. Final sum- In a fuller way, one may define personality as an agent who in-
aary , and def
i
- telligently determines his activities with reference to approved and
^Kpn of per - valued ends; this agent is unitary and identical or abiding, and his
aonality
.
successive activities constitute an organized teleological system
which presupposes, upon the part of the agent, memory, character, and
all the richness of the empirical self. The concept of personality,
then, means a rational and unitary agent who, acting out of aimself
in orderly and individual ways with reference to valuable and organized
ends which he has learned to approve, abides as the identical and im-
manent center or subject of a unique empirical self, constituted of a
varying wealth of proper psychical facts, and possessing conscious
unity and historical continuity. Any human individual or center of
finite experience who possesses t.;ese marks i6 a person or a person-
ality.
9. Comparison The nearest approach to or analogue of this definition of per-
with the def
i
- sonality is found in '.7. Stern's summary statement in his work, Person
ration of 77. una 3ache
.
He says: "A person is such an existent taat, in spite of
jtern
.
the plurality of his parte, he forms a real unity of a unique kind
and value, and as such, in spite of the multiplicity of his particular
functions, carries out a unified, purposive self-activity. A person
is a whole and something lore than ais parts. He is quality, not
quantity, and has individuality. He is active and spontaneous; and in
the realm of persons, there is inner causality. The person is teleo-
logical, and has ends and value in ard for himself." (1)
(1) Person und Sache, pages 17-18. "Ei;.e Person ist ein aolchee
Existierendes, das, trotz der Vielheit der Teile, cine reale, eigen-
artige and eigeiiwer tige Einheit bildet, and als aolcue, trota der
Vielheit der Teilfunktiouen, ein einheitliche, zielatrebige Selbat-
tHtigkeit vollDringt. Die Person ist ein Ganzes. Die Person ist et-
was ttber ihren Teilen. Die Person ist Qualitat, die Sache Quantitat.
Die Person ist aktiv (und spontan.). In der SpaHre der Peraonen
gibt ts inner KausalitHt (d. h. Wirkun des Oanzen auf Teile). Die
' Person ist teleologisch. Der Person hat Selbatzweck. Die Person
ist fttr such genommen Wert. "
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Y/hile the personal agent is not himself a presentation, within
the individual activity as a whole there are aspects which are pre-
sentative or phenomenal. These mark for the agent the progress of
his activity, and are the basis for a definition of his nature.
These psychical phenomena belonging to the agent make consistent and
meaningful the common assertion that a person is a unity in diver-
sity. 3o far as the order of tneae presentative factors depends
upon other conditions than the agent himself, the latter may be said
to be passive with reference to them, but a person is never wholly
passive; he is always active in some degree. Out of these presenta-
tional aspects of activity the agent may build a conception of an em-
pirical self which will be constituted of all those interests, pur-
poses, desires, conations, etc., which he has learned by experience
to value as his own, but which in every case- presuppose his agency
or subjectivity. The empirical self was included in our summary
definition of the concept of personality. This self would not include
ordinarily that objective content with Which he is in contact or
which he knov/s in cognitive acts, which he does not call his own, but
which is an aspect of his total experience. In general, personality
is to be identified with the subject of experience together with the
various activities which that subject carries out.
J. Ward's definition of a person may be noted in this connection.
"We call human beings persons when they talk intelligibly of lie and
Mine; when, that is, they have attained to the consciousness of Self
as continuously related to whatever affects them and whatever they
can affect. It is not the bare cognition of situations, but the cona-
tive attitude towards them, that primarily distinguishes one person
from another. . . Here being is always becoming, and development im-
plies progression as well a3 stability. His personality, then, will
not be 3hewn merely in what a man is but in what he is striving to be.
But to be personal, 'the ideal for which he strives must be his own,
must originate in himself—however impersonal its goal may be. These
two characteristics, stability as the basis of progression, and
originality in shaping its course, seem to be the two essentials of
any living personality." (1)
It is evident that the meaning of personality is not to be ex-
pressed in bodily terms, even in view of the fact that it is by means
of his body that a person acts and reacts with reference to his en"
vironment. One's body no doubt occupies a very "privileged position'
in relation to his personality, and the organic and kinesthetic sen-
sations may be interwoven in most intricate ways with the totality of
his individual acts, but to include his body, or any other physical
object, in his personality is to confuse the objects in which one ia
interested with those interests themselves.
A personality may be called a spirit with perfect appropriate-
ness, so that personality, in its higher stages of development, and
spirit are oractically equivalent. Spirit is especially fitting from
our point of view because, while it designates the subject of exper-
ience .
cation .
of intelligence and appreciation of values, of oelf-dc termination and
self-consciousness, of memory and moral purpose, whicn belong to per-
sonality, are the chief marks of spiritual being. The claim of per-
sonality to spirituality is especially justified because it is the
•oin an u ucBi ^wo — TJ3
, the customary meaning of it definitely precludes the identifi-
ta of that subject with anything corporeal. The characteristics
(1) Psychological Principles, page k6k.
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source of the highest human values, which fact explains why it is of
supreme worth, and ought always to be regarded as an end in itself.
This claim is also based upon the fact that personality is an achieve-
ment which consists in the unification of its activities with refer-
ence to some ideal selfhood or comprehensive plan. Further, the con-
scious unity of personality is of a unique kind, in no sense composed
of parts. The essential meaning, then, of spirituality is to be
found in the highest forms of personal activities as they have been
described. We have presented in this paragraph an indication of the
chief moments connoted by spirituality so as to preclude its identifi-
cation with anything occult or mysterious.
The various aspects of personal character may be reviewed from
the standpoint of their genesis; namely, according to whether or not
they arc due to conscious self-determination and choice, (a) In the
first place, there are activities and features of character which the
conscious person has determined or does determine for himself through
deliberation and conscious selection. These factors in his own per-
sonality which a man brings about by his own efforts we may call the
creative ones. In a real, though limited sense, a man creates his
own world of experience, and his personality is an artificial or manu-
factured, and not a natural product. 3. 3osanquet asserts that "a
true self is something to be made and won, to be held together with
pains and labour, not something given to be enjoyed." (1)
(b) In the second group of factors are those not so determined,
of which there are two classes, the natural and the historical or so-
cial. Here belong all the forces of heredity, environment, and his-
tory which go to determine any one's peculiar nature. In these forces
we recognize the gifts of nature and society which are integrated in
ore's total personality. Intercourse in a social community is very
important in molding both one's personality and his conception of him-
self. "The most potent of all means or self-rer.lisation is human so-
ciety." (2)
While the distinctive features of a man's personality are due to
the creative and social influences, yet when he comes to self-con-
sciousness and becomes a self-determining being by taking his destiny
more and more into his own hands, he finds himself in possession of a
heritage of instincts and emotions, as well as of agency and intelli-
gence, of which he knows he was not the creator, and which he learns
is not a gift of society; consequently he seeks their explanation in
nature or°in God. According to the genetic classification of person-
ality-factors which we have just noted, the two problems of personal
life might be what W. Stern calls self-preservation and self-unfold-
ment
. ( J
)
The point of emphasis in the above study of personality has been
that of purposive activity. The idea of such activity is central in
the concept of personality. The nature of a person is seen above all
in the ends which he approves and according to which, he directs his
action. The development of personality consists in acting with grow-
ing consistency with reference to ends that are more and more clearly
conceived and approved, and more and more fully organized both in
(1) The Principle of Individuality and Value, page 5J8.
(2) J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II,
page 2^6.
(5) Person und Sache, pa^es 169-7°.
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conception and character. A person oujnt not to say, "To thine own
self be true," until he has attained for himself a worthy system of
ends and active tendencies. The first duty of human beings is to
find out what they want, to criticize their desires in the light of
their best knowledge, and to act consistently with reference to
.those that are approved, "it is the essence ... of personality
*0 realize more and more fully the capacity and harmony of its na-
ture
.
" ( 1
)
It is probable that a study of persons that are said to be ab-
normal will not reveal any new principles of which the metaphysician
must take account in formulating a general conception of personality.
Direct support xxxxoxx for this proposition is to be found in the gen-
eral results of the investigations of K. Oesterreich as set forth in
his Die Phanomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen. The important
difference that abnormal conduct makes for the erratic individual him-
self and for society should not be assumed to be equally important in
determining the basic marks of normal personality, unless good warrant
for this assumption is forthcoming. If it is true that the experience
of abnormal persons is to be distinguished by either an incompleteness
or an exaggeration with respect to some of thefactors which constitute
normal persons, we should not expect an analysis of such experience to
yield new principles of significance for the interpretation of com-
plete and symmetrical personalities, although these differences, due
to incompleteness or exageration, may, by contrast, help the philosoph-
er in locating and determining the essential marks of normal personal-
ity. Abnormal persons are selves that have broken down in the very
act of constituting themselves, and by their deficiencies may indicate
to the observer what constitutes genuine personality. We have proposed
already a moral explanation of the assertion, sometimes made, that
several selves exist Y/ithin the total life of certain persons or un-
developed personalities. (2) Some reasons have thus been indicated
for the neglect of abnormal forms of self-experience in this investi-
gation.
I. THE REALITY OF PERSONALITY.
1 . Introuuctio
to 1 problem
of the reality
of personali ty
.
a. Personal
activity is
Been in the at-
tempt to solve
this problem,
and must surely
be included in
reality
.
n \7hoever can verify the above description of personality in his
own experience, by an act of some kind of intuitive recognition or
self-identification to which reference has been made, (j) will acknowl-
edge that he is in possession of a very insistent and important kind of
existence of which he would have to take cognizance if he attempted to
give a complete account of the real world. This account, if undertaken,
would grow out of one of the highest human interests, the interest in
truth and its attainment, and would involve numerous cycles, subordinate
to the unifying interest mentioned, of intelligent activities such as
have furnished all along the concrete material of our exposition. This
attainment would represent a rational construction carried out by a
particular person, or group of particular persons, of the special kind
called metaphysicians, and v.ould be based upon an interpretation of the
best samples of reality available to them. Whatever the character or
(1) E. N. Merrington, Problem of Personality, pa e 206.
(2) See above, page J16.
(5) See above, pages 160-164; below, page 556.
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content of a metaphysical system may be, the active work of intelli-
gent persons in building it certainly must not be overlooked, for such
a system itself is a product of one of the highest types of person-
al activity.
It is clear, then, that this ;:ind of personal activity, as well
as all others, must have a well established place in any metaphysical
system. The question which faces us now is, What is the place of
personal activity, or the concept of personality, in a theory of
reality? An answer to this question would seem to presuppose a
general metaphysics, the presentation of which is beyond the scope
of this investigation, but as a matter of fact it need not, for, as
I believe, the criterion of reality which it is one of the special
functions of metaphysics to furnish is derived from no other source
than personal activity itself, and reflection upon it. If this be-
lief is justified, our only task is to define in what sense a con-
crete person is real.
One fundamental justification for this belief lies in the fol-
lowing considerations. The metaphysical criterion which one adopts
must result, when applied to personal activity, in the inclusion of
the latter among real entities, for it is essential to the ideals
of metaphysical speculation to exclude nothing that is actual, least
of all such rich and significant facts as personalities. The cri-
terion of reality, then, must make a place for personality.
But when it is considered, first, that the metaphysician ob-
viously cannot go beyond his own experience in his search for a
criterion of reality, and, secondly, that his personal activities
are the most central and important, as well as the most highly in-
dividualized phases of his experience, and yet must be included in
reality, the necessity of finding the criterion of reality in per-
sonal activity itself becomes evident, and while this interpreta-
tion may lead to a general, metaphysics, the latter is not an es-
sential presupposition to a definition of the reality of person-
ality. (1)
Only the second of the considerations proposed in the last
paragraph might be challenged, and the challenge could be based,
in the nature of the case, only upon an appeal to some phase of
experience which has more marks of reality than personal activity.
Such an appeal is unfounded for the following reasons.
In the first place, no phase of experience can be found which
meets the requirements. If it is said, for example, that immediate
feeling is a better test of reality than personal activity, the
reasons for objection are the following! If immediate feeling is
taken to mean a simpler, less developed, or less individualized
experience than personal activity, clearly it cannot, by hypothesis,
become a test for the latter without mutilating it, and the meta-
physician is not permitted to mutilate experience to make it fit
his theories. It may be added that it is very probable that this
immediate feeling is an abstraction which a personal thinker makes
from his own experience. (2) In any event, it is inadequate as a
ft) fe have presented already some reasons why the explanatory
principles of personality must be derived from within personality
itself; see above, pages 291-292 and 175-177.
(2) Compare our criticism Of James immediatiu ~,
aU>vo, pa^ea
65-66.
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teat when applied to personality.
But if immediate feeling is taken to mean a more highly devel-
oped and individualized reality than personal experience, we ask,
How has one arrived at such a conception? The reply is, that one
has reached it by a high for i of personal intelligent activity it-
self. Hence, one has not escaped from personal activity as a cri-
terion of reality, but only has developed it further.
These considerations appear to annul, in part at least, the
well known argument of F. H. Bradley to the effect that the human
self is a contrediction and an appearance. (1) Let us briefly
examine his theory of the self. The question at issue is whether
or not a real self exists in human experience; Bradley gives a neg-
ative reply. One reason for this answer is that the a priori char-
acters which for him would mark real selfhood—a self-contained,
changeless, independent, self-complete, perfectly unified being
—
are so exalted that they are precluded in advance from existing in
finite human experience. The self that is present in that experi-
ence is an appearance in the light of this standard; the Absolute
alone is real.
Let us inquire how such a conclusion is possible for human
beings. The indispensable condition for discovering that my self
is unreal seems to be a personal acquaintance with something else
more real than that self is. This other magnitude, however, would
have to appear somewhere within my experience, else my comparative
judgment regarding the different degree of reality possessed by
the two factors would not be a function of human intelligence.
Bradley himself declares that, "The Reality certainly must appear
within my psychical existence." (2)
The further and crucial question, then, is whether that more
perfect form of my experience which leads me to declare that the
Absolute is real and myself apparent is different from the self.
Bradley holds that this superior variety of experience, namely
that of "the immediate feeling" of a "finite center of experience,"
is distinct from the self, for he asserts that, "A self is not the
same as such a ceitre of experience. . . From i:amediate experience
the self emerges, and is set apart by a distinction." (J)
Now we may acknowledge that the distinction between the con-
ceptual self and immediate experience is a possible and useful one,
but a fundamental mistake of Bradley lies in supposing that the
latter is significant or existent, so far as normal human life is
concerned, apart from an active and personal subject. He seems to
admit as much when he says that, "It is true that all I experience'
is my state—so far as I experience it." (4) It is probable that
immediate feeling is an abstraction when considered apart from a
conscious subject. E. K. Merrington maintains that, "The use of
these impersonal concepts is at the basis of his grand mistake in
setting up Experience as Reality, while the Subject involved in all
experience is shut into the outer darkness of 'appearance.'" (5)
(1) Appearance and Reality, chapters IX aad X.
(2) Ibid., page 259.
(5) Ibid., page 524.
(A) The Problem of Personality, page 42.
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But if this immediate experience is abstract and non-existent apart
from an experiencing self, the latter certainly cannot be consistent-
ly condemned as unreal by comparison with the former. If "the self
is the highest form of experience," as Bradley acknowledges that it
is, (1) how is it possible to find a higher form by which to con-
demn the self to appearance? Our fundamental objection, then, to
Bradley's course of argument is that the experience which he takes
as a sample of reality is itself conditioned by the active subject
or self, and cannot, therefore, be used to push the latter into the
realm of illusion.
Only one final point can be noted in connection with Bradley's
affirmation that the self is an appearance because it contains dis-
tinctions or divisions within itself, and is, therefore, contradic-
tory. Here as above much evidence that could be produced must be
omitted. An examination of the presuppositions present in the
actual use of the principle of consistency will, I believe, reveal
the inherent weakness of his argument as applied to the self. If
the self is an appearance, it must of course be an appearance to
someone, and at any rate to us who thus philosophize; that is, we
must feel the contradictions which are said to be present in the
concept of the self. But how can we feel and condemn them unless
we already are acquainted with some kind of consistent ana har-
monious development of experience? In other words, the demand for
a consistent reality is not merely an acstract formula, but it is
also an expression of one of the deepest factors of the human self,
namely, its essential and original unity, its love of harmony, and
its capacity to produce it within its experience.
The emotional satisfactions and dissatisfactions present in
consistent and contradictory thinking, in addition to the unifying
and active 7/0 rk of the self, have not been adequately recognized or
treated in logical discussions. A notable attempt to correlate
passion and thinking in the pursuit of truth has been made by H.
Sturt in his "Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of Personal
Idealism," the main title of which book is, The Principles of the
Understanding . We have seen already that an important service of
pragmatism has been to emphasize the importance of concrete and
personal satisfactions in the verification Of our ideas. (2) In
short, the active personality is not only the source of the cri-
terion of consistency, but is also a condition of its application.
Any doctrine, therefore, that claims to make the self an ap-
pearance is likely to suffer from the fundamental circle in reason-
ing to which attention has been called in the preceding paragraphs.
The argument of such an attempt would conform to the following
general type: the self is appearance because the conception of it
is inconsistent with something else in one's experience which is
regarded as more real; but it is precisely the real self wnich
mediates this agreement (or disagreement), and demands it; and that
which alone establishes the test of the real cunnot itself be
treated as unreal without turning topsy-turvy the rational universe,
and without ending in violating the principle of consistency which
(1) Appearance and Reality, pages 1 1 y- 1 2C
.
(2) See above, page 16.
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was at first adopted as criterion. This statement means that any
assertion of reality must rest upon the rational activity of the hu-
man thinker, v/hich cannot be denied without affirming it. To prove
that a certain conception of the self is inconsistent does not
prove unreal that real self which is the source of the demand for a
consistent conception of itself and which provides, in some aspects
of its experiences, the criterion by whicn so^e ideas 01 itselr may
be tested and found wanting.
What has been said about the denial of the reality of person-
ality by comparison with immediate feeling woula apply to otaer at-
tempts to find the criterion of reality in so.^e ^uiaae of experience
other than personal activity. The fundamental point is that such
criteria either would be abstractions which could not ;ueet the re-
quirement or would be merely varied forms of personal activity it-
self.
The latter idea may be stated in another form by saying that the
thinker who attempts to give personality an inferior grade of reality
does so, it must be supposed, upon the ground that he is acquainted
with a superior grade, but one may fairly demand that he indicate
what this superior grade is if it is not an unrecognized kind or de-
velopment of that very personal activity which he ie subordinating.
It may be concluded that the endeavor to deny the reality of
personality assumes and reaffirms that reality, and that we cannot
escape the need of interpreting reality in terms of the highest form
of experience which we have, namely, personal activities, for it is
among these that we find the most exalted and complete forms of ex-
perience which human beings have. Personal activity is the one thing
from which there is no possibility of escape, for escape itself is a
kind of activity. Ie may, therefore, lay it down as a general rule
that it is both futile and presumptuous for the human metaphysician
to attempt to find a more perfect criterion of reality than that
highest form of^experience which he rinds in his own personal activi-
ties
.
In the examination of the theories of James (1) and Perry (k)
and of the energetic and behavioristic theories of mental activity
(5), there were set forth in detail reasons for the failure to ex-
plain personal experience in terms of something other than itself.
It goes without saying that reality cannot be found in intellect,
will, and feeling, if these are properly regarded as the abstractions
that we have tried to show them to be. (4) Our justification, tnen,
for discussing the meaning of the reality of personality apart from a
complete metaphysical theory seems to be well supported.
The mark of reality which seems best to meet the facts with
respect to personality is a very simple one. The' reality of person-
ality consists in that intelligent ^ur t>osive activity which has oeen
described in detail. A person is real when he acts so ae to achieve
a purpose.
This is no new criterion of reality, but is familiar to readers
of Bowne (5), ward, and Ladd, and many others. »e con accent also
(1) See above, pages 6^-71: criticism of hie neutral monism.
(2) See above, ' ,>ages 106-7, criticism of some phases of
the neo-realistic theory of consciousness.
(5) See above, pages 1^4-211.
(4) See above, pages 28^-^1, 2^C-1 . 524-5.
(5) See aoove, page 148.
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Jaraea 1 two particular statements of now true samples of reality
are to be found in personal experience. (1) One cannot sacrifice
truth to originality. W. R. Sorley also asserts that, "It is the
nature of the self to act." (2) As H. Lotze would say, it is "in
the middle point of the workings which it executes or fulfils" that
we find the reality or the spirit. (5) J. >Vard points out that,
"The subject is_ only as it is active." (4) We do not make any im-
portant distinction between the reality, the being, and the exis-
tence of personality. J. ward also affirms that, "It must surely
ever remain futile, nay, even foolish, to attempt to explain either
receptivity or activity; for what is there in experience more fun-
damental? And being thus fundamental, the prime staple of all ex-
perience, it is absurd to seek to prove them real, since in the
first and foremost sense of reailty the real and they are one." (5)
In a typical personal activity, then, presupposing a unitary
agent, we find reality in as perfect a form as we human beings can
experience it. To point out some reatures of this criterion of
reality would mean to review the main characteristics of personal ac-
tivity as they have been expounded above, but it may be worth wnile
to do this briefly from the new point of View. In other words, from
a study of personal activity we may deduce aoae of the marks of real-
ity; they are as follows:
(a) This criterion is a dynamic one. Only an agent that acts
is real. Tais fact that an agent is operative or a working principle
in the world is the presupposition of a further characteristic, name-
ly, that the agent may also be acted upon, oince we are attempting
to present in order some of the marks of the real, we cannot avoid
using abstractions. In view of this fact, there is no serious ob-
jection to speaking of this first criterion of the real in terms of
the volitional.
(b) It is also a teleolo^ical criterion, for purposive direc-
tion, meaning, the realization of ends,— these are characteristic of
reality as exemplified in the personal act. In this act, in complete
form, the ideal becomes actual, and the reality of the person con-
sists in the realization of the ends which he values, we must find
the perfection of personality in the unity of its development and its
system of ends, and not in any static completeness, even supposing
that to be present. In the real personal act, tin- is created, but
the agent himself is permanent or identical.
(c) Closely associated with the latter characttris tic is the
axio logical one. The presence of values is ir.extr xcuuly bound up
with the real at the personal level. We may distinguish in thought,
if we like, between existence and value, but these two features are
inseparable in that which is concretely and personally real. It may
be, of course, that there are lower levels of the real, such as phys-
ical things, for example, where the etiological mark is absent.
If personal development exhibits an increase in vulue-experience
the original incompleteness as coupared with tne later stage must
not be mistaken for a contradiction in the essential nature of person
;ages 27-6.(1 ) See aDo /e,
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God, page Wd.
(5) Medi'cinische Psychologic Section 152.
(4) Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II, page 245.
(5) Ibid., page 55-
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ality, but should be interpreted rather as a striking expression of
what may be called its axiological reason, namely, of that perfect-
ly inteiligicle movement in personal experience which makes for the
maintenance or increase of the good ths.t is appreciated. Since
personal life is essentially a development, one does not expect a
person to possess at once the total values of his lifetime, for that
would contradict the fundamental nature of personal activity. On
the contrary, the human person finds his reality in tne quest for
and development of values. The iact that a person does not now
possess ail the values he expects some time to possess, in no wise
destroys for him the significance of his present values, but even
enhances it. The very effort of the agent to overcome his axiologi-
cal incompleteness is an evidence for and not against his reality,
for the real is dynamic and purposive.
(d) A fourth mark of the real as illustrated in personal activi-
ty is intelligence or rationality. The following considerations in-
dicate, in part, the importance of intelligence in a real act. The
meaning of a typical personal act is not exhausted for the agent him-
self in its actual or empirical phases, for it is set in a much
larger world. Tais setting consists in its relation both to a more
remote purpose or larger system of ends present to the agent, and to
the environment which must be met in the achievement of the momentary
purpose. How, a personal act is intelligent in the sense that the
agent himselr consciously understands some of these wider bearings
of it. The act as a whole is intelligible in the sense that its
various aspects may be known by the agent when he is interested in
reflecting upon its nature.
But we cannot too carefully avoid the mistake of finding the
real in the consciousness of these ideal relations alone, for if this
consciousness is not an abstract phase of a concrete personal activi-
ty, it is itself such an activity. The consciousness of thet>e v^id^r
relations does not make tne ^eraon an adjective ox the universe, out
an intelligent actor in it. In ether ..or^s, to say tnat personal
reality is intelligent does not exhaust itu meaning, u..itss trie term
is used as equivalent to personality itBelr, but that adjective ao^s
emphasize a fundamental feature ox it. Unless an act is in some
measure articulate in the experience of the agent hiaself, it is not
of a personal kind, and represents a low and ouscure form ox exper-
ience. Reflection u^on the nature of a personal act brings to light
various factors or immanent principles of whic.i the agent at the
moment of acting may not be aware in their entirety, but which may
be made explicit. However, not only intelligiole relation, but
value, permeates the' personal act, and it is not reducible to purely
intellective terms. In a personal activity developed to a conclu-
sion whicn is satisfying in the light of its original goal we have
in concrete form that mark of consistency or non-contradic tion wuicn
is sometimes put in the first rank among the criteria of the real.
(e) A very general and comprehensive characteristic of this
criterion is the individuality which it empnasizea. The personal
act is a whole unified uy a purpose. Its several leaturee cunnot be
regarded as parts in any mechanical sense, but only as phases or as-
pects of an original whole. The concept of compound cycles of ac-
tivity illustrates how the idea of individuality may oe greutly ex-
tended, but this extension does not introduce ue to new principles
or criteria of the real. The criterion of individuality leads us to
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expect that some of the mentioned marks of the real will overlap,
to some extent, for they represent mutually penetrating qualities
of a concrete act; the mark of individuality calls attention to
this peculiar diversity in unity. Hence, any one of the designated
characters of the real, taken by itself, would be insufficient,
for our main contention has been precisely that it is only in that
marvelously unified whole of the individual personal act that we
find reality in the highest form accessible to us human beings.
Consequently, if individuality is taken to include in its
meaning the dynamic, teleological
,
axiological, and intelligible
aspects of a concrete activity, there is no objection to finding •
the real in the individual in this sense. The view that the real
is found only in the cosmic individual whole is only a reflection
of that individuality of the personal act to which attention has
been called and which the metaphysician adopts as a comprehensive
criterion of the real, and when this principle, therefore, is used
to deny the reality of the human person the philosopher is circling
in a world of abstraction.
1'. Personal This conception of the criterion of the real is characteristic
idealism. of personal idealism, which finds the ultimate principles for the
explanation of reality and of knowledge in personality as an indiv-
idual, and in this respect stands in contrast to those who attempt
to interpret reality exclusively in terms of reason, will, feeling,
imagination, or some other abstraction from the concrete personal
act. Personality is a unique source and center of intelligent ac-
tivities which are its very own, and waich the agent knows from
within; while he may distinguish phases within his activity, yet
reality for him is found, not in any one of the phases or aspects
taken by itself, but in the unique and total act.
A. Is person- A very ancient question with reference to the soul is whether
ality subs tan- or not it is a substance or substantial. The answer to thie ..ues -
tial ? tion depends entirely upon what meaning of substance one has in
mind. In any case, personal experience itself seems to be the
a. The ori- source of the category, and to give to it its original meaning,
gin of the It may be applied to objective things, and its personal origin
category of forgotten, but whether or not the latter happens, it is personality
eubstance in which explains substance, and not substance which throw* light upon
the personal personality. We must not expect the substantiality, the permanence,
act. or the identity which we introduce into objects in order to under-
stand them, to help us in explaining ourselves.
The osychological steps in the development of the idea of
substance are described very well by J. Ward. (1) "(a) The unity
and permanence more or less characteristic of what are entitled to
be called things, and (b) this distinction between the things and
their prooerties" are the subjecttive factors in substance. The
source ana oaradigm of the first definition is, we believe, to be
found in our personality; and here we begin by assimilating the
external objects with Whicb we interact to this: we personify
them, that is to say. But the second is to be traced immediately
to the subsequent objective analysis of these things, as already
described: here we end by assimilating ourselves to them as a
something which is the support of qualities* that is to say we
^
K 'reify' ourselves. Hence the materialism of primitive thought.
(1) Psychological Principles, ?ege 5J6.
I
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V.'e have long ago abandoned the hope of learning about ourselves
by analogies derived from physical things. Taus tne origin of
the category of substance must De tae personal act itseii
.
If it is true that the genesis of the idea of substance is
to be found in personal experience, we shall fall into a circle
of reasoning, or lose ourselves in the thin air of abstractions,
in attempting to conceive some kind of spiritual substance to
which personality is to be referred for explanation. If, however,
we avoid this enticing procedure, our sole task will consist in
pointing out what there is, if anything, in personal experience
which may be designated substantial. Doe3 speaking of a personal-
ity as substantial add to our list of its characteristics?
The answer probably is negative. The idea of substance mere-
ly emphasizes some marks that have been mentioned already, and,
in doing so, it may be a term of some use. That to which it es-
pecially calls attention is the permanent and unitary character-
istic of personality as a reality. To hold, as Bowne does, that
personality is a substance in the sense that it acts and is acted
upon not only does violence to the usual meaning of substance, but
makes it identical with reality, and, therefore, redundant. How-
ever, one may very properly speak of personality as a substance in
the sense of being an abiding and unitary reality, but since a
person as a whole is not always tiae same, but only the agent is
identical and permanent, one strictly ought to speak only of the
latter as a substance. In that case, as E. 3. Brightman has very
well suggested, one might consider the empirical self to be the
system of attributes belonging to the substantial agent, provided
one did not try to imagine the latter to be some kind of core or
substratum in which the attributes inhere. If the reflective self
wishes to make use, in this sense, of this category of substance
which he creates, no serious objection may be raised. We must re-
main however, close to the Kantian view of substance as that
which is oermanent through change as the primary meaning of that
concept when it is used in the interpretation of personality.
The substance of a person is found in this, that he self-con-
sciously endures in the midst of his cycles of activity.
But in any case, if we speak of personality as being
substan-
tial we mean to refer to experiential characteristics
and not to
some princi ,le or substratum underlying or supporting
it. A se-
quent and ancient meaning of substance is that of
a supporting
subject in which attributes or powers inhere It is ujmecessary
to examine this erroneous notion after Bowne V*!! «Tn^ard
cism of it in his Metaphysics . (1) It is a misleading
and awto.ard
expression for the fact that the person is an a^idin^
^entwao
acts in various directions and may know himself
to be the source
of his acts. The most important pair of terms Ln
connection with
personality is that of agent and his functions
and not "bstancs
and its attributes. The two former ore names
for fundamental ais
tinguishable aspects of every concrete personal
act
J. Hard points out that, "It is not
proposed to explain psy
chical facts by assuming a faculty beyond them.
All that
(1) James
theory may well
statement and criticism of
be recalled at this point;
40-42

550
2' , In v/hat
sense a person
has attributes .
e. Elements
of truth in
substance as
applied to
personality
.
is that in every psychical fact there is a subject attending)
not that beyond these acts of attending there is a potential at-
tention. The subject is not regarded as merely capable of atten-
tion and as attending, when it chances to attend, by means of an
appropriate faculty; but it only is an actual subject as it ac-
tually attends." (1
)
A person may be said to have attributes in the sense that the
agent grounding his experience is found, upon analysis, to be the
owner or center of a diversified empirical self. The conception
of attributes, applied in this way, stresses the fact that a per-
son maintains his essential unity and identity in the midst of
multiform activities; this use does not imply the correlation of
personality with any transcendent soul-substance. 7,'hen we refer
to the goodness of a man, we do not mean to say that he is some
kind of inert substance which has a certain quality, but we intend
to express the fact, which we have learned to know, that he has
acted* and may be expected to act in definite ways under particular
circumstances. In the light of remembered history, one may say
he has the capacity to act appropriately in diverse situations,
but thi3 statement is an ideal expression of the possibility of ac-
tivity in view of the known past; so that we return here to that
idea of permanence, which is the fundamental meaidng of substance,
and a basic feature of personality.
A. Aliotta declares that "when we speak of the identity of
the Ego , we do not mean to reduce the mind to an empty, motionless
unity, incapable of variation or development, but merely wish to
say that the activity of the Ego in the various phases of its evo-
lution first feels directly and then reflectively recognizes in
itself a characteristic and constant physiognomy which justifies
it in regarding itself as a substance. Tnose who dispute the sub-
stantiality of° the Ego have formed a false concept of substance,
one derived from the abstract materialistic conception of the
atom, regarded as a thing which is inert and rigid in its absolute
identity" If the substantiality of the Ego were of this nature, I
should have no hesitation in acknowledging it to be a pure fic-
tion." (2)
One element of truth in the notion of spiritual suostance,
that is of substance used in the above defined sense in the inter-
pretation of personality, consists in its emphasis upon personality
as a reality which is more permanent than the various mental pro-
cesses that mark the achievement of individual acts, and which is
the ground or foundation of the mental operations themselves.
Another element of worth in the idea of substance is tnat it
points
out that a person is not the attribute or property of anything
else but is a self-determining center of experience—a unique,
individual, self-conscious existent. Whatever the origin of
a
person may be, whenev r he exists, his existence is
demonstrated
by the fact that he is a persistent and spontaneous actor.
(1) Mr. F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind,
Mind, 0. S.,
XII, 1627, P^e 571. .
(2) The Idealistic Reaction Against Science,
pa^e hi*.
1
.
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J. THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-CON3CIOU3NE35
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We have found that a person is an actor, an agent actually,
purposively, intelligently at work in his world; we may call such
an acting agent an actual person. At any moment a person^s inter-
est and activity is absorbed in the performance of a single act,
for it is probable that human beings can execute only one act at a
time, of a typical or complete form. But we cannot be convinced
that the whole meaning of a person is to be found in his momentary
act. Surely the span of human attention is too narrow to contain
within itself the total significance of an individual personality.
We must look beyond the actual person, the actor of the moment.
And yet while we try to extend our view of personality beyond this
momentary actor, we. must not forget that he. is the key to all
other forms of personality.
A person, then, so long as he exists, is constantly acting,
and his history is a series of individual acts. Only one act,
however, in his whole biographical series is actual, and all the
others must be ideal. But the activities which he knows he has
already performed, as well as those he intends to perform in view
of his accepted purposes, constitute a system which he understands
as his own biography, and which we may call his conceptual or
ideal personality. The conception of personality is formed in the
same way as other conceptions, save, as already explained above (1),
that the elements involved in it are an explication of the imma-
nent principles of one's personal activity itself. Tais concep-
tual person is rooted and grounded in the actual person through
whose activities it has been constructed gradually.
Only a very limited phase of the conceptual person is in-
cluded in the real person as above defined, for while the person
acts at the moment with reference to a certain system of ends, and
while such an action is an expression of his whole past, yet not
all of the active contents of his past nor his prospective purposes
are consciously present to him; indeed, only a very meager part of
them are so present, however much his momentary act may be an in-
tegrated part of his total biography as he reviews it in the course
of reflection. So far as the intelligent person builds up a con-
ceptual or ideal self which he regards as his own, he extends his
actual self very greatly, and will properly regard his real self
as being made up of both his actual and his ideal selves, which,
indeed, are only two phases of his complete personal life as he
lives it out in an intelligent way. Now, in the effort to define
the relation between the actual and the ideal personality of a man,
we meet the problem of self-knowledge, the problem of explaining
in what sense I know my own personality.
For a person to ask, not only what he is, but how he knows
what he is/ seems to presuppose a high degree of self-consciousness
.
We cannot answer intelligently the question concerning the nature
of self-knowledge until wc define the meaning of self-consciousness
in connection with personal life. In order to avoid cumbersome ex-
pressions in the following discussion, we shall regard the word
self in the phrases, self-knowled, e and self-couuciousness . as e-
quivalent to personality , and this will be justified, for, when
these experiences appear, the primitive self has become sufficient-
(1) See above, pages 177-S.
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ly developed to be properly called a person. We have considered
how Bowne makes self-consciousness one of the central features of
his theory of personality. His account may be recalled with
profit at this place. (1)
Self-consciousness may mean one's own awareness either of his
actual- or of his ideal personality, or both. Y.re shall take it to
mean both, and this usage is practically equivalent to that of
Bowne. Self-knowledge will refer to one's understanding of his
ideal or conceptual personality, but excludes the awareness or the
immediate experience which attaches to his actual personality; the
latter we shall call personal or self-experience. The reason for
excluding this personal experience from self-knowledge takes us
into the heart of the problem of knowing what we are, and indicates
that it is improper to speak of self-knowledge concerning the ac-
tual person.
It has been essential to the argument of this investigation
to base all interpretations of personality upon particular activi-
ties or concrete acts. In these the individual person or agent is
working out his destiny, seeking the ends he values, and adjusting
himself to a vast world with which he interacts, and all this is
more or less consciously done. Now, since such cycles of activity-
experiences constitute the real person, we are fully justified in
calling them personal or self-experiences, and since they are also
conscious, they are properly called one form of self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness, in this lower form, means the conscious
experience of a personal agent in the midst of performing such
acts as we have described; it means his awareness of the individ-
ual activity-situation, of the worthful end he is seeking, and of
the stages in its realization. Self-consciousness, in this senue,
is a general aspect which we may abstract from every concrete,
self-determined activity; it consists in the fact that the subject
is aware of the actual motive, initiation, and progress of a con-
crete act, and approves it. Self-consciousness, considered from
this point of view, is really identical with that intuitive or im-
mediate awareness of his activities upon the part of an agent
which has been described in connection with personalis tic method.
(2)
The usage explained in the last paragraph is somewhat mislead-
ing. It would make for clearness if we reserved self-cons ciouaness
for the higher form of self-knowledge where the subject refers his
various activities to a conception of himself which he has con-
structed, and if we adopted the phrase, self-ex jerience
.
for the
kind of experience here in question, namely, a subject's experience
of actually acting with reference to a particular end. Self-exper-
ience means the experience of the actual person at work, and pre-
cedes that reflective knowledge where he becomes conscious of the
fact that he acts in this way and in that. In short, self-exper-
ience is merely the name for the concrete activity-experience as we
have described it, involving a conscious agent actin teleological-
ly, and no thing further needs to be seid about it, save that it is
the "raw material," as Bowne said, out of whic.i the agent con-
structs his conceptual personality.
(1) See above, pages 126-9; 152-5,
(2) See above, pages 150-2.
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It is In connection with the higher form of self-conscious-
ness, namely, self-knowled :e, that the epistemological problem of
personality appears. The existence of such knowledge, which in-
cludes much more than the actual
.
ersonal experience of the moment,
has been suggested on several occasions, especially in connection
with the concepts of purposiveness, activity-cycles, and moral
values, where an act occupies a significant place in a wide system
of ideal ends and memories which the agent owns and esteems. (1)
Since we have found that the degree to which purposes are organized
varies greatly from person to person, we may distinguish between
two chief varieties of self-knowledge: common sense and critical
self-knowledge
.
The first is the ordinary self-knowledge which the
man of the street possesses in so far as he knows what his desires
are; the second is. the reflective self-knowledge of the critical
philosopher. These represent two degrees, although important ones,
in the organization or unification of an individual's activities.
Since some degree of self-knowledge is characteristic of per-
sonality, self-consciousness , in both its lower and higher forms,
is a mark of personality. This concept of self-consciousness,
however, adds no new moment to the idea of personality a6 already
worked out. The highest forms of self-knowledge were included
above in out study of the organization of personal values. (2)
Many difficulties and doubts have been associated in the his-
tory of thought with that phase of self-consciousness called self-
knowledge, for it has been both affirmed and denied that knowledge
of personality is possible. Me shall now try to explain our rea-
sons for taking a middle position: for affirming it in one sense,
and denying it in another.
The one phase of my personality which cannot become an object
of knowledge is the acting agent himself. The reason is that such
an act of knowledge, if possible, would itself depend upon the ac-
tion of the agent himself, and the agent known could no longer be
the active agent, unless my real agency divided itself. In that
case, however, I should have become two personalities, and have only
pushed the problem cf per sonality-knowl edge, unsolved, one step
further back. The fundamental point is that one activity cannot
know itself in its totality, for to know an activity as my activi-
ty requires that the agent in the act of knowing should be identi-
cal with the agent in the activity known. But since I cannot act
in two ways at the same time, this identity is destroyed, if I try
to know the agent in a previous act of mine as the real agent dis-
tinct from the real agent in the present act of knowing. Thi3 ar-
gument need not be extended here, for the whole situation has been
considered at length before, in connection with the problem of
knowing the agent, the second implication of activity. (5)
There are various reasons why this inability to know the
agent in the sense explained does not trouble me. (a) In the firBt
place, I am much more interested in maintaining my identity in the
series of my activities than in demonstrating the possibility of
an illusory knowledge of present agency.
(1) See above, pages 226, 255-6, 264-8, 27C-2Q4, J02-6,
514-15.
(2) See especially pages 514-5, above.
C5)See above, pages 2J8-242.
i
(b) I find, after all, that the demand to know present agency
is really an artificial one, since agency is an abstraction de-
rived from a concrete activity with the performance of which I am
exceedingly familiar, and is a fact which I experience, not that
of which I have- experience. I know that I continually act in one
way or another. How do I know this? First, I know it because of
the effects of my acts, because of their efficacy in transforming
my experience, or in bringing satisfaction or disappointment. Fur-
thermore, in a present act of recollection or retrospection, I re-
me.aber the phenomenal phases of an act just finished— the purpose
which I sought, the developing stages of its realization, and its
total sen:;e of worth to me. Indeed, my personal activity is in-
telligible to me precisely because I, an identical agent, know that
I have acted and can act in various ways, and. because I become
aware of the consequences of my numerous activities without losing
my own permanence in so doing, or without leaving or exhausting
myself in a single act.
(c) In the third place, I do have, indeed, an immediate exper-
ience, not o_f my agency by itself, but of consciously and actually
acting, (1) and I am as certain of this experience as I am certain
of the purposes I carry out and of the values I esteem. My capa-
city to act in moral, ways convinces me beyond doubt of the efficacy
of my agency. Tilth this I am content for the simple reason that I
have no difficulty in recognizing my various interests, ends, and
values as my own, including the interest in knowing the agent. In
knowing all these interests as determinants of my activities, I
know -my fundamental self, and am satisfied. And if I should devel-
op some new interest in an immediate experience of activity, I may
know that also, if I choose, in the next act.
(d) Again, the demand that I know my present agency as an ob-
ject presupposes the instantaneous identification of knowing an
activity with realizing it, the momentary equivalent of seeking
and knowing that I seek. But since I am one, and cannot act in
two ways at the same time, I must choose between a concrete activi-
ty directed toward the attainment of a purpose, and my knowledge
of such an activity. The choice is determined entirely by the
momentary purpose which dominates me. If I wish to know the nature
of my activities, then I will proceed in active thought to gain
that end, and may therein carry out a cycle of concrete activities.
But I may choose, on the other hand, to act with reference to some
other end than that of truth- seeking, and in so acting perform
another series of concrete activities. But the knowing series is
a different one than the second series referred to, let us say,
the practical series. If the knowing series is directed to the
latter, the content of the attained knowledge of it will lack, to
a greater or less extent, the experiential richness 01 the prac-
tical series as it was concretely realized. The variation in
richness is due, in large part, to the amount of time that has e-
lapsed. The nearer the act of knowing iB to the act that is
known, the more perfect is the knowledge. I may know an act im-
mediately preceding my present one with a very high degree of com-
~~
( 1 ) The great verbal difficulties involved in expressing the
facts in the case, to which attention has been called, need to be
considered here again; see above, page 177.
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pleteness, with the exception, ever to be noted, that the acting
agent himself is never past, but always present; I have no desire
to leave ray agency entirely in the past, unless I wish to get rid
of my life altogether. In conclusion, I may say that I may know
any act in the next moment, if I choose, by means of another con-
crete act, and thereby I demonstrate my capacity for permanent
existence and self-determination.
(e) The fact that I cannot know the present agent, the agent
acting in a momentary way, does not trouble me when I have before
me the countless modes in which I, the agent, have acted berore,
and v/hen I may include, in the next moment, tne present act in tne
accumulated multitude. This very multitude waicii expresses my
personal history would itseir lose significance for me if I should
surrender or could surrender my own agency.
(r) Tne demand that the acting subject snoula oecome an ob-
ject of knowledge would, if fulfilled, simply make our language
topsy-turvy by confusing tae subject and object in a momentary act
of knowing, ana would ieaa only to ambiguities and confusions in
the use of words and in thinking.
I can affirm knowledge or my personality in the sense that I
have no ani'icuity in knowing that I have acted in manifold ways
in the past, and that i expect in the future to act witn reierence
to certain purposes. I recognize myself as the identical agent
which has performed many activity-cycles wnich I can l ememoer and
which I nave valued. From this series I learn much about my capa-
cities for activity, and about tno3e of my purposes wnich exper-
ience has clarified. Upon the basis of tnis knowledge, I ouild a
conception of myself which contains at least tnese important lac-
tors: the capacity to act in various ways which has oeen learned
from past experience, and one or more systems of purposes which I
have organized and which I esteem.
Ii I am to be more than a single act, I must maintain my iden-
tity through a series of acts. These successive acts ..iay diifer
greatly in their individualities, but all alike are grounded in the
same agent, if they belong to one personal history. Out of the
numerous activities which I coniirm as my own, I build the concep-
tual personality, which, again, is. the -rouuet of or grounded in
the same agent as peri'ormed the original acts out of which it is
constructed. ..e need no demonstration that we are more than the
conceptual or ideal selves thus built up, for the very construc-
tion of them has grown out of an immediate experience of ourselves
as active and interested. A personal agent is the owner and cen-
ter of an historical wealth of psychical facts whicn we ha^e
called the empirical self. Bowne asserts that, "Actually . . .
it is the self that thinks and feels and wills, and in this ac-
tivity experiences and knows itself as the active and abiding
subject of this inner life.." (1)
One of the most illuminating of modern theories of ki;owledge
bearing upon the self is to be found in J. Royce 'a "self-repre-
sentative system." According to this view, while the ideal self
is constituted of a series of distinct acts, the wnole system may
be "precisely represented by a proper fraction of itself. (2)
(1) l/letaphysics, page 550
.
(2) The 'World and the Individual, vol. I, ^age 509.
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Such a portion or fraction would be an individual activity, as
above described. Such a personal act makes the whole nature of
personality intelligible, and without it, the latter would ue
meaningless. Royce says, "And, indeea, if tae uelr is anything
y final at all, it is certainly in its complete expression (although
of course not in our own psychological life from instant to in-
stant ) a self-representati ve system; and its metaphysical fate
stands or falls with the possibility of such systems." (1)
He says further, "But, from our point of view, the world of a
Self, whatever continuity of internal structure it may in some as-
pects possess, is in its principal form of expression embodi ed in
a discrete series of acts
,
of individual expressions , of stages of
s elf-representation and of self- revelation . \ie cannot here re-
peat the argument by which this result was reac.ied in the Essay in
question. But experience at any moment shows how I am conscious
of my own deeds, of my progress, of my acts of attention, and of
my approaches to selfhood in any way, in the form of a discrete
series
.
in which one sta-.e or act of life is followed by the ..ext .
The principle of my li^e, as I come to myself, and, knowing what I
want, proceed to do it, is a principle winning novelty through Re-
currence
.
Again and again , I proceed, fjrom one act to the next,
and so always to new acts. But neither an interpolation of deeds
between my own deeds, nor yet a consciousness of unbroken contin-
uity in my own acts, would help me to understand myself." (2)
As the result of an enlarging series of personal acts, I am
able to expand the conception of my personality, and I aave no
practical difficulty in knowing my own personality for the reason
that I find nothing in any particular act,—which, as a whole, is
a fact of my immediate experience,—and nothing in my activity-
cycles, v/hich prevents my understanding one act in the next, if I
so desire. In this capacity for the performance of an indefinite
number of acts is manifested my personality. Instead of losing
myself in an ixifinite regress, I find myself in an infinite pro-
gression, and become thoroughly intelligible to myself; I find my-
self to be an active, permanent, and free personality
.
5'. I exper- So far as the problem of knowing personality is concerned, the
ience myself as ultimate and satisfying fact is that I experience myself as acting,
acting and this now in this and now in that direction, and that I may construct as
makes my per- complete a system as I please upon the oasis of these acta and
sonality intel- their included purposes. The former fact is called self-ex^er-
ligible to me. ience or personal activity, and the latter is called self-knowl-
edge; together they constitute my self-consciousnees . The former
experience is my actual personality, which gives most of the mean-
ing and significance to my complete self; these two constitute an
intimate unity which we have called the real personality. This
unity is based upon the fact that I may recognize the purpose
which I realize in a momentary act as the living phase of that i-
deal self which I am seeking gradually to realize as conditions
permi t
.
I recognize my finitude in the double limi tr-tions set upon
the scope of my activities: first, the limitations set upon me
(1) Tne V/orld and the Individual, vol. I, page 515.
(2) Ibid., vol. II, pages 1o>6.
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by the varying tractability oi the world in wnich I must act;
and, secondly, the limitations due to the fact that I am confined,
at any instant, to a single act. But in this one act, Where I
experience activity immediately, where I actually seek an end, my
own nature becomes revealed to me. The whole series of activities
which constitutes my biography and my conceptual self becomes in-
telligible to me by reason of this one which is ever present in
immediate experience.
It ia clear, therefore, that an adequate knowledge of one's
real personality consists of an intimate union or his actual and
his ideal personality. Without the significant whole whicn the
ideal personality adds to the actual or momentary personality, the
latter would be of only passing worth; without the immediacy and
the firmness of the. actual personality, the ideal personality would
be either altogether impossible, or a system of abstractions . It
is obvious, therefore, that the actual and ideal phases must De
unified before we attain a full knowledge of our real selves.
One's actual or momentary activity, therefore, plays an im-
portant and fundamental part as one phase of self-Knowledge. It
is an immediate experience in the sense that its basic .function,
which the subject will not give up, is to achieve an end,—although
that end may be an object of knowledge in some other activity,
—
and not to know itself. In other words, it is immediate only in
the sense that the acting subject does not know about himself as
he acts, as an object of his present agency, altaough he ever ex-
periences himself acting. The active subject, then, never becomes
an object of its own knowing, save as a concept; but he acts and
lives, and having lived, he may assert that he has done so; and out
of his multitudinous activities and purposes construct a compre-
hensive idea of himself which greatly enriches the meaning of his
immediate experiences.
The achieving of an end ia a living and immediate experience,
but not wholly so, for the consciousness of the end and of the
stages in its attainment, as well as of the enviroximent, may intro-
duce a measure of mediate or presentati^e knowled toe . In the mo-
ment of achievement I can always say that I immediately experience
myself acting, or that I act, or that I feel. The fact that I now
act in a purposive and intelligent way is my peraonality, whether
or not I add to thi8 actual personality a philosophic conception
of it.
Hence, it is out of my personal activity-cycles tnat I con-
struct, by new acts, a conception oj. myself as I was and aa I ex-
pect to be. Thia total conception containa some measure of inter-
nal order, and givea my preaent conscious act a peculiar stauility,
wiiica stands in strong contrast to those impulsive deeds of a
primitive or undeveloped man which are not determined oy having a
conscious place in a comprehensive grasp of hia own total tire.
In the development of our argument the intelligent phaae of per-
sonality has grown to one of primary importance. The extent to
waich each person becomes an intelligible part or tne world in
which he acta will be less undetermined oo i'ar as thi8 investiga-
tion goes. But the great importance of conception, of the intel-
lective factors in peraonaiity, increases in proportion ae our
knowledge of our interests and purpoaea more and .uore determines
our modea of acting. By meana of our rational activities, we de-
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velop a self-regarding sentiment which becomes a powerful influ-
ence upon all that we do.
f 4. The final There are many degrees of explicitnes3 with which different
intuition or persons consciously recognize a system of ends, interests, or de-
personality., sires as their own. In the moat highly developed stages of self-
consciousness or self-knowledge one may be clearly aware, in the
course of reflection or deliberation, of the main groups of pur-
poses which dominate his life and according to which he directs
his conduct. The highest moment of self-knowledge comes when one
self-consciously owns such a conceptual, purposive system, and
recognizes himself as the real abiding actor, the real desirer,
who gives to the system such unity, value, and realization as it
may possess; and in that moment, too, comprenends his momentary
activity as an integral phase of a unique developing whole, called
his ideal personality, which is rooted and grounded in the actual
and living deed. This act of self-recognition or self-identifica-
tion, where my ideal and actual selves blend in a whole which con-
stitutes my real personality, is a kind of intuitive insight or
comprehension in which I behold the whole meaning of my existence
so far as that is possible at a single glance of finite intelli-
gence.
K. COiiCLUDIiiG REMARKS.
1 . Some
general results
of the above
inves tiRation
.
a. Classi-
fication of
theories of
personality
.
b. Importance
Of studying
method in con-
nection with a
Mtayhyaics of
personality
.
In the preceding examination of self-consciousness and self-
knowledge the concept of activity again has provided a suggestive
and profitable point of view. Indeed, that idea has been the uni-
fying principle of the third cons tructive and systematic part of
thi6 investigation. Some of its general results and the relation
of the theories of personality presented in it to the classifica-
tion of the first part and to the views of American thinkers of
the second part need finally to be outlined.
In the first part of the inquiry the chief types of person-
ality-theory were classified according to the principle of im-
manence in experience. Representative views were arranged accord-
ing to whether or not in them personality was regarded as immanent
in or transcending experience, or both. One result was trie demon-
stration of the great variety of opinions that are held concern-
ing the nature of personality.
A more significant result emerging from this classification
was the cle&r indication of the importance of considering the pro-
blem of method in connection with a metaphysics of personality
,
and this question has been one of constant concern in the develop-
ment of the argument. Three American thinkers were reviewed and
criticized primarily from the point or view of the philosophic
methods employed, and serious defects were found, especially in
the theory of R. B. Perry, but also in that of Wia. James. At the
beginning of the positive argument some of the general require-
ments and characteristics of a proper per sonaliB tic method were
noted. The rest of the third part consisted of an endeavor to
apply this method in determining the nature of personality from
the point of view of concrete human activity, and that part was
concluded, as it was begun, by a discussion of ttie problem of
self-knowledge. In a word, in the investigation as u whole
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c. System^
atic history
of three Ameri-
can theories of
personality
.
d. A system-
atic study, of
personality,
unified by
the concept
of activity.
e. Presenta-
tion of a
theory of
activity.
f. Person-
alistic dia-
lectic.
g. Criteria
of the real
as deduced
from the per-
sonal act.
2. The result
ing theory of
peroonality in
relation to
strong emphasis has been put Upon the importance of studying method
as a condition for the understanding of personality, and it repre-
sents one illustrative attempt to define and apply a personalistic
method.
In the second part of the investigation a systematic and
relatively complete history of three American theories of person-
ality was presented. The views of I. Jaiaes, R. b. Perry, and B. P.
Bowne were selected because each represented well a general and
characteristic metaphysical standpoint. One result of this review
was the confirmation of the importance of personalis tic methodology,
and another was the discovery that activity, in some sense, is a
fundamental factor in the concept of personality. A very general
deficiency, however, in the determination of the meaning of activ-
ity became evident.
The idea of activity was adopted, with a full statement of
the reasons for doing so, as the unifying principle in the whole
constructive exposition of the third part of the investigation.
The latter represents an endeavor to set forth systematically a
comprehensive theory of personality from the point of view of the
experience of activity. The idea of activity proved to be a
valuable principle or standpoint for uotn the organization and
the interpretation of the important phases of personality, es-
pecially or its purposiveness, rationality, unity, individuality,
identity, and self-consciousness. An endeavor was made to clarify
the nature of tae unity of personality by distinguishing and
describing at least five meanings of that term, and also several
ways in which personality might be said to be permanent were
pointed out.
The largest chapter of the investigation dealt with the rela-
tion of activity to personality, and incidentally a theory of
activity was worked out in an effort to meet the contemporary
need of a more definite and thorough explication of that concept.
From a strictly concrete point of view, the implications or the
conditions of activity were explained. Special emphasis was
laid upon the necessary place in activity of purposes of several
kinds
.
As a result of the study of these implications, we were
able to express the inner development of a typical and complete
personal act in the form of a personalistic movement or dialectic
of the form: pur^^se, realization or activity, and memory—all
grounded in the agent. Actual personal life consists in such
cycles, possessing many varied degrees of completeness and in-
dividuality
.
Reasons were presented for supposing that personal activity
might be taken as a genuine sample of reality. Upon the busis of
this supposition, the criteria of the real were deduced from the
completed analysis of the personal act. The presence of value
was included as one of these marks.
The total view of personality resulting from the above in-
- vestigation is based upon a conception of experience which stands
in contrast to James 1 doctrine of pure experience, but agrees
with his statement when he describes consciousness as personal and
finds the " fons et oriKQ " of reality in personal experience.

?6C
We have defended the opinion that, the idea or pure experience,
when treated otherwise than as an abstraction, does violence to
the personal character of the activity-experiences of adult human
beings j these are not neutral, but presuppose an immanent and con-
scious agent or subject.
The theory presented, however, being fundamentally activistic,
appears to be thoroughly harmonious with the pragmatic attitude
and presuppositions. The factors of purpose and value which are
fundamental fit in well with the pragmatic method and its emphasis
upon conative satisfactions in the verification of ideas
.
The several phases of the empirical self of which James made
so much have been fully incorporated in the aoove interpretation
of personality, but the point has been added that this empirical
self, so far as it is phenomenal, requires for its existence an
active subject who owns or grounds it. <»e have learned from James
the importance of studying experiences in the concrete, and agree
with him and Bowne in rejecting the ol(Ld octrine of soul-substance.
As James stresses knowledge of acquaintance or immediate experience
in connection with the apprehension of dynamic reality, so we have
included intuition as one phase of our personalistic method.
The constructive theory of personality presented stands in
opposition to every endeavor, such as that of Perry, to explain
the self or personal activity as a complex of simpler elements or
parts, or to reach the truth about personality by the exclusive
use of the analytical method. The unity of the personal act has
been insisted upon repeatedly. The difficulties of attaining a
thoroughly behavioristic account of activity have seemed to be
insurmountable, and while we agree with Perry that purpose is es-
sential in human acting, unlike him, we feel the necessity and
value of a free use of the method of introspection and of the
development of the principles of personality from within.
The conception of personality offered above stands in closest
connection with Bowne' s theory. It has consisted primarily of a
development of the idea of activity which he made fundamental in
his conception but which he did not treat adequately. We have
indicated how the agent in personal activity is identical or
abiding, while the empirical self which any agent owns may undergo
development, and in this way we have reconciled the ideas of change
and identity within the totality of the personal life. In the ex-
position of Bowne 1 3 view the harmonious relation of these concepts
did not always clearly appear. We have laid a little less emphasis
than bowne upon the rational phases of personality, and greater
stress upon the significance of value in personal activity. There
are many other similarities oetween the two views, especially with
respect to the factors of self-consciousness and the reality of
personality.
The theory of personality resulting from the above investiga-
tion belongs in the class of immanent theories of the oujectivis tic-
subjectivistic species, (1) where personalistic theories of the
self in general belong. The study of the agent and of dispositions,
as well as of self-knowledge, led to the rejection of uny tranacen-
(1) See above, page 8.
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dent element in personality. Personality is always a natter of
experience, and even the active subject which grounds personal
experience enters integrally into or is immanent in the latter.
The inclusion in the total personality of what has been defined
as the empirical self introduces a factor that is objective in
the sense that the complete person is constituted of certain
psychical facts which can be distinguished from the subject.
The investigation has shown the difficulty and fallacy of
explaining and classifying personality exclusively in terms of
intellect, feeling, or will. The general r.-ason for this con-
clusion is that each of the psychical processes referred to enters
into the constitution of every complete personal act.
It has been impossible also to explain the full meaning of
personality irxj,erms of the subject, considered, for example, as
the pure or epistemological ego, for that concept is too empty to
account for the empirical richness of personal experience. Per-
sonality, rather, has been found to consist in concrete acts in-
volving at once an active subject and an empirical self as above
described; both of the latter are abstractions, however, apart
from the actual wholeness or individuality of personal acts.
The marvelous wealth of personal experience explains in
part the great variety of theories of personality which have been
put forward. The bibliography which follows confirms the fact
of this variety, which was made manifest in the classification
of the first part, and also demonstrates the widespread interest,
in contemporary thought, in determining the nature of personality.
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BIOLOGICAL PHASES OF PERSONALITY.
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8. History of Personality, continued.
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in the interpretation of reality, knowledge, etc.)
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11. Personalism, continued.
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15. RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY.
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15. Religious and Theological Aspects of Personality, continued.
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